Are Thoughts Causal?

[Jim B.]

I wouldn't argue that a thought is identical with its physical embodiment, because the thought itself, afaics, is not an existing thing. But a question if I may. What do you mean by "the sufficient conditions for thinking a thought?

And why don't you think that a thought exists? (Let me guess-- because it's not a material object, right? And only material objects exist.) The thought as a brain state/event would exist, even for a materialist. If we define "exist" as "persist across time," then my thought that 1+1=2 exists for as long as I think it. It is still an event that is persisting across time. But I was referring to the content of the thought. 1+1=2 is always immaterially true; whether it exists timelessly somehow or only exists potentially until some mind actually thinks it, or whether it exists timelessly in God's mind.

Necessary condition I understand as being that without which something couldn't happen, and sufficient condition as that with which something definitely HAS to happen. So my being born would be a necessary condition to my starting a fire, and my holding a lit match to dry kindling are the sufficient conditions to starting a fire.

Ah, but your argument is that thoughts are something, that they have some sort of existence in and of themselves, and being that they are not material, you have only one alternative and that is that thoughts, conscious experiences, are immaterially existing things. Do I have that right?

Thoughts do have some sort of existence as brain events/states and as conscious events. As normative content, their existence becomes trickier to pin down, but I would say that the content is definitely real in some sense and definitely not reducible to material objects.

I think that I fully understand what you're saying, ie that thoughts, conscious experiences, are not identical to the physical brain states that give them rise, but I don't think that they are existing things in themselves either. For instance, if you, or anybody else, are not thinking the thought 1+1=2, do you believe that the thought 1+1=2 exists out there somewhere anyway? If so, in what sense, where does it reside?

Do you think that 1+1=2 becomes true or justified each and every time someone actually thinks it? I don't know that that particular truth exists somewhere. If it exists, it does so timelessly and placelessly. I do think it is a truth that is real, and maybe reality extends beyond existence.

[JimL]

And why don't you think that a thought exists? (Let me guess-- because it's not a material object, right? And only material objects exist.)

Correct, and because I see no good reason to believe that there is another kind of world in which ideas/concepts, like 1+1=2, exist all by themselves. Any ideas why that would be so?

The thought as a brain state/event would exist, even for a materialist. If we define "exist" as "persist across time," then my thought that 1+1=2 exists for as long as I think it. It is still an event that is persisting across time.

True, no matter how you define "thought", having one, being in that mental state, will persist for as long as one remains in that mental state.. Does the "thought" continue to persist once you are no longer in that mental state?

But I was referring to the content of the thought. 1+1=2 is always immaterially true;

But being true is different than having existence.

whether it exists timelessly somehow or only exists potentially until some mind actually thinks it, or whether it exists timelessly in God's mind.

I'm not sure what you mean exactly by exist. Exists how? Does it exist somewhere, or nowhere, or what? Does it exist as another substance?

Necessary condition I understand as being that without which something couldn't happen, and sufficient condition as that with which something definitely HAS to happen. So my being born would be a necessary condition to my starting a fire, and my holding a lit match to dry kindling are the sufficient conditions to starting a fire.

Okay, so the physical brain would be the necessary condition for the thinking of a thought, and what would be the sufficient condition? The pre-existence of the thought itself I assume?

Thoughts do have some sort of existence as brain events/states and as conscious events. As normative content, their existence becomes trickier to pin down, but I would say that the content is definitely real in some sense and definitely not reducible to material objects.

Well, I'd have to mull that over for a while, it's not nonsense, it's worthy of considering, but I'm not convinced in what sense they could be said to exist.

Do you think that 1+1=2 becomes true or justified each and every time someone actually thinks it?

No, 1 object is always 1 object and 2 objects are always 2 objects.

I don't know that that particular truth exists somewhere. If it exists, it does so timelessly and placelessly. I do think it is a truth that is real, and maybe reality extends beyond existence.

Well, but that's just a truth about the physical world and how we symbolically/linguistically define it though, no? There may be no reality beyond this existence. I don't think that being true gives the concept of 1+1=2 any reality/existence of it's own though.

[Tassman]

I've never claimed that philosophy ALONE can answer the hard problem. What philosophy can and must do in this case is provide conceptual clarity. Empirical research must have a clear understanding of what is to be investigated and an understanding of the concepts involved.

Philosophy cannot answer the “hard problem” in any realistic way at all, it can only speculate. Philosophy has it uses, certainly, in that it holds the scientific structure together. But only science can reach empirically tested reliable conclusions. Whereas philosophy has no mechanism for testing its speculative arguments except for another speculative argument and vague phrases such as “I would say that...” or “it seems to me that…”. In short, mere speculative opinions.

And once again, philosophy CAN and DOES provide new knowledge, as per my examples and many many others. Human knowledge exists as a complex continuum. Virtually no knowledge, whether philosophically or scientifically derived, is immune from being later amended or even overturned.

No. Philosophy cannot provide new knowledge. It can only expose and reformulate the truths contained in established models, theories and laws. These models, theories and laws are ALL arrived at by scientific methodology and only science can reliably overturn them if errors obtain.

Physicalism DOES definitionally rule out qualia as qualia (at least for your version of reductive physicalism). Appearances, for this kind of physicalist, are not real. They are to be reduced to the lower-level physical properties causing the appearance in question.

Science is in a position to examine the physical process by which the brain functions as it experiences all subjective cognitive activity. Qualia, by its very definition, is subjective, conscious experience. Science, no more than philosophy, can examine the reality of subjective experiences as experienced. But, unlike philosophy, science can determine the origins of such experiences in the brain and accurately predict the course they will take as well as describe what actual sensations can be expected.

[Jim B.]

Philosophy cannot answer the “hard problem” in any realistic way at all, it can only speculate. Philosophy has it uses, certainly, in that it holds the scientific structure together. But only science can reach empirically tested reliable conclusions. Whereas philosophy has no mechanism for testing its speculative arguments except for another speculative argument and vague phrases such as “I would say that...” or “it seems to me that…”. In short, mere speculative opinions.

Once again, DO YOU ACTUALLY READ MY POSTS? Once more, I never claimed that philosophy ALONE can answer the hard problem. It is needed to provide conceptual clarity. And philosophy DOES provide new knowledge as in the numerous examples I provided above and in many other examples. They are not "speculative opinions" but are universally accepted and demonstrable as true. (Observation is not the only means of gaining knowledge. If it were, then this principle itself would not be an observation statement.) This does not mean they are unimpeachable, but no 'truth' is unimpeachable, including those derived from science. Please stop presenting your ill-informed caricatures as dogmatic truths about a field of which you know very little.

No. Philosophy cannot provide new knowledge. It can only expose and reformulate the truths contained in established models, theories and laws. These models, theories and laws are ALL arrived at by scientific methodology and only science can reliably overturn them if errors obtain.

You know nothing about philosophy, so how can you speak so definitively about it? This is simply scientisitic dogma repeated for the nth time. Why would you believe such a muddleheaded view? Please read the article I posted about scientism and why it is self-refuting and muddleheaded. And then read it again.

https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2010/03/1174/

https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2010/03/1184/

Science is in a position to examine the physical process by which the brain functions as it experiences all subjective cognitive activity. Qualia, by its very definition, is subjective, conscious experience. Science, no more than philosophy, can examine the reality of subjective experiences as experienced. But, unlike philosophy, science can determine the origins of such experiences in the brain and accurately predict the course they will take as well as describe what actual sensations can be expected.

Unlocking the essence of the subjective experience itself is entirely beside the point here. The question is : What is the epistemic reach of empirical research relating to a distinct ontology, ie, conscious experiences? The question is NOT : What is the actual constitutional essence of conscious experiences? The former is an epistemological and ontological question that determines how the data are to be interpreted. That's the conceptual clarification part, and it is informed by empirical research, just as research is informed by the conceptual aspect. But it is NOT a simple robotic instrumental matter of compiling ever more correlations. Correlations alone are meaningless as far as the HP. They are helpful in terms of the Easy Problems, but those are qualitatively different things. Thinking that correlations alone will solve the HP is like assuming that piling up enough sand will get you to the Moon.

[Tassman]

Once again, DO YOU ACTUALLY READ MY POSTS?

Yes, I’ve read your posts.

And philosophy DOES provide new knowledge as in the numerous examples I provided above and in many other examples. They are not "speculative opinions" but are universally accepted and demonstrable as true.

Again, philosophy does not have the mechanism to provide new factual knowledge. It can only expose and reformulate the factual truths contained in established models, theories and laws as arrived at via science.

but no 'truth' is unimpeachable, including those derived from science.

Indeed. But scientific truths can be examined and empirically tested and shown to be true. Philosophical “truths” cannot - they can only be argued about.

Please read the article I posted about scientism and why it is self-refuting and muddleheaded.

I am quite familiar with Feser thank you. Notably his attempts to rationalize Aquinas’ 5 Arguments from Ignorance to prove the existence of god – “and this we call god”. He’s obviously, a philosopher after your own heart.

Unlocking the essence of the subjective experience itself is entirely beside the point here. The question is : What is the epistemic reach of empirical research relating to a distinct ontology, ie, conscious experiences? The question is NOT : What is the actual constitutional essence of conscious experiences? The former is an epistemological and ontological question that determines how the data are to be interpreted. That's the conceptual clarification part, and it is informed by empirical research, just as research is informed by the conceptual aspect. But it is NOT a simple robotic instrumental matter of compiling ever more correlations. Correlations alone are meaningless as far as the HP. They are helpful in terms of the Easy Problems, but those are qualitatively different things. Thinking that correlations alone will solve the HP is like assuming that piling up enough sand will get you to the Moon.

Oh dear. And where’s the bit where you show how to understand ‘qualia’ via philosophy? Can you manage it without resorting to philosophizing gobblegook? The bottom line is that anything philosophy can do science can do better. Albeit without having the little unexplained bit that you like to hint at (as per Thomism) “and this we can call an immaterial soul”. Not that you are actually saying this of course – just hinting at it with comments like: “it may be immaterial or it may not.”

[Jim B.]

Correct, and because I see no good reason to believe that there is another kind of world in which ideas/concepts, like 1+1=2, exist all by themselves. Any ideas why that would be so?

I'm not committing to the idea that it exists necessarily but that it's real. I'm not sure numbers exist the way chairs and tables do. But I think that 1 would equal 1 in all worlds, holding the definitions of the terms constant. It's real because its truth holds across worlds regardless of whether anyone believes it or not.

True, no matter how you define "thought", having one, being in that mental state, will persist for as long as one remains in that mental state.. Does the "thought" continue to persist once you are no longer in that mental state?

No, as a mental state it doesn't, like I said. But there may be ideal normative content that thoughts are about, that they refer to.

But being true is different than having existence.

What is the metaphysical status of truths then?


So I find this theory of 'materialism' fascinating. This is the real topic that we're discussing on here. Are you actually claiming that only 'material' things exist or are real? Are events 'material'? How do you understand the term "material"? What is matter? Is space/time 'material'? Are you and I as persons 'material'? Beliefs and desires? Knowledge? Intentionality or 'aboutness'? Science itself as an intellectual activity? To be consistent, you'd have to banish almost everything from existence/reality that would make having this kind of discussion possible. To be thorough and consistent, it would have to be a self-extinguishing exercise.

Well, but that's just a truth about the physical world and how we symbolically/linguistically define it though, no? There may be no reality beyond this existence. I don't think that being true gives the concept of 1+1=2 any reality/existence of it's own though.

Whether there's actually a reality beyond this existence is beside the point. The laws of logic are not physical laws but apply across possible worlds. The question turns on possible and conceivable worlds, not actual worlds. The physical constants may very well have been different but not so for the laws of maths and logic.

[Jim B.]

Yes, IÂ’ve read your posts.

Read without apparently understanding.

Again, philosophy does not have the mechanism to provide new factual knowledge. It can only expose and reformulate the factual truths contained in established models, theories and laws as arrived at via science.

That is not true. I've given you a number of examples of philosophical conclusions that are accepted generally as uncontroversially true by everyone who has investigated them, including reductionists. They are accepted as settled truths. You simply do not know enough about philosophy to speak with such definitiveness. This is simply scientistic dogma that you keep repeating again and again without any support.

Indeed. But scientific truths can be examined and empirically tested and shown to be true. Philosophical “truths” cannot - they can only be argued about.

Again, empirical knowledge is not the only kind of knowledge. That assumption rests upon a principle that is ITSELF not an empirically derived principle, so it is self-contradictory. ARE YOU BEGINNING TO GET A GLIMMER OF UNDERSTANDING?

I am quite familiar with Feser thank you. Notably his attempts to rationalize Aquinas’ 5 Arguments from Ignorance to prove the existence of god – “and this we call god”. He’s obviously, a philosopher after your own heart.

And please tell me what his Thomistic leanings, which I wasn't even familiar with, have to do with the ACTUAL PIECE OF WRITING THAT I POSTED FOR YOU TO READ? (which I can bet you never even troubled yourself to read)There are a number of logical fallacies here in your response on full display, as there have been throughout our entire exchange of "ideas."

Oh dear. And where’s the bit where you show how to understand ‘qualia’ via philosophy? Can you manage it without resorting to philosophizing gobblegook? The bottom line is that anything philosophy can do science can do better. Albeit without having the little unexplained bit that you like to hint at (as per Thomism) “and this we can call an immaterial soul”. Not that you are actually saying this of course – just hinting at it with comments like: “it may be immaterial or it may not.”

Oh dear, if ever you would comprehend a SINGLE THING I EVER WRITE. Setting aside the schoolyard taunt of "Anything philosophy can do, science can do better! Nah Nah!!!" you have never had the slightest glimmer of an idea of what I am writing about. But more importantly, you have never had the slightest DESIRE to understand what I am writing, because you're already so supremely certain that you know.

Again, this has nothing to do with an immaterial soul, as much as you want to straw-man it into that kind of simplistic debate. And if it's not the debate that YOU want to have, then it's "philosophizing gobblegook"(sic) ie "stuff you don't comprehend' and rather than admitting that you don't comprehend it and maybe trying to learn something new, you (1) caricature it, (2)mischaracterize it, (3)demean it and (4)dismiss it.

[Tassman]

. I've given you a number of examples of philosophical conclusions that are accepted generally as uncontroversially true by everyone who has investigated them, including reductionists. They are accepted as settled truths.

The geocentric universe was once “accepted generally as uncontroversially true by everyone”, but it was wrong. So how do these uncontroversial truths of yours get “investigated” – via science or metaphysical argument. And how can you know they are true other than being “generally accepted”?

empirical knowledge is not the only kind of knowledge. That assumption rests upon a principle that is ITSELF not an empirically derived principle,

The “assumption” rests upon Metaphysical Naturalism, as I’ve frequently acknowledged. But, unlike purely metaphysical arguments, empirical knowledge can be multiply tested and make predictions – sufficient to put a man on the moon. Whereas a metaphysical argument cannot be multiply tested, nor make predictions, nor put a man on the moon.

tell me what his Thomistic leanings, which I wasn't even familiar with, have to do with the ACTUAL PIECE OF WRITING THAT I POSTED FOR YOU TO READ?

You quote Feser and yet claim you are not familiar with his ‘Five Proofs of the Existence of God’ in defense of Thomas Aquinas? Nor the philosophical leanings of this self-acknowledged Christian apologist? Nor your own tendency, like Feser, to echo his Thomistic leanings.

Setting aside the schoolyard taunt of "Anything philosophy can do, science can do better! Nah Nah!!!"

Actually, it’s from a famous old musical much loved by my mother: “Anything You Can Do I Can do Better” is the song I paraphrased.

this has nothing to do with an immaterial soul, as much as you want to straw-man it into that kind of simplistic debate.

And yet you constantly express ambiguity about the existence of immaterial reality. E.g. you ask JimL in #321: “Are you and I as persons 'material'?” Are you suggesting persons are ‘immaterial’? Or that persons possess an immaterial component such as an immaterial soul? Because this is how it comes across.

[Sparko]

how are you guys still arguing about this?

Do this experiment. Raise your hand. There. if you did that, it proves thoughts are causal. You decided to move your hand, then your brain told your hand to raise and it did. Your thoughts caused your hand to move.

Also, every time you post to this thread you are telling your fingers what to type... using your thoughts. Amazing.

[JimL]

I'm not committing to the idea that it exists necessarily but that it's real. I'm not sure numbers exist the way chairs and tables do. But I think that 1 would equal 1 in all worlds, holding the definitions of the terms constant. It's real because its truth holds across worlds regardless of whether anyone believes it or not.

I would agree to an extent, except that numbers are only symbolic of realities, not realities themselves. We created the symbols and the symbols could be different but still have the same meaning. 1 object would still be 1 object in any world even if the symbol used to denote 1 was a different symbol. What am I missing?

No, as a mental state it doesn't, like I said. But there may be ideal normative content that thoughts are about, that they refer to.

By normative content do you mean to say that although all thoughts may have existence in and of themselves whether they are being thought of or not? Or do you mean to say that they only have existence in and of themselves while being thought of?

What is the metaphysical status of truths then?

I not sure I understand what you mean by metaphysical here, but that which corresponds to reality would be my guess.

So I find this theory of 'materialism' fascinating. This is the real topic that we're discussing on here. Are you actually claiming that only 'material' things exist or are real?

Not my claim, but my assumption.

Are events 'material'?

As far as I can tell, yes.

How do you understand the term "material"?

That which is made of matter.

What is matter?

The substance out of which the universe is made.

Is space/time 'material'?

As far as I can tell, yes. It bends and warps due to the massive objectes within it. But that has been a question I've been trying to figure out for some time, what kind of matter?

Are you and I as persons 'material'?

It would seems so.

Beliefs and desires? Knowledge? Intentionality or 'aboutness'?

Nope.

Science itself as an intellectual activity? To be consistent, you'd have to banish almost everything from existence/reality that would make having this kind of discussion possible. To be thorough and consistent, it would have to be a self-extinguishing exercise.

I think you are mistaking what matter does for existing things in themselves.

Whether there's actually a reality beyond this existence is beside the point. The laws of logic are not physical laws but apply across possible worlds. The question turns on possible and conceivable worlds, not actual worlds. The physical constants may very well have been different but not so for the laws of maths and logic.

Interesting, but it seems to me that would just be the nature of existence not existnce itself. Something to think about though. thanks.

[seer]

Chinese brain; Ned Block:

Suppose that the whole nation of China was reordered to simulate the workings of a single brain (that is, to act as a mind according to functionalism). Each Chinese person acts as (say) a neuron, and communicates by special two-way radio in the corresponding way to the other people. The current mental state of the China brain is displayed on satellites that may be seen from anywhere in China. The China brain would then be connected via radio to a body, one that provides the sensory inputs and behavioral outputs of the China brain.

Thus, the China brain possesses all the elements of a functional description of mind: sensory inputs, behavioral outputs, and internal mental states causally connected to other mental states. If the nation of China can be made to act in this way, then, according to functionalism, this system would have a mind. Block's goal is to show how unintuitive it is to think that such an arrangement could create a mind capable of thoughts and feelings.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hw7ynh8w-tU

[Jim B.]

Chinese brain; Ned Block:

Suppose that the whole nation of China was reordered to simulate the workings of a single brain (that is, to act as a mind according to functionalism). Each Chinese person acts as (say) a neuron, and communicates by special two-way radio in the corresponding way to the other people. The current mental state of the China brain is displayed on satellites that may be seen from anywhere in China. The China brain would then be connected via radio to a body, one that provides the sensory inputs and behavioral outputs of the China brain.

Thus, the China brain possesses all the elements of a functional description of mind: sensory inputs, behavioral outputs, and internal mental states causally connected to other mental states. If the nation of China can be made to act in this way, then, according to functionalism, this system would have a mind. Block's goal is to show how unintuitive it is to think that such an arrangement could create a mind capable of thoughts and feelings.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hw7ynh8w-tU

But that's not empirical data and so for Tassman it is just so much "philosophical gobbledegook."

[Jim B.]

how are you guys still arguing about this?

Do this experiment. Raise your hand. There. if you did that, it proves thoughts are causal. You decided to move your hand, then your brain told your hand to raise and it did. Your thoughts caused your hand to move.

Also, every time you post to this thread you are telling your fingers what to type... using your thoughts. Amazing.

I've said that, but we've strayed off of the causal topic onto whether or not consciousness is reducible to physics.

Tassman is basically saying that he won't accept anything that isn't already a physical (ie scientific) explanation that justifies why consciousness is physically (ie scientifically) explainable! I've tried to explain to him why that's circular reasoning, and he just says that's "philosophical gobbledegook" and won't accept anything other than empirical evidence for why only empirical evidence is admissible in this case. And around and around we've gone for the past 6 weeks! Wheeeee!

[Tassman]

Tassman is basically saying that he won't accept anything that isn't already a physical (ie scientific) explanation that justifies why consciousness is physically (ie scientifically) explainable! and won't accept anything other than empirical evidence for why only empirical evidence is admissible in this case.

It is the only evidence available “in this case”.

Unlike your academic philosophical arguments, metaphysical naturalism in which science is grounded can be tested by conducting empirical scientific experiments and studies. Whereas your examples of philosophical conclusions that are believed as “uncontroversially true” and “accepted as settled truths” have not been tested by experiments nor shown to be true. In actuality they have often been shown to be false as Aristotle discovered. Nearly every argument and conclusion he made about physical science turned out to be wrong and misguided – including the geocentric universe.

[JimL]

I'm not committing to the idea that it exists necessarily but that it's real. I'm not sure numbers exist the way chairs and tables do. But I think that 1 would equal 1 in all worlds, holding the definitions of the terms constant. It's real because its truth holds across worlds regardless of whether anyone believes it or not.




No, as a mental state it doesn't, like I said. But there may be ideal normative content that thoughts are about, that they refer to.



What is the metaphysical status of truths then?


So I find this theory of 'materialism' fascinating. This is the real topic that we're discussing on here. Are you actually claiming that only 'material' things exist or are real? Are events 'material'? How do you understand the term "material"? What is matter? Is space/time 'material'? Are you and I as persons 'material'? Beliefs and desires? Knowledge? Intentionality or 'aboutness'? Science itself as an intellectual activity? To be consistent, you'd have to banish almost everything from existence/reality that would make having this kind of discussion possible. To be thorough and consistent, it would have to be a self-extinguishing exercise.






Whether there's actually a reality beyond this existence is beside the point. The laws of logic are not physical laws but apply across possible worlds. The question turns on possible and conceivable worlds, not actual worlds. The physical constants may very well have been different but not so for the laws of maths and logic.

So your argument is that the laws of math and logic would exist in and of themselves even if the existing world of which they are descriptive, did not itself exist?