Answers to Atheistic arguments

[John Powell]

An acorn has the potency to become a tree. The acorn is a necessary being to the contingency of a future tree. The tree that produced the acorn is necessary being to the contingent potency of the acorn.

It's all turtles all the way down.

Now, explain logical worlds please.

POWELL:
It's not logically necessary that there be acorns. They actually exist on Earth (i.e. they exist in the actual world), but under other possible circumstances (other possible "worlds") such as the situation in which a massive collision made Earth uninhabitable then there would never have been acorns, so in that possible "world", acorns don't exist.

You can say that, necessarily, if man M exists then man M had parents, but it's not necessary that man M exist.

John Powell

[johnmartin]

: Originally posted by johnmartin

Now explain why there can't be two prime movers that are both everywhere. Otherwise you're still just assuming that there is only one prime mover.

Even if there are multiple beings in the same location, whatever difference they have is a potency.

No explanation, just a retreat to a former unsupported assertion.

Explanation given on previous post concerning privation and negation.



No it wasn't. Nowhere have you explained why there cannot be two prime movers. You merely assert there cannot be two prime movers, and justify this by asserting that any two candidates must have a difference such that only one has a JM_potency wrt the other.

You have not explained why there cannot exist two prime movers which are either identical, or which differ in a way not covered by your list of nine properties. Nor have you explained why your supposed unique prime mover must lack all JM_potencies of all other entities.

A self evident contradiction is had in the statement “two prime movers which are either identical”. If they are properly identical then they are not many, but one. Identity is one and not many.

Show me how anything can differ in a way not found in that list. IOW don’t use anything in that list to show how two prime movers can differ. I suggest you don’t try because the categories cover everything in the real.

JM

[johnmartin]

POWELL:
It's a being that isn't logically necessary. It's a being for which it's possible (there are logically possible worlds) that it doesn't exist. It's a being for which maybe it doesn't exist.


JOHN MARTIN:
A contingent being is of itself indifferent to exist of not exist, or IOW is indifferent to happen or not. We know a being is contingent from the fact that things change and suffer the loss of existence.


POWELL:
We are confident that a particular being X is contingent because we can imagine a logically possible world in which it doesn't exist and we can't see that the statement "X does not exist" is self-contradictory.

Theists who affirm that God is necessary have a tough time imagining that God does not exist.

You confuse imaginary with the real. The proof for God from contingency shows the contingent to be in the real and conclusion of a necessary being is then also real.

You say a particular being (maybe = confident) is contingent because we can imagine it not existing. But the fallacy in this argument is that a contingent being is known from its nature through its actions, which you have ignored. We observe in the real things coming into and going out of existence and change. These facts are not imaginary, but are real. From it is determined what a contingent being is. The proofs are based in the real and conclude to God in the real. Your imagination argument ignores this.

JOHN MARTIN:
For example trees grow and thereby change, they also come into existence and go out of existence. From this we know that a tree is not the cause of its own existence. Why? Because if it were, it would have existed before it existed. Change and indifference to existence then concludes to contingent beings are necessarily dependent upon an efficient cause for its existence. a tree is then caused to exist by other and this cause is ultimately the only necessary universal cause that keeps all contingent beings in existence.

POWELL:
Some of that is correct. Because trees appear to be transitory rather than eternal, a particular tree that existed yesterday might fail to appear today because somebody burnt it up, we are confident that trees are contingent rather than necessary.

Good you admit trees are contingent beings. Now the tree is then not the cause of its own existence but must then be efficiently caused by another. This other is the necessary be which is God. There is no escaping this conclusion.

JOHN MARTIN:
Or IOW, any being that has potency is a contingent being. Any being with potency is then kept in existence through efficient causation by a being that does not have potency, but is pure act. To be pure act is to have identity of essence and be, and this is to be the necessary being.

POWELL:
AFAICT, potency/act isn't logically connected with contingent/necessary. I don't see that if X is contingent it can't have potency or if X is necessary then it can't have potency.

Potency and act are the following

1. The most fundamental modes of being
2. Are analogous to each other
3. Are contrary to each other as positive opposing positive.
4. Complement each other – for every act that is limited, the act is limited by its complementary potency. For example a substance of dog is limited to this particular dog through the cause of potency in the order of substance. The weight, height and shape of the dog are limited by potencies in the order of accident. Each substantial act is complemented by a substantial potency and each accidental act is complemented by an accidental potency.
5. 5. Are necessary for a creature to exist. This necessity is only a property of the nature of a creature where the creature is in itself only a contingent being. The existence of potency and act in creatures is then understood to be only relatively necessary based on the existence of a limited being, which is contingent. However absolute necessity is required of the singular necessary being which is not composed of potency and act, which is God.

On the contrary, one could argue that potency and act are both necessary things, a world without them wouldn't be a logically possible world.

Only relatively necessary based on the nature of a contingent being. This then gets us back to the proof from contingency.

JOHN MARTIN:

Or IOW, a being composed of potency and act has the following.

Act is the cause of what is actual (does be).

Potency is the cause of the limit (can be).

Potency is then the limit of act.

Potency and act exist as a compound in beings with limit (any creature)

Potency is contrary to act

Contraries are diverse

What are of themselves diverse are not of themselves the cause of the unity

But in creatures potency and act are found united

therefore creatures are efficiently caused by another agent that unites the potency and act found in creatures.

This being that is the efficient cause of the contingent being (any creature) is then not composed of potency and act

This being is then pure act in every order of being, which means this being has identity of essence and be

For if essence and be in God were diverse, God would then be a contingent being efficiently caused by other

But to have God as a contingent being does not give sufficient reason to cause his own be and the be of other creatures (a contradiction is had)

Therefore God as the efficient cause of creatures, must be the only necessary be which is pure act, causing creatures to exist from one instant to the next. This conclusion is unavoidable from the nature of causation, the fact of change in creatures and contingency.\

POWELL:
Even if your argument worked, it would seem that the ultimate cause would be a logical concept such as "ultimate cause" rather than some personal being such as God or the IPU.

They are the same. I did not prove it above but it has been proven by Thomists.

You seem to be personifying concepts. That's poetry, not logic.

Its probably both and its legitimate.

JOHN MARTIN:

Summary argument

Creatures are limited

Creatures are then composed of potency and act

Potency and act are diverse

What are of themselves diverse are not of themselves the cause of the unity

Therefore, to keep potency and act united, creatures are efficiently caused by pure act, which is the necessary be.

This is God.

POWELL:
"Pure act" is a concept. It would be as wrong to personify it as to personify love or art or science.

Pure act is real. All the proofs for God are in the real.

Summary argument



From the conclusions of the five ways of Thomas we know there is a first mover, cause, necessary being, orderer and perfector containing all perfections.



As prime mover, there is no potency,

but bodies have potency

therefore God is not a body but a spirit as only a spirit can be pure act

as spirit is the root cause of the person

God is a person (known through reason alone).

POWELL:

A necessary being, on the other hand, is one that exists in every logically possible world. It's a being for which it's not logically possible that it doesn't exist. It's a being for which there is no maybe. It certainly exists.

Some theists claim that God is a necessary being, but of course atheists reject that.

JOHN MARTIN:
A necessary being is the being that cannot not exist, or IOW must exist.

I’m assuming the possible world argument is derived from a theory in physics. If other worlds do exist they too must comply with the modes of being which are potency and act which then concludes to the same necessary being. The necessary being then is the same in any possible world.



Further we are not in a possible world, but the real world and the proofs reflect the realities found in the real. Your argument, even if it was true, is neither relevant nor does it effect the proofs.

POWELL:

Yes. Atheists and wise theists acknowledge that it's logically possible that God does not exist.

An assertion without any proof and without any relevance to the proofs for God. To say God does not exist requires one to admit to many contradictions and absurdities. The proofs for God demonstrate this.

POWELL:

It's clear to me that God is a contingent thing. There is no logical requirement that God exist. There is nothing self contradictory about the statement "God does not exist." There are possible worlds in which God does not exist and the debate is whether the actual world is one of them.

JOHN MARTIN:
Its now clear God is the only necessary being. Also we now know what a contingent being is and what a necessary being is.

JM



POWELL:
But, John Martin, what would you say in the possible world in which you're an atheist?

You concede that it's logically possible that you're an atheist, yes?

John Powell

No. Your possible world argument has no foundation and is irrelevant to finding any errors in the proofs for God as shown above.



Do you want to make any further comment on movement before I post?

JM

[johnmartin]

Originally posted by Zeluvia

An acorn has the potency to become a tree. The acorn is a necessary being to the contingency of a future tree. The tree that produced the acorn is necessary being to the contingent potency of the acorn.

It's all turtles all the way down.

Now, explain logical worlds please.


POWELL:
It's not logically necessary that there be acorns. They actually exist on Earth (i.e. they exist in the actual world), but under other possible circumstances (other possible "worlds") such as the situation in which a massive collision made Earth uninhabitable then there would never have been acorns, so in that possible "world", acorns don't exist.

You can say that, necessarily, if man M exists then man M had parents, but it's not necessary that man M exist.

John Powell

You have not established the existence of other possible worlds nor the non existence of acorns in other possible worlds. The answer to the turtle problem is that there must be a first mover that is only analogously like the secondary causes in the series. This being is far superior to all secondary causes and is the universal cause of all causes.

JM

[johnmartin]

POWELL:

That you know that you actually exist (i.e., that you exist in the actual world) is no guarantee that you exist in every possible world. On the contrary, since there's nothing self-contradictory about the statement "Zeluvia does not exist," you are NOT a necessary being. There are possible worlds (of the imagination) in which you do not exist, such as in worlds in which your parents never married.

The possible world is then only imaginary. Your statement then that "since there's nothing self-contradictory about the statement "Zeluvia does not exist," has a real contradiction in the real world and a possible contradiction in an imaginary world. I'm amazed you don't seem to see this.

POWELL:

Yes. If there is a first cause then maybe it isn't sentient.



Some theists argue that the first cause must have free will in order to account for why the universe was created rather than wasn't, which free will would imply sentience.

God is a person as is proven in natural theology as a conclusion derived from the five ways of Thomas. Pure act can only be found in a spirit and spirit is the root cause of knowledge and knowledge is followed upon by an appetite, which is a will. God then is a person with intellect and will.

POWELL:

Yes. If there is a first cause then maybe it's either evil or apathetic.

This is to have a privation, which is a lack of perfection, which is not pure act, which is to have potency. God then cannot be evil as you say.

POWELL:

You seem to be a more reasonable person than John Martin.



John Powell

Only to the ignorant. JP makes up things as he goes along. He has no systematic belief, is illogical and has made the following errors including problems with his understanding -



1. Thinks geocentrism is related to the proofs for God. This one was a cracker jack error.

2. Thinks newtons equations disprove the proof from movement and he does this by mere assertion. He thereby makes no case in this respect, but thinks he has to fool the ignorant.

3. He thinks inertia some how disproves the proof from movement and he does this by mere assertion.

4. Doesn't know the difference between absolute and relative as proposed by his answer to my argument regarding cause required for an effect. He answered my proof of absolute nothing with an example of air in a box, which is only a relative nothing (really air is something).

5. Doesn't know what a definition is

6. Failed to give definitions for causation movement and inertia that were correct.

7. Doesn't know the difference between imaginary and the real as proposed by his possible worlds

8. Doesn't know what a possible is. He thinks its an imaginary being, but its really an objective potency.

9. He doesn't know what an object is. He confuses object with thing.

10. He doesn't know the difference between a cause and principle, nor principle and instrumental cause.

11. He insists I have the proof for God placed into a syllogism but never ever places his counter arguments into a syllogism (I find this very odd indeed).

12. He doesn't know what the difference between absolute and relative necessity is as exposed in his argument concerning potency and act.

13. He doesn't understand potency and act.

14. He doesn't understand being.

15. He doesn’t understand contingency and how we know things are contingent as evidenced by his response concerning contingency and imagination.

16. He consistently ignores my proofs and places counter arguments that do not answer the proofs. I find this incredible. For example his counter arguments concerning newtons equations, air in the box, imaginary world and inertia all ignored my arguments and making his responses irrelevant to the discussion and certainly irrelevant to the proofs for God.



These are all big problems and shows he is not capable of refuting the proof from movement which is the easiest proof to understand of the five proofs by Thomas. He will no doubt deny the above at least in part, but they are nevertheless all errors and holes in his understanding and method. I have found this to be typical of scientists at Tweb who try to argue in philosophy to the detriment of the truth.

So far the dialogue has been cordial and I'm hoping it remains so. I had to show some of the errors of JP to keep the dialogue in perspective.

Yes God does exist and the proofs remain unrefuted just as they have been since the time they were penned centuries ago.

JM

[John Powell]

POWELL:
It's a being that isn't logically necessary. It's a being for which it's possible (there are logically possible worlds) that it doesn't exist. It's a being for which maybe it doesn't exist.

JOHN MARTIN:
A contingent being is of itself indifferent to exist of not exist, or IOW is indifferent to happen or not. We know a being is contingent from the fact that things change and suffer the loss of existence.

POWELL:
We are confident that a particular being X is contingent because we can imagine a logically possible world in which it doesn't exist and we can't see that the statement "X does not exist" is self-contradictory.

Theists who affirm that God is necessary have a tough time imagining that God does not exist.

JOHN MARTIN:
You confuse imaginary with the real.

POWELL:
Not AFAICT. Imaginary means "exists in your thoughts" usually with the implication that it does not "exist outside your thoughts." "Real" means "exists outside your thoughts regardless whether it also exists in your thoughts."

JOHN MARTIN:
The proof for God from contingency shows the contingent to be in the real and conclusion of a necessary being is then also real.

POWELL:
If your proof worked then that's the kind of thing it should show.

JOHN MARTIN:
You say a particular being (maybe = confident) is contingent because we can imagine it not existing.

POWELL:
No, I don't. I say we are confident on that basis. We could be wrong. For example, we could think trees are contingent but they are necessary and exist in some state we are ignorant of.

JOHN MARTIN:
But the fallacy in this argument is that a contingent being is known from its nature through its actions, which you have ignored.

POWELL:
I ignore it because it seems to me to be irrelevant to whether or not a thing is contingent or necessary.

JOHN MARTIN:
We observe in the real things coming into and going out of existence and change. These facts are not imaginary, but are real.

POWELL:
So we believe. When wood burns does the matter go out of existence? People used to think so. Due to careful, detailed, repeatable observations, we now believe that the matter continues to exist.

JOHN MARTIN:
From it is determined what a contingent being is. The proofs are based in the real and conclude to God in the real. Your imagination argument ignores this.

POWELL:
Demonstrate the relevance. Post the argument that shows the relevance, something like that it's not possible that a necessary thing have potency. Try using "potency" as the thing that you claim isn't necessary.

JOHN MARTIN:
For example trees grow and thereby change, they also come into existence and go out of existence. From this we know that a tree is not the cause of its own existence. Why? Because if it were, it would have existed before it existed. Change and indifference to existence then concludes to contingent beings are necessarily dependent upon an efficient cause for its existence. a tree is then caused to exist by other and this cause is ultimately the only necessary universal cause that keeps all contingent beings in existence.

POWELL:
Some of that is correct. Because trees appear to be transitory rather than eternal, a particular tree that existed yesterday might fail to appear today because somebody burnt it up, we are confident that trees are contingent rather than necessary.

JOHN MARTIN:
Good you admit trees are contingent beings. Now the tree is then not the cause of its own existence but must then be efficiently caused by another. This other is the necessary be which is God. There is no escaping this conclusion.

POWELL:
But the "cause of the tree" may be nothing other than the "cause of the tree." There is no logical requirement AFAICT that the cause be some personal being. It could be "Nature."

JOHN MARTIN:
Or IOW, any being that has potency is a contingent being. Any being with potency is then kept in existence through efficient causation by a being that does not have potency, but is pure act. To be pure act is to have identity of essence and be, and this is to be the necessary being.

POWELL:
AFAICT, potency/act isn't logically connected with contingent/necessary. I don't see that if X is contingent it can't have potency or if X is necessary then it can't have potency.
Potency and act are the following

JOHN MARTIN:
The most fundamental modes of being
Are analogous to each other
Are contrary to each other as positive opposing positive.
Complement each other – for every act that is limited, the act is limited by its complementary potency. For example a substance of dog is limited to this particular dog through the cause of potency in the order of substance. The weight, height and shape of the dog are limited by potencies in the order of accident. Each substantial act is complemented by a substantial potency and each accidental act is complemented by an accidental potency.

5. Are necessary for a creature to exist. This necessity is only a property of the nature of a creature where the creature is in itself only a contingent being. The existence of potency and act in creatures is then understood to be only relatively necessary based on the existence of a limited being, which is contingent. However absolute necessity is required of the singular necessary being which is not composed of potency and act, which is God.

POWELL:
So you say. It's unclear to me that any personal being is necessary. On the contrary, it seems to me that any particular person will be contingent. Necessary things are things like logic.

POWELL:
On the contrary, one could argue that potency and act are both necessary things, a world without them wouldn't be a logically possible world.

JOHN MARTIN:
Only relatively necessary based on the nature of a contingent being. This then gets us back to the proof from contingency.

POWELL:
Do you think that "potency" and "act" exist in every logically possible world or do you think that there are some in which one or both do not exist?

JOHN MARTIN:
Or IOW, a being composed of potency and act has the following.

Act is the cause of what is actual (does be).

Potency is the cause of the limit (can be).

Potency is then the limit of act.

Potency and act exist as a compound in beings with limit (any creature)

Potency is contrary to act

Contraries are diverse

What are of themselves diverse are not of themselves the cause of the unity

But in creatures potency and act are found united

therefore creatures are efficiently caused by another agent that unites the potency and act found in creatures.

This being that is the efficient cause of the contingent being (any creature) is then not composed of potency and act

This being is then pure act in every order of being, which means this being has identity of essence and be

For if essence and be in God were diverse, God would then be a contingent being efficiently caused by other

But to have God as a contingent being does not give sufficient reason to cause his own be and the be of other creatures (a contradiction is had)

Therefore God as the efficient cause of creatures, must be the only necessary be which is pure act, causing creatures to exist from one instant to the next. This conclusion is unavoidable from the nature of causation, the fact of change in creatures and contingency.\

POWELL:
Even if your argument worked, it would seem that the ultimate cause would be a logical concept such as "ultimate cause" rather than some personal being such as God or the IPU.

JOHN MARTIN:
They are the same. I did not prove it above but it has been proven by Thomists.

POWELL:
I doubt it.

POWELL:
You seem to be personifying concepts. That's poetry, not logic.

JOHN MARTIN:
Its probably both and its legitimate.

POWELL:
Not AFAICT. Please post the supportive argument.

JOHN MARTIN:
Summary argument

Creatures are limited

Creatures are then composed of potency and act

Potency and act are diverse

What are of themselves diverse are not of themselves the cause of the unity

Therefore, to keep potency and act united, creatures are efficiently caused by pure act, which is the necessary be.

This is God.

POWELL:
"Pure act" is a concept. It would be as wrong to personify it as to personify love or art or science.

JOHN MARTIN:
Pure act is real. All the proofs for God are in the real.

POWELL:
Love is also real. That does not justify equating love with God. Love is an emotion. God, supposedly, is a person (or 3 of them).

JOHN MARTIN:
Summary argument

From the conclusions of the five ways of Thomas we know there is a first mover, cause, necessary being, orderer and perfector containing all perfections.

As prime mover, there is no potency,

but bodies have potency

therefore God is not a body but a spirit as only a spirit can be pure act

as spirit is the root cause of the person

God is a person (known through reason alone).

POWELL:
I don't know that so I doubt that you know it.

POWELL:
A necessary being, on the other hand, is one that exists in every logically possible world. It's a being for which it's not logically possible that it doesn't exist. It's a being for which there is no maybe. It certainly exists.

Some theists claim that God is a necessary being, but of course atheists reject that.

JOHN MARTIN:
A necessary being is the being that cannot not exist, or IOW must exist.

I’m assuming the possible world argument is derived from a theory in physics.

POWELL:
Nope. It's a philosophical construct.

JOHN MARTIN:
If other worlds do exist they too must comply with the modes of being which are potency and act which then concludes to the same necessary being. The necessary being then is the same in any possible world.

POWELL:
I'm talking about possible worlds, worlds that could be. I'm not talking about alleged actual worlds that exist outside our universe.

JOHN MARTIN:
Further we are not in a possible world, but the real world and the proofs reflect the realities found in the real. Your argument, even if it was true, is neither relevant nor does it effect the proofs.

POWELL:
We are in a possible world. It's a special possible world called the actual world.

POWELL:
Yes. Atheists and wise theists acknowledge that it's logically possible that God does not exist.

JOHN MARTIN:
An assertion without any proof and without any relevance to the proofs for God. To say God does not exist requires one to admit to many contradictions and absurdities. The proofs for God demonstrate this.

POWELL:
I fail to see the contradictions and absurdities that you see.

POWELL:
It's clear to me that God is a contingent thing. There is no logical requirement that God exist. There is nothing self contradictory about the statement "God does not exist." There are possible worlds in which God does not exist and the debate is whether the actual world is one of them.

JOHN MARTIN:
Its now clear God is the only necessary being. Also we now know what a contingent being is and what a necessary being is.

POWELL:
But, John Martin, what would you say in the possible world in which you're an atheist?

You concede that it's logically possible that you're an atheist, yes?

JOHN MARTIN:
No. Your possible world argument has no foundation and is irrelevant to finding any errors in the proofs for God as shown above.

POWELL:
So, it's impossible that John Martin is pretending to be a theist when he's actually an atheist? That's logically impossible? Why? Why can't an atheist pose as a theist? What's logically impossible about that in general and it being the case for you in particular?

JOHN MARTIN:
Do you want to make any further comment on movement before I post?

POWELL:
No.

POWELL:
That you know that you actually exist (i.e., that you exist in the actual world) is no guarantee that you exist in every possible world. On the contrary, since there's nothing self-contradictory about the statement "Zeluvia does not exist," you are NOT a necessary being. There are possible worlds (of the imagination) in which you do not exist, such as in worlds in which your parents never married.

JOHN MARTIN:
The possible world is then only imaginary.

POWELL:
All possible worlds are imaginary except the actual world. The practical problem is determining what precisely are the circumstances within the actual world. For example, an orphan may have grown up believing that in the actual world his biological parents were alive and living with him, but he found out later that's not the case. He was responding to a possible, but non actual world.

JOHN MARTIN:
Your statement then that "since there's nothing self-contradictory about the statement "Zeluvia does not exist," has a real contradiction in the real world and a possible contradiction in an imaginary world. I'm amazed you don't seem to see this.

POWELL:
The statement "Zeluvia does not exist" is not self-contradictory. What would be self-contradictory is the conjunction: "Zeluvia exists" and "It's not the case that Zeluvia exists."

POWELL:
Yes. If there is a first cause then maybe it isn't sentient.

. . .

Some theists argue that the first cause must have free will in order to account for why the universe was created rather than wasn't, which free will would imply sentience.

JOHN MARTIN:
God is a person as is proven in natural theology as a conclusion derived from the five ways of Thomas. Pure act can only be found in a spirit and spirit is the root cause of knowledge and knowledge is followed upon by an appetite, which is a will. God then is a person with intellect and will.

POWELL:
Spirit? That's supposed to be the substance God is composed of? What are the observable attributes of that? If there are no observable attributes then why do you believe it exists?

POWELL:
Yes. If there is a first cause then maybe it's either evil or apathetic.

JOHN MARTIN:
This is to have a privation, which is a lack of perfection, which is not pure act, which is to have potency. God then cannot be evil as you say.

POWELL:
God can be evil because the dictionary definition of God allows for it. There's nothing self-contradictory about "X is an evil God." If you try to define God so God cannot be evil then you will be begging the question among those who allow for it.

POWELL:
You seem to be a more reasonable person than John Martin.

JOHN MARTIN:
Only to the ignorant. JP makes up things as he goes along. He has no systematic belief, is illogical and has made the following errors including problems with his understanding -

1. Thinks geocentrism is related to the proofs for God. This one was a cracker jack error.

POWELL:
The Geocentrism of Thomas Aquinas affected his philosophical arguments for God. I believe that if Aquinas had lived post-Newton then he would not have promoted some of those arguments.

JOHN MARTIN:
2. Thinks newtons equations disprove the proof from movement and he does this by mere assertion. He thereby makes no case in this respect, but thinks he has to fool the ignorant.

POWELL:
I use Newtonian mechanics to show you don't understand the dynamics of spacial movement in ways similar to how Thomas Aquinas misunderstood. Where did I use it to DISPROVE something?

JOHN MARTIN:
3. He thinks inertia some how disproves the proof from movement and he does this by mere assertion.

POWELL:
I submit "inertia" as the better answer than "God" to explain motion in a straight line at constant speed.

JOHN MARTIN:
4. Doesn't know the difference between absolute and relative as proposed by his answer to my argument regarding cause required for an effect. He answered my proof of absolute nothing with an example of air in a box, which is only a relative nothing (really air is something).

POWELL:
Yes, air is something. So, when you say "absolutely nothing is in the box" what would you mean? Would you mean there's not even space within the box?

JOHN MARTIN:
5. Doesn't know what a definition is

POWELL:
Poppycock. You argued for a mistaken restriction on what a definition can be.

JOHN MARTIN:
6. Failed to give definitions for causation movement and inertia that were correct.

POWELL:
If you don't like them then perhaps we should use the appropriate dictionary definition.

JOHN MARTIN:
7. Doesn't know the difference between imaginary and the real as proposed by his possible worlds

POWELL:
I understand the difference. Demonstrate that you understand the difference:

If I were imagining a pink elephant then would that action be occuring in the actual world or in a non-actual possible world?

In what kind of logical world did it happen?

JOHN MARTIN:
8. Doesn't know what a possible is. He thinks its an imaginary being, but its really an objective potency.

POWELL:
I understand what "possible" means.

JOHN MARTIN:
9. He doesn't know what an object is. He confuses object with thing.

POWELL:
An object is a kind of thing. There are other kinds of things besides objects.

JOHN MARTIN:
10. He doesn't know the difference between a cause and principle, nor principle and instrumental cause.

POWELL:
You seem to be trying to personify principles like "ultimate cause" rather than acknowledging that they aren't persons.

JOHN MARTIN:
11. He insists I have the proof for God placed into a syllogism but never ever places his counter arguments into a syllogism (I find this very odd indeed).

POWELL:
What particular argument do you wish for me to formalize?

JOHN MARTIN:
12. He doesn't know what the difference between absolute and relative necessity is as exposed in his argument concerning potency and act.

POWELL:
You recently brought it up so maybe I don't understand it like you do.

JOHN MARTIN:
13. He doesn't understand potency and act.

POWELL:
I translate your "potency" into "has the potential to do X or be Y." I translate your "act" as "is doing X or being Y."

JOHN MARTIN:
14. He doesn't understand being.

POWELL:
Why do you say that?

JOHN MARTIN:
15. He doesn’t understand contingency and how we know things are contingent as evidenced by his response concerning contingency and imagination.

POWELL:
Perhaps my understanding differs from yours.

JOHN MARTIN:
16. He consistently ignores my proofs and places counter arguments that do not answer the proofs. I find this incredible. For example his counter arguments concerning newtons equations, air in the box, imaginary world and inertia all ignored my arguments and making his responses irrelevant to the discussion and certainly irrelevant to the proofs for God.

POWELL:
You don't seem to see the relevance that I see.

JOHN MARTIN:
These are all big problems and shows he is not capable of refuting the proof from movement which is the easiest proof to understand of the five proofs by Thomas. He will no doubt deny the above at least in part, but they are nevertheless all errors and holes in his understanding and method. I have found this to be typical of scientists at Tweb who try to argue in philosophy to the detriment of the truth.

POWELL:
That you claim they are errors and holes in my understanding does not make them so.

JOHN MARTIN:
So far the dialogue has been cordial and I'm hoping it remains so. I had to show some of the errors of JP to keep the dialogue in perspective.

POWELL:
That begs the question that I made those errors.

JOHN MARTIN:
Yes God does exist and the proofs remain unrefuted just as they have been since the time they were penned centuries ago.

POWELL:
I refute that.

Merely saying so does not constitute a disproof, but it does constitute a refutation.

Modern theist philosophers are more knowledgeable than Thomas Aquinas was. That's why they've discarded some of those old arguments in favor of others. Perhaps you should do likewise.

John Powell

[Roy]

A self evident contradiction is had in the statement “two prime movers which are either identical”. If they are properly identical then they are not many, but one. Identity is one and not many.[/color]

Identical does not imply identity, merely indistinguishableness.

Show me how anything can differ in a way not found in that list. IOW don’t use anything in that list to show how two prime movers can differ. I suggest you don’t try because the categories cover everything in the real.

Or do you suggest I don't try because you're afraid I wil succeed?

Anyway, repost the list.

Roy

[johnmartin]

Identical does not imply identity, merely indistinguishableness.

No identity means identity which means they are identical in every respect. This is unbelievable that you resort to word games to avoid the obvious error.

Or do you suggest I don't try because you're afraid I wil succeed?

Anyway, repost the list.

Roy

The categories are substance, action, passion, quality, quantity, habit, relation, where, when and posture. I'll give you a clue about potency and act and the categories. As potency and act are modes of being and the categories are beings . . .then, your attempt to show anything relevant to multiple prime movers either inside or your attempted outside new category will fail, because even your new category will fall under the genus of being, which has the modes of potency and act. Try if you will, but you will fail.

JM

[johnmartin]

POWELL:

We are confident that a particular being X is contingent because we can imagine a logically possible world in which it doesn't exist and we can't see that the statement "X does not exist" is self-contradictory.



Theists who affirm that God is necessary have a tough time imagining that God does not exist.





JOHN MARTIN:

You confuse imaginary with the real.





POWELL:

Not AFAICT. Imaginary means "exists in your thoughts" usually with the implication that it does not "exist outside your thoughts." "Real" means "exists outside your thoughts regardless whether it also exists in your thoughts."

Ok but you still have not recognised that the possible world or imaginary world does not relate in any way to the proofs and the conclusion of the proofs for God. To say it does shows you really do not understand how the imagination relates to the real and how you have misapplied it in an attempt to refute the proof from movement. It also shows you have not understood the proofs that are based in the real and not in the imagination or possible worlds. The proofs are in no way effected by your counter arguments. I suggest you leave this line of argument as it has been shown to be false.



Even if you insist on continuing this possible world argument you still have the problem of efficient causation of the imagination that is caused by other. This other is the necessary which is . . .

JOHN MARTIN:

The proof for God from contingency shows the contingent to be in the real and conclusion of a necessary being is then also real.





POWELL:

If your proof worked then that's the kind of thing it should show.

It does and it does.

JOHN MARTIN:

You say a particular being (maybe = confident) is contingent because we can imagine it not existing.





POWELL:

No, I don't. I say we are confident on that basis. We could be wrong. For example, we could think trees are contingent but they are necessary and exist in some state we are ignorant of.

Again you show you have not understood the argument presented. The argument proceeds by showing that anything that has a limit is from its very nature a contingent being an must be efficiently caused by another. As an infinite series per se subordinated is impossible, there must be a being that is not contingent, that efficiently causes all contingent beings to exist. This being is the necessary being.

JOHN MARTIN:

But the fallacy in this argument is that a contingent being is known from its nature through its actions, which you have ignored.





POWELL:

I ignore it because it seems to me to be irrelevant to whether or not a thing is contingent or necessary.

The proof stands regardless of you ignoring it. I suggest you either thoroughly rebut it or reconsider your position and reject atheism. I hope you do the later. It would be a victory for yourself and for God if you do.

From memory you stated somewhere that you were once a Mormon. If this is true then may I suggest that part of the reason you are now an atheist is that you were exposed to a false religion and found it to be abhorrent. From there you have moved to atheism, possibly through a process of disillusion and agnosticism and then . . .

But what if there really is a true religion out there that really does account for the real nature of man and God which you have not yet investigated? Maybe, just maybe your atheism would then disappear. I put it to you that the true religion is the Catholic faith. Maybe you could look into it in some depth. Its teachings can be found on the net in the catechism of the Catholic church.

JOHN MARTIN:

We observe in the real things coming into and going out of existence and change. These facts are not imaginary, but are real.





POWELL:

So we believe. When wood burns does the matter go out of existence? People used to think so. Due to careful, detailed, repeatable observations, we now believe that the matter continues to exist.

The (philosophical) matter (potency) of the wood goes back into primary matter of pure potency. The form of wood is changed into the form of ash and smoke through the ultimate disposition in the matter being change from wood to ash and smoke. This is the philosophical answer and the empirical answer complements this through the sense observation of change in chemical structure and states of existence of the wood from a solid to solid and smoke (gas). All this is a side issue not really related to the proofs anyway.

The proof from contingency only requires the facts of change and movement from existence to non existence. When we say existence, we mean existence as a complete substance through unity of substantial form and primary matter to effect the existence of the substance, wood. When the substance ceases to exist, the unity of the matter and form is removed and the form changes to result in a new substance as observed above. Nevertheless, the wood has ceased to exist as wood. This is all that is required for the proof.

JOHN MARTIN:

From it is determined what a contingent being is. The proofs are based in the real and conclude to God in the real. Your imagination argument ignores this.





POWELL:

Demonstrate the relevance. Post the argument that shows the relevance, something like that it's not possible that a necessary thing have potency. Try using "potency" as the thing that you claim isn't necessary.

Even your imagination is a contingent being that is caused by an efficient cause, which is you. Do see what I mean by contingent being? Even in the world of imagination and possibles, all images and all possibles still require an efficient cause in the real to keep them in existence. The ultimate efficient cause is then not contingent, but necessary, which is God.

JOHN MARTIN:

For example trees grow and thereby change, they also come into existence and go out of existence. From this we know that a tree is not the cause of its own existence. Why? Because if it were, it would have existed before it existed. Change and indifference to existence then concludes to contingent beings are necessarily dependent upon an efficient cause for its existence. a tree is then caused to exist by other and this cause is ultimately the only necessary universal cause that keeps all contingent beings in existence.



POWELL:

Some of that is correct. Because trees appear to be transitory rather than eternal, a particular tree that existed yesterday might fail to appear today because somebody burnt it up, we are confident that trees are contingent rather than necessary.





JOHN MARTIN:

Good you admit trees are contingent beings. Now the tree is then not the cause of its own existence but must then be efficiently caused by another. This other is the necessary be which is God. There is no escaping this conclusion.





POWELL:

But the "cause of the tree" may be nothing other than the "cause of the tree." There is no logical requirement AFAICT that the cause be some personal being. It could be "Nature."

Because the tree and nature are both contingent beings, then they are both efficiently caused by the only necessary being.

JOHN MARTIN:

Or IOW, any being that has potency is a contingent being. Any being with potency is then kept in existence through efficient causation by a being that does not have potency, but is pure act. To be pure act is to have identity of essence and be, and this is to be the necessary being.



POWELL:

AFAICT, potency/act isn't logically connected with contingent/necessary. I don't see that if X is contingent it can't have potency or if X is necessary then it can't have potency.

Any being with potency and act is a composed being.

If a being has potency and act it has a nature that is limited be its be, there is then a real distinction between the essence and the existence of the creature.



For example a dog has a canine nature and a finite existence united with that nature. We know the nature and the existence of dogs are really distinct because we know there are many distinct dogs of the same nature with different existences and we also know there are many other creatures such as cats and men and tree with distinct existences that have diverse natures from the dog. Therefore in creatures the essence and the existence of the creature are really diverse. There is nothing in



1. the essence of the creature as it is an essence, to exist (nothing in the nature of dog that the dog really exists)

2. the existence (be) of the creature that that nature exists (nothing in the notion of existence that it be a dog as existence is found in many things which are diverse natures).



The above two points are very important. Please try to understand them as it will show you that there must be a thing in every creature (which is not that creature) that has



1. the reason of the existence (be) in the essence of the thing (it is then very much unlike the creature), and



2. the essence of the thing in the very existence of the thing existing, for the creature to exist (it is then very much unlike the creature)



To account for how creatures that have essences and existences really diverse and yet are in the real found united, we conclude that there is a being that has a proper identity of essence and existence, or IOW essence = be. As this being properly has this identity it then must be the necessary being. This is God.



Lets look at it again in other words.



A dog is this particular dog called fido. Fido has the essence of canine. An essence is the ‘whatness’ of a thing. So if we ask the question what is Fido the answer is, Fido is a canine thing. If the ask does Fido exist, the answer to this is the be or existence. The be then answers the question ‘that a thing exists’. We can see that the first question gives a unique answer in the order of essence and the second in the order of being. As essence = whatness and being = thatness, whatness is not thatness, therefore essences and being are not the same, but diverse in the real.



But this concludes to a very real problem because in Fido we have two principles of action (two acts) within the same creature that are



1. of themselves really diverse (one does not cause the other), but yet

2. are found to be really united (together) for Fido to exist in the real.



But within the order of essence there is nothing to cause the essence to exist in the real and within the order of existence there is nothing in it for a particular essence to exist in the real. The reason for Fido to exist cannot be from either Fidos own essence or Fidos own be. Fido must then be efficiently caused by another to unit the diverse essence abd existence in Fido.



Or IOW - We can imagine Fido and his essence, but he then only has an imaginary existence and not the real existence of the real Fido that bites Johns leg. Why is this so? Its because the essence of Fido imagined in no way has any causal power to cause Fido to be caused to exist in the real.



The only conclusion that can solve this very real problem is that there must be an essence in the real which is its own be in the real that



1. unites the diverse principles of essence and be in creatures, and

2. has the own reason of be from itself.



This being then is its own being by nature and all other beings (creatures) are said to have being by participation. God then is the subsistent be, whose very nature is to exist. God then is the universal efficient cause of both essence and existences of all creatures.



In summary for Fido to exist he must have



A canine essence = substantial form

An existence – be

A limit to the be and form received – primary matter



Fido is then a composite of substantial form + be + primary matter all or which are really diverse but are required to be united for Fido to be a real dog. The only being that can unite the diverse in a composed creature, is the being that does not have any potency (hence no primary matter) and an identity of essence and be. This essence and be is then only analogously like that of the creature and has a presence within the creature according to a conserving power. The identity of essence and be is then to have its own reason of be, which is then to be a subsistent be.

JOHN MARTIN

Potency and act are the following

The most fundamental modes of being

Are analogous to each other

Are contrary to each other as positive opposing positive.

Complement each other – for every act that is limited, the act is limited by its complementary potency. For example a substance of dog is limited to this particular dog through the cause of potency in the order of substance. The weight, height and shape of the dog are limited by potencies in the order of accident. Each substantial act is complemented by a substantial potency and each accidental act is complemented by an accidental potency.



5. Are necessary for a creature to exist. This necessity is only a property of the nature of a creature where the creature is in itself only a contingent being. The existence of potency and act in creatures is then understood to be only relatively necessary based on the existence of a limited being, which is contingent. However absolute necessity is required of the singular necessary being which is not composed of potency and act, which is God.





POWELL:

So you say. It's unclear to me that any personal being is necessary. On the contrary, it seems to me that any particular person will be contingent. Necessary things are things like logic.

Fair enough. I only presented a summary argument on another post. It does assume much knowledge. The existence of a spirit and that being a person is based on the doctrine of Thomas’ moderate realism that requires a power to be proportional to its act. We know men think in the abstract, but the abstract is to act above the physical, in an immaterial manner. This then requires an immaterial power to do an immaterial act. Immateriality is then the root cause of abstract knowledge and it is also the formal cause of the existence of the person. Therefore wherever there is a knower abstracting, there is spirit and therefore there is a person. This is the fundamentals of the proof. OR even more simply – Pure act -> (not body) spirit -> person, therefore as the first mover is pure act, it is a person. God is then a person. Essentially the proof is that simple.

POWELL:

On the contrary, one could argue that potency and act are both necessary things, a world without them wouldn't be a logically possible world.



JOHN MARTIN:

Only relatively necessary based on the nature of a contingent being. This then gets us back to the proof from contingency.



POWELL:

Do you think that "potency" and "act" exist in every logically possible world or do you think that there are some in which one or both do not exist?

Yes they exist in every logically possible world. A possible world is objective potency.

JOHN MARTIN:

Or IOW, a being composed of potency and act has the following.



Act is the cause of what is actual (does be).

Potency is the cause of the limit (can be).

Potency is then the limit of act.

Potency and act exist as a compound in beings with limit (any creature)

Potency is contrary to act

Contraries are diverse

What are of themselves diverse are not of themselves the cause of the unity

But in creatures potency and act are found united

therefore creatures are efficiently caused by another agent that unites the potency and act found in creatures.

This being that is the efficient cause of the contingent being (any creature) is then not composed of potency and act

This being is then pure act in every order of being, which means this being has identity of essence and be

For if essence and be in God were diverse, God would then be a contingent being efficiently caused by other

But to have God as a contingent being does not give sufficient reason to cause his own be and the be of other creatures (a contradiction is had)

Therefore God as the efficient cause of creatures, must be the only necessary be which is pure act, causing creatures to exist from one instant to the next. This conclusion is unavoidable from the nature of causation, the fact of change in creatures and contingency.



POWELL:

Even if your argument worked, it would seem that the ultimate cause would be a logical concept such as "ultimate cause" rather than some personal being such as God or the IPU.

They are both the same. The ultimate cause can be proven to be a person. I’ve shown this briefly above.

JOHN MARTIN:

They are the same. I did not prove it above but it has been proven by Thomists.



POWELL:

I doubt it.

Proven above

POWELL:

You seem to be personifying concepts. That's poetry, not logic.



JOHN MARTIN:

Its probably both and its legitimate.



POWELL:

Not AFAICT. Please post the supportive argument.

God is a person as shown above. As a side issue it is note worthy that Christianity is a personalist world view that is pretty much unique in many respects. Personalism is almost non existent outside religion, except for metaphors regarding mother earth and humanist philosophy (which only has a vague understanding of the human person and virtually no understanding of the divine person).



However even in the other mono theistic religions the personalism of God is greatly restricted to a distant deity or strict overlord who is greatly dis-interested in men (especially in Islam). The God of Christianity and of Catholicism in particular is very personal and very much involved in human events, in fact in every event in the universe no matter how small. This personalism is found both in reason and in the sources of revelation and is one of many big evidences of the truth of the Christian faith. To be personal is to be real and to be Christian. After all heaven has been revealed according to several metaphors but essentially it is to know a person = to know the Father.

JOHN MARTIN:

If other worlds do exist they too must comply with the modes of being which are potency and act which then concludes to the same necessary being. The necessary being then is the same in any possible world.



POWELL:

I'm talking about possible worlds, worlds that could be. I'm not talking about alleged actual worlds that exist outside our universe.

The proofs are applied in both the actual and any possible world.

POWELL:

Yes. If there is a first cause then maybe it's either evil or apathetic.



JOHN MARTIN:

This is to have a privation, which is a lack of perfection, which is not pure act, which is to have potency. God then cannot be evil as you say.



POWELL:

God can be evil because the dictionary definition of God allows for it. There's nothing self-contradictory about "X is an evil God." If you try to define God so God cannot be evil then you will be begging the question among those who allow for it.

I’m talking about the real God as derived from natural theology. The other gods are only myths.

POWELL:

You seem to be a more reasonable person than John Martin.



JOHN MARTIN:

Only to the ignorant. JP makes up things as he goes along. He has no systematic belief, is illogical and has made the following errors including problems with his understanding -



1. Thinks geocentrism is related to the proofs for God. This one was a cracker jack error.



POWELL:

The Geocentrism of Thomas Aquinas affected his philosophical arguments for God. I believe that if Aquinas had lived post-Newton then he would not have promoted some of those arguments.

You haven’t shown this. The proofs remain regardless of geo or helio or any other cosmology being true.

JOHN MARTIN:

2. Thinks newtons equations disprove the proof from movement and he does this by mere assertion. He thereby makes no case in this respect, but thinks he has to fool the ignorant.



POWELL:

I use Newtonian mechanics to show you don't understand the dynamics of spacial movement in ways similar to how Thomas Aquinas misunderstood. Where did I use it to DISPROVE something?

From memory you only asserted this by reference to inertia and in no way did you show the proofs deny inertia. You did infer the proofs were no longer valid due to modern understanding of motion.

JOHN MARTIN:

3. He thinks inertia some how disproves the proof from movement and he does this by mere assertion.



POWELL:

I submit "inertia" as the better answer than "God" to explain motion in a straight line at constant speed.

We shall discover soon enough that inertia is not the full story and there is more to movement than most know.

JOHN MARTIN:

4. Doesn't know the difference between absolute and relative as proposed by his answer to my argument regarding cause required for an effect. He answered my proof of absolute nothing with an example of air in a box, which is only a relative nothing (really air is something).



POWELL:

Yes, air is something. So, when you say "absolutely nothing is in the box" what would you mean? Would you mean there's not even space within the box?

I mean nothing is non being. That all I’m saying.

JOHN MARTIN:

5. Doesn't know what a definition is



POWELL:

Poppycock. You argued for a mistaken restriction on what a definition can be.

Definitions are derived from the natures of things. You denied this.

JOHN MARTIN:

9. He doesn't know what an object is. He confuses object with thing.



POWELL:

An object is a kind of thing. There are other kinds of things besides objects.

An object is what is presented to a power. For example a tree is known under the object of illuminated color presented to the power of sight, under the object of roughness to the power of touch, the object of sound to hearing and so on.

JOHN MARTIN:

11. He insists I have the proof for God placed into a syllogism but never ever places his counter arguments into a syllogism (I find this very odd indeed).



POWELL:

What particular argument do you wish for me to formalize?

Any argument that concludes with God does not exist or a denial of Gods existence doesn’t require contradiction. Any of your big statements can be placed into a syllogism as you wish.

JOHN MARTIN:

13. He doesn't understand potency and act.



POWELL:

I translate your "potency" into "has the potential to do X or be Y." I translate your "act" as "is doing X or being Y."

JOHN MARTIN:

14. He doesn't understand being.



POWELL:

Why do you say that?

Potency and act and being are used in the contingency argument that you did not understand. You also don’t seem to understand what the necessary being is. Many think it is univocal to created being, when God is actually analogically related to creatures.

JOHN MARTIN:

15. He doesn’t understand contingency and how we know things are contingent as evidenced by his response concerning contingency and imagination.



POWELL:

Perhaps my understanding differs from yours.

JOHN MARTIN:

16. He consistently ignores my proofs and places counter arguments that do not answer the proofs. I find this incredible. For example his counter arguments concerning newtons equations, air in the box, imaginary world and inertia all ignored my arguments and making his responses irrelevant to the discussion and certainly irrelevant to the proofs for God.





POWELL:

You don't seem to see the relevance that I see.

There is no relevance in the manner that your arguments refute the proofs. Other than that they are only side issues that have limited interest value and nothing more.

JOHN MARTIN:

These are all big problems and shows he is not capable of refuting the proof from movement which is the easiest proof to understand of the five proofs by Thomas. He will no doubt deny the above at least in part, but they are nevertheless all errors and holes in his understanding and method. I have found this to be typical of scientists at Tweb who try to argue in philosophy to the detriment of the truth.



POWELL:

That you claim they are errors and holes in my understanding does not make them so.

Your counter arguments consistently miss the gist of the proofs.

JOHN MARTIN:

So far the dialogue has been cordial and I'm hoping it remains so. I had to show some of the errors of JP to keep the dialogue in perspective.



POWELL:

That begs the question that I made those errors.

I know they were errors. I’ve shown briefly above that you do not understand several of the notions previously presented. This is critical when trying to rebut the proofs.

JOHN MARTIN:

Yes God does exist and the proofs remain unrefuted just as they have been since the time they were penned centuries ago.





POWELL:

I refute that.

So far you haven’t and I’m willing to bet you nor anybody else ever will. To refute the proofs you first of all need to be familiar with the terminology used in Thomism.

Merely saying so does not constitute a disproof, but it does constitute a refutation.

You haven’t done either. You have shown you are not familiar with Thomist terminology which is to be expected. I know you want to think you have refuted one proof, but you need to do it in the real by focusing on the arguments presented and not diverting your attention to issues that are almost completely irrelevant or have no impact on the proofs.

Modern theist philosophers are more knowledgeable than Thomas Aquinas was. That's why they've discarded some of those old arguments in favor of others. Perhaps you should do likewise.

John Powell

Ok John this is the standard sort of argumentation you have presented throughout this dialogue that is a diversion without substance. You say modern knowledge has overturned the proofs. Lets see you demonstrate this. Some how you have to show one of the following are false



1. fact of movement

2. causes per se subordinated

3. principle of limited regress

4. informal logic used in the proof



I put it to you that modern philosophy has found none of the above to be false. The proofs are therefore as true as the day they were written.

JM

[John Powell]

POWELL:
We are confident that a particular being X is contingent because we can imagine a logically possible world in which it doesn't exist and we can't see that the statement "X does not exist" is self-contradictory.

. . .

Theists who affirm that God is necessary have a tough time imagining that God does not exist.

JOHN MARTIN:
You confuse imaginary with the real.

POWELL:
Not AFAICT. Imaginary means "exists in your thoughts" usually with the implication that it does not "exist outside your thoughts." "Real" means "exists outside your thoughts regardless whether it also exists in your thoughts."

JOHN MARTIN:
Ok but you still have not recognised that the possible world or imaginary world does not relate in any way to the proofs and the conclusion of the proofs for God.

POWELL:
They better or it's not logical. When you say "if x then y" which is a standard logical statement then you are dealing with possible worlds.

JOHN MARTIN:
To say it does shows you really do not understand how the imagination relates to the real and how you have misapplied it in an attempt to refute the proof from movement. It also shows you have not understood the proofs that are based in the real and not in the imagination or possible worlds. The proofs are in no way effected [affected] by your counter arguments. I suggest you leave this line of argument as it has been shown to be false.

POWELL:
So, do you plan to avoid hypotheticals in your proof? If yes then how do you intend to logically prove anything?

JOHN MARTIN:
Even if you insist on continuing this possible world argument you still have the problem of efficient causation of the imagination that is caused by other. This other is the necessary which is . . .

JOHN MARTIN:
The proof for God from contingency shows the contingent to be in the real and conclusion of a necessary being is then also real.

POWELL:
If your proof worked then that's the kind of thing it should show.

JOHN MARTIN:
It does and it does.

POWELL:
So, you say. How do you intend to prove it if you're not allowed to use things like "if then" statements?

JOHN MARTIN:
You say a particular being (maybe = confident) is contingent because we can imagine it not existing.

POWELL:
No, I don't. I say we are confident on that basis. We could be wrong. For example, we could think trees are contingent but they are necessary and exist in some state we are ignorant of.

JOHN MARTIN:
Again you show you have not understood the argument presented. The argument proceeds by showing that anything that has a limit is from its very nature a contingent being an[d] must be efficiently caused by another. As an infinite series per se subordinated is impossible, there must be a being that is not contingent, that efficiently causes all contingent beings to exist. This being is the necessary being.

POWELL:
When you use words like "impossible" then you are dealing with logically possible worlds. The word "logically impossible" means there's no logically possible world in which it's the case.

JOHN MARTIN:
But the fallacy in this argument is that a contingent being is known from its nature through its actions, which you have ignored.

POWELL:
I ignore it because it seems to me to be irrelevant to whether or not a thing is contingent or necessary.

JOHN MARTIN:
The proof stands regardless of you ignoring it. I suggest you either thoroughly rebut it or reconsider your position and reject atheism. I hope you do the later. It would be a victory for yourself and for God if you do.

POWELL:
Would God actually show up to congratulate me or would I have to just imagine it?

JOHN MARTIN:
From memory you stated somewhere that you were once a Mormon. If this is true then may I suggest that part of the reason you are now an atheist is that you were exposed to a false religion and found it to be abhorrent. From there you have moved to atheism, possibly through a process of disillusion and agnosticism and then . . .

POWELL:
I bet some Mormons trying to rationalize why Thomists become atheists would argue similarly: it's because Thomism is an abhorrent religion.

JOHN MARTIN:
But what if there really is a true religion out there that really does account for the real nature of man and God which you have not yet investigated?

POWELL:
Why should I consider such a hypothetical if we're not supposed to consider hypothetical worlds, only the real world?

JOHN MARTIN:
Maybe, just maybe your atheism would then disappear.

POWELL:
What does "maybe" mean in an argument that doesn't allow for the possible, only the real?

JOHN MARTIN:
I put it to you that the true religion is the Catholic faith. Maybe you could look into it in some depth. Its teachings can be found on the net in the catechism of the Catholic church.

POWELL:
Maybe I could? What does that mean if we aren't allowed to consider possible worlds?

JOHN MARTIN:
We observe in the real things coming into and going out of existence and change. These facts are not imaginary, but are real.

POWELL:
So we believe.

POWELL:
So we believe. When wood burns does the matter go out of existence? People used to think so. Due to careful, detailed, repeatable observations, we now believe that the matter continues to exist.

JOHN MARTIN:
The (philosophical) matter (potency) of the wood goes back into primary matter of pure potency. The form of wood is changed into the form of ash and smoke through the ultimate disposition in the matter being change from wood to ash and smoke. This is the philosophical answer and the empirical answer complements this through the sense observation of change in chemical structure and states of existence of the wood from a solid to solid and smoke (gas). All this is a side issue not really related to the proofs anyway.

The proof from contingency only requires the facts of change and movement from existence to non existence. When we say existence, we mean existence as a complete substance through unity of substantial form and primary matter to effect the existence of the substance, wood. When the substance ceases to exist, the unity of the matter and form is removed and the form changes to result in a new substance as observed above. Nevertheless, the wood has ceased to exist as wood. This is all that is required for the proof.

POWELL:
The same atoms continue to exist as they change form from what we call "wood" to what we call "ash" and "gas." Such events are like the forming and then dissipating of clouds. Science provides adequate answers to such things without the need to invoke some personal entity as the ultimate cause.

JOHN MARTIN:
From it is determined what a contingent being is. The proofs are based in the real and conclude to God in the real. Your imagination argument ignores this.

POWELL:
Logical arguments depend on the concept of possible worlds.

POWELL:
Demonstrate the relevance. Post the argument that shows the relevance, something like that it's not possible that a necessary thing have potency. Try using "potency" as the thing that you claim isn't necessary.

JOHN MARTIN:
Even your imagination is a contingent being that is caused by an efficient cause, which is you. Do see what I mean by contingent being? Even in the world of imagination and possibles, all images and all possibles still require an efficient cause in the real to keep them in existence. The ultimate efficient cause is then not contingent, but necessary, which is God.

POWELL:
The things we imagine do not, in general, exist (outside the imagination), so what value is there in suggesting they have an efficient cause to keep them in existence?

JOHN MARTIN:
For example trees grow and thereby change, they also come into existence and go out of existence. From this we know that a tree is not the cause of its own existence. Why? Because if it were, it would have existed before it existed. Change and indifference to existence then concludes to contingent beings are necessarily dependent upon an efficient cause for its existence. a tree is then caused to exist by other and this cause is ultimately the only necessary universal cause that keeps all contingent beings in existence.

POWELL:
Some of that is correct. Because trees appear to be transitory rather than eternal, a particular tree that existed yesterday might fail to appear today because somebody burnt it up, we are confident that trees are contingent rather than necessary.

JOHN MARTIN:
Good you admit trees are contingent beings. Now the tree is then not the cause of its own existence but must then be efficiently caused by another. This other is the necessary be which is God. There is no escaping this conclusion.

POWELL:
But the "cause of the tree" may be nothing other than the "cause of the tree." There is no logical requirement AFAICT that the cause be some personal being. It could be "Nature."

JOHN MARTIN:
Because the tree and nature are both contingent beings, then they are both efficiently caused by the only necessary being.

POWELL:
The necessary thing would be some logical principle. It would be misguided to personify such things.

JOHN MARTIN:
Or IOW, any being that has potency is a contingent being. Any being with potency is then kept in existence through efficient causation by a being that does not have potency, but is pure act. To be pure act is to have identity of essence and be, and this is to be the necessary being.

POWELL:
AFAICT, potency/act isn't logically connected with contingent/necessary. I don't see that if X is contingent it can't have potency or if X is necessary then it can't have potency.

JOHN MARTIN:
Any being with potency and act is a composed being.

If a being has potency and act it has a nature that is limited be its be, there is then a real distinction between the essence and the existence of the creature.

POWELL:
Your language is needlessly obscure.

JOHN MARTIN:
For example a dog has a canine nature and a finite existence united with that nature.

POWELL:
Yes, a dog is in the set of canine things. Wolves aren't dogs, but they're also canines.

JOHN MARTIN:
We know the nature and the existence of dogs are really distinct because we know there are many distinct dogs of the same nature with different existences and we also know there are many other creatures such as cats and men and tree with distinct existences that have diverse natures from the dog. Therefore in creatures the essence and the existence of the creature are really diverse. There is nothing in

1. the essence of the creature as it is an essence, to exist (nothing in the nature of dog that the dog really exists)

2. the existence (be) of the creature that that nature exists (nothing in the notion of existence that it be a dog as existence is found in many things which are diverse natures).

The above two points are very important. Please try to understand them as it will show you that there must be a thing in every creature (which is not that creature) that has

1. the reason of the existence (be) in the essence of the thing (it is then very much unlike the creature), and

2. the essence of the thing in the very existence of the thing existing, for the creature to exist (it is then very much unlike the creature)

To account for how creatures that have essences and existences really diverse and yet are in the real found united, we conclude that there is a being that has a proper identity of essence and existence, or IOW essence = be. As this being properly has this identity it then must be the necessary being. This is God.

POWELL:
I fail to see the logical connection. Will you make it explicit in a sound deductive argument?

JOHN MARTIN:
Lets look at it again in other words.

A dog is this particular dog called fido. Fido has the essence of canine. An essence is the ‘whatness’ of a thing. So if we ask the question what is Fido the answer is, Fido is a canine thing. If the ask does Fido exist, the answer to this is the be or existence. The be then answers the question ‘that a thing exists’. We can see that the first question gives a unique answer in the order of essence and the second in the order of being. As essence = whatness and being = thatness, whatness is not thatness, therefore essences and being are not the same, but diverse in the real.

But this concludes to a very real problem because in Fido we have two principles of action (two acts) within the same creature that are

1. of themselves really diverse (one does not cause the other), but yet

2. are found to be really united (together) for Fido to exist in the real.

But within the order of essence there is nothing to cause the essence to exist in the real and within the order of existence there is nothing in it for a particular essence to exist in the real. The reason for Fido to exist cannot be from either Fidos own essence or Fidos own be. Fido must then be efficiently caused by another to unit the diverse essence abd existence in Fido.

POWELL:
Fido exists as a dog because the atoms came together in the appropriate way. It was a natural process. Nature is the cause. If we had prevented the atoms from doing so then Fido would not exist as a dog, but the atoms would have some other form. There is no logical requirement that a person be the cause.

JOHN MARTIN:
Or IOW - We can imagine Fido and his essence, but he then only has an imaginary existence and not the real existence of the real Fido that bites Johns leg. Why is this so? Its because the essence of Fido imagined in no way has any causal power to cause Fido to be caused to exist in the real.

POWELL:
Uh, John, no Fido has actually bitten my leg so you are speaking of a possible world. Don't you think that's a mistake? Don't you intend to restrict yourself to the real world?

JOHN MARTIN:
The only conclusion that can solve this very real problem is that there must be an essence in the real which is its own be in the real that

1. unites the diverse principles of essence and be in creatures, and

2. has the own reason of be from itself.

POWELL:
On the contrary, another conclusion is that "nature" and "logic" are the solutions to the problem. There's no need for some personal being to be the ultimate cause.

JOHN MARTIN:
This being then is its own being by nature and all other beings (creatures) are said to have being by participation. God then is the subsistent be, whose very nature is to exist. God then is the universal efficient cause of both essence and existences of all creatures.

POWELL:
What you speak of seems to be a concept, like "truth" or "ultimate cause", something logical, not something personal.

JOHN MARTIN:
In summary for Fido to exist he must have

A canine essence = substantial form

An existence – be

A limit to the be and form received – primary matter

Fido is then a composite of substantial form + be + primary matter all or which are really diverse but are required to be united for Fido to be a real dog. The only being that can unite the diverse in a composed creature, is the being that does not have any potency (hence no primary matter) and an identity of essence and be. This essence and be is then only analogously like that of the creature and has a presence within the creature according to a conserving power. The identity of essence and be is then to have its own reason of be, which is then to be a subsistent be.

POWELL:
Fido comes to existence because two dogs have a baby dog. It's the kind of natural process that has happened to canines before man even appeared on the scene. There's no logical need for some person to be the ultimate cause. Dogs can do it on their own.

JOHN MARTIN
Potency and act are the following

The most fundamental modes of being

Are analogous to each other

Are contrary to each other as positive opposing positive.

Complement each other – for every act that is limited, the act is limited by its complementary potency. For example a substance of dog is limited to this particular dog through the cause of potency in the order of substance. The weight, height and shape of the dog are limited by potencies in the order of accident. Each substantial act is complemented by a substantial potency and each accidental act is complemented by an accidental potency.

5. Are necessary for a creature to exist. This necessity is only a property of the nature of a creature where the creature is in itself only a contingent being. The existence of potency and act in creatures is then understood to be only relatively necessary based on the existence of a limited being, which is contingent. However absolute necessity is required of the singular necessary being which is not composed of potency and act, which is God.

POWELL:
So you say. It's unclear to me that any personal being is necessary. On the contrary, it seems to me that any particular person will be contingent. Necessary things are things like logic.

JOHN MARTIN:
Fair enough. I only presented a summary argument on another post. It does assume much knowledge. The existence of a spirit and that being a person is based on the doctrine of Thomas’ moderate realism that requires a power to be proportional to its act. We know men think in the abstract, but the abstract is to act above the physical, in an immaterial manner. This then requires an immaterial power to do an immaterial act. Immateriality is then the root cause of abstract knowledge and it is also the formal cause of the existence of the person. Therefore wherever there is a knower abstracting, there is spirit and therefore there is a person. This is the fundamentals of the proof. OR even more simply – Pure act -> (not body) spirit -> person, therefore as the first mover is pure act, it is a person. God is then a person. Essentially the proof is that simple.

POWELL:
AFAICT, the brain is a biological organ operating according to the laws of nature. I don't see any need for some immaterial spirit to be the cause. If you believe otherwise then will you provide an example of a functioning mind without the material brain? To give "God" as the example won't be adequate unless you can provide God for our observation.

AFAICT, God is just something in your imagination.

POWELL:
On the contrary, one could argue that potency and act are both necessary things, a world without them wouldn't be a logically possible world.

JOHN MARTIN:
Only relatively necessary based on the nature of a contingent being. This then gets us back to the proof from contingency.

POWELL:
Do you think that "potency" and "act" exist in every logically possible world or do you think that there are some in which one or both do not exist?

JOHN MARTIN:
Yes they exist in every logically possible world. A possible world is objective potency.

POWELL:
Then you should consider "potency" and "act" to be logically necessary.

JOHN MARTIN:
Or IOW, a being composed of potency and act has the following.

Act is the cause of what is actual (does be).

Potency is the cause of the limit (can be).

Potency is then the limit of act.

Potency and act exist as a compound in beings with limit (any creature)

Potency is contrary to act

Contraries are diverse

What are of themselves diverse are not of themselves the cause of the unity

But in creatures potency and act are found united

therefore creatures are efficiently caused by another agent that unites the potency and act found in creatures.

This being that is the efficient cause of the contingent being (any creature) is then not composed of potency and act

This being is then pure act in every order of being, which means this being has identity of essence and be

For if essence and be in God were diverse, God would then be a contingent being efficiently caused by other

But to have God as a contingent being does not give sufficient reason to cause his own be and the be of other creatures (a contradiction is had)

Therefore God as the efficient cause of creatures, must be the only necessary be which is pure act, causing creatures to exist from one instant to the next. This conclusion is unavoidable from the nature of causation, the fact of change in creatures and contingency.

POWELL:
Even if your argument worked, it would seem that the ultimate cause would be a logical concept such as "ultimate cause" rather than some personal being such as God or the IPU.

JOHN MARTIN:
They are both the same. The ultimate cause can be proven to be a person. I’ve shown this briefly above.

POWELL:
I don't see it. Where do you logically go from there being pure act to that pure act being a person (or three of them)?

JOHN MARTIN:
They are the same. I did not prove it above but it has been proven by Thomists.

POWELL:
I doubt it.

JOHN MARTIN:
Proven above

POWELL:
Then please post the appropriate sound deductive argument.

POWELL:
You seem to be personifying concepts. That's poetry, not logic.

JOHN MARTIN:
Its probably both and its legitimate.

POWELL:
Not AFAICT. Please post the supportive argument.

JOHN MARTIN:
God is a person as shown above.

POWELL:
Where's the proof that pure act is a person?

JOHN MARTIN:
As a side issue it is note worthy that Christianity is a personalist world view that is pretty much unique in many respects. Personalism is almost non existent outside religion, except for metaphors regarding mother earth and humanist philosophy (which only has a vague understanding of the human person and virtually no understanding of the divine person).

However even in the other mono theistic religions the personalism of God is greatly restricted to a distant deity or strict overlord who is greatly dis-interested in men (especially in Islam). The God of Christianity and of Catholicism in particular is very personal and very much involved in human events, in fact in every event in the universe no matter how small. This personalism is found both in reason and in the sources of revelation and is one of many big evidences of the truth of the Christian faith. To be personal is to be real and to be Christian. After all heaven has been revealed according to several metaphors but essentially it is to know a person = to know the Father.

POWELL:
The personifying of concepts is common to all humans. It's not unique to Christians. In fact, the ubiquity of religion is due in part to the common tendency of humans to personify natural events. They see something happen and they figure some person made it happen. Since they don't see the person they figure the person is invisible. Because some events are very powerful they figure some of the persons are very powerful. They call these invisible powerful persons "gods." Science has shown that the events are adequately explained by impersonal forces of nature. For example, we no longer need Zeus or Thor to explain thunder. Because there are still some mysteries about our existence, most people continue to imagine there's some person or persons behind it.

JOHN MARTIN:
If other worlds do exist they too must comply with the modes of being which are potency and act which then concludes to the same necessary being. The necessary being then is the same in any possible world.

POWELL:
I'm talking about possible worlds, worlds that could be. I'm not talking about alleged actual worlds that exist outside our universe.

JOHN MARTIN:
The proofs are applied in both the actual and any possible world.

POWELL:
They would need to do that to be logical.

POWELL:
Yes. If there is a first cause then maybe it's either evil or apathetic.

JOHN MARTIN:
This is to have a privation, which is a lack of perfection, which is not pure act, which is to have potency. God then cannot be evil as you say.

POWELL:
The dictionary definition of God allows for a God being evil. Do you deny this?

POWELL:
God can be evil because the dictionary definition of God allows for it. There's nothing self-contradictory about "X is an evil God." If you try to define God so God cannot be evil then you will be begging the question among those who allow for it.

JOHN MARTIN:
I’m talking about the real God as derived from natural theology. The other gods are only myths.

POWELL:
AFAICT, you're talking about the God in your imagination. If God is real then show him (or them) to us. Demonstrate to us that your God is real like you are real rather than just imaginary like you figure all the other gods are.

POWELL:
You seem to be a more reasonable person than John Martin.

JOHN MARTIN:
Only to the ignorant. JP makes up things as he goes along. He has no systematic belief, is illogical and has made the following errors including problems with his understanding -

1. Thinks geocentrism is related to the proofs for God. This one was a cracker jack error.

POWELL:
The Geocentrism of Thomas Aquinas affected his philosophical arguments for God. I believe that if Aquinas had lived post-Newton then he would not have promoted some of those arguments.

JOHN MARTIN:
You haven’t shown this. The proofs remain regardless of geo or helio or any other cosmology being true.

POWELL:
Do you deny that the Geocentrism of Aquinas affected his philosophical arguments for God?

JOHN MARTIN:
2. Thinks newtons equations disprove the proof from movement and he does this by mere assertion. He thereby makes no case in this respect, but thinks he has to fool the ignorant.

POWELL:
I use Newtonian mechanics to show you don't understand the dynamics of spacial movement in ways similar to how Thomas Aquinas misunderstood. Where did I use it to DISPROVE something?

JOHN MARTIN:
From memory you only asserted this by reference to inertia and in no way did you show the proofs deny inertia. You did infer the proofs were no longer valid due to modern understanding of motion.

POWELL:
Aquinas didn't understand inertia. Perhaps neither do you.

Why don't you just personify inertia? Why don't you accept that inertia explains uniform motion, but then claim that inertia is a person called God or three persons called the Trinitarian God? If you think there's no problem with personifying "ultimate cause" then what's wrong with personifying "inertia"?

JOHN MARTIN:
3. He thinks inertia some how disproves the proof from movement and he does this by mere assertion.

POWELL:
I submit "inertia" as the better answer than "God" to explain motion in a straight line at constant speed.

JOHN MARTIN:
We shall discover soon enough that inertia is not the full story and there is more to movement than most know.

POWELL:
Big deal. It usually happens that there's more to a story than what is said.

JOHN MARTIN:
4. Doesn't know the difference between absolute and relative as proposed by his answer to my argument regarding cause required for an effect. He answered my proof of absolute nothing with an example of air in a box, which is only a relative nothing (really air is something).

POWELL:
Yes, air is something. So, when you say "absolutely nothing is in the box" what would you mean? Would you mean there's not even space within the box?

JOHN MARTIN:
I mean nothing is non being. That all I’m saying.

POWELL:
So you would be saying that the box contains "non being"?

JOHN MARTIN:
5. Doesn't know what a definition is

POWELL:
Poppycock. You argued for a mistaken restriction on what a definition can be.

JOHN MARTIN:
Definitions are derived from the natures of things. You denied this.

POWELL:
Not that I remember. I denied that definitions are restricted in the way you suggested.

JOHN MARTIN:
9. He doesn't know what an object is. He confuses object with thing.

POWELL:
An object is a kind of thing. There are other kinds of things besides objects.

JOHN MARTIN:
An object is what is presented to a power. For example a tree is known under the object of illuminated color presented to the power of sight, under the object of roughness to the power of touch, the object of sound to hearing and so on.

POWELL:
Do you concede that an object is a thing, but there are things that aren't objects?

JOHN MARTIN:
11. He insists I have the proof for God placed into a syllogism but never ever places his counter arguments into a syllogism (I find this very odd indeed).

POWELL:
What particular argument do you wish for me to formalize?

JOHN MARTIN:
Any argument that concludes with God does not exist or a denial of Gods existence doesn’t require contradiction. Any of your big statements can be placed into a syllogism as you wish.

POWELL:
Ok. What do you think of the following argument?

1. If it's logically possible that God does not exist then there is at least one logically possible world in which God does not exist.
2. It's logically possible that God does not exist.
Therefore
3. There is at least one logically possible world in which God does not exist.

JOHN MARTIN:
13. He doesn't understand potency and act.

POWELL:
I translate your "potency" into "has the potential to do X or be Y." I translate your "act" as "is doing X or being Y."

JOHN MARTIN:
14. He doesn't understand being.

POWELL:
Why do you say that?

JOHN MARTIN:
Potency and act and being are used in the contingency argument that you did not understand. You also don’t seem to understand what the necessary being is. Many think it is univocal to created being, when God is actually analogically related to creatures.

POWELL:
Your language is needlessly obscure.

JOHN MARTIN:
15. He doesn’t understand contingency and how we know things are contingent as evidenced by his response concerning contingency and imagination.

POWELL:
Perhaps my understanding differs from yours.

JOHN MARTIN:
16. He consistently ignores my proofs and places counter arguments that do not answer the proofs. I find this incredible. For example his counter arguments concerning newtons equations, air in the box, imaginary world and inertia all ignored my arguments and making his responses irrelevant to the discussion and certainly irrelevant to the proofs for God.

POWELL:
You don't seem to see the relevance that I see.

JOHN MARTIN:
There is no relevance in the manner that your arguments refute the proofs. Other than that they are only side issues that have limited interest value and nothing more.

POWELL:
So you say.

JOHN MARTIN:
These are all big problems and shows he is not capable of refuting the proof from movement which is the easiest proof to understand of the five proofs by Thomas. He will no doubt deny the above at least in part, but they are nevertheless all errors and holes in his understanding and method. I have found this to be typical of scientists at Tweb who try to argue in philosophy to the detriment of the truth.

POWELL:
That you claim they are errors and holes in my understanding does not make them so.

JOHN MARTIN:
Your counter arguments consistently miss the gist of the proofs.

POWELL:
Perhaps that's one of the reasons you opt for obscure language, to give you freedom to claim your opponents misunderstand you. If you were to do a better job using clear language then perhaps you wouldn't so easily make use of that fall back position.

JOHN MARTIN:
So far the dialogue has been cordial and I'm hoping it remains so. I had to show some of the errors of JP to keep the dialogue in perspective.

POWELL:
That begs the question that I made those errors.

JOHN MARTIN:
I know they were errors. I’ve shown briefly above that you do not understand several of the notions previously presented. This is critical when trying to rebut the proofs.

POWELL:
Then please post the sound deductive argument justifying such confidence. The conclusion should be something like "Therefore, I, John Martin, know that John Powell made those errors." Otherwise, it appears that it's merely your opinion that they were errors.

JOHN MARTIN:
Yes God does exist and the proofs remain unrefuted just as they have been since the time they were penned centuries ago.

POWELL:
I refute that.

JOHN MARTIN:
So far you haven’t and I’m willing to bet you nor anybody else ever will. To refute the proofs you first of all need to be familiar with the terminology used in Thomism.

POWELL:
No I don't have to be familiar with such things. I can just say it. Saying it can count as a refutation. Merely saying it doesn't count as a disproof. If you want to say I haven't disproven something, fine, but don't deny that I've refuted something.

POWELL:
Merely saying so does not constitute a disproof, but it does constitute a refutation.

JOHN MARTIN:
You haven’t done either.

POWELL:
I'll do it again.

I refute that.

Do you see where I refuted it?

JOHN MARTIN:
You have shown you are not familiar with Thomist terminology which is to be expected. I know you want to think you have refuted one proof, but you need to do it in the real by focusing on the arguments presented and not diverting your attention to issues that are almost completely irrelevant or have no impact on the proofs.

POWELL:
That's not required in order to refute an argument. I can just say it. What you say pertains to disproving something.

POWELL:
Modern theist philosophers are more knowledgeable than Thomas Aquinas was. That's why they've discarded some of those old arguments in favor of others. Perhaps you should do likewise.

JOHN MARTIN:
Ok John this is the standard sort of argumentation you have presented throughout this dialogue that is a diversion without substance. You say modern knowledge has overturned the proofs. Lets see you demonstrate this. Some how you have to show one of the following are false

POWELL:
What part of my claim do you wish me to show?

1. Modern theist philosophers are more knowledgeable than Thomas Aquinas was?

or

2. That's why they've discarded some of those old arguments in favor of others?

or

3. Perhaps you should do likewise?

JOHN MARTIN:
1. fact of movement

2. causes per se subordinated

3. principle of limited regress

4. informal logic used in the proof

I put it to you that modern philosophy has found none of the above to be false. The proofs are therefore as true as the day they were written.

POWELL:
We understand spacial movement better than Thomas Aquinas did. Aristotle figured the sky consisted of concentric spheres moving around the Earth each sphere caused to turn by a sphere exterior to it with some unmoved mover in the outermost sphere. Thomas Aquinas equated that unmoved mover with God.

We realize now that the sky isn't domes circling the Earth, but the Earth is a spinning sphere. There's no need for an unmoved mover person. If there is a need for an ultimate cause then that's what it is, the ultimate cause. There's no logical requirement that the ultimate cause be a person (or three of them).

John Powell

[johnmartin]

JP - Ok. What do you think of the following argument?

1. If it's logically possible that God does not exist then there is at least one logically possible world in which God does not exist.
2. It's logically possible that God does not exist.
Therefore
3. There is at least one logically possible world in which God does not exist.

Line 2 has not been established and so line 3 does not follow.

JP- No I don't have to be familiar with such things. I can just say it. Saying it can count as a refutation. Merely saying it doesn't count as a disproof. If you want to say I haven't disproven something, fine, but don't deny that I've refuted something.

I cannot admit to either disproof or refutation as the word refute is easily misunderstood to mean you have made a case against the argument. For the sake of clarity I’d prefer if you used the word ‘deny’ rather than refute, unless you provide an argument against mine, then you can use the word refute or better still, disprove in association with your argument.

JP- POWELL:
I'll do it again.

I refute that.

Do you see where I refuted it?

Ok but I hope you agree with the above for the sake of clarity.

JM- POWELL:
What part of my claim do you wish me to show?

1. Modern theist philosophers are more knowledgeable than Thomas Aquinas was?

This one would be good especially in regard to the proof from movement. Please don’t rely on your argument below about ancient cosmology to back your position. I agree that ancient cosmology was in error. But I deny that this shows Thomas did not have the correct understanding of movement. These are two distinct notions and only the nature of movement is required to be correctly understood. You could try and show how movement understood by Thomas and Newton varied, but I think Thomas already had Newtons laws placed into his definitions. We shall see.

JP- or

2. That's why they've discarded some of those old arguments in favor of others?

or

3. Perhaps you should do likewise?

2 would be good. 3 isn’t that important but you can if you wish.

JP - POWELL:
We understand spacial movement better than Thomas Aquinas did. Aristotle figured the sky consisted of concentric spheres moving around the Earth each sphere caused to turn by a sphere exterior to it with some unmoved mover in the outermost sphere. Thomas Aquinas equated that unmoved mover with God.

We realize now that the sky isn't domes circling the Earth, but the Earth is a spinning sphere. There's no need for an unmoved mover person. If there is a need for an ultimate cause then that's what it is, the ultimate cause. There's no logical requirement that the ultimate cause be a person (or three of them).

John Powell

Now this is something you should definitely develop much more. I deny ancient cosmology is used in the proofs for God. I affirm the nature of movement as a transition from potency to act is the correct understanding of movement from can move to does move. This I think is quite simple and its really all that required for the proof to hold.

JM

[Roy]

[size=2] No identity means identity which means they are identical in every respect. This is unbelievable that you resort to word games to avoid the obvious error.

But I didn't say 'identity'. I said 'identical'. You said 'identity'.

You are the one resorting to word games here.

The categories are substance, action, passion, quality, quantity, habit, relation, where, when and posture.

I submit 'variability', either as rate of change or as maximum degree of change, as something not covered by these categories.

I'll give you a clue about potency and act and the categories. As potency and act are modes of being and the categories are beings . . .then, your attempt to show anything relevant to multiple prime movers either inside or your attempted outside new category will fail, because even your new category will fall under the genus of being, which has the modes of potency and act. Try if you will, but you will fail.

That just returns you to the unsupported assertion that a prime mover must have all attributes of all other entities, which is not only probably false, but may be contradictory too.

Roy

[John Powell]

POWELL:
JP - Ok. What do you think of the following argument?

1. If it's logically possible that God does not exist then there is at least one logically possible world in which God does not exist.
2. It's logically possible that God does not exist.
Therefore
3. There is at least one logically possible world in which God does not exist.

JOHN MARTIN:
Line 2 has not been established and so line 3 does not follow.

POWELL:
The conclusion logically, deductively follows from the premises. That's because the argument has the valid form called "Modus Ponens." If the premises are true then the conclusion is guaranteed to be true. If the premises are not true then the conclusion might be nevertheless true, but there's no guarantee.

Do you deny that it's logically possible that God does not exist?

If you do then what will you say to the college professors of philosophy who acknowledge otherwise, who accept that there's a rational debate among philosophers whether or not God actually exists? If philosophers believe it's not possible that God does not exist then there's no rational basis to argue whether God actually exists. God must.

Is it that modern philosophers don't know what they're talking about? They're incompetent? They shouldn't teach logic? The colleges should hire people like you as the teachers of logic?

Well?

POWELL:
No I don't have to be familiar with such things. I can just say it. Saying it can count as a refutation. Merely saying it doesn't count as a disproof. If you want to say I haven't disproven something, fine, but don't deny that I've refuted something.

JOHN MARTIN:
I cannot admit to either disproof or refutation as the word refute is easily misunderstood to mean you have made a case against the argument.

POWELL:
All I have to do is deny the truth. No other case is required beyond that.


American Heritage Dictionary:
Refute
2. To deny the truth or accuracy of
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/refute

JOHN MARTIN:
For the sake of clarity I’d prefer if you used the word ‘deny’ rather than refute, unless you provide an argument against mine, then you can use the word refute or better still, disprove in association with your argument.

POWELL:
That's my point. Refute can mean "disprove" or it can mean "deny" so you should say "You haven't disproven" rather than say what could mean "You haven't denied."

POWELL:
I'll do it again.

I refute that.

Do you see where I refuted it?

JOHN MARTIN:
Ok but I hope you agree with the above for the sake of clarity.

POWELL:
Yes. Use "disprove" or "deny" rather than "refute" in negative statements unless you mean the person has done neither.

POWELL:
What part of my claim do you wish me to show?

1. Modern theist philosophers are more knowledgeable than Thomas Aquinas was?

JOHN MARTIN:
This one would be good especially in regard to the proof from movement. Please don’t rely on your argument below about ancient cosmology to back your position. I agree that ancient cosmology was in error. But I deny that this shows Thomas did not have the correct understanding of movement. These are two distinct notions and only the nature of movement is required to be correctly understood. You could try and show how movement understood by Thomas and Newton varied, but I think Thomas already had Newtons laws placed into his definitions. We shall see.

POWELL:
Well, you're trying to restrict me from using the exact example I would want to use, so I will ignore your restriction.

The physics of Aquinas was outdated Aristotelian. Aquinas did not realize that no force is required for a body to move at constant speed in a straight line. So, he figured some force was required and figured that there had to be some ultimate force behind everything. If no force is required for uniform motion, then there's no need for some ultimate force to to be behind uniform motion.

On the other hand, we can ask "Why does a body move uniformly?" The answer to that question will be a "logical cause" such as "inertia" or "conservation of linear momentum" that isn't a force. It need not be some answer like "A 3-persons-in-one-substance thing called God is the reason."

POWELL:
or

2. That's why they've discarded some of those old arguments in favor of others?

or

3. Perhaps you should do likewise?

JOHN MARTIN:
2 would be good. 3 isn’t that important but you can if you wish.

POWELL:
I'm no expert, rather a God debater by hobby, but it was this discussion with you that led me to look into the arguments for God by Thomas Aquinas. If the arguments of Aquinas were popular today then probably I would have had more exposure to them.

POWELL:
We understand spacial movement better than Thomas Aquinas did. Aristotle figured the sky consisted of concentric spheres moving around the Earth each sphere caused to turn by a sphere exterior to it with some unmoved mover in the outermost sphere. Thomas Aquinas equated that unmoved mover with God.

We realize now that the sky isn't domes circling the Earth, but the Earth is a spinning sphere. There's no need for an unmoved mover person. If there is a need for an ultimate cause then that's what it is, the ultimate cause. There's no logical requirement that the ultimate cause be a person (or three of them).

JOHN MARTIN:
Now this is something you should definitely develop much more. I deny ancient cosmology is used in the proofs for God. I affirm the nature of movement as a transition from potency to act is the correct understanding of movement from can move to does move. This I think is quite simple and its really all that required for the proof to hold.

JM

POWELL:
Since something can be doing X or being Y and have the potential to do X or be Y, I think you should clarify your meaning by saying something like "A transition from potency to act is a transition from 'can do X or be Y but isn't doing X or being Y' to 'can do X or be Y and is doing X and is Y'."

The alternative meaning for "act" would be self-contradictory: "is doing X but can't do X or is Y but can't be Y."

Perhaps this is a devastating problem to your argument since both your "potency" implies potential and your "act" implies potential.

John Powell

[johnmartin]

Originally posted by johnmartin

No identity means identity which means they are identical in every respect. This is unbelievable that you resort to word games to avoid the obvious error.



But I didn't say 'identity'. I said 'identical'. You said 'identity'.

You are the one resorting to word games here.

Ok so your original statement used the word identical, big deal. How then can there be two or more prime movers that are identical in every respect? This is not possible. Identical in every respect is to be the same in every respect, which is then to be one only.

It may be objected that we could have, say two white blocks of marble that are perfectly identical and yet we can distinguish one from the other. So too, we can do this with several prime movers. But the two blocks of marble, though identical, do lack the perfections of ‘substance’ and ‘where’ that the other has and they both are subject to potency. As they are then not the cause of all perfects, but only contain some perfections, they then cannot be the prime mover, as the prime is the universal origin of all causes. We can then apply this same notion of potency to exclude any being that has potency from being the prime mover. The prime mover is then one only.

The categories are substance, action, passion, quality, quantity, habit, relation, where, when and posture.

I submit 'variability', either as rate of change or as maximum degree of change, as something not covered by these categories.

Variability is a mode of action. A Thomist recently did propose another category in an article (I think either on the Maritain web site or ‘the Thomist’ journal). I’m not sure how successful he was. Nevertheless, as being transcends the categories and is found in every category, so too potency and act transcend the categories. This then brings us back to the proofs for God using the very simple notions of potency and act.

I'll give you a clue about potency and act and the categories. As potency and act are modes of being and the categories are beings . . .then, your attempt to show anything relevant to multiple prime movers either inside or your attempted outside new category will fail, because even your new category will fall under the genus of being, which has the modes of potency and act. Try if you will, but you will fail.



That just returns you to the unsupported assertion that a prime mover must have all attributes of all other entities, which is not only probably false, but may be contradictory too.



Roy

Unsupported assertion by you. The conclusion that God is pure act is determined from the five ways. The conclusion is supported by valid argument.

JM

[johnmartin]

POWELL:

JP - Ok. What do you think of the following argument?



1. If it's logically possible that God does not exist then there is at least one logically possible world in which God does not exist.

2. It's logically possible that God does not exist.

Therefore

3. There is at least one logically possible world in which God does not exist.



JOHN MARTIN:

Line 2 has not been established and so line 3 does not follow.



POWELL:

The conclusion logically, deductively follows from the premises. That's because the argument has the valid form called "Modus Ponens." If the premises are true then the conclusion is guaranteed to be true. If the premises are not true then the conclusion might be nevertheless true, but there's no guarantee.

Lines 2 and 3 are untrue.

Do you deny that it's logically possible that God does not exist?

You haven’t proposed one yet. You will never proposed an argument that concludes to God does not exist as a true statement of the real.

If you do then what will you say to the college professors of philosophy who acknowledge otherwise, who accept that there's a rational debate among philosophers whether or not God actually exists? If philosophers believe it's not possible that God does not exist then there's no rational basis to argue whether God actually exists. God must.

Is it that modern philosophers don't know what they're talking about? They're incompetent? They shouldn't teach logic? The colleges should hire people like you as the teachers of logic?



Well?

Well your argument is very simplistic. Professors are part of a fallen human race and have agendas just like the rest of us. Atheist professors propose fallacies and sophisms and theist professors propose otherwise if they are competent. There is no way to conclude that ‘God does not exist’ as a true statement when terms are correctly defined.

POWELL:

No I don't have to be familiar with such things. I can just say it. Saying it can count as a refutation. Merely saying it doesn't count as a disproof. If you want to say I haven't disproven something, fine, but don't deny that I've refuted something.

JOHN MARTIN:

I cannot admit to either disproof or refutation as the word refute is easily misunderstood to mean you have made a case against the argument.





POWELL:

All I have to do is deny the truth. No other case is required beyond that.





American Heritage Dictionary:

Refute

2. To deny the truth or accuracy of

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/refute

I know but I’d prefer you don’t use the term as it is commonly misleading. Use the word ‘deny’ instead unless you provide an argument. I ask you do this for the sake of clarity.

POWELL:

What part of my claim do you wish me to show?



1. Modern theist philosophers are more knowledgeable than Thomas Aquinas was?



JOHN MARTIN:

This one would be good especially in regard to the proof from movement. Please don’t rely on your argument below about ancient cosmology to back your position. I agree that ancient cosmology was in error. But I deny that this shows Thomas did not have the correct understanding of movement. These are two distinct notions and only the nature of movement is required to be correctly understood. You could try and show how movement understood by Thomas and Newton varied, but I think Thomas already had Newtons laws placed into his definitions. We shall see.



POWELL:

Well, you're trying to restrict me from using the exact example I would want to use, so I will ignore your restriction.



The physics of Aquinas was outdated Aristotelian. Aquinas did not realize that no force is required for a body to move at constant speed in a straight line. So, he figured some force was required and figured that there had to be some ultimate force behind everything. If no force is required for uniform motion, then there's no need for some ultimate force to to be behind uniform motion.



On the other hand, we can ask "Why does a body move uniformly?" The answer to that question will be a "logical cause" such as "inertia" or "conservation of linear momentum" that isn't a force. It need not be some answer like "A 3-persons-in-one-substance thing called God is the reason."

The proof from movement does not depend upon uniform movement as you say. All it depends upon is the very simple notion of a transition from can move to does move. I’m sure you can understand this. Even uniform motion can be traced back to a first mover through the other proofs, such as the proof from contingency. Your objection in no way provides any information to show the proof from movement is false. It then remains true.

Also you merely assert Thomas did not understand uniform motion as indicated above. I find this line of argumentation deficient in evidence. Can you quote Thomas where he denies uniform motion and then show how this relates to the proof from movement.

POWELL:

or



2. That's why they've discarded some of those old arguments in favor of others?



or



3. Perhaps you should do likewise?





JOHN MARTIN:

2 would be good. 3 isn’t that important but you can if you wish.





POWELL:

I'm no expert, rather a God debater by hobby, but it was this discussion with you that led me to look into the arguments for God by Thomas Aquinas. If the arguments of Aquinas were popular today then probably I would have had more exposure to them.

I respectfully submit you are avoiding the problem you have created by making an objection based on your own ignorance. Unless you provide the information to back the objection you need to admit your objection fails. So far it does.

JOHN MARTIN:

Now this is something you should definitely develop much more. I deny ancient cosmology is used in the proofs for God. I affirm the nature of movement as a transition from potency to act is the correct understanding of movement from can move to does move. This I think is quite simple and its really all that required for the proof to hold.



JM



POWELL:

Since something can be doing X or being Y and have the potential to do X or be Y, I think you should clarify your meaning by saying something like "A transition from potency to act is a transition from 'can do X or be Y but isn't doing X or being Y' to 'can do X or be Y and is doing X and is Y'."



The alternative meaning for "act" would be self-contradictory: "is doing X but can't do X or is Y but can't be Y."



Perhaps this is a devastating problem to your argument since both your "potency" implies potential and your "act" implies potential.



John Powell

Again you show you do not understand potency and act. Potency and act are contraries according to positive opposition. There is nothing in act that implies potency. It’s the limit of the act that requires potency to exist. An act is – does do, and its contrary is can do. That’s as simple as it gets.

-------------------------------------------
As yet you have not provided any evidence for your argument concerning ancient cosmology and its relationship to the proof from movement. If you have nothing to present you should retract the argument. I suggest you will not find any information that demonstrates your position in this regard. I am familiar with the proofs and the cosmology of the time of Thomas. The proofs and cosmology are not dependent in the manner you have stated.
JM