Atheism And Moral Progress

[Jim B.]

My use of "cohesive" in my statement, "No society has a cohesive moral framework," was meant to indicate that no society achieves 100% alignment on a moral framework between the individual members of that society. I said noting about individual moral frameworks being cohesive. However, since you brought it up, for the individual, the degree of cohesion within their moral framework will depend on the degree of cohesion between what they value and the degree to which they have correctly reasoned from valuing to moral principles. I would think cohesion for an individual would best be measured by the absence of direct conflict between elements of the overall moral framework.

I know you said nothing about individual moral frameworks, but you seem to be assuming that they can descriptively reach a high level of internal cohesion. My point was that you seem to be confusing descriptive ethics with normative or prescriptive ethics at both the individual and collective level.

And here is where I disagree with you. "Truth" is not a property of a sentence. It is a measure of the alignment between a sentence and the reality it purports to represent. A sentence is "true" if it aligns with the objective reality it represents, and untrue if it does not. I agree that language is only one way in which human communicate, which is why I think you err to conflate language and communication. I can deceive you without using language.

A property of a sentence can refer to an objective state of affairs, so its potential alignment with such a state would be one of its properties. The referential content is already one of its properties, and that content can either align or misalign with a state of affairs. I never "conflated communication with language." Language is one form of communication. When I wrote 'deceive," I meant "lie," which is propositional and therefore linguisitic.

As for "communicate via the truth," that is a very odd sentence. I communicate via language. I communicate via gestures. I communicate via facial expressions and so-called "body language." I don't communicate via truth." What I communicate, by any of those means, is either true or untrue, depending on its alignment with reality.

I'm not sure why you're having trouble with these concepts. If I say,"The cat is on the porch," I'm communicating to you in terms of a sentence that is potentially true, and thus potentially false. If I say "Get me my shirt," I am not communicating in exactly the same manner, although some linguists would say that there is some potential truth content, such as my sincerity about my desire, or my knowledge that there is a shirt, etc. If I say "Ouch!" I am not communicating via a potentially true statement in all likelihood, but rather signalling or symptomizing my pain. Likewise, when ants communicate, they are not doing so via potentially true or false sentences; they are signalling to each other.

No. The statement "good in itself" is meaningless, IMO. "Good" is an assessment made by an assessor using a selected metric. Without that assessor and the defined metric, the notion of "good" does not exist.

At least you put IMO for once! Thank you! Okay, let's back up. Let's assume that you are the only assessor of 'good' for yourself. Would you say that there are 'good things' for YOU that are just good in themselves and not for the sake of other good things they can give you? For instance, some would say that health is simply 'good.' It's just a good thing to be healthy, regardless of what other good, bad or indifferent consequences may flow from that health. And that there are other things that are 'good' for YOU that are good primarily or only for what they can give you, such as money? Unless you're a miser, money is usually thought of as an 'instrument' to give you other good things, like food, housing, entertainment, etc. (Health can also be an 'instrument' but that would not detract from the fact that it is simply good in itself.)

Again, you seem to contradict yourself within the same paragraph. If a thing is good-in-itself, then how can a "context" change that goodness? The thing's goodness is, according to you, self-contained. It should be immune to "context." Yet you acknowledge that it is not always a good thing in the next sentence. Do you not see the problem here...?

Try to think of pleasure as a good thing in itself. It's merely good to feel pleasure, bracketing off any consequences that come from the pleasure. (And plug in your own moral theory here with "It's a pleasure for ME, by my assessment...") If that's so, then pleasure is what is called an "intrinsic good," ie the goodness inheres in the pleasure itself and not in what the pleasure can give me or bring me. But if I then shift my focus to the consequences of the pleasure, from smoking, say, then 'bad things' can result. I may get various health problems. So that the intrinsic good I derive from smoking may become an instrumental evil consequentially.

We see moral frameworks emerge in high-level sentience. We also see advanced language and communication emerge in high-level sentience. That correlation does not equate to any form of causation. If you think so, you have yet to make that case.

We see rudimentary fairness, shunning, shaming, and the like, in other species. We don't see the essential attributes of morality until human language emerges and the ability to think in terms of symbols universals and principles.

So which part lacks evidence. Does not morality deal with human action and categorize ought versus ought not? Does not legality also deal with human action and categorize ought versus ought not? Are legal systems not subjective to the society/group/culture that derive them? Do you know of anyone who suggests that the absence of an "objectively true" legal framework renders legal frameworks useless because there is no way to resolve discrepancies? You like to toss out "question begging," but I see nothing in that statement that assumes its own conclusion.

The part where you said "Legal principles are subjective to the group, etc..." as being under the rubric of how, as you headed the paragraph, "Moral principles are analogous to legal principles." You might want to consult your own previous posts more often.

So how do legal codes differ from moral ones in a way that you consider "crucial" and requiring an explanation?

Universalizability, categorizability, normativity, possibility of rational critique across cultures and across historical periods, the fact that as you yourself wrote: "Interestingly, no one ever argues for an "objective legal framework" to which all other frameworks should align." How do we account for this difference? You note the difference but you don't attempt to explain it.



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[Jim B.]

Not so much a strawman, but I have heard this argument so often from Seer (and others) that I may be guilty of assuming it of you as well. If that assumption is incorrect, consider my objection withdrawn with my apologies for the presumption.

I appreciate the apology.

Yeah...no. Here's the thing about analogies: you take two things that have similarities to help someone who understands one but not the other to gain that understanding. But in order for the analogy to work, the two things have to have similarities. Mathematical/logical principles have nothing in common with moral principles, except that many want to claim they are all absolute/universal/objective. That's not a very functional analogy.

An analogy is not meant to apply literally or universally to the two terms of the analogy. That's silly. If that were the case, no two terms in the universe could serve as analogies and no analogy would be possible. When trying to understand an analogy, you have to try to understand what the point of comparison is. The point of comparison between math/logic and morality turns on the concept of 'subjectivity.' As defined in terms of ethical subjectivism, this word is defined as "depending upon an individual's choice or preference." MY POINT was that according to moral objectivism, math/logic are analogous to morality ONLY IN TERMS OF THE FACT THAT NEITHER DEPENDS UPON INDIVIDUAL CHOICE OR PREFERENCE. I hope this helps.

I am getting at what I challenged you to do many posts ago. Take ANY moral principle you hold to be true that is not a tautology (i.e., like "murder is wrong") and ask yourself "why?" See if you can explain why it is wrong WITHOUT ending up talking about something that you subjectively value and the threat this action poses to that thing. If you can demonstrate how even ONE moral principle is true on purely objective grounds - I would have no choice but to rethink my meta-ethics.

Autonomy of persons. And other moral principles that you yourself espouse. You've been doing so for fifteen or so posts. You're either arguing descriptively, saying that we are all in fact subjectivists although some of us don't know it, which I suspect you're doing, but you also seem to be arguing prescriptively. You keep listing norms that the subjectivist ought to hold to, such as to correct his or her 'faulty reasoning,' to align his principles with his values etc. These are all prescriptive, and as such they contradict subjectivism.

I am getting it, Jim, but I think you might not be. What is fixed by physics is the wavelength of light. The assignment of "red" to a specific range of that spectrum is an arbitrary one made by humans. The set of wavelength we call "red" extend from approximately 635 to 700 nanometers (430-480 THz), a range that includes 50 trillion frequencies, not to mention the fact that these are analog signals, creating an infinity of variation within the range. No two of us can experience any of this at the same time/place for any given object, making the experience of these wavelengths subjective on that front, but it goes beyond that. Your claim that our experience is "fixed by physiology" is simply untrue. Color blindness immediately shows that position to be untrue. So too does any disease that impacts our ability to experience sight. So too does the level of light (i.e., luminosity) within a given situation (i.e., rods detect light, cones detect color - but cannot do so at low luminosity levels. Objects still reflect the light at the specified wavelengths, but we cannot detect them). Furthermore, no two of us has exactly the same retinal pattern, the same exact structure of neurons on our optic nerves, or the same synaptic patterns in our brains. Not only do we have any way to determine whether or not your experience of "red" and mine are the same (qualia), we have no reason to believe that experience of "red" IS the same. You are suggesting that, despite all of that difference between any two individuals, they are having the same experience of red? They are having a subjective experience of an objective reality. ALL of our experiences are subjective experiences of objective reality. You cannot escape it.

Sorry, Carpe. I do admre your tenacity, though. Whether I'm color blind or have an astigmatism or inverted qualia ala Chalmers, NONE OF THIS IS MY CHOOSING. It is still fixed by physics and physiology. It is not subjective in terms of my color assessment, as in "That shirt is this sensation of 'green'". It is not subjective as the word 'subjective' is used in your moral theory. I cannot just decide to make that building purple or this cat beige. By whatever causal chains,involving physics and physiology and evoltionary history, it is a 'given.' It is not 'mine' except trivially by virtue of the fact that it's happening in part inside of my body.

[carpedm9587]

I know you said nothing about individual moral frameworks, but you seem to be assuming that they can descriptively reach a high level of internal cohesion.

Yes - they can. I would describe a moral framework with no outright internal contradictions as "more cohesive" than one without.

My point was that you seem to be confusing descriptive ethics with normative or prescriptive ethics at both the individual and collective level.

I don't believe I am doing that, but feel free to expand.

A property of a sentence can refer to an objective state of affairs, so its potential alignment with such a state would be one of its properties. The referential content is already one of its properties, and that content can either align or misalign with a state of affairs.

I would not consider that a "property of a sentence." To me, a "property of a sentence" is a characteristic of the sentence itself (proper syntax, proper grammatical form, etc.). But we may have come to the point where we are splitting hairs unnecessarily, and I'm not sure what the relevance of this is to the original discussion.

I never "conflated communication with language." Language is one form of communication. When I wrote 'deceive," I meant "lie," which is propositional and therefore linguisitic.

Language is a tool for communicating. A hammer is a tool for pounding/prying nails. I would consider the sentence "language is one form of communication" as odd as I would consider the sentence "a hammer is one form of nail pounding." The tool is not the thing.

I'm not sure why you're having trouble with these concepts.

I'm not. I'm disagreeing with your articulation of the concepts.

If I say,"The cat is on the porch," I'm communicating to you in terms of a sentence that is potentially true, and thus potentially false.

"In terms of" is an odd construct. You are communicating to me using the tool of language, and the truth value of the sentence can be determined by comparing the meaning of the sentence and the location of the cat.

If I say "Get me my shirt," I am not communicating in exactly the same manner, although some linguists would say that there is some potential truth content, such as my sincerity about my desire, or my knowledge that there is a shirt, etc. If I say "Ouch!" I am not communicating via a potentially true statement in all likelihood, but rather signalling or symptomizing my pain. Likewise, when ants communicate, they are not doing so via potentially true or false sentences; they are signalling to each other.

No problem with any of these things - and one of them equates to "communicating via truth." I am communicating via language - or some other tool that can be used to communicate. "Truth" is not such a tool. It is an assessment of the alignment between the meaning of my communication and the state of the reality that communication attempts to convey.

At least you put IMO for once! Thank you!

Who else's opinion would I be expressing?

I don't pepper my posts with, "IMO." I make the assumption that the person I'm talking to knows I'm speaking out of my own beliefs or philosophy. When I'm not, I usually cite the source.

Okay, let's back up. Let's assume that you are the only assessor of 'good' for yourself. Would you say that there are 'good things' for YOU that are just good in themselves and not for the sake of other good things they can give you? For instance, some would say that health is simply 'good.' It's just a good thing to be healthy, regardless of what other good, bad or indifferent consequences may flow from that health. And that there are other things that are 'good' for YOU that are good primarily or only for what they can give you, such as money? Unless you're a miser, money is usually thought of as an 'instrument' to give you other good things, like food, housing, entertainment, etc. (Health can also be an 'instrument' but that would not detract from the fact that it is simply good in itself.)

No.

Try to think of pleasure as a good thing in itself.

The concept is oxymoronic.

It's merely good to feel pleasure, bracketing off any consequences that come from the pleasure. (And plug in your own moral theory here with "It's a pleasure for ME, by my assessment...") If that's so, then pleasure is what is called an "intrinsic good," ie the goodness inheres in the pleasure itself and not in what the pleasure can give me or bring me. But if I then shift my focus to the consequences of the pleasure, from smoking, say, then 'bad things' can result. I may get various health problems. So that the intrinsic good I derive from smoking may become an instrumental evil consequentially.

Sorry, Jim, but no thing (conceptual or otherwise) can be said to have "good" intrinsic to it. The "good" of the thing is always with respect to a valuer and a specific metric for measuring that "goodness." I know of no exceptions.

We see rudimentary fairness, shunning, shaming, and the like, in other species. We don't see the essential attributes of morality until human language emerges and the ability to think in terms of universals.

I think that aligns pretty well with what I said, except for the "universals" part. We also have a sample set of one species to work from. Moral thinking occurs, as best we can tell, along with the ability to abstract, self-reflect, and form complex languages. It also appears to occur with higher tool making. But we see aspects of moral behavior in other species, just less developed than we see it in humans. That is pretty consistent with just about everything associated with higher brain function.

The part where you said "Legal principles are subjective to the group, etc..." as being under the rubric of how, as you headed the paragraph, "Moral principles are analogous to legal principles." You might want to consult your own previous posts more often.

So you misunderstood the post. Moral principles are not analogous to legal principles because they are both subjective. They are analogous to legal principles because they a) both deal with categorizing human behavior and b) both establish "ought" and "ought not" categories. Legal principles are clearly subjective (unless you want to try to argue otherwise...?), which does not appear to be a problem for anyone. No one says "we cannot discuss legal principles due to their subjective nature" or "legal principles are irrational because there is not objective standard against which to assess them," or "legal principles are trivialized by their subjectivity." Yet when someone says, "morality is subjective," these are some of the arguments touted out to argue against the position. So why is subjectivity NOT a problem with legal principles and is suddenly a problem with moral ones?

Universalizability, categorizability, normativity, possibility of rational critique across cultures and across historical periods, the fact that as you yourself wrote: "Interestingly, no one ever argues for an "objective legal framework" to which all other frameworks should align." How do we account for this difference? You note the difference but you don't attempt to explain it.

Universalizability: You are apparently assuming moral norms need to be or can be - this has not been shown.
Categorizability: Both appear to be about categorization of action, so I don't see a difference to be explained here.
Normativity: Both deal with "ought" conditions related to actions. I don't see a difference to be explained here.
Possibility of critique across cultures and historical periods: Again, you seem to be begging the question. If both are subjective, there is no issue here. The issue only arises if you make the assumption that morality is objective and law subjective - which means you're assuming your conclusion.

I have proposed a reason why I think people cling to this notion of an objective moral framework that all "ought" to align to: they have been conditioned to think this way. That is what religions have taught since the concept of a punisher god first emerged. But when you look at the arguments for an objective basis for morality - none of them hold up to scrutiny. Most of them (e.g., Seer's arguments) reduce to a restatement of the definition of the terms.

I see no reason to cling to this notion when, upon examination, it simply cannot withstand scrutiny. The subjective nature of morality is fairly evident all around us, easily explains the dynamics we see in the human species, and aligns well with its close cousin: legal frameworks. Why add to a concept that which is not necessary to it?

I appreciate the apology.

An analogy is not meant to apply literally or universally to the two terms of the analogy. That's silly. If that were the case, no two terms in the universe could serve as analogies and no analogy would be possible.

Agreed. I don't think I ever said otherwise.

When trying to understand an analogy, you have to try to understand what the point of comparison is. The point of comparison between math/logic and morality turns on the concept of 'subjectivity.' As defined in terms of ethical subjectivism, this word is defined as "depending upon an individual's choice or preference." MY POINT was that according to moral objectivism, math/logic are analogous to morality ONLY IN TERMS OF THE FACT THAT NEITHER DEPENDS UPON INDIVIDUAL CHOICE OR PREFERENCE. I hope this helps.

And again, I note, an analogy is only useful when the two things being compared have some points of comparison that can be built on. You're not trying to make an analogy here, you're making a form of equation: "this is like that because both are X." Except that is the exact point of our conflict. Moral principles are NOT like logical and mathematical ones because the former is subjective and the latter are not. Moral principles are more rightly compared to legal ones, because the two groups show much in common. Examining the later can inform us about the former.

Autonomy of persons. And other moral principles that you yourself espouse. You've been doing so for fifteen or so posts. You're either arguing descriptively, saying that we are all in fact subjectivists although some of us don't know it, which I suspect you're doing, but you also seem to be arguing prescriptively. You keep listing norms that the subjectivist ought to hold to, such as to correct his or her 'faulty reasoning,' to align his principles with his values etc. These are all prescriptive, and as such they contradict subjectivism.

Morality is both descriptive and prescriptive, and there is no conflict between subjectivity and prescription.

P1: I want pizza for lunch
P2: That restaurant serves pizza
C: I should eat my lunch at that restaurant.

The conclusion is a prescription for future behavior. It is not the only possibility. P1 is completely subjective. Where is the problem?

Sorry, Carpe. I do admre your tenacity, though. Whether I'm color blind or have an astigmatism or inverted qualia ala Chalmers, NONE OF THIS IS MY CHOOSING. It is still fixed by physics and physiology. It is not subjective in terms of my color assessment, as in "That shirt is this sensation of 'green'". It is not subjective as the word 'subjective' is used in your moral theory. I cannot just decide to make that building purple or this cat beige. By whatever causal chains,involving physics and physiology and evoltionary history, it is a 'given.' It is not 'mine' except trivially by virtue of the fact that it's happening in part inside of my body.

OK - I see our disconnect now. I am using the term subjective in two senses: 1) unique to each individual, and 2) impacted by thoughts, opinions, and feelings. Morality and color are both subjective in the first sense (and perhaps I should use "individualized" instead for that sense, since the formal definition of subjective does not really include that concept directly) but only morality is subjective in the second sense (which is more aligned with the dictionary definition of "subjective"). I agree that color is not, as far as I know. Our perception of color will be largely dictated by the wavelength, luminosity, and my specific physiology.

[Tassman]

No Tass, you brought up the deductive thing as IF it was a deficit on my part because I couldn't prove God to make a deductive case for moral absolutes. But so what? You (we) believe a lot of things that can't be proven, deductively or otherwise.

There is no reason to take seriously your argument for a code of moral absolutes when the source of that argument, i.e. God, cannot be shown to exist.

And all science is based on assumptions, and has to be. The uniformity of nature, logical absolutes, a physical universe exists that operates independently of our perceptions, the universe operates according to certain laws which are knowable, events have natural causes which can be explained by natural laws, the laws of nature are constant throughout space and time, etc....

Science is based upon more than just assumptions. Scientific knowledge is grounded in empirically tested experiments based upon the observation and study of the laws and constants of the universe. It is sufficiently reliable to enable space-travel and the maintenance of advanced technology. In short it is reality-based unlike your axiomatic metaphysical basis for the existence of absolute morality.

[seer]

There is no reason to take seriously your argument for a code of moral absolutes when the source of that argument, i.e. God, cannot be shown to exist.

But that is no more than your opinion, there is no reason to assume that the non-rational forces of nature created this finely tuned, life permitting, intelligible universe. Now what

Science is based upon more than just assumptions. Scientific knowledge is grounded in empirically tested experiments based upon the observation and study of the laws and constants of the universe. It is sufficiently reliable to enable space-travel and the maintenance of advanced technology. In short it is reality-based unlike your axiomatic metaphysical basis for the existence of absolute morality.

Nonsense Tass, every thing I listed is necessary for science to function, and they are all unprovable assumptions, again:

The uniformity of nature, logical absolutes, a physical universe exists that operates independently of our perceptions, the universe operates according to certain laws which are knowable, events have natural causes which can be explained by natural laws, the laws of nature are constant throughout space and time.


Tell me Tass how do you do science without these assumptions? What does that even look like?

[seer]

Apparently not - since I do not believe there are moral absolutes, no one has ever demonstrated the existence of one, and I am not having difficulty with my moral sanity, unless you'd like to simply declare that anyone who does not agree with your so-called "moral realism' is morally insane by definition - which would be begging the question badly.

Now that is interesting. On what basis do you claim moral sanity? I mean you must have some objective standard, if it is just a private notion of yours then how do you justify that claim without you too begging the question?

[carpedm9587]

Now that is interesting. On what basis do you claim moral sanity? I mean you must have some objective standard, if it is just a private notion of yours then how do you justify that claim without you too begging the question?

Sanity: the ability to think and behave in a normal and rational manner; sound mental health.
Sanity: reasonable and rational behavior.

My moral framework proceeds rationally from what I value. I can enter into discussions about moral principles with most people without much of a problem. Most of my moral positions are pretty well aligned with society (not that this is a measure of their correctness, but it is a metric by which the broader society would assess my "moral sanity," since the definition of sanity includes the definition of "normal.").

I'm not sure what else you want to factor in to demonstrate "sanity," but those seem fairly adequate. If you'd like to take the position that I am "morally insane," knock yourself out. It would be consistent with your general discussion methodology.

[seer]

Sanity: the ability to think and behave in a normal and rational manner; sound mental health.
Sanity: reasonable and rational behavior.

Sound and reasonable according to whom? The Nazis, Stalinists, Maoists? The Hutu? Or are you saying that there is an objective standard for moral sanity?

My moral framework proceeds rationally from what I value. I can enter into discussions about moral principles with most people without much of a problem. Most of my moral positions are pretty well aligned with society (not that this is a measure of their correctness, but it is a metric by which the broader society would assess my "moral sanity," since the definition of sanity includes the definition of "normal.").

Right and if you were a good Hitler Youth in 1939 Germany would would have been considered morally sane and virtuous. And on points where your moral ideals don't align with your society could we consider those ideals morally insane?

[carpedm9587]

Sound and reasonable according to whom? The Nazis, Stalinists, Maoists? The Hutu?

According to the basic principles of reason.

Or are you saying that there is an objective standard for moral sanity?

There is a definition of the word "sanity" and anything with the characteristics that definition includes would be consider "sane" by most people who use the English language conventionally. "Moral" simply provides a context.

Right and if you were a good Hitler Youth in 1939 Germany would would have been considered morally sane and virtuous. And on points where your moral ideals don't align with your society could we consider those ideals morally insane?

The definition of "sanity" includes the concept of "normal." It's a broad, vague term. I'm sure some in a society would consider someone who's behavior/ideas does not align with the norms of that society to be "insane" at some level. And what is "sane" for one society may be "insane" for another. Personally, I don't find the concept of "sanity" to be all that useful specifically because it does appeal to vague definitions and norms. You were the one suggesting "moral sanity" requires an objective basis. As best I can tell - that claim simply appeals to the majority, based on the definition of the words involved.

I'm not sure where you think you are going with this entire sequence - but it doesn't seem to be going anywhere, to me.

[seer]

According to the basic principles of reason.

What do principles of reason have to do with MORAL sanity? What does that even look like?

There is a definition of the word "sanity" and anything with the characteristics that definition includes would be consider "sane" by most people who use the English language conventionally. "Moral" simply provides a context.

So that would depend on the kind of ethical culture you were in - correct?

The definition of "sanity" includes the concept of "normal." It's a broad, vague term. I'm sure some in a society would consider someone who's behavior/ideas does not align with the norms of that society to be "insane" at some level. And what is "sane" for one society may be "insane" for another. Personally, I don't find the concept of "sanity" to be all that useful specifically because it does appeal to vague definitions and norms. You were the one suggesting "moral sanity" requires an objective basis. As best I can tell - that claim simply appeals to the majority, based on the definition of the words involved.

Well obviously is there isn't an objective standard moral sanity could include or exclude almost anything.

I'm not sure where you think you are going with this entire sequence - but it doesn't seem to be going anywhere, to me.

Well you claimed to be morally sane. It is clear that that could mean anything, which means it means nothing. But if you want to pretend that you are morally sane it is no skin off my nose. But it all seems rather circular.

[carpedm9587]

What do principles of reason have to do with MORAL sanity? What does that even look like?

An odd question, for someone who claims to value reason/rationality. The definition of sanity is all about reasoning/rationality, Seer. You are probably struggling with this because you seem to be under the impression that rationality can only live in the land of the objective, blind to the fact that we apply reason to subjective premises all the time. This has been demonstrated multiple times, but you tend to cut those parts out so you can get back to "green is not red" arguments.

So that would depend on the kind of ethical culture you were in - correct?

Of course.

Well obviously is there isn't an objective standard moral sanity could include or exclude almost anything.

There isn't and it can and does - that's why I find the term largely useless.

Well you claimed to be morally sane.

I do!

It is clear that that could mean anything, which means it means nothing.

Basically. But then - so would the claim to moral insanity.

But if you want to pretend that you are morally sane it is no skin off my nose. But it all seems rather circular.

Unlike you, Seer, I tend to try to use words as they are defined. If someone shows me a way I have misused a word (as in my discussion with JimB and "subjective"), I'll acknowledge it and adjust accordingly. I recognize you tend to prefer to redefine words to suit your tastes and positions. I don't find that a useful way to communicate.

Beyond that observation, I'll leave the last word to you on this theme. It doesn't look like it's going anywhere that the other endless pages haven't already gone, and you still have not provided any shred of defense for so-called "moral realism."

[seer]

An odd question, for someone who claims to value reason/rationality. The definition of sanity is all about reasoning/rationality, Seer. You are probably struggling with this because you seem to be under the impression that rationality can only live in the land of the objective, blind to the fact that we apply reason to subjective premises all the time. This has been demonstrated multiple times, but you tend to cut those parts out so you can get back to "green is not red" arguments.

Listen to yourself Carp, subjective moral premises that you can not demonstrate are true. Nor can you make a case without begging the question. And you call that reason?

There isn't and it can and does - that's why I find the term largely useless.

So your claim to moral sanity was largely useless. One wonders why you made the claim in the first place.

I do!

But why if the claim is useless?

Unlike you, Seer, I tend to try to use words as they are defined. If someone shows me a way I have misused a word (as in my discussion with JimB and "subjective"), I'll acknowledge it and adjust accordingly. I recognize you tend to prefer to redefine words to suit your tastes and positions. I don't find that a useful way to communicate.

So because I question the definition of supernatural (which we have no real understand of) I therefore redefine words at will? Nonsense...

[Jim B.]

Yes - they can. I would describe a moral framework with no outright internal contradictions as "more cohesive" than one without.

Okay, I appreciate the fact that you demurred and said "more cohesive," but I challenge the assertion that you can find many moral frameworks at the descriptive level 'with no outright internal contradictions.'

I would not consider that a "property of a sentence." To me, a "property of a sentence" is a characteristic of the sentence itself (proper syntax, proper grammatical form, etc.). But we may have come to the point where we are splitting hairs unnecessarily, and I'm not sure what the relevance of this is to the original discussion.

I wrote the "truth content" when I should have written "truth value," ie whether or not a sentence is truth-bearing, that is whether it is a candidate for truth or falsity. But you're right, I think we're digressing a bit.

Language is a tool for communicating. A hammer is a tool for pounding/prying nails. I would consider the sentence "language is one form of communication" as odd as I would consider the sentence "a hammer is one form of nail pounding." The tool is not the thing.

But there are other forms of communication aside from language. There are no other tools for nail pounding aside from hammers. "The tool is not the thing'? Please explain. Although I suspect it's not worth it.

I'm not. I'm disagreeing with your articulation of the concepts.

I respectfully disagree.

"In terms of" is an odd construct. You are communicating to me using the tool of language, and the truth value of the sentence can be determined by comparing the meaning of the sentence and the location of the cat.

"In terms of" is a perfectly clear construction in that context. Is there something about you I should know? I ask this in a perfectly honest, respectful way just as a means of facilitating our discussion.

No problem with any of these things - and one of them equates to "communicating via truth." I am communicating via language - or some other tool that can be used to communicate. "Truth" is not such a tool. It is an assessment of the alignment between the meaning of my communication and the state of the reality that communication attempts to convey.

I didn't say truth is a tool. Truth is a norm by which language operates. Language is not strictly or entirely a "tool" either. That functional, reductive way of looking at language was abandoned in the 19th and early 20th Century. It's a rather simplistic way of looking at human language and cognition.

Who else's opinion would I be expressing?

I don't pepper my posts with, "IMO." I make the assumption that the person I'm talking to knows I'm speaking out of my own beliefs or philosophy. When I'm not, I usually cite the source.

"IMO" is usually intended as a "rhetorical device." It's not usually meant as a literal marker to mean that one is expressing one's opinion. It's meant as a way to show some humility, attempt at fellow-feeling,camaraderie or an attempt to show that willingness, etc. You seem extremely literal-minded, if you don't mind my saying so.

No.

Wow. Okay. My condolences.

The concept is oxymoronic.

Do you mean that pleasure being a good in itself is oxymoronic to you or the very concept of a good-in-itself is oxymoronic? There is nothing you seek of savor just for its own sake? Giving or receiving love? A pleasant meal? Looking at a sunset?

Sorry, Jim, but no thing (conceptual or otherwise) can be said to have "good" intrinsic to it. The "good" of the thing is always with respect to a valuer and a specific metric for measuring that "goodness." I know of no exceptions.

All intrinsic goods presuppose experiences and all experiences presuppose an experiencer, ie a valuer or assessor.

I think that aligns pretty well with what I said, except for the "universals" part. We also have a sample set of one species to work from. Moral thinking occurs, as best we can tell, along with the ability to abstract, self-reflect, and form complex languages. It also appears to occur with higher tool making. But we see aspects of moral behavior in other species, just less developed than we see it in humans. That is pretty consistent with just about everything associated with higher brain function.

No evidence in non-human species of normativity or principles or of being able to adopt the subjunctive or hypothetical mood relative to oneself, all of which take a pretty high order of self-abstraction.

So you misunderstood the post. Moral principles are not analogous to legal principles because they are both subjective. They are analogous to legal principles because they a) both deal with categorizing human behavior and b) both establish "ought" and "ought not" categories. Legal principles are clearly subjective (unless you want to try to argue otherwise...?), which does not appear to be a problem for anyone. No one says "we cannot discuss legal principles due to their subjective nature" or "legal principles are irrational because there is not objective standard against which to assess them," or "legal principles are trivialized by their subjectivity." Yet when someone says, "morality is subjective," these are some of the arguments touted out to argue against the position. So why is subjectivity NOT a problem with legal principles and is suddenly a problem with moral ones?

Well, you need to write more carefully. Here's the paragraph header:

Moral principles are analogous to legal principles.

And then after one sentence:

Legal principles are subjective to the group/society/culture that derives them.

Universalizability: You are apparently assuming moral norms need to be or can be - this has not been shown.
Categorizability: Both appear to be about categorization of action, so I don't see a difference to be explained here.
Normativity: Both deal with "ought" conditions related to actions. I don't see a difference to be explained here.
Possibility of critique across cultures and historical periods: Again, you seem to be begging the question. If both are subjective, there is no issue here. The issue only arises if you make the assumption that morality is objective and law subjective - which means you're assuming your conclusion.

No, except for normativity, these are all normative. These are what we are aiming towards in our moral systems. You really ought to try to learn what normativity is and how it differs from being descriptive. You keep confusing the two.

I have proposed a reason why I think people cling to this notion of an objective moral framework that all "ought" to align to: they have been conditioned to think this way. That is what religions have taught since the concept of a punisher god first emerged. But when you look at the arguments for an objective basis for morality - none of them hold up to scrutiny. Most of them (e.g., Seer's arguments) reduce to a restatement of the definition of the terms.

But wouldn't law carry residual religious baggage as well. Why do we not see it as much there? Law has to do with societal norms, punishment, reward, keeping God's laws.

I see no reason to cling to this notion when, upon examination, it simply cannot withstand scrutiny. The subjective nature of morality is fairly evident all around us, easily explains the dynamics we see in the human species, and aligns well with its close cousin: legal frameworks. Why add to a concept that which is not necessary to it?

Because it leaves out essential parts unexplained. It's reductive. Like when phyicalists try to 'explain' consciousness, they leave the essential part out of it in order for consciousness to fit into a physical world picture. Like trying to cram a round peg into a square hole. You're trying to re-define the subject matter, in this case, morality, to fit your already agreed upon theory. It strikes many as Procrustean.

And again, I note, an analogy is only useful when the two things being compared have some points of comparison that can be built on. You're not trying to make an analogy here, you're making a form of equation: "this is like that because both are X." Except that is the exact point of our conflict. Moral principles are NOT like logical and mathematical ones because the former is subjective and the latter are not. Moral principles are more rightly compared to legal ones, because the two groups show much in common. Examining the later can inform us about the former.

I think I see the source of the confusion. I'm not offering the analogy as evidence that I am right. That would be question-begging. I am offering the analogy as part of my argument. You have to understand it as part of the broader context of an argument I'm making, but that I can never get to because we keep haggling over these myopic points you keep raising. It's part of a broader argument.

Morality is both descriptive and prescriptive, and there is no conflict between subjectivity and prescription.

P1: I want pizza for lunch
P2: That restaurant serves pizza
C: I should eat my lunch at that restaurant.

The conclusion is a prescription for future behavior. It is not the only possibility. P1 is completely subjective. Where is the problem?

No problem because you're talking about everyday prudence and practicality. The controversy is over whether morality involves another kind of language and logic than prudence. You cannot assume that it does not without begging the question. My trying to establish that it DOES involve another kind of language and logic is what I'm trying to get started doing.

OK - I see our disconnect now. I am using the term subjective in two senses: 1) unique to each individual, and 2) impacted by thoughts, opinions, and feelings. Morality and color are both subjective in the first sense (and perhaps I should use "individualized" instead for that sense, since the formal definition of subjective does not really include that concept directly) but only morality is subjective in the second sense (which is more aligned with the dictionary definition of "subjective"). I agree that color is not, as far as I know. Our perception of color will be largely dictated by the wavelength, luminosity, and my specific physiology.

I've always used the same definition of "subjective" which is in line with the definition used by moral subjectivists: determined by an individual's personal choice or preference. Color assessment is almost never subjective in this sense,and I would argue that moral judgments are not either.

[carpedm9587]

Listen to yourself Carp, subjective moral premises that you can not demonstrate are true. Nor can you make a case without begging the question. And you call that reason?

See my previous response. You are making the same error - again.

So your claim to moral sanity was largely useless. One wonders why you made the claim in the first place.

Useless to you, because of your flawed reasoning. Useful to most people who use language conventionally.

But why if the claim is useless?

See above.

So because I question the definition of supernatural (which we have no real understand of) I therefore redefine words at will? Nonsense...

Well... it is a pattern with you, Seer. YOu have a tendency to try to redefine your way to your conclusions. I frankly don't expect that pattern to change.

[Tassman]

But that is no more than your opinion, there is no reason to assume that the non-rational forces of nature created this finely tuned, life permitting, intelligible universe. Now what

Well here we are in our “life permitting, intelligible universe”. And we have evolved in such a way as to survive on this particular planet in this particular universe. There is no good reason to add a deity into the equation, nor is there any substantive evidence to support your notion that one was necessary.

Nonsense Tass, every thing I listed is necessary for science to function, and they are all unprovable assumptions, again:

The uniformity of nature, logical absolutes, a physical universe exists that operates independently of our perceptions, the universe operates according to certain laws which are knowable, events have natural causes which can be explained by natural laws, the laws of nature are constant throughout space and time.


Tell me Tass how do you do science without these assumptions? What does that even look like?

These are not assumptions. They are universal, measurable constants and have a physical quantity that is seen to be both universal in nature and have constant value in time.