Answers to Atheistic arguments

[geochron]

Once again I'll extract a few comments for reply.

Geo:

Many things are imaginary.
Many things are non-existent.
Many things exist that are non-existent.

(As I recollect this is close to JM's "existing in potency", but it has been a while.)

POWELL:
I don't follow your reasoning. How does the conclusion deductively follow from the first two premises?

Do you follow...

Many things have property "A"
Therefore there exists something with property "A"?

And what happens when the property is "non-existent" or "imaginary"?

POWELL:
You over restrict human discourse. Sometimes when we talk about the properties of imaginary things we are talking about the REAL properties they would have if they existed outside the imagination, if they were real. And, some times we are talking about the imaginary properties they possess in our imagination.

Geo:
Which of these does "imaginary" fall under? Obviously not the first.

POWELL:
But the first (without my added qualification "sometimes") was your suggestion. Are you revising your opinion?

No, since I don't accept that "imaginary" is a property at all (I'm not talking about the role it plays in language here). Obviously, even if it was a property it couldn't be a real property of a real thing.

When I say something is imaginary I'm simply saying that I or somebody is imagining it. Linguistically it appears as a property, but reasoning with it as if it is a property leads to absurdities. If this is not kept in mind, one can end up with something like John Martin's "proofs".

GEOCHRON:
Is "being imaginary" the imaginary property of an imaginary object?

POWELL:
Yes.

Are you sure? An imaginary property of a thing is one it does not have, as I understand it.

I suppose you could say an imaginary property of a real thing is one it doesn't have, whereas an imaginary property of an imaginary thing is one it does have. But then that rather distinguishes between how we treat properties of real things and properties of imaginary things, which is pretty close to my point.

Alternatively, perhaps "being imaginary" is a real property of an imaginary thing. I don't think that makes much sense.

GEOCHRON:
Can you imagine something having the property non-existence? Or do you imagine a world in which something is absent?

POWELL:
To be absent from the world is synonymous with being non-existent. If you think the words "something having the property of non-existence" is a problem then you should also think "something being absent" is a problem. You think the thing and then you "think it absent". To "think it absent" is tricky since thinking about it prohibits it from disappearing from your imagination. You have to assign a label to it like "non-existent" for whenever it pops back up and then think of something else.

Consider an example. If I ask you to think of a non-existent flying pink elephant then don't you first imagine the label "non-existent" and then the label "flying" and then the label "pink" and then attach those labels = assign those properties to the elephant you imagine? If you stop imagining it but later it resurfaces, then the labels should come along with it including the "non-existent" label. You see, it's an assigned "property" of the thing.

Yes, I think "something being absent from the universe" is a problem, on the face of it. I imagine the world without imagining the thing. Being absent is not a property of the thing, not having the thing is a property of the universe.

And no, I don't imagine the thing and then imagine it "not-existing". If you ask me to imagine a pink elephant I imagine it existing. If you ask me to imagine a world without monkeys, I imagine a world without monkeys. I don't think it is possible to imagine something not existing in the way you describe it, though I can of course add adjectives to nouns as you describe.

GEOCHRON:
I agree that it is proper English. My case is that using it during metaphysical musings leads to absurdities.

POWELL:
Hmm.

GEOCHRON:
What such logical manipulations reveal is amusing idiosyncracies of the English language. English allows us to speak of things as if they are properties when they aren't. But reasoning with these things as if they are properties is misguided.

POWELL: Logic should guide the natural language (such as English). Metaphysics isn't so reliable, but perhaps you're correct on this matter.

Perhaps I am.

[John Powell]

GEOCHRON:
Once again I'll extract a few comments for reply.

Geo:
Many things are imaginary.
Many things are non-existent.
Many things exist that are non-existent.

(As I recollect this is close to JM's "existing in potency", but it has been a while.)

POWELL:
I don't follow your reasoning. How does the conclusion deductively follow from the first two premises?

GEOCHRON:
Do you follow...

Many things have property "A"
Therefore there exists something with property "A"?

POWELL:
No. That argument isn't valid based on your use of "exists" and "things" since "things" isn't restricted to "existent / real things." There are also imaginary things, yes?

GEOCHRON:
And what happens when the property is "non-existent" or "imaginary"?

POWELL:
Then it's possessed by imaginary things.

For you, is everything real, nothing imaginary?

POWELL:
You over restrict human discourse. Sometimes when we talk about the properties of imaginary things we are talking about the REAL properties they would have if they existed outside the imagination, if they were real. And, some times we are talking about the imaginary properties they possess in our imagination.

Geo:
Which of these does "imaginary" fall under? Obviously not the first.

POWELL:
But the first (without my added qualification "sometimes") was your suggestion. Are you revising your opinion?

GEOCHRON:
No, since I don't accept that "imaginary" is a property at all (I'm not talking about the role it plays in language here).

POWELL:
Oh. I should have said "(without my added qualifications of `sometimes' and `real' and `outside the imagination')" Then it would correspond to what you suggested, yes?

GEOCHRON:
Obviously, even if it was a property it couldn't be a real property of a real thing.

POWELL:
I don't see that. Imaginary things can share many of the same properties as real things such as the color red.

GEOCHRON:
When I say something is imaginary I'm simply saying that I or somebody is imagining it.

POWELL:
Yes.

GEOCHRON:
Linguistically it appears as a property, but reasoning with it as if it is a property leads to absurdities.

POWELL:
Will you post some of those real absurdities rather than the ones you imagine?

What I see is that they seem absurd to you. They don't seem absurd to me.

GEOCHRON:
If this is not kept in mind, one can end up with something like John Martin's "proofs".

POWELL:
Perhaps. And failure to keep my suggestions can end up with absurd conclusions like "the red car I'm imagining isn't the red car I'm imagining."

GEOCHRON:
Is "being imaginary" the imaginary property of an imaginary object?

POWELL:
Yes.

GEOCHRON:
Are you sure?

POWELL:
No. Are you sure it isn't?

GEOCHRON:
An imaginary property of a thing is one it does not have, as I understand it.

POWELL:
I would say something like the MERELY imaginary property of a thing is a property that the real correspondent doesn't have.

GEOCHRON:
I suppose you could say an imaginary property of a real thing is one it doesn't have, whereas an imaginary property of an imaginary thing is one it does have. But then that rather distinguishes between how we treat properties of real things and properties of imaginary things, which is pretty close to my point.

POWELL:
I see you making an effort to approach some agreement. It's working.

GEOCHRON:
Alternatively, perhaps "being imaginary" is a real property of an imaginary thing. I don't think that makes much sense.

POWELL:
I agree, so let's not talk that way.

GEOCHRON:
Can you imagine something having the property non-existence? Or do you imagine a world in which something is absent?

POWELL:
To be absent from the world is synonymous with being non-existent. If you think the words "something having the property of non-existence" is a problem then you should also think "something being absent" is a problem. You think the thing and then you "think it absent". To "think it absent" is tricky since thinking about it prohibits it from disappearing from your imagination. You have to assign a label to it like "non-existent" for whenever it pops back up and then think of something else.

Consider an example. If I ask you to think of a non-existent flying pink elephant then don't you first imagine the label "non-existent" and then the label "flying" and then the label "pink" and then attach those labels = assign those properties to the elephant you imagine? If you stop imagining it but later it resurfaces, then the labels should come along with it including the "non-existent" label. You see, it's an assigned "property" of the thing.

GEOCHRON:
Yes, I think "something being absent from the universe" is a problem, on the face of it. I imagine the world without imagining the thing. Being absent is not a property of the thing, not having the thing is a property of the universe.

And no, I don't imagine the thing and then imagine it "not-existing". If you ask me to imagine a pink elephant I imagine it existing. If you ask me to imagine a world without monkeys, I imagine a world without monkeys. I don't think it is possible to imagine something not existing in the way you describe it, though I can of course add adjectives to nouns as you describe.

POWELL:
It seems to be the way my mind works. Perhaps our mental wiring is that different? Possible, but doubtful. More likely our brains work very much the same, but one or both of us are mischaracterizing how this particular mental process works.

GEOCHRON:
I agree that it is proper English. My case is that using it during metaphysical musings leads to absurdities.

POWELL:
Hmm.

GEOCHRON:
What such logical manipulations reveal is amusing idiosyncracies of the English language. English allows us to speak of things as if they are properties when they aren't. But reasoning with these things as if they are properties is misguided.

POWELL:
Logic should guide the natural language (such as English). Metaphysics isn't so reliable, but perhaps you're correct on this matter.

GEOCHRON:
Perhaps I am.

POWELL:
Thanks.

John Powell

[Wyzaard]

POWELL:
Well, what do you mean? What are some good examples of ontological entities and why are they ontological entities while existence is not? What are some good examples of things that bear fruit and have been shown to be frameable by systems that possess the adequate power to do so?

I reject metaphysical questions outright; without any meaningful frame of reference, such matters fall stillborn without any justification/verification that must come from a stronger framework, which then inherits the same problem of authority. If ontological matters go beyond establishing 'givens', I get ornery.

Without circularity? How are you going to establish logic without circularity?

We're not... but on that note, this disqualifies logic from dealing with metaphyscial matters that require a solid foundation in 'actuality'.

Do we have to know for sure in order for the belief to be justified?

If the belief is an absolute one dealing with metaphyscial entities, then yes.

What's a good example that avoids speculation?

Of a metaphyscial claim? There is none. Epistmic problems are inherently provisional, so this isn't an issue there.

Well sure it works, very nicely. Do you think it would work if existence didn't exist while nonexistence did?

What does this accomplish?

Well, it seems to me that "If x has existence then x exists" is on a very solid foundation.

But what does it produce? Even as an analytic tautology, it's pretty useless.

There is no greater authority. Logic stands supreme.

How did you reach this determination?

"Things-in-themselves" is a concept. Whether the concept corresponds to something real is a separate matter.

So there's no difference... ooo, this is going to get Quine-messy.

Even though the explanation might be mistaken, you might use it to help you decide to follow some other topic.

Unless it helps me to decide that tghis topic needs an injection of "oh come on!"

What power specifically?

A good method would be efficient: it would be reliable without requiring too much time. Reliability is improved by possessing greater objectivity.

This begs a lot of questions... 'efficient', 'reliable', 'greater objectivity' according to what? And what establishes its authority?

Speculation is often useful, so what's your point?

Is it useful here, and how did you come by this?

For someone who likes to use philosophical words like "ontological" you don't seem to know how to spell ordinary words like "existence."

I'm not an english major, and I type horribly.

[Roy]

Proven as follows.

1. If any being were not to have a reason of be, a reason on account of which it is rather than is not,
2. it would not be distinguished from nothing,


Proofs are much easier when you include what you're supposed to be proving as a premise, aren't they?

Sure are. So show me where its been done here. Check the lines following those above to see how the first two are true.

It's being done right there. Unless you've started writing your proofs with the conclusions at the beginning and the premises at the end, working backwards. (Try it - it might be an improvement).

Lets not talk about concepts. Lets stick to the way the proof was presented that is in the real and stays in the real. This is your first big error, to reduce the proof down to concepts.

Roy

Roys rhetoric rolls on.

JM is arguing with himself again!

Roy

[Roy]

Point 3 can be rebutted simply by noting that the inverse of a true implication may not be true.

(X->Y) -/-> (~X->~Y)

Example:
If an entity is a raven, it is black.
If an entity is not a raven, it is not black.

Wrong Roy. Very wrong.

Another demonstration of JM's cluelessness re logic.

You divert the attention away from what I wrote to an unrelated example of your own making yet again.

Nonsense. You claimed that the inverse of a true statement was true. My example shows that this is a fallacy. You only think it's unrelated because you don't understand its relevance.

I can translate your syllogism into the third degree as follows

If an entity is a physical substance, then it has an accident of colour

If an entity is not a physical substance, then it does not have an accident of colour.

This answers your objection.

No, it does not. It merely waffles tangentially at it, as usual.

Roy

[geochron]

Once again I'll extract and edit. I hope it doesn't remove clarity.

GEOCHRON:
Do you follow...

Many things have property "A"
Therefore there exists something with property "A"?


POWELL:
No. That argument isn't valid based on your use of "exists" and "things" since "things" isn't restricted to "existent / real things." There are also imaginary things, yes?

I was attempting to use things in your way in this (since I understand you to say that there are imaginary things in the same way that there are red things). I think that, in general, if you start with "many things have property A" you can infer "there exists something with property A". That's why I don't think non-existence is a property. This is one of the absurdities you request me to explain.

I would say there are no imaginary things. When we say "there are imaginary things" I understand it as shorthand for "we are capable of conceiving of things that don't exist".

POWELL:

For you, is everything real, nothing imaginary?

No thing has the property "imaginary" because it isn't a property of things.

Of course, like anyone else I will talk about "imaginary things" colloquially. My "position" is that it is a mistake to reason with "imaginary" or "non-existent" as if they were properties of things in the same sense as "being red" or "having four legs" are properties of things.

For instance, talking about things as changing properties from "non-existence" to "existence" suffers from this mistake.

GEOCHRON:
No, since I don't accept that "imaginary" is a property at all (I'm not talking about the role it plays in language here).

POWELL:
Oh. I should have said "(without my added qualifications of `sometimes' and `real' and `outside the imagination')" Then it would correspond to what you suggested, yes?

The question was "what sort of property do you think 'being imaginary' is". It followed your suggestion that there were (at least?) two sorts of properties of things. I don't think it is a property at all, so telling me that one category is the one I came up with doesn't seem to me to be to the point.

GEOCHRON:
Obviously, even if it ["being imaginary"] was a property it couldn't be a real property of a real thing.

POWELL:
I don't see that. Imaginary things can share many of the same properties as real things such as the color red.

I don't think something which is real can have the real property "being imaginary". If it had that property, it wouldn't be real. This would be absurd.

POWELL:
Perhaps. And failure to keep my suggestions can end up with absurd conclusions like "the red car I'm imagining isn't the red car I'm imagining."

Not at all. It leads to "the red car I am imagining is not a red car". And indeed it isn't. Ceci n'est pas une pomme.

For absurdities...

As I argue above, I think it would be absurd that one can't reason from "many things are red" to "there exists something which is red". Rather than accept this, I argue that "being imaginary" is not a property of things (at least in the sense that "being red" is a property of things).

Again, what sort of property of a thing is "being imaginary". Is it an imaginary property, in which case we imagine that the thing is imaginary, in which case the thing is real? Consider an imaginary car. If imaginary is a property of the car, it is not an imaginary property of the car because the car actually is imaginary. Or is it a real property - I can't understand "being imaginary" as a real property of an imaginary thing. I can't understand "being red" as a real property of an imaginary thing, for that matter.

I might go so far as to say that a property is something which can take the role of "A" in "many things are A" such that it implies "there exists something that is A".

But I might not.

POWELL:
I would say something like the MERELY imaginary property of a thing is a property that the real correspondent doesn't have.

I'm not sure what to make of "merely imaginary". But I was talking about the imaginary properties of a real thing to understand what an imaginary property might be. So I'm not sure what to make of "real correspondent".

POWELL:
Thanks.

I think it is interesting to explore the ideas.

[John Powell]

POWELL:
Well, what do you mean? What are some good examples of ontological entities and why are they ontological entities while existence is not? What are some good examples of things that bear fruit and have been shown to be frameable by systems that possess the adequate power to do so?

WYZAARD:
I reject metaphysical questions outright; without any meaningful frame of reference, such matters fall stillborn without any justification/verification that must come from a stronger framework, which then inherits the same problem of authority. If ontological matters go beyond establishing 'givens', I get ornery.

POWELL:
Probably in a discussion forum you shouldn't make claims about things you aren't willing to respond to questions about.

POWELL:
Without circularity? How are you going to establish logic without circularity?

WYZAARD:
We're not... but on that note, this disqualifies logic from dealing with metaphyscial matters that require a solid foundation in 'actuality'.

POWELL:
I don't see why.

POWELL:
Do we have to know for sure in order for the belief to be justified?

WYZAARD:
If the belief is an absolute one dealing with metaphyscial entities, then yes.

POWELL:
Isn't that circular?

POWELL:
What's a good example that avoids speculation?

WYZAARD:
Of a metaphyscial claim? There is none. Epistmic problems are inherently provisional, so this isn't an issue there.

POWELL:
It's not much of a criticism that X is speculation if all the others are too.

POWELL:
Well sure it works, very nicely. Do you think it would work if existence didn't exist while nonexistence did?

WYZAARD:
What does this accomplish?

POWELL:
Preserve sensibility. That's a good thing, yes?

POWELL:
Well, it seems to me that "If x has existence then x exists" is on a very solid foundation.

WYZAARD:
But what does it produce? Even as an analytic tautology, it's pretty useless.

POWELL:
The result is preserved sensibility.

POWELL:
There is no greater authority. Logic stands supreme.

WYZAARD:
How did you reach this determination?

POWELL:
By thinking about it. I can't seem to come up with anything superior or even coherently imagine doing so.

Do you have a suggestion for something superior?

"Things-in-themselves" is a concept. Whether the concept corresponds to something real is a separate matter.

WYZAARD:
So there's no difference... ooo, this is going to get Quine-messy.

POWELL:
There is a difference between the real and the imaginary.

POWELL:
Even though the explanation might be mistaken, you might use it to help you decide to follow some other topic.

WYZAARD:
Unless it helps me to decide that tghis topic needs an injection of "oh come on!"

POWELL:
"Unless" doesn't seem to belong there since there are other possible uses.

POWELL:
What power specifically?

A good method would be efficient: it would be reliable without requiring too much time. Reliability is improved by possessing greater objectivity.

WYZAARD:
This begs a lot of questions... 'efficient', 'reliable', 'greater objectivity' according to what? And what establishes its authority?

POWELL:
How are those begged questions? Are you saying you don't think efficient, reliable, and objective are elements of a good method?

What establishes its authority? Success.

POWELL:
Speculation is often useful, so what's your point?

WYZAARD:
Is it useful here, and how did you come by this?

POWELL:
Yes. By thinking about it. How do you determine such things?

POWELL:
For someone who likes to use philosophical words like "ontological" you don't seem to know how to spell ordinary words like "existence."

WYZAARD:
I'm not an english major, and I type horribly.

POWELL:
English majors aren't the only ones who need good communication skills.

John Powell

[John Powell]

GEOCHRON:
Once again I'll extract and edit. I hope it doesn't remove clarity.

GEOCHRON:
Do you follow...

Many things have property "A"
Therefore there exists something with property "A"?

POWELL:
No. That argument isn't valid based on your use of "exists" and "things" since "things" isn't restricted to "existent / real things." There are also imaginary things, yes?

GEOCHRON:
I was attempting to use things in your way in this . . .

POWELL:
If you replace "exists" with "is" then it works for me.

GEOCHRON:
(since I understand you to say that there are imaginary things in the same way that there are red things).

POWELL:
We imagine that the real red car really reflects red light whereas the imaginary red car (whether it's supposed to correspond to the real car or not) doesn't really reflect red light, but we only imagine it to.

GEOCHRON:
I think that, in general, if you start with "many things have property A" you can infer "there exists something with property A".

POWELL:
Not when you allow for imaginary things and restrict "exists" for real things.

GEOCHRON:
That's why I don't think non-existence is a property. This is one of the absurdities you request me to explain.

POWELL:
I avoid the absurdity by allowing for imaginary things and if I use "exists" with imaginary things then I should include "exists in the imagination."

GEOCHRON:
I would say there are no imaginary things. When we say "there are imaginary things" I understand it as shorthand for "we are capable of conceiving of things that don't exist".

POWELL:
What is this "thing" that you conceive that doesn't exist if not an "imaginary thing"?

POWELL:
For you, is everything real, nothing imaginary?

GEOCHRON:
No thing has the property "imaginary" because it isn't a property of things.

Of course, like anyone else I will talk about "imaginary things" colloquially. My "position" is that it is a mistake to reason with "imaginary" or "non-existent" as if they were properties of things in the same sense as "being red" or "having four legs" are properties of things.

For instance, talking about things as changing properties from "non-existence" to "existence" suffers from this mistake.

POWELL:
I don't see the problem with that either.

Our discussions concern things we imagine. We discuss the things in our imagination. Whether there are corresponding things in the real world is a separate matter. For example, if a Muslim and Mormon argue about their respective Gods are they arguing about real Gods or the Gods they imagine are real? When we discuss Jesus or God or Gerald Ford are we really doing any differently?

GEOCHRON:
No, since I don't accept that "imaginary" is a property at all (I'm not talking about the role it plays in language here).

POWELL:
Oh. I should have said "(without my added qualifications of `sometimes' and `real' and `outside the imagination')" Then it would correspond to what you suggested, yes?

GEOCHRON:
The question was "what sort of property do you think 'being imaginary' is". It followed your suggestion that there were (at least?) two sorts of properties of things. I don't think it is a property at all, so telling me that one category is the one I came up with doesn't seem to me to be to the point.

POWELL:
Whatever. Are you agreeable to considering "non existent" or "fictional" or "fantasy" as mental labels to attach to the imaginary thing when it pops back up in our imagination? If yes then that's basically what I mean by an imaginary property.

GEOCHRON:
Obviously, even if it ["being imaginary"] was a property it couldn't be a real property of a real thing.

POWELL:
I don't see that. Imaginary things can share many of the same properties as real things such as the color red.

GEOCHRON:
I don't think something which is real can have the real property "being imaginary". If it had that property, it wouldn't be real. This would be absurd.

POWELL:
Being imaginary isn't a "real" property in the sense of "real" I've been using. It's an imaginary property.

POWELL:
Perhaps. And failure to keep my suggestions can end up with absurd conclusions like "the red car I'm imagining isn't the red car I'm imagining."

GEOCHRON:
Not at all. It leads to "the red car I am imagining is not a red car". And indeed it isn't. Ceci n'est pas une pomme.

POWELL:
Well, what you said is absurd unless you clarify it to mean "the red car I am imagining is not a real red car."

GEOCHRON:
For absurdities...

As I argue above, I think it would be absurd that one can't reason from "many things are red" to "there exists something which is red". Rather than accept this, I argue that "being imaginary" is not a property of things (at least in the sense that "being red" is a property of things).

POWELL:
The imaginary property of red can be different than the real property of red.

GEOCHRON:
Again, what sort of property of a thing is "being imaginary". Is it an imaginary property, in which case we imagine that the thing is imaginary, in which case the thing is real?

POWELL:
The imaginary thing is imaginary.

GEOCHRON:
Consider an imaginary car. If imaginary is a property of the car, it is not an imaginary property of the car because the car actually is imaginary.

POWELL:
Well "actually" and "real" are different. Actual corresponds to the special possible world that is actual. Real corresponds to what exists outside the imagination.

GEOCHRON:
Or is it a real property - I can't understand "being imaginary" as a real property of an imaginary thing. I can't understand "being red" as a real property of an imaginary thing, for that matter.

POWELL:
I haven't said that "being imaginary" is a REAL property. I've tried to consistently refer to it as an imaginary property.

GEOCHRON:
I might go so far as to say that a property is something which can take the role of "A" in "many things are A" such that it implies "there exists something that is A".

But I might not.

POWELL:
I think we want to restrict "exists" for real things unless modified, but I don't restrict "is" or "have" to real things.

POWELL:
I would say something like the MERELY imaginary property of a thing is a property that the real correspondent doesn't have.

GEOCHRON:
I'm not sure what to make of "merely imaginary".

POWELL:
The correspondence between the real and imaginary is often treated as an equality. To be precise we should keep them distinct. They aren't the same, but one might map to the other.

GEOCHRON:
But I was talking about the imaginary properties of a real thing to understand what an imaginary property might be. So I'm not sure what to make of "real correspondent".

POWELL:
The real thing that corresponds to the thing you imagine.

POWELL:
Thanks.

GEOCHRON:
I think it is interesting to explore the ideas.

POWELL:
I agree.

John Powell

[Wyzaard]

POWELL:
Probably in a discussion forum you shouldn't make claims about things you aren't willing to respond to questions about.

I would add that you shouldn't make claims about things that you aren't willing to provide adiquate justification for.

POWELL:
I don't see why.

You claim it, you show it... a nice rule, but you can chuck it if you'd like. Just remember it gets massier from here on out if you do.

POWELL:
Isn't that circular?

Yep, it's conventionally bound... hense the impossibility I was speaking of, namely the imossibility of speaking of such matters with any adiquately justified certainty.

POWELL:
It's not much of a criticism that X is speculation if all the others are too.

It is, if someone such as yourself is claiming it is not.


POWELL:
Preserve sensibility. That's a good thing, yes?

The result is preserved sensibility.
[/quote]

What does this mean, and why is it a 'must'?

By thinking about it. I can't seem to come up with anything superior or even coherently imagine doing so.

Do you have a suggestion for something superior?

Why is that my problem? You're the one with the omni-justification issues... don't argue from ignorance.

POWELL:
There is a difference between the real and the imaginary.

Geochron, as well as Bertie Russell, answered this better than I have...

POWELL:
"Unless" doesn't seem to belong there since there are other possible uses.

But I have chosen to use it thusly... come on! :)

POWELL:
How are those begged questions? Are you saying you don't think efficient, reliable, and objective are elements of a good method?

Of course not... for bounded epistmic issues. However:

What establishes its authority? Success.

How would we independantly verify a satisfied metaphyscial claim in order to justify said methodology?

POWELL:
Yes. By thinking about it. How do you determine such things?

Who says these thoughts are metaphyscially fruitful? I have no reassurance that these flights of fancy are such... though they are fun, I would say.

POWELL:
English majors aren't the only ones who need good communication skills.

(Shrugs) I mainly concentrate on content.

[John Powell]

POWELL:
Probably in a discussion forum you shouldn't make claims about things you aren't willing to respond to questions about.

WYZAARD:
I would add that you shouldn't make claims about things that you aren't willing to provide adiquate justification for.

POWELL:
I agree that generally you shouldn't.

POWELL:
I don't see why.

WYZAARD:
You claim it, you show it... a nice rule, but you can chuck it if you'd like. Just remember it gets massier from here on out if you do.

POWELL:
Yes, it's a nice rule.

POWELL:
Isn't that circular?

WYZAARD:
Yep, it's conventionally bound... hense the impossibility I was speaking of, namely the imossibility of speaking of such matters with any adiquately justified certainty.

POWELL:
It's not much of a criticism that X is speculation if all the others are too.

WYZAARD:
It is, if someone such as yourself is claiming it is not.

POWELL:
If someone such as myself is claiming it is not what?

POWELL:
Preserve sensibility. That's a good thing, yes?

. . .

The result is preserved sensibility.

WYZAARD:
What does this mean, and why is it a 'must'?

POWELL:
What does what mean? "Preserved sensibility"? Another phrase is "truth preserving." Why is what a must? Do you mean the conclusion of a valid argument given the truth of the premises?

WYZAARD:
By thinking about it. I can't seem to come up with anything superior or even coherently imagine doing so.

Do you have a suggestion for something superior?

WYZAARD:
Why is that my problem? You're the one with the omni-justification issues... don't argue from ignorance.

POWELL:
Why is it your problem? Maybe because you desire an answer?

Don't argue from ignorance? Do I have a realistic option to argue from certain knowledge?

POWELL:
There is a difference between the real and the imaginary.

WYZAARD:
Geochron, as well as Bertie Russell, answered this better than I have...

POWELL:
"Unless" doesn't seem to belong there since there are other possible uses.

WYZAARD:
But I have chosen to use it thusly... come on! :)

POWELL:
Then your word choice seems ill advised. Does that surprise either of us?

POWELL:
How are those begged questions? Are you saying you don't think efficient, reliable, and objective are elements of a good method?

WYZAARD:
Of course not... for bounded epistmic issues. However:

POWELL:
What's a good example of a "bounded epistmic [sic] issue"?

POWELL:
What establishes its authority? Success.

WYZAARD:
How would we independantly verify a satisfied metaphyscial claim in order to justify said methodology?

POWELL:
I don't know. Do you? Is it required that we do that?

POWELL:
Yes. By thinking about it. How do you determine such things?

WYZAARD:
Who says these thoughts are metaphyscially fruitful?

POWELL:
Who says it matters enough to worry about?

WYZAARD:
I have no reassurance that these flights of fancy are such... though they are fun, I would say.

POWELL:
English majors aren't the only ones who need good communication skills.

WYZAARD:
(Shrugs) I mainly concentrate on content.

POWELL:
In my experience, careless writers tend to be careless thinkers.

John Powell

[geochron]

Sorry for the delay in replying. I decided to mull things over for a while. (Though I get a sense of having written some of this before - I hope I'm not repeating myself.)

Throughout, "imagined" corresponds to "non-existent". My aim is to show problems that arise when one considers "non-existent" to be a property of things.

POWELL:

If you replace "exists" with "is" then it works for me.

[...]

Not when you allow for imaginary things and restrict "exists" for real things.

In general, if I say "there is a red car" I'm not including the possibility that it is imaginary. If I tell my wife her dinner is ready, she's not happy if I mean only in my imagination.

I would assert that "There is a red car" means "A red car exists". Do you disagree?

So what to do about "there are imaginary things"? My solution is to say that "imaginary" is not a property of "things". It is a qualifier of "there are".

POWELL:
Whatever. Are you agreeable to considering "non existent" or "fictional" or "fantasy" as mental labels to attach to the imaginary thing when it pops back up in our imagination? If yes then that's basically what I mean by an imaginary property.

POWELL:
Being imaginary isn't a "real" property in the sense of "real" I've been using. It's an imaginary property.

Imagine a world with a red car in it.
In the imagined world, the car is red.
In the imagined world, the car is not imaginary.

As far as I can see. you use "imaginary property" to cover both properties you imagine the car to have (red) and properties you imagine the car not to have (being imaginary).

Our discussions concern things we imagine. We discuss the things in our imagination. Whether there are corresponding things in the real world is a separate matter. For example, if a Muslim and Mormon argue about their respective Gods are they arguing about real Gods or the Gods they imagine are real? When we discuss Jesus or God or Gerald Ford are we really doing any differently?

I don't see how this is different in either of our interpretations. From my point of view, they discuss the properties their Gods would have if they were real.

POWELL:
Well, what you said is absurd unless you clarify it to mean "the red car I am imagining is not a real red car."

In general I don't think it is necessary to clarify that something one imagines is not real. If it were a red car it would not be imaginary.

POWELL:
The imaginary property of red can be different than the real property of red.

Then there is no way to know what you mean when you say you imagine something to be red.

I think this illustrates another problem. I can only understand a property if you can point to real things that have that property. Words for properties that only "imaginary things" can have convey no meaning. "Imaginary" in "there is an imaginary thing" is understood because it is a negation of "there is", not because it is a property of a thing.

[John Powell]

GEOCHRON:
Sorry for the delay in replying. I decided to mull things over for a while. (Though I get a sense of having written some of this before - I hope I'm not repeating myself.)

POWELL:
No problem.

GEOCHRON:
Throughout, "imagined" corresponds to "non-existent".

POWELL:
I'm ok with that. I'll adopt that with you here. However, don't equate "real" with "is" and "imaginary" with "isn't" or we'll have problems.

GEOCHRON:
My aim is to show problems that arise when one considers "non-existent" to be a property of things.

POWELL:
Go for it. To be more precise, I think you should say ". . . when one considers 'non-existent' to be a property of imaginary things." That's the controversy between us. We agree that it would be an error to consider "non-existent" to be a property of real things.

POWELL:
If you replace "exists" with "is" then it works for me.

...

Not when you allow for imaginary things and restrict "exists" for real things.

GEOCHRON:
In general, if I say "there is a red car" I'm not including the possibility that it is imaginary.

POWELL:
Then you err because there is that possibility in general.

GEOCHRON:
If I tell my wife her dinner is ready, she's not happy if I mean only in my imagination.

POWELL:
Don't confuse "actual" with "possible." If you tell your wife that POSSIBLY dinner is ready is she similarly upset?

GEOCHRON:
I would assert that "There is a red car" means "A red car exists". Do you disagree?

POWELL:
Yes, I disagree if we restrict "exists" to "real." "There is a red car" could mean "There is a red car in the imagination."

GEOCHRON:
So what to do about "there are imaginary things"? My solution is to say that "imaginary" is not a property of "things". It is a qualifier of "there are".

POWELL:
Does that produce any important differences in how imaginary things should be handled other than affirming your position that "imaginary" isn't a property?

POWELL:
Whatever. Are you agreeable to considering "non existent" or "fictional" or "fantasy" as mental labels to attach to the imaginary thing when it pops back up in our imagination? If yes then that's basically what I mean by an imaginary property.

. . .

Being imaginary isn't a "real" property in the sense of "real" I've been using. It's an imaginary property.

GEOCHRON:
Imagine a world with a red car in it.

POWELL:
Ok. Got it. It was on sale.

GEOCHRON:
In the imagined world, the car is red.

POWELL:
Yep. My girlfriend is driving it and smiling.

GEOCHRON:
In the imagined world, the car is not imaginary.

POWELL:
Huh? Isn't that self-contradictory?

GEOCHRON:
As far as I can see. you use "imaginary property" to cover both properties you imagine the car to have (red) and properties you imagine the car not to have (being imaginary).

POWELL:
AFAICS, you're confusing real things and imaginary things. You should realize that the real car is not the imaginary car. They correspond, they map to each other, but they aren't the same thing. They are different things.

I would say that the real car has real properties while the imaginary car has imaginary properties.

POWELL:
Our discussions concern things we imagine. We discuss the things in our imagination. Whether there are corresponding things in the real world is a separate matter. For example, if a Muslim and Mormon argue about their respective Gods are they arguing about real Gods or the Gods they imagine are real? When we discuss Jesus or God or Gerald Ford are we really doing any differently?

GEOCHRON:
I don't see how this is different in either of our interpretations. From my point of view, they discuss the properties their Gods would have if they were real.

POWELL:
That's ok, but don't prohibit non believers from joining the discussion who wish to discuss the imaginary properties of the Mormon and Muslim Gods.

POWELL:
Well, what you said is absurd unless you clarify it to mean "the red car I am imagining is not a real red car."

GEOCHRON:
In general I don't think it is necessary to clarify that something one imagines is not real. If it were a red car it would not be imaginary.

POWELL:
It could be an imaginary red car. You mean if it were a REAL red car then it would not be imaginary.

POWELL:
The imaginary property of red can be different than the real property of red.

GEOCHRON:
Then there is no way to know what you mean when you say you imagine something to be red.

POWELL:
We live with such uncertainties. If we wish our imagination to correspond well to reality so that our decisions have the best chance of success then we need to make the imaginary things as similar as we can imagine to the real things.

GEOCHRON:
I think this illustrates another problem. I can only understand a property if you can point to real things that have that property. Words for properties that only "imaginary things" can have convey no meaning.

POWELL:
Do you understand pi = circumference / diameter? Can you point to any real circles with that property?

GEOCHRON:
"Imaginary" in "there is an imaginary thing" is understood because it is a negation of "there is", not because it is a property of a thing.

POWELL:
Not in my opinion. It's more like a negation of "there REALLY is."

John Powell

[geochron]

POWELL:
Then you err because there is that possibility in general.

Then you would be content to agree that there is a God (with no caveats)?

Geo: "There is a God".
Powell: "Yes".

But if I told someone else that you said God exists, you would disagree.

It's an interesting position.

POWELL:
Don't confuse "actual" with "possible." If you tell your wife that POSSIBLY dinner is ready is she similarly upset?

I think there's a clear difference between "it is possible that X is red" and "X is red". Possible is a statement about "X is red", not a statement about X. Ditto imaginary.

POWELL:

Yes, I disagree if we restrict "exists" to "real." "There is a red car" could mean "There is a red car in the imagination."

...or "A red car exists in the imagination".

POWELL:
Does that produce any important differences in how imaginary things should be handled other than affirming your position that "imaginary" isn't a property?

It comes up in discussions of the ontological argument. Roughly...

Conceive of the most useful car you can.
If imaginary and non-imaginary are properties of a car, it can either have the property imaginary or non-imaginary.
It is clearly a more useful car if it has the property non-imaginary.
Therefore it exists.

I'm curious what your solution to this is. Does the most useful car you can imagine exist. I would say that any car would be more useful if you owned it. So do you own the most useful car you can imagine?

POWELL:
Ok. Got it. It was on sale.

POWELL:
Yep. My girlfriend is driving it and smiling.

POWELL:
Huh? Isn't that [in an imagined world something is not imaginary] self-contradictory?

No, I don't think so. Thurber imagined Walter Mitty was hen pecked. And he imagined that Walter Mitty imagined he was a pilot. I think you would say that "hen-pecked husband" and "pilot" were both imaginary properties of Walter Mitty, even though he really was a hen-pecked husband in the imaginary world and really wasn't a pilot in the imaginary world.

Suppose "imaginary" (non-existent) and "real" (existing) are properties of things (as I understand you to say).
Can you not imagine some thing to have the property "real"?

POWELL:
Do you understand pi = circumference / diameter? Can you point to any real circles with that property?

Is a circle a thing in the sense we are discussing? I think there is a whole different discussion there.

[John Powell]

POWELL:
Then you err because there is that possibility in general.

GEOCHRON:
Then you would be content to agree that there is a God (with no caveats)?

Geo: "There is a God".
Powell: "Yes".

But if I told someone else that you said God exists, you would disagree.

It's an interesting position.

POWELL:
Curious isn't it?

There is a God in your imagination.

If given the opportunity, I would try to clarify that I don't believe that the Christian God exists outside the imagination, but I believe that the Christian God is a set of imaginary entities in the minds of human persons.

I believe that statues and the universe and money exist so if "God" is equated to a statue or to the universe or to money then I believe those Gods exist.

POWELL:
Don't confuse "actual" with "possible." If you tell your wife that POSSIBLY dinner is ready is she similarly upset?

GEOCHRON:
I think there's a clear difference between "it is possible that X is red" and "X is red". Possible is a statement about "X is red", not a statement about X. Ditto imaginary.

POWELL:
There is a clear difference.

The statement "It is imaginary that X is red" is a direct statement about the imaginary redness of imaginary X. Perhaps the imaginary X corresponds to a real X (red or otherwise).

POWELL:
Yes, I disagree if we restrict "exists" to "real." "There is a red car" could mean "There is a red car in the imagination."

GEOCHRON:
...or "A red car exists in the imagination".

POWELL:
I would permit that. I would discourage language like "the imaginary car really exists" and "the real car is imaginary."

POWELL:
Does that produce any important differences in how imaginary things should be handled other than affirming your position that "imaginary" isn't a property?

GEOCHRON:
It comes up in discussions of the ontological argument. Roughly...

Conceive of the most useful car you can.
If imaginary and non-imaginary are properties of a car, it can either have the property imaginary or non-imaginary.
It is clearly a more useful car if it has the property non-imaginary.
Therefore it exists.

POWELL:
Interesting argument. It would seem that the most useful car you can imagine isn't going to be a real one since your powers of imagination surpass the powers of the universe to produce. Practical people realize that the ideal situations rarely, if ever, obtain except in the imagination.

GEOCHRON:
I'm curious what your solution to this is.

POWELL:
Ok.

GEOCHRON:
Does the most useful car you can imagine exist.

POWELL:
Not outside your imagination.

GEOCHRON:
I would say that any car would be more useful if you owned it. So do you own the most useful car you can imagine?

POWELL:
Nope. I can imagine much more useful cars than the one I really own.

POWELL:
Ok. Got it. It was on sale.

. . .

Yep. My girlfriend is driving it and smiling.

. . .

Huh? Isn't that [in an imagined world something is not imaginary] self-contradictory?

GEOCHRON:
No, I don't think so.

POWELL:
Odd.

GEOCHRON:
Thurber imagined Walter Mitty was hen pecked. And he imagined that Walter Mitty imagined he was a pilot. I think you would say that "hen-pecked husband" and "pilot" were both imaginary properties of Walter Mitty, . . .

POWELL:
Yes.

GEOCHRON:
. . . even though he really was a hen-pecked husband in the imaginary world and really wasn't a pilot in the imaginary world.

POWELL:
I discourage you from using "really imaginary." It causes similar problems to saying "actually possible."

GEOCHRON:
Suppose "imaginary" (non-existent) and "real" (existing) are properties of things (as I understand you to say).

Can you not imagine some thing to have the property "real"?

POWELL:
Yes, I can imagine that. Similarly, I can imagine a possible world as the actual world. However, I try to be careful to not confuse the real with the imaginary and not confuse the actual with the possible.

POWELL:
Do you understand pi = circumference / diameter? Can you point to any real circles with that property?

GEOCHRON:
Is a circle a thing in the sense we are discussing? I think there is a whole different discussion there.

POWELL:
Yes, a circle is a thing. Every thing is a thing.

You said "I can only understand a property if you can point to real things that have that property" so I was challenging that by posting a potential counter-example.

John Powell

[geochron]

POWELL:
Curious isn't it?

There is a God in your imagination.

If given the opportunity, I would try to clarify that I don't believe that the Christian God exists outside the imagination, but I believe that the Christian God is a set of imaginary entities in the minds of human persons.

I believe that statues and the universe and money exist so if "God" is equated to a statue or to the universe or to money then I believe those Gods exist.

Nonetheless, in the bare bones of it you believe that there is a God.

POWELL:
There is a clear difference.

The statement "It is imaginary that X is red" is a direct statement about the imaginary redness of imaginary X. Perhaps the imaginary X corresponds to a real X (red or otherwise).

If I see a blue car and imagine it is red, it is imaginary that the blue car is red. I wouldn't say that there is a blue car and a corresponding red car that has the property imaginary.

POWELL:
I would permit that. I would discourage language like "the imaginary car really exists" and "the real car is imaginary."

I discourage you from using "really imaginary." It causes similar problems to saying "actually possible."

What is wrong with "I imagine a car with the property 'existing' "?

GEOCHRON:
Conceive of the most useful car you can.
If imaginary and non-imaginary are properties of a car, it can either have the property imaginary or non-imaginary.
It is clearly a more useful car if it has the property non-imaginary.
Therefore it exists.


POWELL:
Interesting argument. It would seem that the most useful car you can imagine isn't going to be a real one since your powers of imagination surpass the powers of the universe to produce. Practical people realize that the ideal situations rarely, if ever, obtain except in the imagination.

Of course I agree with you that the conclusion is not correct. But where is the flaw in the argument? My explanation is that it treats "existence" and "non-existence" as properties like "red" or "doing 50 mpg" and that existence is not a property of things in this way.

The most useful car I can conceive of has the property red.
The most useful car I can conceive of has the property "doing 50 mpg".
The most useful car I can conceive of has the property "existing".

Where is the difference?

Both these statements seems true to me if "existence" is a property...

The most useful car I can conceive of has the property "not existing".
Any car is more useful if it has the property "existing".

...yet together they are paradoxical.

If existence is a property, is it a property that you can't conceive of something having? If you can conceive of something having that property, that thing is more useful if it does have that property.

POWELL:
Yes, a circle is a thing. Every thing is a thing.

You said "I can only understand a property if you can point to real things that have that property" so I was challenging that by posting a potential counter-example.

A circle is the locus of points that are a fixed distance from a defined point. In planar geometry it is derivable from this statement that the circumference and diameter are in fixed ratio. pi is defined as this ratio.

I'm not sure that I agree that a circle is a thing in the sense that a car is a thing - as I say, I think that is a different discussion. I also don't think that the pi "property" is the same sort of property as red or (your use) "existence", since it is not logically possible that a circle in a plane might have a different ratio of circumference to diameter than pi.

What is the relationship between properties and things? Could there be a thing with no properties? Perhaps a "thing" is identified with certain necessary properties - "a thing is a bag of properties"- to say a thing lacks one of these properties is logically impossible because they are part of the definition of that thing. Associated with any thing can be extra, possible properties. As I understand it we are discussing whether existence and non-existence should be considered as possible properties of things.