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Cogito ergo sum

Here in the Philosophy forum we will talk about all the "why" questions. We'll have conversations about the way in which philosophy and theology and religion interact with each other. Metaphysics, ontology, origins, truth? They're all fair game so jump right in and have some fun! But remember...play nice!

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  • Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
    Science just isn't in that line of work. It isn't equipped, the way it's presently constituted, to think about or consider values, meaning or purpose. It doesn't have a category for 'final causation,' or teleology. It considers cause in terms of antecedent conditions. So you're wrong, there are good reasons to think that philosophy is better equipped than science to do certain things, just as science is better equipped than philosophy to do certain things. Part of growing up intellectually is growing out of uncritical, unquestioning awe of fields and seeing them in terms of their capacities and their limitations. All human endeavors are characterized by form, ie definite defining characteristics.
    I’ve not argued that philosophy has no place in helping science reach such conclusion, philosophy is very useful – as I’ve said repeatedly. But, again, ALL mental phenomena are ultimately physical phenomena. To deny this is to claim a non-material component to the natural world. Is this what you are claiming?

    Evolutionary psychology is very far from being established and still extremely controversial. (That doesn't mean I'm denying evolution, in case you need me to make that explicit!)
    I’m talking about the standard materialist position that consciousness is a byproduct of the brain – NOT “evolutionary psychology.”

    That's like saying that the Shakespeare Folio doesn't exist in isolation from the chemicals of the ink and paper making it up. They're distinct levels of explanation and description. Neuor-centrism risks losing the mind for the brain.
    Nevertheless the Shakespeare Folio cannot have existed in isolation from the physical phenomena of his conscious mind.

    We don't need that ontology if we restrict ourselves from the outset to a third-person perspective on the functions associated with consciousness. Just as we don't need to bother with the meanings and the aesthetic qualities of what Shakespeare wrote if we restrict ourselves from the outset to a purely physical analysis of his folio.
    Nor can one restrict oneself purely to a third-person perspective on the functions associated with consciousness. Both are necessary for a complete understanding.
    “He felt that his whole life was a kind of dream and he sometimes wondered whose it was and whether they were enjoying it.” - Douglas Adams.

    Comment


    • Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
      I don't think you're going to seriously consider, or even hear, any answer other than 'God.' The general, universal properties that we all recognize are not subjective or psychological in nature. "Redness" and "the number two" and "being to the left of" are not subjective, psychological properties. My feeling my own suffering is psychological, but that there is this thing called 'suffering in the world' that I can confidently conclude is a general property based on inductive generalization is not subjective or psychological. That my own personal suffering is bad is psychological , but that there is this thing called 'badness' in general, just like there's this thing called 'yellowness,' and 'illness' isn't psychological. Yes, it has to be processed through my brain, but not everything that I process through my brain has to be psychological. Otherwise all of math and logic would be psychological.
      Jim, we have been over this. Redness is a physical property, pain is a physical property attaching a moral consideration to that is subjective. It is like attaching a moral quality to redness or yellowness or the law of excluded middle.
      Last edited by seer; 02-24-2020, 07:04 AM.
      Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

      Comment


      • Originally posted by Tassman View Post
        I’ve not argued that philosophy has no place in helping science reach such conclusion, philosophy is very useful – as I’ve said repeatedly. But, again, ALL mental phenomena are ultimately physical phenomena. To deny this is to claim a non-material component to the natural world. Is this what you are claiming?
        And as I've said repeatedly, you have to establish that 'mental phenomena are ultimately physical phenomena' through a very strong convincing argument. Otherwise, it's a mere assertion made from a faith in science. No one knows what a "physical phenomenon" ultimately means, other than as a working methodological concept, so no one can confidently say what the phrase "a non-material component to the natural world" actually means. As I've said, all I have to do to demonstrate irreducibilty is to show how physical reduction fails for conscious experiences. Period. As far as what follows from that failure, there are many ways to interpret it. We would first have to understand what 'physical' means. There are 'dual-aspect' theories. There are various kinds of emergence. There's non-reductive physicalism, and yes, there is the possibility of non-physical particulars, and so forth....



        I’m talking about the standard materialist position that consciousness is a byproduct of the brain – NOT “evolutionary psychology.”
        What you've been saying sounds a lot like evo psych, that everything about human culture is ultimately explainable by and reducible to a physical evolutionary vocabulary. And how can consciousness both be caused by and be identical to brain states? Which is it? If A causes B, A cannot be identical to B.



        Nevertheless the Shakespeare Folio cannot have existed in isolation from the physical phenomena of his conscious mind.
        Necessary conditions are not sufficient conditions.



        Nor can one restrict oneself purely to a third-person perspective on the functions associated with consciousness. Both are necessary for a complete understanding.
        I think you meant to say 'first-person perspective.' Yes, both are necessary for a complete understanding, 'complete' meaning from first AND third-person perspective. My point, though, is that the first-person is the essential, the sine qua non, of conscious experiences. Imagine if neuro-scientists built a robot that had ALL the functions associated with consciousness and yet somehow they knew that it lacked first-person experience. Would it be conscious?

        Comment


        • Originally posted by seer View Post
          Jim, we have been over this. Redness is a physical property, pain is a physical property attaching a moral consideration to that is subjective. It is like attaching a moral quality to redness or yellowness or the law of excluded middle.
          Yes, we've been over this. Redness is not a physical property the way I was using it; it's a phenomenal property, an item of experience. Pain is a phenomenal property. It's something that's experienced. Badness and goodness are attached to experiences. They are valuations. They become generalized and detached from their particular instantiations, as do rightness and wrongness. Maybe we should move on to the Nielsen excerpt and the other arguments?

          Comment


          • Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
            Yes, we've been over this. Redness is not a physical property the way I was using it; it's a phenomenal property, an item of experience. Pain is a phenomenal property. It's something that's experienced. Badness and goodness are attached to experiences. They are valuations. They become generalized and detached from their particular instantiations, as do rightness and wrongness. Maybe we should move on to the Nielsen excerpt and the other arguments?
            Redness is a physical property that can be measured in minute degrees. The human perception of the subjective values of redness for qualitative aspects of the color.
            Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
            Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
            But will they come when you do call for them? Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, Act III:

            go with the flow the river knows . . .

            Frank

            I do not know, therefore everything is in pencil.

            Comment


            • Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
              And as I've said repeatedly, you have to establish that 'mental phenomena are ultimately physical phenomena' through a very strong convincing argument. Otherwise, it's a mere assertion made from a faith in science. No one knows what a "physical phenomenon" ultimately means, other than as a working methodological concept, so no one can confidently say what the phrase "a non-material component to the natural world" actually means.
              ALL phenomena “are ultimately physical.” There is no good reason to posit the existence of NON-physical phenomena. All attempts in the past (e.g. animism, polytheism, the various monotheisms - and other attempts to promote subjective beliefs in non-physical entities) have failed, whereas the methodological naturalism of science has produced verifiable results.

              As I've said, all I have to do to demonstrate irreducibilty is to show how physical reduction fails for conscious experiences. Period. As far as what follows from that failure, there are many ways to interpret it. We would first have to understand what 'physical' means. There are 'dual-aspect' theories. There are various kinds of emergence. There's non-reductive physicalism, and yes, there is the possibility of non-physical particulars, and so forth....
              And how exactly do these ‘interpretations’ of yours (i.e. 'dual-aspect' theories, emergence etc.) definitively establish conscious experiences as ultimately non-physical? In short, they don’t – this again is an ‘argument from ignorance’.

              And how can consciousness both be caused by and be identical to brain states? Which is it? If A causes B, A cannot be identical to B.
              Consciousness among sentient creatures such as us, arises from brain states, it is not identical to them.

              Necessary conditions are not sufficient conditions.
              So, you keep saying. But, given that Shakespeare created his masterpieces, they obviously are sufficient.

              I think you meant to say 'first-person perspective.' Yes, both are necessary for a complete understanding, 'complete' meaning from first AND third-person perspective. My point, though, is that the first-person is the essential, the sine qua non, of conscious experiences. Imagine if neuro-scientists built a robot that had ALL the functions associated with consciousness and yet somehow they knew that it lacked first-person experience. Would it be conscious?
              There is no good reason to think that computers/robots won’t be conscious when they equal and ultimately exceed human intelligence. Why would you think otherwise?
              “He felt that his whole life was a kind of dream and he sometimes wondered whose it was and whether they were enjoying it.” - Douglas Adams.

              Comment


              • Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
                Redness is a physical property that can be measured in minute degrees. The human perception of the subjective values of redness for qualitative aspects of the color.
                So are you saying that we can tell exactly when something shifts from being red to being orange?


                I'm always still in trouble again

                "You're by far the worst poster on TWeb" and "TWeb's biggest liar" --starlight (the guy who says Stalin was a right-winger)
                "Overall I would rate the withdrawal from Afghanistan as by far the best thing Biden's done" --Starlight
                "Of course, human life begins at fertilization that’s not the argument." --Tassman

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                • Originally posted by rogue06 View Post
                  So are you saying that we can tell exactly when something shifts from being red to being orange?

                  [ATTACH=CONFIG]43007[/ATTACH]
                  Yes. The names of red and orange are a human construct, but science can measure the color of every pixel point on the picture.
                  Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
                  Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
                  But will they come when you do call for them? Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, Act III:

                  go with the flow the river knows . . .

                  Frank

                  I do not know, therefore everything is in pencil.

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
                    Yes, we've been over this. Redness is not a physical property the way I was using it; it's a phenomenal property, an item of experience. Pain is a phenomenal property. It's something that's experienced. Badness and goodness are attached to experiences. They are valuations. They become generalized and detached from their particular instantiations, as do rightness and wrongness. Maybe we should move on to the Nielsen excerpt and the other arguments?
                    This is why we have to camp here Jim, because you are relying on unprovable assertions. And this lies at the base of your argument. The color red is objective, our experience of it is subjective. We are experiencing an objective reality. Pain, though real, is always subjective (I don't feel pain when you cut yourself) and attaching a moral value to that experience is also subjective, personal. There is no moral value attached when one chimp kills another chimp. We invent and attach moral values. And we do not all have the same value system. Sorry, I don't see how you escape relativism apart from God. In other words, in the end Jim, something is good because we say it is good.
                    Last edited by seer; 02-25-2020, 07:03 AM.
                    Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

                    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
                      Redness is a physical property that can be measured in minute degrees. The human perception of the subjective values of redness for qualitative aspects of the color.
                      I wrote, "in the way I used it." Please work on reading comprehension.

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by Tassman View Post
                        ALL phenomena “are ultimately physical.” There is no good reason to posit the existence of NON-physical phenomena. All attempts in the past (e.g. animism, polytheism, the various monotheisms - and other attempts to promote subjective beliefs in non-physical entities) have failed, whereas the methodological naturalism of science has produced verifiable results.
                        There MAY be good reason to posit non-physical phenomena if a given phenomenon does not conceptually fit the pattern of physical reduction. (Please note, for about the sixth time now, that I'm saying that the lack of fit is conceptual and not empirical for the reasons already stated. If it were an empirical lack of fit, then we would have every reason to think that our ignorance could be filled in, at least in principle, through empirical knowledge.) But first we have to try to define what the term 'physical' means. Is it a domain of reality or is it a certain kind of understanding? If you have an argument for why you think the lack of fit is not conceptual, please present it.



                        And how exactly do these ‘interpretations’ of yours (i.e. 'dual-aspect' theories, emergence etc.) definitively establish conscious experiences as ultimately non-physical? In short, they don’t – this again is an ‘argument from ignorance’.
                        No, those are theories for what the place of consciousness in the natural order could be. Those theories aren't related to the argument for irreducibility. The argument for irreducibility, once again, isn't an 'argument form ignorance.' "We don't know" or "We can't imagine" play no part in the argument. It's a positive, conceptual argument for why phenomenal concepts cannot reduce to physical concepts. No matter how much we learn about the mechanisms that perform the functions associated with consciousness, the basic explanatory gap remains unaffected.



                        Consciousness among sentient creatures such as us, arises from brain states, it is not identical to them.
                        But you said that conscious states are ultimately physical states. What other physical state would a conscious state be if not a brain state?



                        So, you keep saying. But, given that Shakespeare created his masterpieces, they obviously are sufficient.
                        Assuming your question-begging argument that mind=brain.

                        Ink + Paper = Necessary Conditions for Folio, but Ink + paper =/= Sufficient Conditions for Folio.



                        There is no good reason to think that computers/robots wonÂ’t be conscious when they equal and ultimately exceed human intelligence. Why would you think otherwise?
                        You completely missed my point. I was saying that IF a robot were built with all the functions associated with consciousness but still lacked a "first-robot perspective" on the world, it would not be conscious. Ergo, the first-person perspective, ie subjectivity, is the sine qua non of consciousness.

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by seer View Post
                          This is why we have to camp here Jim, because you are relying on unprovable assertions. And this lies at the base of your argument. The color red is objective, our experience of it is subjective. We are experiencing an objective reality. Pain, though real, is always subjective (I don't feel pain when you cut yourself) and attaching a moral value to that experience is also subjective, personal. There is no moral value attached when one chimp kills another chimp. We invent and attach moral values. And we do not all have the same value system. Sorry, I don't see how you escape relativism apart from God. In other words, in the end Jim, something is good because we say it is good.
                          Okay, we can camp here if you want or we can shift focus to the Nielsen and the other arguments. I think you're missing my points. Yes, when I see 'red,' it's a subjective experience, but there's this general experience of redness that isn't just my own. When the traffic light turns red, I assume anyone with normal vision would see it as 'red' and stop their vehicle. My pain is a subjective experience, but there's this property called 'pain' that isn't my own, that doesn't belong to me. It isn't even human. As far as chimps, other species lack the capacity for moral reasoning. We don't 'invent' moral values. Humans and other species have given needs for flourishing, so that there are severe constraints on what could count as a 'moral value' in the normative, not the descriptive, sense. Yes, there could be a society in which lying is permissible, or even encouraged, but it would soon break down into incoherence.

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
                            Redness is a physical property that can be measured in minute degrees. The human perception of the subjective values of redness for qualitative aspects of the color.
                            You're failing to make Chalmers' distinction of the 'hard problem' of consciousness, which is what Jim is talking about. Any physical property that can be measured is a 'third person' perspective. Experiencing redness subjectively is a first person experience. Third person measurements are great for certain things like learning how to block pain so surgeons can operate. But third person physical measurements run into a brick wall explanatorily when it gets down to the "what it's like to experience x".

                            I equate being and existence with information. All empiric information is valid, but that's not all the information there is. The experience of redness provides information to apprehension that leaves third party empiricism out in the cold. So the hardcore empiricists (atheists) have a workaround: Let's only include things that can be measured in our list of what is real. The theist prefers to include more information in his/her epistemic library than only measured information. So be it, but at least be aware that the argument that "only things that are measure are real" is a circular argument. You can ignore non-measured information in public arguments, but you are well aware subjectively of the large amount of qualia information you experience, whether you'll admit it or not shunya.

                            Comment


                            • Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
                              There MAY be good reason to posit non-physical phenomena if a given phenomenon does not conceptually fit the pattern of physical reduction. (Please note, for about the sixth time now, that I'm saying that the lack of fit is conceptual and not empirical for the reasons already stated. If it were an empirical lack of fit, then we would have every reason to think that our ignorance could be filled in, at least in principle, through empirical knowledge.) But first we have to try to define what the term 'physical' means. Is it a domain of reality or is it a certain kind of understanding?
                              “A certain type of reality” or a “conceptual” notion is meaningless without being empirically tested. It is merely an unsubstantiated belief system e.g. Aristotle’s notion of ‘celestial spheres. This too was a “certain type of reality”, but Aristotle’s conceptual notion of the universe was completely wrong. It took empirical science to understand the reality of a heliocentric solar system.

                              No, those are theories for what the place of consciousness in the natural order could be.
                              No, your 'dual-aspect' theories and 'emergence theory' etc are no more than fanciful guesses on a par with Aristotle’s celestial spheres.

                              Those theories aren't related to the argument for irreducibility. The argument for irreducibility, once again, isn't an 'argument form ignorance.' "We don't know" or "We can't imagine" play no part in the argument. It's a positive, conceptual argument for why phenomenal concepts cannot reduce to physical concepts. No matter how much we learn about the mechanisms that perform the functions associated with consciousness, the basic explanatory gap remains unaffected.
                              The argument for irreducible complexity is wrong. Just because certain things in nature appear very complicated there is no good reason to assume that the “explanatory gap” will never be bridged.

                              But you said that conscious states are ultimately physical states. What other physical state would a conscious state be if not a brain state?
                              “Conscious states” would be the byproduct of “brain states” NOT the actual brain state itself

                              Assuming your question-begging argument that mind=brain.
                              You do not have a substantive alternative other than wishful-thinking dressed up as an academic argument.

                              You completely missed my point. I was saying that IF a robot were built with all the functions associated with consciousness but still lacked a "first-robot perspective" on the world, it would not be conscious. Ergo, the first-person perspective, ie subjectivity, is the sine qua non of consciousness.
                              It is reasonable to assume that such a condition for consciousness would be an essential quality of a robot with “consciousness” – just as it is for all sentient biological life-forms such as us
                              “He felt that his whole life was a kind of dream and he sometimes wondered whose it was and whether they were enjoying it.” - Douglas Adams.

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
                                Okay, we can camp here if you want or we can shift focus to the Nielsen and the other arguments. I think you're missing my points. Yes, when I see 'red,' it's a subjective experience, but there's this general experience of redness that isn't just my own. When the traffic light turns red, I assume anyone with normal vision would see it as 'red' and stop their vehicle. My pain is a subjective experience, but there's this property called 'pain' that isn't my own, that doesn't belong to me. It isn't even human. As far as chimps, other species lack the capacity for moral reasoning. We don't 'invent' moral values. Humans and other species have given needs for flourishing, so that there are severe constraints on what could count as a 'moral value' in the normative, not the descriptive, sense. Yes, there could be a society in which lying is permissible, or even encouraged, but it would soon break down into incoherence.
                                Jim where does pain exist apart from a personal subjective experience? How is it a property? The color red would exist in nature even if there were no minds to experience it. How does that work with pain? And yes there could be societies that enslave or exploit the minority without breaking down into incoherence, so coherence or lack of can not be the standard. And moral values are helpful for human flourishing, but that would be just as true if relativism was the case.
                                Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

                                https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

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