Is libertarian free will coherent?

[Jim B.]

Because A is dependent upon B doesn't mean that A IS B. I'm dependent on my heart continuing to beat but that doesn't mean I am my heart continuing to beat.



Neuroscience shows us sets of correlations which, barring strong counter-evidence, indicates causality. Just as the normally functioning components of my TV strongly correlate with the images on the screen. There are good reasons to think that brain functions are not the whole story when it comes to experience.

[Jim B.]

You are assuming that you are something other than your brain. So, in such a case, how does this "brainless you" or "brainless mind," however you wish to define it, decide which choice to make? Btw, I am not copletely sold on determinism either, though I am sold on the notion of there being no such thing as an immaterial spirit or mind separate from the material body.

Again, I'm not defending causal indeterminism, but taking that position for the sake of argument, I don't think it necessarily assumes a 'ghost in the machine.' I don't know for sure, but I think most causal indeterminists would subscribe to strong emergence of the self, so that the self emerges from and depends upon lower-level processes but isn't entirely reducible to them, and that this macro-level phenomenon, the self, would have its own causal powers

[Jim B.]

Even if you are a spirit or immaterial mind of some sort, how do you explain the mechanism by which you make decisions?

probably most of my decisions are the result of unconscious processes in my body. But some may not be. Consciousness and reason don't operate by mechanisms, imo. The part-whole relations of mechanisms don't apply to experiences.

[JimL]

Again, I'm not defending causal indeterminism, but taking that position for the sake of argument, I don't think it necessarily assumes a 'ghost in the machine.' I don't know for sure, but I think most causal indeterminists would subscribe to strong emergence of the self, so that the self emerges from and depends upon lower-level processes but isn't entirely reducible to them, and that this macro-level phenomenon, the self, would have its own causal powers

That seems a contradiction though. This self/mind can't be said to be both dependent upon the brain and have its own causal powers. If you mean to say that the self is born of, or is emergent from the brain and then separates from the brain to become its own entity, then it is a ghost in the machine. But to say that mind/self is dependent upon the brain is to say nothing more than that it is the brain.

[JimL]

probably most of my decisions are the result of unconscious processes in my body. But some may not be. Consciousness and reason don't operate by mechanisms, imo. The part-whole relations of mechanisms don't apply to experiences.

But the brain does reason, thats what it does, the unconscious decisions that you make are not random, they are based upon the information contained in your brain. The choices you make are prior to your consciousness of those choices, miliseconds prior, but prior nontheless. As you ponder on that assertion, it is your brain doing the pondering, not a spirit, or ghost in the machine, that is somehow distinct from your brain. Think about it, if the thinking thing that you call the self were a distinct entity, what possible need would it have of a physical brain.

[Tassman]

why don't you try learning what go0f of gaps is, It's just anytime you say we don't know something, you8r pretense of knowing logic is so funny. let's see you actually to disprove the six things?

http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/God_of_the_gaps

ALL of your arguments are 'god-of-the-gap' arguments. "We don't know, therefore god".

Because it's the one that connects us to consciousness. .why is it this way and not some other say? you really think that's an argument? why don't you give me a reason why it should be some other way, Then show what that proves? it doesn't change the argument, it doesn't make mind reducible to brain does it?

No. That is BS.
here's why

(1) you are misusing the germ supernatural it is not synonym for "para normal" it pertains to mystical experience and that's all. Mystical experience has been proved and made more valid with the 200 studies I've been talking about.

(2) Hume's arguments against miracles were circular. Lourdes has good scientific rules for determining miracles and the documentation for them is strong. Other scholars have studied the records and find they are unexplained. If anything miracles of healing are stronger better validated than ever before.

(3) Atheist sociologist Abraham Maslow argued that ordinary psychology can be understood and SN he argued that studies allover the social sciences confirm it and anyone who can't see it is blind. YOU have been brain washed by propaganda.

Peak Experience by Maslow

(4) God on the Brain: thye evidence from nuero sicence is not anti- god rather according to Andrew Newberg it's good reasom to believe in God.

There is no good reason to believe in anything when the sole evidence is: http://www.positiveatheism.org/mail/eml9139.htm

[Jim B.]

That seems a contradiction though. This self/mind can't be said to be both dependent upon the brain and have its own causal powers. If you mean to say that the self is born of, or is emergent from the brain and then separates from the brain to become its own entity, then it is a ghost in the machine. But to say that mind/self is dependent upon the brain is to say nothing more than that it is the brain.

I don't see a contradiction. The light in my room is dependent on the switch, the wiring, etc, and yet that light is not identical to the switch and the wiring. I can turn the light off and on by flipping the switch, but this dependence doesn't mean that light = switch. As far as causal powers go, here's a passage from John Searle's
"The Rediscovery of the Mind":

(It seems obvious that) macro mental phenomena are all caused by lower-level micro phenomena. There is nothing mysterious about such bottom up causation; it is quite common in the physical world. Furthermore, the fact that the mental features are supervenient on neuronal features in no way diminishes their causal efficacy. The solidity of the piston is causally supervenient on its molecular structure, but this does not make solidity epiphenomenal; and similarly, the causal supervenience of my present back pain does not make the pain epiphenomenal.

he refers to natural supervenience. Chalmers talks about, and gives good reasons supporting, the logical non-supervenience of conscious experiences. The physical structure of the world is logically consistent with the absence of consciousness, so consciousness is a further feature of the world.

[Jim B.]

But the brain does reason, thats what it does, the unconscious decisions that you make are not random, they are based upon the information contained in your brain. The choices you make are prior to your consciousness of those choices, miliseconds prior, but prior nontheless. As you ponder on that assertion, it is your brain doing the pondering, not a spirit, or ghost in the machine, that is somehow distinct from your brain. Think about it, if the thinking thing that you call the self were a distinct entity, what possible need would it have of a physical brain.

"Distinct" and "emergent" are two different things. What emerges requires what it emerges from, although it isn't entirely reducible to its physical base. Software requires hardware, tv transmissions require actual equipment, but this dependence alone doesn't justify saying that software IS hardware or tv transmissions ARE tv sets.

[Tassman]

I don't see a contradiction. The light in my room is dependent on the switch, the wiring, etc, and yet that light is not identical to the switch and the wiring. I can turn the light off and on by flipping the switch, but this dependence doesn't mean that light = switch. As far as causal powers go, here's a passage from John Searle's
"The Rediscovery of the Mind":

(It seems obvious that) macro mental phenomena are all caused by lower-level micro phenomena. There is nothing mysterious about such bottom up causation; it is quite common in the physical world. Furthermore, the fact that the mental features are supervenient on neuronal features in no way diminishes their causal efficacy. The solidity of the piston is causally supervenient on its molecular structure, but this does not make solidity epiphenomenal; and similarly, the causal supervenience of my present back pain does not make the pain epiphenomenal.he refers to natural supervenience. Chalmers talks about, and gives good reasons supporting, the logical non-supervenience of conscious experiences.

Light itself is a physical thing arising via electromagnetic radiation within a certain portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. The light, the switch and the wiring etc are ALL ultimately dependent on the physical power station which generates the power...in this instance, as per your analogy, the brain. And without that power station the switches and wiring etc are useless.

The physical structure of the world is logically consistent with the absence of consciousness, so consciousness is a further feature of the world.

The physical structure of the world is logically consistent with both the absence and existence of consciousness...obviously, because consciousness exists among many living creatures to a greater or lesser degree.

[Jim B.]

Light itself is a physical thing arising via electromagnetic radiation within a certain portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. The light, the switch and the wiring etc are ALL ultimately dependent on the physical power station which generates the power...in this instance, as per your analogy, the brain. And without that power station the switches and wiring etc are useless.

There's no exact analogy for consciousness since it is unique. The analogy was meant to illustrate that causal dependence alone does not mean ontological identity. And even taking a more literal-minded approach to the analogy, light would still not be identical to any or all of the parts of the infrastructure bringing it into my room.

The physical structure of the world is logically consistent with both the absence and existence of consciousness...obviously, because consciousness exists among many living creatures to a greater or lesser degree.

No, it's not logically consistent, since a world that's physically identical to ours is logicallyconsistent with the lack of consciousness. The latter seems to be an added feature of the world.

[Tassman]

There's no exact analogy for consciousness since it is unique.

The analogy was meant to illustrate that causal dependence alone does not mean ontological identity.

And even taking a more literal-minded approach to the analogy, light would still not be identical to any or all of the parts of the infrastructure bringing it into my room.

No, it's not logically consistent, since a world that's physically identical to ours is logicallyconsistent with the lack of consciousness. The latter seems to be an added feature of the world.

[Jim B.]

Most participants on this site are religious to some extent and most seem to be Christians. Most Christians believe in libertarian free will. That is, they reject determinism, are incompatibilists, and believe that our will, mind, and consciousness is not determined by anything and are free to choose any number of possible courses of action. Libertarian free will requires at least 3 things:

(1) We are in control of our will
(2) our mind is causally effective
(3) in the same situation we could have done otherwise

This view is popular among lay people but not among scientists and philosophers. Why is this? It's because libertarian free will is incoherent.

One simple question to ask the libertarian is: do our thoughts have causes? Yes or no?

If our thoughts have causes, what ever caused that can't be our will or our mind, because our thoughts are our will and mind. Saying that the soul causes the thoughts just pushes the issue back one step further, because the question now becomes, does the soul have a cause? If it does, then what ever caused it can't be the soul or the mind or the will, it has to be something other. And once you have that, you are essentially admitting that your will is not truly free, since it has a cause that is not us and that we cannot control.

If our thoughts do not have causes, then you are saying that it begins to exist without a cause. This could violate the kalam cosmological argument's first premise (everything that begins to exist has a cause) and would essentially falsify it. If our thoughts had no cause they would be totally random fluctuations and it would be a mere coincidence that they had any connection to the physical world or reality.

On top of that, the ability to choose your thoughts is logically impossible. You can't have a thought, about a thought, before you have a thought. You can't choose what your next thought, desire, or idea will be. In order to do that, you'd have to think about it, before you think about it. That's incoherent. If you can't choose your next thought, or any of your thoughts, how is your will or mind controlled by you, and in what sense is it free? It isn't. Thoughts arise in consciousness and we have no control over it.

Right now I'm only asking for a justification of (1) above. (2) and (3) is a whole other argument that only adds to the difficulty the libertarian has.

So what's a libertarian free will believer to do? Here are some typical nonstarter responses:

1. If we don't have free will moral responsibility goes out the window!

This is an informal fallacy known as an appeal to consequences. The undesirable consequences of a thing say nothing about whether it is false. For example, creationists will often say, "If we evolved then we're just animals. I don't like that, so evolution is false." This is a fallacious way of reasoning. The undesirability of being related to monkeys says nothing about whether evolution is true.

2. If we don't have free will rationality goes out the window!

This is similar to an appeal to consequences but not quite. If libertarian free will itself is not coherent and its coherency cannot be established, then you cannot claim that without it there is no rationality. You'd be arguing from a square-circle.

Basically, I want to challenge all believers in libertarian free will to make a positive argument for the coherency of libertarian free will. I don't need every single detail explained, I just need you to show how it is even logically coherent and not self-refuting. Or, admit that you can't. So who is up to the challenge? I want respondents to focus on the positive argument for LFW, not fallacious appeals to consequences.

I question whether libertarian free will requires that we have "control over our wills." What libertarian free will requires is that same past does not necessarily equal same future where our conscious purposes and intentions are concerned. If I have a choice between apple pie and pecan pie, the same past leading up to the moment of my decision could conceivably lead to me choosing one or the other. Causal indeterminism shows how this kind of free will is not incoherent. I'm not sure it's right, but all you're asking for is to show that a theory of free will is not incoherent, not that it's logically persuasive.

Setting that aside, why is the argument from rationality not valid? If we have to assume reason in making any argument at all, and if determinism is shown to be incompatible with reason, then determinism is incoherent, at least the way it's been traditionally formulated...

[JimL]

I question whether libertarian free will requires that we have "control over our wills." What libertarian free will requires is that same past does not necessarily equal same future where our conscious purposes and intentions are concerned. If I have a choice between apple pie and pecan pie, the same past leading up to the moment of my decision could conceivably lead to me choosing one or the other. Causal indeterminism shows how this kind of free will is not incoherent. I'm not sure it's right, but all you're asking for is to show that a theory of free will is not incoherent, not that it's logically persuasive.

No control, no free will. Libertarian free will is about there being no anticedent causes which determine your present actions.

Setting that aside, why is the argument from rationality not valid? If we have to assume reason in making any argument at all, and if determinism is shown to be incompatible with reason, then determinism is incoherent, at least the way it's been traditionally formulated...

If ifs and buts were..... determinism isn't incompatible with reason, thats why its coherent.

[seer]

determinism isn't incompatible with reason, thats why its coherent.

Really? How do you know that on any give subject, like this one, whether you were determined to believe a false thing to be true? You were determined to believe that determinism is true? Sounds rather circular.

[Jim B.]

No control, no free will. Libertarian free will is about there being no anticedent causes which determine your present actions.

We have control over our actions. And we can set our wills. This is a framing problem. It all depends on how these terms are understood.

If ifs and buts were..... determinism isn't incompatible with reason, thats why its coherent.

It's not coherent if we assume that we are (to some degree) capable of reason. There's no coherent way to consistently believe that that's true, because that belief couldn't be rationally arrived at or defended.