An objection to William Lane Craig's moral argument

[Jichard]

Yes, I saw what you wrote. None of that refutes that fact that Craig quite clearly identifies God as one who is innately good and is characterized by his omnibenevolence. So to say that he does not say what he quite plainly does say, and then throw in a few paragraphs why you think he does not say what he clearly says, is still wrong.

No ,you didn't actually read what I wrote at all. Either that, or you didn't understand it before responding Here's an easy way to show that.

In the following, what did I say that Craig did not say?:

"It's the whole might makes right mentality, where moral truths hold in virtue of a powerful, divine enforcer's say-so. Now Craig can claim that divine enforce[r] is just, merciful, compassionate, etc. But that's irrelevant to his position. If it were relevant, then he'd just say that moral truths hold in virtue of what is merciful, just, compassionate, etc., without need of an appeal to a divine enforcer. But Craig doesn't say that, since he wants to carve out a place for his enforcer to determine moral truths."

The answer is:

"moral truths hold in virtue of what is merciful, just, compassionate, etc., without need of an appeal to a divine enforcer."

And yet you claim that Craig said that:

It's the whole might makes right mentality, where moral truths hold in virtue of a powerful, divine enforcer's say-so. Now Craig can claim that divine enforce is just, merciful, compassionate, etc. But that's irrelevant to his position. If it were relevant, then he'd just say that moral truths hold in virtue of what is merciful, just, compassionate, etc., without need of an appeal to a divine enforcer. But Craig doesn't say that, since he wants to carve out a place for his enforcer to determine moral truths.

Well he does if he says that God is innately good, and that he's characterized by his omnibenevolence.

So feel free to show where claimed that moral truths hold in virtue of what is merciful, just, compassionate, etc., without need of an appeal to a divine enforcer.

I'll wait.

[Adrift]

No ,you didn't actually read what I wrote at all. Either that, or you didn't understand it before responding Here's an easy way to show that.

In the following, what did I say that Craig did not say?:

"It's the whole might makes right mentality, where moral truths hold in virtue of a powerful, divine enforcer's say-so. Now Craig can claim that divine enforce[r] is just, merciful, compassionate, etc. But that's irrelevant to his position. If it were relevant, then he'd just say that moral truths hold in virtue of what is merciful, just, compassionate, etc., without need of an appeal to a divine enforcer. But Craig doesn't say that, since he wants to carve out a place for his enforcer to determine moral truths."

The answer is:

"moral truths hold in virtue of what is merciful, just, compassionate, etc., without need of an appeal to a divine enforcer."

And yet you claim that Craig said that:



So feel free to show where claimed that moral truths hold in virtue of what is merciful, just, compassionate, etc., without need of an appeal to a divine enforcer.

I'll wait.

Are you at all familiar with Craig's split of the Euthyphro Dilemma? Craig does not merely assert that God recognizes the good, or that God arbitrarily enforces the good, but that God IS the good.

[Jichard]

I don't think so. As Paul Copan and Matt Flannagan point out when dealing with Wielenberg's arguments,

I tend not to trust Copan, due to the poor quality of his arguments. I tend to take a dim view of those who defend genocide.

Source: Did God Command Genocide: Paul Copan, Matt Flannagan, Baker Books

Craig's divine command theory is that moral obligations are identified with the commands of God, where God is defined as the greatest conceivable being, a being worthy of worship. And when Craig states that our moral obligations are identified with the commands of God (he is using the word God as a title), they are identified with the commands of whoever is worthy of worship or the greatest conceivable being. So if, in these impossible situations proposed by Wielenberg, a personal being does not hold this title of maximally great being, then the divine command theory does not identify that personal being's commands with our obligations.

© Copyright Original Source

Actually, no. On the particularist position Craig borrows from Alston, God is taken to be the standard of moral perfection, without taking into account any of God's other traits, including omnibenevolence. So, on this position, even if God turned out to be a murderous psychopath, then God would turn out to be the standard of moral perfection. If Craig said otherwise and instead made appeal to the properties sufficient for omnibenevolence (call these properties "P") in explaining why God was morally good, then God's would not be required for of moral goodness; P would suffice for the existence of moral goodness, regardless of whether or not God existed. And at that point, Craig wouldn't be a particularist anymore. Koons explains this rather well in his paper:

"Can God’d Goodness Save The Divine Command Theory From Euthyphro?"
http://faculty.georgetown.edu/koonsj.../Euthyphro.pdf

"Alston implies that one who is sufficiently acquainted with God and who has given the matter adequate, impartial thought will come to see (with justification or warrant) that God is the standard of moral perfection. But we can now see why this is wrong. For when one imagines acquaintance with God, and contemplation of the divine, one naturally imagines contemplating God given his attributes – such as being perfectly loving, just, merciful, and so forth. And of course someone who contemplated God as so presented might well come to believe in God’s moral perfection. But Alston must claim that God is the standard of moral perfection independently of his possession of these characteristics. He is not morally perfect because he possesses these characteristics; these characteristics are features of moral perfection only because they are possessed by God. Thus, what Alston should exhort us to do is this: imagine God, stripped of every moral perfection – His lovingness, His justice, His caring. Now is it self-evident that God as so conceived is morally perfect, the ultimate standard of good? Intuition is not a magical power; it needs something to work with. If intuition is a*genuine mental power (and presumably, if it is, it is the power of forming non-inferential beliefs in response to some stimulus or mental input), then intuition requires inputs to generate an output. When Alston tells us that God’s moral perfection is self-evident, he is imagining God’s moral virtues as cognitive inputs, in which case we should expect as an output the belief “God is the standard of goodness”. But the question must be reconceived: ‘Does it make sense to say of God, independent of these virtues, that He is good?’ I have argued this is not coherent; it is certainly not self-evident that God so conceived is the ultimate standard of moral perfection (190)."

Anyway, terms like "worthy of worship" and "greatest conceivable being" are just theistic tools for smuggling P into the definition of God, so as to try to make it look like it's God's existence that's required for moral goodness, as opposed to it P being that is sufficient for moral goodness, even if God does exist. I've familiar enough with this topic to not fall for those attempts. Just because you include some X in the definition of God, that doesn't mean that things that depend on X also require God's existence.

And of course, a maximally great being includes properties like omnibenevolence (as Craig has stated many times in many places).

Maximal greatness is defined as including omnibenevolence; it's simply another way of smuggling P into the definition of God, to make it look like moral goodness depends on God's existence, as opposed to it just depend on P. But this move doesn't help Craig for the reason I already noted.

Interesting enough, Paul Copan and Matt Flanagan deal with the Psychopathy Objection right after the section I cited.

And they do so in a very confused way. For example, they claim that:

Y : "To say God is morally perfect is to say he possesses certain character traits such as being loving, just, impartial, and so on."

They seem to think that Y is an implication of William Lane Craig's Divine Command Theory. But Y isn't an implication of Craig's position. As I explained above and in this post, Craig is committed to denying Y, since Craig is desperate to maintain that God's existence is necessary for the existence of moral objective moral values, and admitting that certain character traits suffice for the instantiation of moral goodness would be to admit that God's existence isn't necessary for the existence of moral goodness. In fact, it would be be to admit that objective moral values don't depend on God, but instead on those certain character traits.

[Jichard]

Are you at all familiar with Craig's split of the Euthyphro Dilemma? Craig does not merely assert that God recognizes the good, or that God arbitrarily enforces the good, but that God IS the good.

Which is an utterly silly claim for Craig to make, like many of Craig's other claims. Moral goodness is a property, not a person. And it is a property that can be instantiated by persons, actions, etc. That's why, for example, one can make statements such as:

That action is morally good
That person is morally good

These statements ascribe the property referred to by "is morally good" to those actions. Yet if Craig's absurd position was true, then every good things must be God, since God is the good. And that's ridiculous. At best, if God were to exist, then God would have the property of being morally good. That doesn't make God "the good"; properties are not identical to the particulars that instantiate them.



Anyway, you didn't answer my question.

In the following, what did I say that Craig did not say?:

"It's the whole might makes right mentality, where moral truths hold in virtue of a powerful, divine enforcer's say-so. Now Craig can claim that divine enforce[r] is just, merciful, compassionate, etc. But that's irrelevant to his position. If it were relevant, then he'd just say that moral truths hold in virtue of what is merciful, just, compassionate, etc., without need of an appeal to a divine enforcer. But Craig doesn't say that, since he wants to carve out a place for his enforcer to determine moral truths."

The answer is:

"moral truths hold in virtue of what is merciful, just, compassionate, etc., without need of an appeal to a divine enforcer."

[Tassman]

I'm only concerned about one species.

That’s very chauvinistic of you.

All species are genetically predisposed to survive; it’s instinctive and has nothing to do with moral obligations.

[seer]

First, why are you responding to the post of someone you claim to have on ignore?


Second, your question doesn't have any bearing on Wielenberg's argument from the OP.


Third, I cannot make sense of your question. If you're asking:

1 : Are humans morally obligated to survive?

then the answer is:

Depends on the circumstance, but the answer is often "no".

For example, in some circumstances, it can be morally good for someone to sacrifice their life to save someone else. Happens fairly often.

I took you off ignore. Lucky you! And the answer is no, there is no moral imperative that we as a species should survive. Subjectively of course, like any other species, even species that have gone extinct, we seek to survive. But the fact is, if atheists are correct, we are insignificant creatures on an insignificant planet in a purposeless universe. How much more insignificant are our moral musings. It's about as compelling as arguing about how to arrange the deck chairs on the Titanic.

[seer]

Now, the above line of reasoning also applies to morality. For example, one can have the following moral version of question 1:

"Why is that action morally good?"

And a utilitarian might respond:

7 : "A morally good action is an action promotes the well-being of sentient life, that action promotes the welfare of sentient life, and therefore that action is morally good."

And if, in response to 7, someone responds with the following version of question 1:

8: "Why are actions that promote the well-being of sentient life morally good?"

the utilitarian can respond:

"Being morally good is identical to promoting the well-being of sentient life, and we know that through examining primae facie examples of moral good acts, to figure out what those examples have in common."

According to this utilitarian, it's a fact that:

9: Being morally good is identical to promoting the well-being of sentient life

they have explained how they know that 9 is a fact, and no further explanation is required. They need not appeal to anything else in order to explain why 9 is true. Thus 9 is a brute moral fact.

I don't understand, why isn't it just as morally good to promote the well-being of my sentient life at the expense of, or to the detriment of, other sentient life? That seems to be a pretty common occurrence in human history. Isn't that also a brute moral fact?

[Adrift]

Anyway, you didn't answer my question.

That is the answer to the question. If Craig believes that the divine enforcer IS the good, then the good, and all moral truths that derive from the good cannot be appealed to absent the divine enforcer.

Also to say that Craig never says that God is innately good or omnibenevolent, because he doesn't specifically assert so in a particular argument (though he obviously does in others) is very peculiar to me. I don't have any reason to believe that Craig is inconsistent in his view of God throughout his various arguments. Finally, I think Copan knows Craig's arguments a bit better than you. I'll take him at his word.

[Mountain Man]

I think the most damning critique of WLC's moral argument is its nature. It, like a lot of theistic personalist based arguments, sees morality as something imposed.

Craig's argument, as I understand it, focuses not on the existence of morals but on the concept of moral obligation. For example, if atheism is true then morals could exist as a brute fact of nature, like the laws of physics, but we would have no obligation to live morally; however, most people intuitively reject this notion, but if one concedes that moral obligation does exist then one also concedes that a being like the God of the Bible necessarily exists.

[Jichard]

I don't understand, why isn't it just as morally good to promote the well-being of my sentient life at the expense of, or to the detriment of, other sentient life?

We've had this discussion before: http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/sh...625#post227625

You advocate a crude form of ethical egoism (combined with moral subjectivism), where things are morally good, morally bad, etc., because a powerful deity says so, and we ought to follow what that deity says because of rewards and punishments we will receive. So, it's no surprise that you would think that promoting your own well-being (while ignoring the well-being of everyone else) is morally good. Of course, you'd be wrong.

That seems to be a pretty common occurrence in human history.

So is rape. That doesn't make rape morally good.

Isn't that also a brute moral fact?

No.


Now, do you care to address the argument from the OP?

[Jichard]

I took you off ignore. Lucky you!

Not lucky at all. Because I expect you'll go back to your usual tactics, like willful misrepresentation of others.

And the answer is no, there is no moral imperative that we as a species should survive. Subjectively of course, like any other species, even species that have gone extinct, we seek to survive.

Your question was nonsensical, as I noted, and your response to your own question to it was nonsensical.

Anyway, you didn't actually address my response to your question. As usual, when someone responded to you, you didn't address the substance of whta they said.

But the fact is, if atheists are correct, we are insignificant creatures on an insignificant planet in a purposeless universe.

Now you're making up false claims you've never supported.

Go ahead and show that atheism implies: "we are insignificant creatures on an insignificant planet in a purposeless universe."

You won't be able to, because you just made it up.

How much more insignificant are our moral musings.

Once again, you resort to the appeal to consequence fallacy. Whether our "moral musings" (as you call them) are significant, has no bearing on whether those "moral musings" are true/false, justified/unjustified, etc. So your point is irrelevant to the matter at hand.

It's about as compelling as arguing about how to arrange the deck chairs on the Titanic.

Of course you don't care bout it nor do you find it compelling. After all, you're an ethical egoist who only cares about being rewarded and punished. So of course, you don't care what claims are true/false, justified/unjustified, etc., nor do you have any genuine interest in other people. The only way to get through to you is to threaten you with punishment, or promise you rewards.

But for the rest of us who aren't psychopaths, we do actually care about truth, falsity, other people, etc.


Now, can you actually address what was written in the OP?

[Jichard]

That is the answer to the question.

No, it doesn't answer the question. An answer to the question would involve telling me what I denied that Craig said. You didn't tell me that. So you didn't answer the question.

Once again:

In the following, what did I say that Craig did not say?:

"It's the whole might makes right mentality, where moral truths hold in virtue of a powerful, divine enforcer's say-so. Now Craig can claim that divine enforce[r] is just, merciful, compassionate, etc. But that's irrelevant to his position. If it were relevant, then he'd just say that moral truths hold in virtue of what is merciful, just, compassionate, etc., without need of an appeal to a divine enforcer. But Craig doesn't say that, since he wants to carve out a place for his enforcer to determine moral truths."

The answer is:

"moral truths hold in virtue of what is merciful, just, compassionate, etc., without need of an appeal to a divine enforcer."

If Craig believes that the divine enforcer IS the good, then the good, and all moral truths that derive from the good cannot be appealed to absent the divine enforcer.

Doesn't answer the question.

Also to say that Craig never says that God is innately good or omnibenevolent, because he doesn't specifically assert so in a particular argument (though he obviously does in others) is very peculiar to me. I don't have any reason to believe that Craig is inconsistent in his view of God throughout his various arguments. Finally, I think Copan knows Craig's arguments a bit better than you. I'll take him at his word.

Doesn't answer the question.

[seer]

We've had this discussion before: http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/sh...625#post227625

You advocate a crude form of ethical egoism (combined with moral subjectivism), where things are morally good, morally bad, etc., because a powerful deity says so, and we ought to follow what that deity says because of rewards and punishments we will receive. So, it's no surprise that you would think that promoting your own well-being (while ignoring the well-being of everyone else) is morally good. Of course, you'd be wrong.

Nonsense, I'm asking you why isn't it just as morally good to promote the well-being of my sentient life at the expense of, or to the detriment of, other sentient life? If doing that promotes my well being and the survival of me, my family or tribe why is it morally wrong. Certainly our survival is a moral good.

No.

Of course it is, the survival of my kin at the expense of others if necessary is a moral good, and just as much a brute moral fact as anything you can invent. I mean you are the one who brought up that whole brute moral fact thing.

[seer]

Now you're making up false claims you've never supported.

Go ahead and show that atheism implies: "we are insignificant creatures on an insignificant planet in a purposeless universe."

You won't be able to, because you just made it up.

Really we live in a universe that has inherent purpose? Let me quote Dawkin:

In a universe of electrons and selfish genes, blind physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get hurt, other people are going to get lucky, and you won't find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The universe that we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but pitiless indifference.

So where is our inherent purpose Jichard, or inherent significance? Where is good and evil? Except what we subjectively decide?

[Jichard]

Really we live in a universe that has inherent purpose? Let me quote Dawkin:

Ah, you've gone back to quote-mining sources again.

Here's is what you misrepresented:

"In a universe of electrons and selfish genes, blind physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get hurt, other people are going to get lucky, and you won't find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The universe that we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but pitiless indifference."

Nowhere does that support your made up claim that "we are insignificant creatures on an insignificant planet in a purposeless universe,", for a number of reasons.


First, nowhere does your quote-mine mention atheism. Please stop confusing atheism with materialism.

Second, you're again making a mistake I dealt with months ago: you seem to confusedly thinking that if a property exists in a natural universe, that property must occur at the level of physics. This is silly. Not all properties occur at the even discussed in physics. For example, the property referred to by "is a car" does not occur at the level of physics. So Dawkins is right: at bottom (that is: at the level referred to by physics), there is no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, etc. After all, those properties don't occur at the level discussed in physics. Just like, at bottom, there are no cars, no planets, no animals, etc. Instead, you need to go to a higher level of explanation to find those.

Third, you're misrepresenting Dawkins. He's not claiming that atheism implies that life is purposeless. He's instead making the obvious point that sentient beings don't always get what they deserve. As I've told on other occasions, life is not some merry-go-round where good people always get what they deserve and bad people always get punished. That doesn't mean make life purposeless. You seem to have this childlike view of the world, where you think everything that in order for things to have purpose, everything has to be like a Hollywood movie, where everyone always gets what they deserve. Sorry, but no. Pleas leave that childlike view behind.

So where is our inherent purpose Jichard,

I don't know what you mean by this notion of "inherent purpose". I suspect what you want to say is that you can have inherent purpose, only if a creator made you. But that's silly. That would not be "inherent purpose", since the purpose isn't inherent in me. Instead, it would be inherent in the creator's intentions for me. So you wouldn't have accounted for "inherent purpose". And there's no reason to think that I need to have a creator to have a purpose. For example, I can assign purposes for myself, based on what I'm good at and enjoy doing (where I limit myself only to actions that are not morally wrong). I don't need to rely on the intentions of some creator in order to find purpose

or inherent significance?

So you don't think that the well-being of sentient life is significant, unless some powerful being made it? Are you some sort of psychopath?

Where is good and evil? Except what we subjectively decide?

Please stop repeating the same mistakes you've been making on what "subjective" (and it's cognates) mean in this context; "subjective" is not about decisions. I already address those on another thread. For example:
http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/sh...747#post198747

It's incredible that despite this, you keep pretending as if the only options open to an atheist are to claim that things are good and evil, because we decide it is so. You should know by now that that is not what atheism entails.