Answers to Atheistic arguments

[John Powell]

POWELL:
Curious isn't it?

There is a God in your imagination.

If given the opportunity, I would try to clarify that I don't believe that the Christian God exists outside the imagination, but I believe that the Christian God is a set of imaginary entities in the minds of human persons.

I believe that statues and the universe and money exist so if "God" is equated to a statue or to the universe or to money then I believe those Gods exist.

GEOCHRON:
Nonetheless, in the bare bones of it you believe that there is a God.

POWELL:
Yes, in the imagination. Don't make too big a deal of it. There is also a Santa Claus in the imagination.

POWELL:
There is a clear difference.

The statement "It is imaginary that X is red" is a direct statement about the imaginary redness of imaginary X. Perhaps the imaginary X corresponds to a real X (red or otherwise).

GEOCHRON:
If I see a blue car and imagine it is red, it is imaginary that the blue car is red. I wouldn't say that there is a blue car and a corresponding red car that has the property imaginary.

POWELL:
The first sentence is a common way of describing things, but the second sentence, the way you reject, involves a more precise description. There is a real blue car and a closely corresponding imaginary blue car. There is also an imaginary red car that has less correspondence to the real blue car.

POWELL:
I would permit that. I would discourage language like "the imaginary car really exists" and "the real car is imaginary."

I discourage you from using "really imaginary." It causes similar problems to saying "actually possible."

GEOCHRON:
What is wrong with "I imagine a car with the property 'existing' "?

POWELL:
That's ok.

GEOCHRON:
Conceive of the most useful car you can.
If imaginary and non-imaginary are properties of a car, it can either have the property imaginary or non-imaginary.
It is clearly a more useful car if it has the property non-imaginary.
Therefore it exists.

POWELL:
Interesting argument. It would seem that the most useful car you can imagine isn't going to be a real one since your powers of imagination surpass the powers of the universe to produce. Practical people realize that the ideal situations rarely, if ever, obtain except in the imagination.

GEOCHRON:
Of course I agree with you that the conclusion is not correct. But where is the flaw in the argument?

POWELL:
The flaw seems to be equating the real car with the imaginary car rather than acknowledging that they merely map to each other. The pronoun "it" ambiguously refers to both.

GEOCHRON:
My explanation is that it treats "existence" and "non-existence" as properties like "red" or "doing 50 mpg" and that existence is not a property of things in this way.

POWELL:
I see. We disagree.

Is this the application of a similar criticism you support of Anselm's "that than which nothing greater can be thought" argument for God?

GEOCHRON:
The most useful car I can conceive of has the property red.
The most useful car I can conceive of has the property "doing 50 mpg".
The most useful car I can conceive of has the property "existing".

Where is the difference?

Both these statements seems true to me if "existence" is a property...

The most useful car I can conceive of has the property "not existing".
Any car is more useful if it has the property "existing".

POWELL:
A car REALLY is more useful if it has the property "existing." However, a car can be IMAGINED to be more useful than a car that exists.

GEOCHRON:
...yet together they are paradoxical.

POWELL:
It doesn't seem such a problem to me.

GEOCHRON:
If existence is a property, is it a property that you can't conceive of something having?

POWELL:
No. The imagination is a powerful thing. What is difficult to imagine are self-contradictory things like square circles or married bachelors.

GEOCHRON:
If you can conceive of something having that property, that thing is more useful if it does have that property.

POWELL:
Yes, it REALLY is more useful. However, it can be imagined to be more useful still.

Have you heard the maxim: "one in hand is better than two in the bush"? Among other things, the maxim illustrates the idea that really having one in your hand is better than imagining you have two, but they're really in the bush.

POWELL:
Yes, a circle is a thing. Every thing is a thing.

You said "I can only understand a property if you can point to real things that have that property" so I was challenging that by posting a potential counter-example.

GEOCHRON:
A circle is the locus of points that are a fixed distance from a defined point. In planar geometry it is derivable from this statement that the circumference and diameter are in fixed ratio. pi is defined as this ratio.

POWELL:
You seem to understand the relationship nicely. Now, please point to a real circle having that property, ok? Can you?

GEOCHRON:
I'm not sure that I agree that a circle is a thing in the sense that a car is a thing - as I say, I think that is a different discussion.

POWELL:
Well a car can be a physical object, whereas a (perfect) circle is an imaginary thing, a mental construct only, an ideal shape that physical objects can approximate.

GEOCHRON:
I also don't think that the pi "property" is the same sort of property as red or (your use) "existence", since it is not logically possible that a circle in a plane might have a different ratio of circumference to diameter than pi.

POWELL:
Big deal. So, it's a definitional property.

GEOCHRON:
What is the relationship between properties and things?

POWELL:
A property is a thing. Objects have properties. Real objects have real properties. Imaginary objects have imaginary properties.

GEOCHRON:
Could there be a thing with no properties?

POWELL:
Maybe. Try "nothing."

GEOCHRON:
Perhaps a "thing" is identified with certain necessary properties - "a thing is a bag of properties"- to say a thing lacks one of these properties is logically impossible because they are part of the definition of that thing.

POWELL:
The definitional properties define the object, but that's usually few in number. Objects usually have a near limitless number of other properties.

GEOCHRON:
Associated with any thing can be extra, possible properties. As I understand it we are discussing whether existence and non-existence should be considered as possible properties of things.

POWELL:
Yes. You think no. I think yes.

John Powell

[geochron]

Yes, in the imagination. Don't make too big a deal of it. There is also a Santa Claus in the imagination.

I'm not making an atheist/theist thing of it. I can't follow why you feel the need to keep tacking on "in the imagination" when you say "There is a Santa Claus" (or similar). After all "is" already includes imaginary things.

POWELL:
The flaw seems to be equating the real car with the imaginary car rather than acknowledging that they merely map to each other. The pronoun "it" ambiguously refers to both.

There is only one car.

"The most useful car you can imagine" is one thing, not two. Do the properties of "the most useful car you can imagine" include "existence"?

Is this the application of a similar criticism you support of Anselm's "that than which nothing greater can be thought" argument for God?

Broadly speaking. I suppose you don't find that argument any more convincing than I do. What is your critique? I think the "existence is not a property" critique is pretty well known.

POWELL:
A car REALLY is more useful if it has the property "existing." However, a car can be IMAGINED to be more useful than a car that exists.

The latter is fine by me, since you aren't attributing "imaginary" to the car as a property.

If I translate it into "property-speak" I think the statement "a car with the property 'imaginary' is more useful than an otherwise identical car with the property 'existing' " is plainly false.

POWELL:
You seem to understand the relationship nicely. Now, please point to a real circle having that property, ok? Can you?

A property is a thing.

POWELL:
Well a car can be a physical object, whereas a (perfect) circle is an imaginary thing, a mental construct only, an ideal shape that physical objects can approximate.

I don't think "red" is a thing.

I don't think a circle is a thing, imaginary or otherwise.

POWELL:
Maybe. Try "nothing."

Nothing is not a thing either.

Yes. You think no. I think yes.

My point being that in discussing properties we've been discussing possible properties, not definitional properties. FWIW.

[Wyzaard]

POWELL:
If someone such as myself is claiming it is not what?

Speculation... you seem to think that metaphyscial matters possess some 'oomph'.

POWELL:
What does what mean? "Preserved sensibility"? Another phrase is "truth preserving." Why is what a must? Do you mean the conclusion of a valid argument given the truth of the premises?

Conventional, or metaphyscial truths? Preserving the former, sure... the latter? Errr...

POWELL:
Why is it your problem? Maybe because you desire an answer?

From you, mind you.

Don't argue from ignorance? Do I have a realistic option to argue from certain knowledge?

Nope... but a that point, the lack of options other than fallacies and empty hand-waving should clue you into the possibility that perhaps uncertainty is the answer. :)


POWELL:
Then your word choice seems ill advised. [/quote]

... because...?

POWELL:
What's a good example of a "bounded epistmic [sic] issue"?

"Is there a water glass on the table" (looks at 'table', sees 'glass'... re-checks...); yep... it's 'there'.

POWELL:
I don't know. Do you? Is it required that we do that?

Yep... otherwise, who says what we use is a valid methodology? And considering that the task is determining the end-all be-all grounding of existance... what would verify that from a position 'outside the box' ( yeah, I know) of existance?

POWELL:
Who says it matters enough to worry about?

Exactly! So let's drop matters of the metaphyscial altogether... otherwise, we're going to be fruitlessly batting a nigh-infinite series of unjustified schemas around for squat.

POWELL:
In my experience, careless writers tend to be careless thinkers.

Then I'm glad I have shown myself to be a counter-example!

[John Powell]

POWELL:
Yes, in the imagination. Don't make too big a deal of it. There is also a Santa Claus in the imagination.

GEOCHRON:
I'm not making an atheist/theist thing of it. I can't follow why you feel the need to keep tacking on "in the imagination" when you say "There is a Santa Claus" (or similar). After all "is" already includes imaginary things.

POWELL:
To make it clear what I mean.

POWELL:
The flaw seems to be equating the real car with the imaginary car rather than acknowledging that they merely map to each other. The pronoun "it" ambiguously refers to both.

GEOCHRON:
There is only one car.

POWELL:
No. There is the car claimed to be imaginary and there is the car that is concluded to exist. Those aren't the same car. They can correspond to each other. They can map one to the other, but the car in your imagination is not the physical object.

GEOCHRON:
"The most useful car you can imagine" is one thing, not two.

POWELL:
Correct! But what about the car that is concluded to exist? Is that the same car as the one you imagine?

GEOCHRON:
Do the properties of "the most useful car you can imagine" include "existence"?

POWELL:
You can imagine it to be so, but probably there is no real car that matches the ideal.

POWELL:
Is this the application of a similar criticism you support of Anselm's "that than which nothing greater can be thought" argument for God?

GEOCHRON:
Broadly speaking. I suppose you don't find that argument any more convincing than I do. What is your critique? I think the "existence is not a property" critique is pretty well known.

POWELL:
I'd treat it the same way as this car argument. Our minds can conceive of things which do not exist. When composing arguments relying on the imaginary-real mapping, we should be careful not to confuse the imaginary object for the real object. In most other circumstances it's not such a big deal to refer to them as the same thing.

POWELL:
A car REALLY is more useful if it has the property "existing." However, a car can be IMAGINED to be more useful than a car that exists.

GEOCHRON:
The latter is fine by me, since you aren't attributing "imaginary" to the car as a property.

POWELL:
I am attributing "imaginary" to the imaginary car.

GEOCHRON:
If I translate it into "property-speak" I think the statement "a car with the property 'imaginary' is more useful than an otherwise identical car with the property 'existing' " is plainly false.

POWELL:
I imagine that's ok.

If the only difference is "imaginary" versus "existing" then the real, existing car should be more useful.

POWELL:
You seem to understand the relationship nicely. Now, please point to a real circle having that property, ok? Can you?

. . .

A property is a thing.

. . .

Well a car can be a physical object, whereas a (perfect) circle is an imaginary thing, a mental construct only, an ideal shape that physical objects can approximate.

GEOCHRON:
I don't think "red" is a thing.

POWELL:
Sure it is. It's a color thing. Every thing is a thing.

Do you think red is nothing?

GEOCHRON:
I don't think a circle is a thing, imaginary or otherwise.

POWELL:
Sure it is. It's a geometrical figure thing.

POWELL:
Maybe. Try "nothing."

GEOCHRON:
Nothing is not a thing either.

POWELL:
It seems self-contradictory, but "nothing" is a thing. It's a concept isn't it?

If I ask you "What's in the box?" and you reply "nothing" then what do you mean? Do you mean there isn't any air or space in the box?

If you persist, then is zero not a number? Is zero the absense of number?

POWELL:
Yes. You think no. I think yes.

GEOCHRON:
My point being that in discussing properties we've been discussing possible properties, not definitional properties. FWIW.

POWELL:
That's a good point. We're talking about things like the colors and utility of cars rather than the circularity of circles or the marriage state of bachelors.

BTW, did you automatically disagree with that last statement because I referred to "colors of cars" and "utility of cars" as "things"?

John Powell

[geochron]

To make it clear what I mean.

Don't you think it is widely understood that "there is a Santa Claus" is true because it includes "there is an imaginary Santa Claus"?

POWELL:
No. There is the car claimed to be imaginary and there is the car that is concluded to exist. Those aren't the same car. They can correspond to each other. They can map one to the other, but the car in your imagination is not the physical object.

POWELL:
Correct! But what about the car that is concluded to exist? Is that the same car as the one you imagine?

"Things that have existence exist" (JP). If a conceived of thing has the property "existence" it exists. Whether it is the same car as some other car that exists is beside the point.

Is there some reason you can't arbitrarily assign the property "existing" to some thing you conceive of? If you conceive of something and assign the property red, it is red (according to you). If you conceive of something and assign the property "existing", why doesn't it follow that it exists? Is existence not a property in the same way that red is a property?

POWELL:
You can imagine it to be so, but probably there is no real car that matches the ideal.

The ideal has the property "existing". Can there be no real car that matches the car with the property "existing"?

POWELL:
I'd treat it the same way as this car argument. Our minds can conceive of things which do not exist. When composing arguments relying on the imaginary-real mapping, we should be careful not to confuse the imaginary object for the real object. In most other circumstances it's not such a big deal to refer to them as the same thing.

Doesn't the statement that an object exists guarantee that there is a mapping between the conceived of object and some real thing? Isn't that what "the red car exists" means?

It seems that you think "existing" is not a property that you can just assign arbitrarily to some conceived of object?

POWELL:
Sure it is. It's a color thing. Every thing is a thing.

Do you think red is nothing?

No, I think it is not a thing.

POWELL:
It seems self-contradictory, but "nothing" is a thing. It's a concept isn't it?

If I ask you "What's in the box?" and you reply "nothing" then what do you mean? Do you mean there isn't any air or space in the box?

If you say "Is everything in the box" can I never say "Yes" (unless the entire universe actually is in the box?)

Of course in everyday language both are intelligible. I impute to you an implict subset of things when you ask the question. I may misdefine it - I may say "nothing" and you may say "What, not even air?". When I answer "Nothing" I mean that no member of that set of things is in the box. Alternatively, that the set of things in the box that are in the subset of things I understand you to be talking about is the empty set.

Nothing is worse than the worst thing makes sense if you think of "nothing" as "the empty set". It means that "the set of things worse than the worst thing" = "the empty set".

If nothing is a thing, then it makes no sense. Nothing is the thing that is worse than the worst thing. Nothing is also the thing that is better than the best thing. So the best thing is worse than the worst thing.

If you persist, then is zero not a number? Is zero the absense of number?

Zero is not a good analogy to the empty set.

POWELL:
That's a good point. We're talking about things like the colors and utility of cars rather than the circularity of circles or the marriage state of bachelors.

BTW, did you automatically disagree with that last statement because I referred to "colors of cars" and "utility of cars" as "things"?

John Powell

No, because I understand daily language to indulge in imprecise reification. I have no problem until such "things" are reasoned with as if they are things in all respects.

[John Powell]

POWELL:
To make it clear what I mean.

GEOCHRON:
Don't you think it is widely understood that "there is a Santa Claus" is true because it includes "there is an imaginary Santa Claus"?

POWELL:
Some people might be confused by assuming "there is" means "there really is." If you say "There is a Santa Claus in the imagination" then they understand.

POWELL:
No. There is the car claimed to be imaginary and there is the car that is concluded to exist. Those aren't the same car. They can correspond to each other. They can map one to the other, but the car in your imagination is not the physical object.

. . .

Correct! But what about the car that is concluded to exist? Is that the same car as the one you imagine?

GEOCHRON:
"Things that have existence exist" (JP). If a conceived of thing has the property "existence" it exists. Whether it is the same car as some other car that exists is beside the point.

Is there some reason you can't arbitrarily assign the property "existing" to some thing you conceive of?

POWELL:
Not AFAIK. That's well within the power of the imagination.

GEOCHRON:
If you conceive of something and assign the property red, it is red (according to you).

POWELL:
Yes. Red in the imagination. Imaginary red.

GEOCHRON:
If you conceive of something and assign the property "existing", why doesn't it follow that it exists?

POWELL:
It does. It exists in the imagination.

GEOCHRON:
Is existence not a property in the same way that red is a property?

POWELL:
They are each a property.

POWELL:
You can imagine it to be so, but probably there is no real car that matches the ideal.

GEOCHRON:
The ideal has the property "existing". Can there be no real car that matches the car with the property "existing"?

POWELL:
No, there can be. But, probably there isn't a real match to the ideal.

POWELL:
I'd treat it the same way as this car argument. Our minds can conceive of things which do not exist. When composing arguments relying on the imaginary-real mapping, we should be careful not to confuse the imaginary object for the real object. In most other circumstances it's not such a big deal to refer to them as the same thing.

GEOCHRON:
Doesn't the statement that an object exists guarantee that there is a mapping between the conceived of object and some real thing? Isn't that what "the red car exists" means?

POWELL:
No. That you claim God exists doesn't guarantee a real God.

It can. To claim a red car exists means you conceive of a red car and it often means you are claiming there is a real car.

GEOCHRON:
It seems that you think "existing" is not a property that you can just assign arbitrarily to some conceived of object?

POWELL:
No. The imagination can do that.

POWELL:
Sure it is. It's a color thing. Every thing is a thing.

Do you think red is nothing?

GEOCHRON:
No, I think it is not a thing.

POWELL:
Isn't that what "nothing" means?

POWELL:
It seems self-contradictory, but "nothing" is a thing. It's a concept isn't it?

If I ask you "What's in the box?" and you reply "nothing" then what do you mean? Do you mean there isn't any air or space in the box?

GEOCHRON:
If you say "Is everything in the box" can I never say "Yes" (unless the entire universe actually is in the box?)

POWELL:
You can say those words, but probably you'd be wrong.

GEOCHRON:
Of course in everyday language both are intelligible. I impute to you an implict subset of things when you ask the question.

POWELL:
Right. Whether you say "nothing is in the box" or "everything is in the box" usually you are referring to a subset of things.

GEOCHRON:
I may misdefine it - I may say "nothing" and you may say "What, not even air?". When I answer "Nothing" I mean that no member of that set of things is in the box. Alternatively, that the set of things in the box that are in the subset of things I understand you to be talking about is the empty set.

Nothing is worse than the worst thing makes sense if you think of "nothing" as "the empty set". It means that "the set of things worse than the worst thing" = "the empty set".

If nothing is a thing, then it makes no sense. Nothing is the thing that is worse than the worst thing. Nothing is also the thing that is better than the best thing. So the best thing is worse than the worst thing.

POWELL:
Maybe.

POWELL:
If you persist, then is zero not a number? Is zero the absense of number?

GEOCHRON:
Zero is not a good analogy to the empty set.

POWELL:
How many element things are in the empty set?

POWELL:
That's a good point. We're talking about things like the colors and utility of cars rather than the circularity of circles or the marriage state of bachelors.

BTW, did you automatically disagree with that last statement because I referred to "colors of cars" and "utility of cars" as "things"?

GEOCHRON:
No, because I understand daily language to indulge in imprecise reification. I have no problem until such "things" are reasoned with as if they are things in all respects.

POWELL:
Things in all respects? To be a thing you only have to satisfy one of the definitions, not all of them.

John Powell

[geochron]

GEOCHRON
If you conceive of something and assign the property "existing", why doesn't it follow that it exists?

POWELL:
It does. It exists in the imagination.

If to exist in the imagination is to exist, how is it distinct from "to be" (your usage)?

I thought to be in the imagination was to be, but to exist implied being real.

To be includes "to be imaginary", but to exist does not include "to exist in the imagination" iirc.

POWELL:
No. That you claim God exists doesn't guarantee a real God.

Indeed it doesn't. But if God has the property "existence" a real God is guaranteed.

It can. To claim a red car exists means you conceive of a red car and it often means you are claiming there is a real car.

A car has the property "existence" can only be true if the car exists. "To have existence is to exist".

POWELL:
Isn't that [not a thing] what "nothing" means?

Apprently not for you, since for you "nothing" is a thing.

POWELL:
You can say those words, but probably you'd be wrong.

So when you were packing for your trip in the red car, and your girlfriend said "is everything packed", you replied "No, the greater magellanic cloud is still in the sky"?

My point being that answers such as these (everything, nothing) are understood in context.

POWELL:
How many element things are in the empty set?

The number of elements in a set and the set itself are different concepts. How one behaves is different from how the other behaves.

[John Powell]

GEOCHRON
If you conceive of something and assign the property "existing", why doesn't it follow that it exists?

POWELL:
It does. It exists in the imagination.

GEOCHRON:
If to exist in the imagination is to exist, how is it distinct from "to be" (your usage)?

POWELL:
It's analogous. Often when people say "exist" or "is" they mean "real" rather than "imaginary". To be clear, I say "exist in the imagination" and "is in the imagination."

GEOCHRON:
I thought to be in the imagination was to be, but to exist implied being real.

POWELL:
"To be in the imagination" is one kind of "to be". Another kind of "to be" is "to be real." Similarly, "to exist in the imagination" is to be imaginary. "To really exist" is to be real.

GEOCHRON:
To be includes "to be imaginary", but to exist does not include "to exist in the imagination" iirc.

POWELL:
That was a distinction you were promoting. I allow for the language "to exist in the imagination."

POWELL:
No. That you claim God exists doesn't guarantee a real God.

GEOCHRON:
Indeed it doesn't. But if God has the property "existence" a real God is guaranteed.

POWELL:
Not if you allow for "existence in the mind." "Existence" is a label / property we imagine attaching to objects we imagine to be "real."

POWELL:
It can. To claim a red car exists means you conceive of a red car and it often means you are claiming there is a real car.

GEOCHRON:
A car has the property "existence" can only be true if the car exists.

POWELL:
Yes.

GEOCHRON:
"To have existence is to exist".

POWELL:
Yes. To have existence in the imagination is to exist in the imagination. On the other hand, to really have existence is to really exist.

POWELL:
Isn't that [not a thing] what "nothing" means?

GEOCHRON:
Apprently not for you, since for you "nothing" is a thing.

POWELL:
Don't forget about the implied subset.

POWELL:
You can say those words, but probably you'd be wrong.

GEOCHRON:
So when you were packing for your trip in the red car, and your girlfriend said "is everything packed", you replied "No, the greater magellanic cloud is still in the sky"?

POWELL:
It's called the "Large Magellanic Cloud." I didn't really say that. I don't really own a red car. My real car is white.

GEOCHRON:
My point being that answers such as these (everything, nothing) are understood in context.

POWELL:
I'm largely in agreement about what is usually meant by "nothing" and "everything."

POWELL:
How many element things are in the empty set?

GEOCHRON:
The number of elements in a set and the set itself are different concepts. How one behaves is different from how the other behaves.

POWELL:
Ok. So what's the answer to my question?

John Powell

[geochron]

It's analogous. Often when people say "exist" or "is" they mean "real" rather than "imaginary". To be clear, I say "exist in the imagination" and "is in the imagination."

POWELL:
"To be in the imagination" is one kind of "to be". Another kind of "to be" is "to be real." Similarly, "to exist in the imagination" is to be imaginary. "To really exist" is to be real.

POWELL:
That was a distinction you were promoting. I allow for the language "to exist in the imagination."

So when you say "my red car exists in the imagination", how often do they reply "ah, you mean it doesn't exist"? Isn't this what is understood by "in the imagination"?

-----

It seems to me that you would say an imaginary car had the property non-existence and the imaginary property existence. Interesting.

So is "being real" a property?

-----

I sense semantic troubles here, perhaps I can clarify...

Consider a conception...

We say it exists if it maps to a real thing.
We say it doesn't exist if it doesn't map to a real thing.

You say...

Some conceived of thing that maps to a real thing has the property existence.
Some conceived of thing that doesn't map to a real thing does not have the property existence.

Do you agree? If so, can you arbitrarily attach the property "existing" to something that doesn't map to a real thing?

-----

What do you say when you want to exclude the imaginary? Do you ever try to make statements about an external reality?

"It exists in reality"?

Is "existing in reality" a property?

What about

"It exists in reality in my imagination"?
Does something that "exists in reality in your imagination" have the property "exists in reality"?

POWELL:
Not if you allow for "existence in the mind." "Existence" is a label / property we imagine attaching to objects we imagine to be "real."

When you say "Existence is a label.." Do you mean you imagine it is a label...?

POWELL:
Don't forget about the implied subset.

A set of things is not a thing. Is a set of carrots a carrot?

POWELL:
It's called the "Large Magellanic Cloud."

Why, so it is. How embarrassing. Don't tell my students.

POWELL:
Ok. So what's the answer to my question?

John Powell

Zero, and irrelevant

[John Powell]

POWELL:
It's analogous. Often when people say "exist" or "is" they mean "real" rather than "imaginary". To be clear, I say "exist in the imagination" and "is in the imagination."

. . .

"To be in the imagination" is one kind of "to be". Another kind of "to be" is "to be real." Similarly, "to exist in the imagination" is to be imaginary. "To really exist" is to be real.

. . .

That was a distinction you were promoting. I allow for the language "to exist in the imagination."

GEOCHRON:
So when you say "my red car exists in the imagination", how often do they reply "ah, you mean it doesn't exist"? Isn't this what is understood by "in the imagination"?

POWELL:
To many people. I mean it's not the car that might really exist.

GEOCHRON:
It seems to me that you would say an imaginary car had the property non-existence and the imaginary property existence. Interesting.

So is "being real" a property?

POWELL:
Yes. It's a property of the things we imagine to be real.

GEOCHRON:
I sense semantic troubles here, perhaps I can clarify...

Consider a conception...

We say it exists if it maps to a real thing.

POWELL:
What does "it" refer to? To the thing you imagine or to the thing that's real? Your language suggests the "it" refers to the thing you imagine.

GEOCHRON:
We say it doesn't exist if it doesn't map to a real thing.

POWELL:
The "it" there seems to refer to the imaginary thing. That "it" exists in the imagination.

If you wish to carefully consider the logic, then don't make the mistake of EQUATING the imaginary thing with the real thing. The thing you imagine is not the same thing that might really exist.

GEOCHRON:
You say...

Some conceived of thing that maps to a real thing has the property existence.

POWELL:
Your language suggests that the thing that has the property of existence is the conceived of thing. Is that what you mean?

GEOCHRON:
Some conceived of thing that doesn't map to a real thing does not have the property existence.

POWELL:
The mapping is irrelevant to determining this. The conceived of thing exists in the imagination. There may or may not be a corresponding real thing.

GEOCHRON:
Do you agree?

POWELL:
No.

GEOCHRON:
If so, can you arbitrarily attach the property "existing" to something that doesn't map to a real thing?

POWELL:
Yes. Your imagination has that power. AFAICT, you've attached the property / label "existing" to something that does not map to a real thing: God.

GEOCHRON:
What do you say when you want to exclude the imaginary?

POWELL:
That's an odd question. I might try by speaking of the real, but it doesn't really work.

How do you propose to discuss something by excluding your thoughts from the discussion?

GEOCHRON:
Do you ever try to make statements about an external reality?

POWELL:
Yes. I try. However, I'm hampered by the realization that I'm imagining an external reality.

GEOCHRON:
"It exists in reality"?

POWELL:
Yes, at least we imagine that it exists in reality.

GEOCHRON:
Is "existing in reality" a property?

POWELL:
Yes. It's a label we attach to the things that we imagine to exist in reality.

GEOCHRON:
What about

"It exists in reality in my imagination"?

POWELL:
I suppose you could say that but such language risks confusion. I suggest you instead say "It exists in my imagination."

GEOCHRON:
Does something that "exists in reality in your imagination" have the property "exists in reality"?

POWELL:
Yes. It would be self-contradictory to claim that something that exists in reality does not exist in reality. However, such language is likely to confuse. Rather, say "something that exists in your imagination isn't the same thing as the thing that might exist in reality."

POWELL:
Not if you allow for "existence in the mind." "Existence" is a label / property we imagine attaching to objects we imagine to be "real."

GEOCHRON:
When you say "Existence is a label.." Do you mean you imagine it is a label...?

POWELL:
Yes.

POWELL:
Don't forget about the implied subset.

GEOCHRON:
A set of things is not a thing. Is a set of carrots a carrot?

POWELL:
No, but a set is a thing. Every thing is a thing. If you disagree then try to name a thing that isn't a thing.

POWELL:
It's called the "Large Magellanic Cloud."

GEOCHRON:
Why, so it is. How embarrassing. Don't tell my students.

POWELL:
Why not?

POWELL:
Ok. So what's the answer to my question?

GEOCHRON:
Zero, and irrelevant

POWELL:
Thanks.

John Powell

[geochron]

The mapping is irrelevant to determining this. The conceived of thing exists in the imagination. There may or may not be a corresponding real thing.

But real things are in your imagination as well.

Is "having a corresponding real thing and not only in my imagination" a property?

[quote]

POWELL:
That's an odd question. I might try by speaking of the real, but it doesn't really work.

How do you propose to discuss something by excluding your thoughts from the discussion?

What do you mean when you say "God doesn't exist"? Are you excluding your thoughts from the discussion?

We were equating imaginary with non-existent. Your position seems to be that everything exists (where existence includes the imaginary). Hence non-existence is not a property.

POWELL:
Yes. I try. However, I'm hampered by the realization that I'm imagining an external reality.

What's "an external reality"? Is it a label you attach to something you imagine?

POWELL:
I suppose you could say that but such language risks confusion. I suggest you instead say "It exists in my imagination."

I don't see that it's any worse than the language you use already.

POWELL:
No, but a set is a thing. Every thing is a thing. If you disagree then try to name a thing that isn't a thing.

Is the set of all things that do not contain themselves a member of itself?

POWELL:
Why not?

They don't exist.

[John Powell]

POWELL:
Your thoughtful challenge has been helping me to reconsider these issues. I thank you for that.

POWELL:
The mapping is irrelevant to determining this. The conceived of thing exists in the imagination. There may or may not be a corresponding real thing.

GEOCHRON:
But real things are in your imagination as well.

POWELL:
Imaginary things we label as real are in the imagination.

GEOCHRON:
Is "having a corresponding real thing and not only in my imagination" a property?

POWELL:
I imagine so.

POWELL:
That's an odd question. I might try by speaking of the real, but it doesn't really work.

How do you propose to discuss something by excluding your thoughts from the discussion?

GEOCHRON:
What do you mean when you say "God doesn't exist"?

POWELL:
I would mean that God is an imaginary thing. I would mean that I imagine that there is no real correspondent to what you imagine to be real.

GEOCHRON:
Are you excluding your thoughts from the discussion?

POWELL:
No.

GEOCHRON:
We were equating imaginary with non-existent. Your position seems to be that everything exists (where existence includes the imaginary). Hence non-existence is not a property.

POWELL:
How does that conclusion follow? That every massive body has mass does not imply that mass is not a property of massive bodies.

POWELL:
Yes. I try. However, I'm hampered by the realization that I'm imagining an external reality.

GEOCHRON:
What's "an external reality"? Is it a label you attach to something you imagine?

POWELL:
Yes. It's something that I imagine would exist even if I didn't imagine it.

POWELL:
I suppose you could say that but such language risks confusion. I suggest you instead say "It exists in my imagination."

GEOCHRON:
I don't see that it's any worse than the language you use already.

POWELL:
Ok. I see things differently and probably I'm more concerned about proper language than you are.

POWELL:
No, but a set is a thing. Every thing is a thing. If you disagree then try to name a thing that isn't a thing.

GEOCHRON:
Is the set of all things that do not contain themselves a member of itself?

POWELL:
I believe the answer is "yes." Every thing is a thing. Even confusing, mysterious, contradictory things are things.

POWELL:
Why not?

GEOCHRON:
They don't exist.

POWELL:
They exist in the imagination.

John Powell

[B21C9L15]

POWELL:
They exist in the imagination.

John Powell

Can you consider imagination as a property of the brain, like the earth having the property of gravity?

My point, I guess, is that the property of a thing cannot exist independent of the physical thing that possesses it. What exists is the imagination that is possessed by your brain, not of what you imagine that do not exist in the physical. Isn't that what many are objecting?

Or, are you taking Descartes' position that a thing in your mind(imagination) is real and impacting in your being?

What do you mean by "existence," btw?

[John Powell]

B21C9L15:
Can you consider imagination as a property of the brain, like the earth having the property of gravity?

POWELL:
Yes. I can imagine that.

BTW, are you talking about the earth and gravity that are real or the earth and gravity that you imagine to be real?

B21C9L15:
My point, I guess, is that the property of a thing cannot exist independent of the physical thing that possesses it.

POWELL:
I imagine something like that to be the case.

B21C9L15:
What exists is the imagination that is possessed by your brain, not of what you imagine that do not exist in the physical. Isn't that what many are objecting?

POWELL:
I don't understand the last half of your first sentence.

B21C9L15:
Or, are you taking Descartes' position that a thing in your mind(imagination) is real and impacting in your being?

POWELL:
I don't know about that.

What is in your imagination is imaginary by definition. You might imagine it to be real. There might be a real thing that corresponds to the thing you imagine. However, in general the imaginary thing and the real thing aren't the same thing.

B21C9L15:
What do you mean by "existence," btw?

POWELL:
The property of existing.

Things that exist have existence. Imaginary things exist in the imagination. Real things really exist.

John Powell

[B21C9L15]

B21C9L15:
Can you consider imagination as a property of the brain, like the earth having the property of gravity?

POWELL:
Yes. I can imagine that.

BTW, are you talking about the earth and gravity that are real or the earth and gravity that you imagine to be real?

Well, if my imagination is real, then all I imagine is actually real. What I imagine is actually a part of my existence, as the gravity is part of earth’s existence. My imagination is real and existing, in a sense that it has a corresponding effect to my physical being. Same as the earth’s gravity is real and existing. The only difference, I guess, is that you knew how gravity will affect the physical, while you may not know what I imagine and how it affects me. There is a god that exists, that drew the Inquisitors to go hunting. The same god is drawing some scholars to convince the he is one. That god is not my God, but that god exist, and so is mine God.

B21C9L15:
My point, I guess, is that the property of a thing cannot exist independent of the physical thing that possesses it.

POWELL:
I imagine something like that to be the case.

So then, there is nothing I know that does not exist, and is not real.