An objection to William Lane Craig's moral argument

[Jichard]

Nonsense, I'm asking you why isn't it just as morally good to promote the well-being of my sentient life at the expense of, or to the detriment of, other sentient life? If doing that promotes my well being and the survival of me, my family or tribe why is it morally wrong.

Because it harms the well-being of sentient life. If you don't understand why that's wrong, then enjoy your psychopathy. I suggest you read the OP, and familiarize yourself with the most obvious examples of things that are primae facie morally wrong. Because your ethical egoism does not account for those.

Certainly our survival is a moral good.

Your special pleading is ridiculous, and so blatantly obvious. You're willing to acknowledge that personal survival is a moral good, but you won't acknowledge that the welfare of other sentient life is a moral good. Thus you're exactly what you denied being: you're an ethical egoist, completely unable to understand why it's morally good to care about other's (unless it benefits you).

Of course it is, the survival of my kin at the expense of others if necessary is a moral good, and just as much a brute moral fact as anything you can invent.

You haven't shown that, and I doubt you ever could. But go ahead, and show I'm wrong, using the methodology discussed in the OP. I won't hold my breath.

I mean you are the one who brought up that whole brute moral fact thing.

What I brought up was an objection to William Lane Craig's moral argument. As opposed to addressing that objection, you did what you normally do: went off-topic and started making absurd claims.

[seer]

Because it harms the well-being of sentient life. If you don't understand why that's wrong, then enjoy your psychopathy. I suggest you read the OP, and familiarize yourself with the most obvious examples of things that are primae facie morally wrong. Because your ethical egoism does not account for those.

Really Jichard is that all you got? An emotional rant and name calling? Look at the last century how many millions were killed by the followers of Mao, Pol Pot or Stalin - did they just all happen to be psychopaths? Human history is replete with man killing man for their own selfish ends. And it is all perfectly natural. It is our nature.

Your special pleading is ridiculous, and so blatantly obvious. You're willing to acknowledge that personal survival is a moral good, but you won't acknowledge that the welfare of other sentient life is a moral good. Thus you're exactly what you denied being: you're an ethical egoist, completely unable to understand why it's morally good to care about other's (unless it benefits you).

Listen Homer, I'm not claiming that I personally act that way, but men do, and have for all of history - in great numbers. And the fact is, even if I agree with you, our opinion is subjective, and no more objectively valid or correct than those who hold a different opinion. How could it be?

What I brought up was an objection to William Lane Craig's moral argument. As opposed to addressing that objection, you did what you normally do: went off-topic and started making absurd claims.

But your objection i.e. appealing to a brute moral fact is just silly. It is an invention and no more valid than one claiming that it is a moral good to fend for his family at the expense of others.

[seer]

Nowhere does that support your made up claim that "we are insignificant creatures on an insignificant planet in a purposeless universe,", for a number of reasons.

OK, so the universe has purpose? How? What is it? How are we objectively significant creatures?

I don't know what you mean by this notion of "inherent purpose". I suspect what you want to say is that you can have inherent purpose, only if a creator made you. But that's silly. That would not be "inherent purpose", since the purpose isn't inherent in me. Instead, it would be inherent in the creator's intentions for me. So you wouldn't have accounted for "inherent purpose". And there's no reason to think that I need to have a creator to have a purpose. For example, I can assign purposes for myself, based on what I'm good at and enjoy doing (where I limit myself only to actions that are not morally wrong). I don't need to rely on the intentions of some creator in order to find purpose

Yes and that purpose would be subjective like I said. And as meaningless as we as a species are.

[Jichard]

OK, so the universe has purpose? How? What is it? How are we objectively significant creatures?

You still haven't supported your fabricated claim. You asking me questions does not support your fabricated claim. Misrepresenting Dawkins does not support your fabricated claims.

Yes and that purpose would be subjective like I said.

You once again misapply the term "subjective", even though I pointed this out in the previous post. Please stop. It's getting tedious.

Please let me know when you know what "subjective" means in this context.

And as meaningless as we as a species are.

Another fabricated claim you can't support

[seer]

You still haven't supported your fabricated claim. You asking me questions does not support your fabricated claim. Misrepresenting Dawkins does not support your fabricated claims.

I did not misrepresent Dawkins, he clearly said that the universe had no purpose. And I take it you can't explain why we are objectively significant creatures. That is understandable.

You once again misapply the term "subjective", even though I pointed this out in the previous post. Please stop. It's getting tedious.

Please let me know when you know what "subjective" means in this context.

Dependent on personal opinion, or tastes, not objective. You said: I can assign purposes for myself, based on what I'm good at and enjoy doing (where I limit myself only to actions that are not morally wrong)

How is that not subjective?

Another fabricated claim you can't support

Well if you can show how we are meaningful in any objective way - I'm all ears.

[Jichard]

Really Jichard is that all you got? An emotional rant and name calling?

What "emotional rant"? I'm just pointing out that your inability to understand why the suffering of other people matters, is a sign of psychopathy.

Look at the last century how many millions were killed by the followers of Mao, Pol Pot or Stalin - did they just all happen to be psychopaths?

Irrelevant, since (unlike you), Mao, Pol Pot, and Stalin cared about the lives of other people. The fact that their actions led to the deaths of some people, does not show that they only cared about themselves, anymore than Truman's actions against Nagasaki showed that Truman only cared about himself.

Human history is replete with man killing man for their own selfish ends. And it is all perfectly natural. It is our nature.

Again, irrelevant. People also often sacrifice themselves to help other people. Pointing out that people do stuff, does nothing to support your confused notion that only one's personal well-being matters. That would be as silly as saying that since people once thought the earth was flat, then that means the earth was flat. Just because people act in immoral ways, does not mean there's some question about whether their acts were immoral.

Listen Homer, I'm not claiming that I personally act that way, but men do, and have for all of history - in great numbers.

Again, so what?

And the fact is, even if I agree with you, our opinion is subjective, and no more objectively valid or correct than those who hold a different opinion. How could it be?

First, you're misusing the term "subjective" again, as explained to you before:
http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/sh...545#post200545


Second, please be honest. Your lie involves you continuing to pretend that people have no explained to you how moral claims can be objectively true, without God. This has be explained to you, but you always disingenuously pretend it hasn't.

Once again:

"So, what is moral realism about? It's about what sort of thing makes moral beliefs, moral statements, etc. true or false or false. That's what meant by "moral facts"; not "moral truths", but the truth-makers for moral claims. To take a non-moral example: scientific realists can point to things like "cats", as being the sort of things that make scientific claims like "cats exist" true. You'd have to be deeply confused to treat that as meaning the same thing as "the truth that cats exist must exist apart from minds". Similarly, the moral realist can point to things like character traits (as per virtue ethics), effects of welfare (as per welfare utilitarianism), etc. as being the sort of things that make moral claims true or false. You've already been given examples of such positions:

(http://www.ucs.mun.ca/~alatus/phil12...ctivism.html):

2. Moral Objectivism: The view that what is right or wrong doesn’t depend on what anyone thinks is right or wrong. That is, the view that the 'moral facts' are like 'physical' facts in that what the facts are does not depend on what anyone thinks they are. Objectivist theories tend to come in two sorts:
(i) Duty Based Theories (or Deontological Theories): Theories that claim that what determines whether an act is morally right or wrong is the kind of act it is.

E.g., Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) thought that all acts should be judged according to a rule he called the Categorical Imperative: "Act only according to that maxim [i.e., rule] whereby you can at the same time will that it become a universal law." That is, he thought the only kind of act one should ever commit is one that could be willed to be a universal law.

(ii) Consequentialist Theories (or Teleological Theories): Theories that claim that what determines whether an act is right or wrong are its consequences.

Utilitarianism is the best known sort of Consequentialism. Its best known defender is John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Essentially, utilitarianism tells us that, in any situation, the right thing to do is whatever is likely to produce the most happiness overall. (The wrong thing to do is anything else.)"

But your objection i.e. appealing to a brute moral fact is just silly.

You're misrepresenting people again. I never claimed that "appealing to a brute moral fact is just silly". You made that up. In fact, in the OP I made it clear that appealing to brute moral facts is necessary for any moral position on which moral facts exist, but there is no infinite regress of fact.

Now, the actual objection I gave in the OP, can be summarized as follows:

Craig objects to non-theistic moral realism by saying that non-theistic realism appeals to brute moral facts, and that one should not appeal to brute moral facts. However, Craig's own position involves an appeal to brute moral facts. So Craig's position is self-contradictory and Craig is engaged in special pleading.

It is an invention and no more valid than one claiming that it is a moral good to fend for his family at the expense of others.

I doubt that you even know whether it's a "invention", since I don't think you even know what it is and you've shown you can't even fairly represent what the OP says about it.

[seer]

What "emotional rant"? I'm just pointing out that your inability to understand why the suffering of other people matters, is a sign of psychopathy.



Irrelevant, since (unlike you), Mao, Pol Pot, and Stalin cared about the lives of other people. The fact that their actions led to the deaths of some people, does not show that they only cared about themselves, anymore than Truman's actions against Nagasaki showed that Truman only cared about himself.

No they care about a crewing power. I mean really are you going to justify their actions?

Again, irrelevant. People also often sacrifice themselves to help other people. Pointing out that people do stuff, does nothing to support you confused notion that only one's personal well-being matters. That would be as silly as saying that since people once thought the earth was flat, then that means the earth was flat. Just because people act in immoral ways, does not mean there's some question about whether their acts were immoral.

Of course it is. I'm sure Mao, Pol Pot, and Stalin thought they were doing good, at least good for their power base. And your opinion is no more valid than theirs, nor can it be.

You're misrepresenting people again. I never claimed that "appealing to a brute moral fact is just silly". You made that up. In fact, in the OP I made it clear that appealing to brute moral facts is necessary for any moral position on which moral facts exist, but there is no infinite regress of fact.

No Homer, I said it was silly. Can't you read?

Now, the actual objection I gave in the OP, can be summarized as follows:

Craig objects to non-theistic moral realism by saying that non-theistic realism appeals to brute moral facts, and that one should not appeal to brute moral facts. However, Craig's own position involves an appeal to brute moral facts. So Craig's position is self-contradictory and Craig is engaged in special pleading.

Yes, and my point is that stopping where you did is arbitrary... And without merit. Why not stop at the individual? Or society?

I doubt that you even know whether it's a "invention", since I don't think you even know what it is and you've shown you can't even fairly represent what the OP says about it.

No, that is exactly what it is, invention - you make up a nice sounding moral principle and say, we will stop there.

[Jichard]

No they care about a crewing power.

Once again, Mao, Pol Pot, and Stalin cared about the lives of other people. That is compatible with them also wanting power. You do realize that people can desire multiple things, right?

I mean really are you going to justify their actions?

No, I'm not. So stop dishonestly implying that I am. I'm simply pointing out to you that Mao, Pol pot, and Stalin cared about the lives of people other than themselves. Unfortunately, I don't know if the same can be said of you

Of course it is. I'm sure Mao, Pol Pot, and Stalin thought they were doing good, at least good for their power base. And your opinion is no more valid than theirs, nor can it be.

You know you can't that claim you just made up. I even listed for you moral objectivist positions that rebut what you just said. But you're such a willfully dishonest person, that you'll never address them. You instead just cut them out every time you see them, so you can pretend they don't exist. That's really sad, seer. And really quite dishonest.

Once again:

"So, what is moral realism about? It's about what sort of thing makes moral beliefs, moral statements, etc. true or false or false. That's what meant by "moral facts"; not "moral truths", but the truth-makers for moral claims. To take a non-moral example: scientific realists can point to things like "cats", as being the sort of things that make scientific claims like "cats exist" true. You'd have to be deeply confused to treat that as meaning the same thing as "the truth that cats exist must exist apart from minds". Similarly, the moral realist can point to things like character traits (as per virtue ethics), effects of welfare (as per welfare utilitarianism), etc. as being the sort of things that make moral claims true or false. You've already been given examples of such positions:

(http://www.ucs.mun.ca/~alatus/phil12...ctivism.html):

2. Moral Objectivism: The view that what is right or wrong doesn’t depend on what anyone thinks is right or wrong. That is, the view that the 'moral facts' are like 'physical' facts in that what the facts are does not depend on what anyone thinks they are. Objectivist theories tend to come in two sorts:
(i) Duty Based Theories (or Deontological Theories): Theories that claim that what determines whether an act is morally right or wrong is the kind of act it is.

E.g., Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) thought that all acts should be judged according to a rule he called the Categorical Imperative: "Act only according to that maxim [i.e., rule] whereby you can at the same time will that it become a universal law." That is, he thought the only kind of act one should ever commit is one that could be willed to be a universal law.

(ii) Consequentialist Theories (or Teleological Theories): Theories that claim that what determines whether an act is right or wrong are its consequences.

Utilitarianism is the best known sort of Consequentialism. Its best known defender is John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Essentially, utilitarianism tells us that, in any situation, the right thing to do is whatever is likely to produce the most happiness overall. (The wrong thing to do is anything else.)"

No Homer, I said it was silly. Can't you read?

No, dishonest person, this is what you said:

"But your objection i.e. appealing to a brute moral fact is just silly."

Yes, and my point is that stopping where you did is arbitrary... And without merit.

What you wrote does absolutely nothing to address what I wrote, seer. Feel free to address it this time:

Now, the actual objection I gave in the OP, can be summarized as follows:

Craig objects to non-theistic moral realism by saying that non-theistic realism appeals to brute moral facts, and that one should not appeal to brute moral facts. However, Craig's own position involves an appeal to brute moral facts. So Craig's position is self-contradictory and Craig is engaged in special pleading.

By the way, you haven't shown that there's anything arbitrary here. All you've shown is that you really don't think the well-being of anyone (other than you) matters.

Why not stop at the individual? Or society?

Already deal with this on the other thread: http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/sh...181#post236181

You seem think that the issue is who is making the claim? Hence you're thinking that the issue is about "Why not stop at the individual? Or society?". You're wrong, since the issue is not who is making the claim? You seem to live in this weird world where the truth or falsity of objectively true or false claims, depends on who makes the claim. This is silly. It's like saying that the truth or falsity of the statement "evolution happens", depends on whether it's a statement made by a society or an individual. This is the sort of subjectivism you accept. Please stop being a subjectivist seer.

No, that is exactly what it is, invention - you make up a nice sounding moral principle and say, we will stop there.

Again, that does nothing to address the argument from the OP. Try again:

Now, the actual objection I gave in the OP, can be summarized as follows:

Craig objects to non-theistic moral realism by saying that non-theistic realism appeals to brute moral facts, and that one should not appeal to brute moral facts. However, Craig's own position involves an appeal to brute moral facts. So Craig's position is self-contradictory and Craig is engaged in special pleading.

[seer]

Craig objects to non-theistic moral realism by saying that non-theistic realism appeals to brute moral facts, and that one should not appeal to brute moral facts. However, Craig's own position involves an appeal to brute moral facts. So Craig's position is self-contradictory and Craig is engaged in special pleading.

OK, I'll bite - where does Craig appeal to brute moral facts?

[seer]

And again:

I did not misrepresent Dawkins, he clearly said that the universe had no purpose. And I take it you can't explain why we are objectively significant creatures. That is understandable.

You said: I can assign purposes for myself, based on what I'm good at and enjoy doing (where I limit myself only to actions that are not morally wrong)

How is that not subjective?

[Jichard]

And again:

I did not misrepresent Dawkins, he clearly said that the universe had no purpose.

I already explained how you misrepresented him, much as you misrepresent the other sources you cite.

And I take it you can't explain why we are objectively significant creatures.

Again, I don't think you know what "objectively" means here, nor was significant means here. If you did, then you'd know that if moral objectivism were true, then humans (and many other organism) can have objective moral significance. Of course, you don't think moral objectivism is true, since you're a moral subjectivist who doesn't think anything is objectively morally wrong (including the Holocaust, genocide, murder, rape, etc.).

There is no good reason to think that objective moral facts actually exist, or that if they did that they would have any authority, or in any sense be preferable to theistic moral law.

And, of course, you ignore anything that shows you're wrong, such as:

Once again:

"So, what is moral realism about? It's about what sort of thing makes moral beliefs, moral statements, etc. true or false or false. That's what meant by "moral facts"; not "moral truths", but the truth-makers for moral claims. To take a non-moral example: scientific realists can point to things like "cats", as being the sort of things that make scientific claims like "cats exist" true. You'd have to be deeply confused to treat that as meaning the same thing as "the truth that cats exist must exist apart from minds". Similarly, the moral realist can point to things like character traits (as per virtue ethics), effects of welfare (as per welfare utilitarianism), etc. as being the sort of things that make moral claims true or false. You've already been given examples of such positions:

(http://www.ucs.mun.ca/~alatus/phil12...ctivism.html):

2. Moral Objectivism: The view that what is right or wrong doesn’t depend on what anyone thinks is right or wrong. That is, the view that the 'moral facts' are like 'physical' facts in that what the facts are does not depend on what anyone thinks they are. Objectivist theories tend to come in two sorts:
(i) Duty Based Theories (or Deontological Theories): Theories that claim that what determines whether an act is morally right or wrong is the kind of act it is.

E.g., Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) thought that all acts should be judged according to a rule he called the Categorical Imperative: "Act only according to that maxim [i.e., rule] whereby you can at the same time will that it become a universal law." That is, he thought the only kind of act one should ever commit is one that could be willed to be a universal law.

(ii) Consequentialist Theories (or Teleological Theories): Theories that claim that what determines whether an act is right or wrong are its consequences.

Utilitarianism is the best known sort of Consequentialism. Its best known defender is John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Essentially, utilitarianism tells us that, in any situation, the right thing to do is whatever is likely to produce the most happiness overall. (The wrong thing to do is anything else.)"

Ok, so what are these reasons then? Let's say, a person wants to assassinate somebody in my country.

I stated them already:

And moral reasons are constituted by the properties/features discussed in welfare utilitarianism (ex: effects of well-being) and virtue ethics (ex: character traits like compassion).

In my country, most murderers get away with murder. The people who murdered Dana Seetahal got away. Most people agree it was an assassination i.e. somebody got paid. My question is: Was it morally wrong for the killer(s) to assassinate her? If it wasn't, why wasn't it?

I would need to know the details of the situation, so that I could know what level of harm resulted from the assassination, what other available options the assassins had, and so on. In ethics, much as in science, details often matter, even if one can make help rules-of-thumb or general statements that apply in most situations one would encounter.

For example: a general statement / rule-of-thumb that would apply here is that "assassinations are morally wrong because they harm the person being assassinated". Is that always true? No, just as the statement "if something is a four-legged, barking mammal, then it's a dog". But it is a decent place to start and begin filling in further details. For example, was the assassination the only viable way to prevent Seetahal from slaughtering numerous other people? So feel free to provide the relevant details.

Yes I agree that you, and other moral realists, believe that your theory accounts for objective moral truths. The question I have been asking is how are these moral facts actually objective.

Because they're features of the world that don't depend on mind-dependent views. You've been told this before.

That is understandable.

You mean you understand your misrepresentation of me?

You said: I can assign purposes for myself, based on what I'm good at and enjoy doing (where I limit myself only to actions that are not morally wrong)

How is that not subjective?

Please your quote-mining, especially when you don't bother to link to the original source, so that you can make it harder for people to correct your misrepresentations.

Here's what I actually wrote:

"I don't know what you mean by this notion of "inherent purpose". I suspect what you want to say is that you can have inherent purpose, only if a creator made you. But that's silly. That would not be "inherent purpose", since the purpose isn't inherent in me. Instead, it would be inherent in the creator's intentions for me. So you wouldn't have accounted for "inherent purpose". And there's no reason to think that I need to have a creator to have a purpose. For example, I can assign purposes for myself, based on what I'm good at and enjoy doing (where I limit myself only to actions that are not morally wrong). I don't need to rely on the intentions of some creator in order to find purpose."

When one reads what you quote-mined in context, one can see that my point was not to provide some account of non-subjective purpose Instead, my point was to explain to you that one does not need a creator in order to have a purpose. Yet instead of addressing that point, you quote-mined what I said, failed to link to the original context, and then pretended that my point was meant to show some non-subjective purpose. Was that an honest thing for you to do, seer?

In any event, you have no objective account of purpose, seer. Instead, you have a subjectivist account where purpose is whatever God says, intends, and so on. That's not objective, since that's just an expression of God's attitudes, opinions, and so on. And that's what I would expect you to think. After all, I have no more reason to think you accept that there's objective significance, than I have for thinking you accept that there are objective moral facts.

[Jichard]

OK, I'll bite - where does Craig appeal to brute moral facts?

You just showed that you still haven't read the OP, even though you've been responding on this thread. After all, I already answered your question in the OP:

Now, here's where William Lane Craig makes his objection: he claims that atheists cannot appeal to brute moral facts. Instead, atheists are required to provide a further explanation for moral facts, by appealing to something else. But as Erik Wielenberg notes, this is special pleading on Craig's part, since Craig himself appeals to brute moral facts. He would have to appeal to such brute facts, unless he wanted to fall into the trap of the infinite pattern I discussed above, where versions of question 1 pop up over and over and... So there's an inconsistency in Craig's defense of his moral argument: he appeals to brute moral facts, yet says that one cannot appeal to brute moral facts.

[...]


Here's Wielenberg's presentation of his objection:

"An Inconsistency in Craig's Defence of the Moral Argument"
http://dpuadweb.depauw.edu/ewielenbe...WIELENBERG.pdf

"I* argue that William Craig’s defence of the moral argument is internally inconsistent. In the course of defending the moral argument, Craig criticizes non-theistic moral realism on the grounds that it posits the existence of certain logically necessary connections but fails to provide an adequate account of why such connections hold. Another component of Craig’s defence of the moral argument is an endorsement of a*particular version of the divine command theory (DCT). Craig’s version of DCT posits certain logically necessary connections but Craig fails to provide an adequate account of why these connections hold. Thus, Craig’s critique of non-theistic moral realism is at odds with his DCT. Since the critique and DCT are both essential elements of his defence of the moral argument, that defence is internally inconsistent."

I even gave you a source that also answered the question. For example, on page 68 of the aformentioned paper:

"An Inconsistency in Craig's Defence of the Moral Argument"
http://dpuadweb.depauw.edu/ewielenbe...WIELENBERG.pdf

"Craig often characterizes non-theistic moral realism as a*‘shopping list approach’, by which he means (at least in part) that it entails the existence of ungrounded objective moral truths. Wielenberg argues that ‘both parties to the debate [Craig and non-theistic moral realists] are stuck with a*“shopping list” approach; the only difference between them is the content of their respective lists’ (2009: 38-9). Similarly, Morriston claims that ‘[n]o*matter what story you tell about the ontological ground of moral value, you must at some point come to your own full stop’ (2012: 29).2 Craig sometimes concedes this point. For example, commenting on his and Sinnott-Armstrong’s different explanations for the wrongness of rape, Craig observes that ‘the difference between the theist and Sinnott-Armstrong is not that one has an explanatory ultimate and the other does not. It is rather that the theist has a different explanatory ultimate’ (Garcia and King 2009: 173) (68)"

So, seer, can you please explain why you didn't read the OP, even though you've commented on the OP multiple times and even started a thread in response to the OP?
I ask because I don't see the point in your commenting on this topic, if you're not even willing to understand the topic by reading the OP. Should I ask you to leave the thread, as you did to shuny, since you don't seem to even bother to read the OP before commenting?

Shuny, I said please - now please leave my thread. Thank you...

[Jichard]

I don't understand, why isn't it just as morally good to promote the well-being of my sentient life at the expense of, or to the detriment of, other sentient life? That seems to be a pretty common occurrence in human history. Isn't that also a brute moral fact?

It's funny what you admit when you decide to stop pretending that the harm of other other people doesn't matter...

Surely, the NT does not contain specifics regarding every possible moral question that may arise. In the case of a moral question that is not dealt with in the NT, how do you determine right and wrong?

Right, in that case I would look at immediate harm, actually physical harm. The problem is we we can not know the long term consequences of our acts - even our good acts.

[Jichard]

Nonsense, I'm asking you why isn't it just as morally good to promote the well-being of my sentient life at the expense of, or to the detriment of, other sentient life? If doing that promotes my well being and the survival of me, my family or tribe why is it morally wrong. Certainly our survival is a moral good.

But even here, there is no objective reason why our survival as a species would be a moral good.

Liars lie, and in so doing, often contradict themselves. It's what they do.