This is a synopsis and review of
Homology, An Unsolved Problem
by Sir Gavin de Beer
Oxford University Press (1971) ISBN 0 19 914111 8
The post is longer than I would normally write. It is intended to be informative, to resolve what light de Beer sheds upon homology as a problem, and as an object lesson in how to make serious consideration of a cited reference.
I lack the depth of understanding required for this review to have any professional weight, but it may serve as a useful pointer. It is as fair assessment as I can honestly manage in a reasonable time.
The text is a short 16 page monograph that refers to prior work for “further reading”. Following some of this “further reading” was useful; but difficult. Citations are not included as part of the text, but must be inferred from the bibliography. All references are now at least 35 years old, and so I was generally forced to use more modern review articles to explore them.
My review is structured with the same twelve sections as the original.
1. The concept of homology. A historical review, going back to pre-Darwinian and pre-evolutionary explanations for homology, including the first detailed studies in the eighteenth century that sought to establish whether or not particular structures really are homologous. De Beer describes Darwin’s work as a bombshell that had a profound effect on the explanation of homology by introducing the notion of common ancestors; but did not affect how homology was identified.
De Beer concludes with a teaser for what follows:
So, provided with a cast-iron explanation in terms of affinity, of inheritance in evolution from a common ancestor, it looked as if the concept of homology was at last soundly based and presented no more problems of principle; however, as will be seen below, it unfortunately does.
2. Homology in plants: leaves and flowers. This is a straightforward description of the structures of leaves and flowers, showing structural evidence for homology that was first identified by Goethe in about 1790. No problems here; and subsequent work in genetics has abundantly confirmed this classic example of unambiguous homology.
3. Homology in animals: the ear ossicles. This is another classic example, without any conceptual difficulties; the homology of the bones of the inner ear in mammals with bones that make up part of the jaw in reptiles. He concludes:
What makes this study even more significant is that the results of comparative anatomy are confirmed by those of palaeontology, for there are fossil reptiles that show advances towards the mammalian condition, and the superseding of the quadrate-articular hinge of the lower jaw by the squamosal-dentary articulation. All this evolution took place without any functional discontinuity. It is a sobering thought that ever man carries in his ear ossicles the homologue of the lower jaw hinge of his reptilian ancestors. This is one of the most demonstrative examples of how comparative anatomy can determine homology of structures inherited from common ancestors in evolution.
4. Conservative effects of homology. This section considers, by an example, the consequence of a well known homology on certain other conserved structures, explaining an otherwise inexplicable anomaly.
Diverse vertebrate species have “branchial arches” in the embryo (sometimes called “gill slits”). In different species, these arches develop into different structures. The “recurrent laryngeal nerve” passes behind branchial arch number six in the vertebrate embryo. During embryonic development, several of the arches disappear, and others develop into various structures, in diverse manners for different species.
The result is that in mammals, the recurrent laryngeal nerve ends up with what would appear to be a very poorly designed route, “running backwards and looping round the ductus arteriosus, then runs forward again to innervate the muscles of the larynx.” In humans, the nerve is thus several inches longer than we should expect in a well designed organism; and in a giraffe it is several feet longer. De Beer shows how homology explains this curious anomaly.
The explanation is the homology between the mammalian ductus arteriosus and the 6th arterial arch of the fish, which is respected in descendent forms, resulting in apparently anomalous conditions.
5. The displacement of homologous structures. This section shows how homologous structures can, in the course of evolution, shift position so that they are expressed by different tissues in the embryo. This is a plain refutation of some confused criticisms raised by Michael Kent and Michael Denton. In this section, De Beer is not presenting a problem with the concept of homology (we’ll get to that in later sections) but clarifying a feature of homology that was surprising at the time.
De Beer uses to the vertebrate forelimb illustrate his point.
There is no doubt whatsoever that the forelimb in the newt and the lizard and the arm of man are strictly homologous, inherited with modification from the pectoral fins of fishes 500 million years ago. They have identical elbow and wrist joints and their hands end in five fingers. The bones and muscles that they contain also correspond. But a minute examination of their comparative anatomy reveals the astonishing fact that they do not occupy the same positions in the body. The limbs of vertebrates are always formed from material that is contributed from several adjacent sections of the trunk. So, in the newt the forelimb is from trunk segments 2, 3, 4 and 5; in the lizard from 6, 7, 8 and 9; in man from trunk sections 13 to 18 inclusive. [...]
[...] in the course of evolution, transposition has occurred; new adjacent segments further back in the trunk have been drawn into contribution to the formation of the limb, and segments further forward, which previously contributed, cease to do so.[...]
These examples illustrate the important principle of the pattern which is where the problem of homology lies, not in identity of position in the body.
That is, the problem of homology is
not that different embryonic tissues give rise to homologous organs. This is a non-problem.
As a minor aside, a similar phenomenon has now pretty much resolved the best argument that used to be raised against the close relationship of birds and dinosaurs. See
Digit numbering and limb development by Paul Myers, at the Pharyngula Blog. This is a caustic response to confusions published by Dr Sarfati at Answers in Genesis, but don’t be put off. Paul is very good at explaining the scientific details. The technical description is
“A solution to the problem of the homology of the digits in the avian hand.”, by Wagner GP and Gauthier JA (1999), in PNAS 96:5111-5116.
6. Serial homology. “Serial homology is something really a misnomer.” This section is an aside to the main thread of argument. It concerns not the association of organs with their representatives in a common ancestor, but similarity between organs in an individual. For example, forelimbs and hind limbs are “serially homologous”, showing very closely related structure.
This is not real homology, as forelimb and hindlimb cannot be traced back to any ancestor with a single pair of limbs. At most it might be said that there had been reduplication of a pattern.
7. Latent homology. This covers the case in which related structures may be homologous, and yet not visible in the phenotype of the common ancestor. This is starting to get close to a “problem” in homology. Several examples are given; most especially:
[...] the problem of spiral cleavage. This is a very precise set of manoeuvres by which the fertilized egg is cleaved. [...] Spiral cleavage occurs in polyclad turbellarians, nemertines, marine annelids, and molluscs other than Cephalopoda. It surely indicates a general affinity between the different groups in which it is found, because it is difficult to see how such a complicated mechanism could have been evolved separately in each group, and this affinity is supported by other embryological and morphological considerations. But did the common ancestor of these groups itself develop by spiral cleavage? It is impossible to say and difficult to assert, because in many species of these groups it does not occur.
This example might be grist to the mill for an “intelligent design” hypothesis, in which related themes appear independently by design, without a related starting point in a common ancestor. I deliberately refrain from a critique of that hypothesis here; but would be inclined to engage discussion of this point should it arise.
A survey of the literature indicates that that conventional biology identifies spiral cleavage with protostomes, and radial cleavage with deuterostomes.
This is a very deep distinction within Animalia; and so unsurprisingly the details of phylogenetic relationships remain open to considerable debate. As an example of this debate, see
The new animal phylogeny: Reliability and implications, by Adoutte et. al., in PNAS Vol. 97, Issue 9, 4453-4456, April 25, 2000.
The “problem” of spiral cleavage being incompletely characteristic of protostomes seems to be pretty much resolved. Some lineages have lost this characteristic, and mutations that have this effect are known. This is strong circumstantial evidence that the common ancestor had spiral cleavage, and that loss of this feature is a secondary characteristic in some lineages. For more details, see
Cleavage patterns and the topology of the metazoan tree of life, by James W. Valentine, in PNAS Vol. 94, pp. 8001-8005, July 1997.
There is lots of scope in this section to explore real substantive disputes on evolutionary relationships, but not much basis for seeing a fundamental problem with the notion of homology.
8. Homology and functional change. Homologous organs can have different functions in different organisms. No “problems” are noted in this section, and several examples are given. Here is the first:
There are several proofs of this, of which one of the simplest is the case of muscles and electric organs in fishes. [...] In some fishes [...] the muscles of certain parts of the body are modified to produce electric organs [...] powerful enough to deter predators and to kill prey. As it was difficult to imagine how these specializations arose by natural selection, and what advantages could have been conferred by initial states of such specialization, Darwin warned that ‘it would be extremely bold to maintain that no serviceable transitions are possible [...]’ This prophecy has been fully verified [...] the weak electric discharges [...] of certain fishes function in a manner analogous to radar and provide the fish with information of the proximity of other objects, [...]
9. Non-homology This section shows how morphology can provide proof (in the scientific sense of the word proof, of course) that “certain organs and structures are homologous, it can also show that others are not.” This is not a claim that homology can always be reliably identified or refuted; but a claim that there are some cases in which homology can be reliably inferred or refuted. Examples are given.
10. Homology and embryology. This is the longest single section. It does not identify problems with the concept of homology, so much as difficulties with identifying homology. Various common assumptions about homology are refuted, and some of those refutations still stand today. The section makes three major points, and that I present with my own subheadings.
(10.1. Location of embryonic cells giving rise to homologous structures.) As an example, the “obviously homologous” structure, the vertebrate alimentary canal, may arise from cells in the roof, or the floor, of the embryonic gut cavity (sharks, or lampreys), from both roof and floor (frogs), or from the lower layer of the embryonic disk (reptiles). In conclusion:
correspondence between homologous structures cannot be pressed back to similarity of position of the cells of the embryo or the parts of the egg out of which these structures are ultimately differentiated.
This is closely related to the information in section 5, and is not really a problem.
(10.2. The master organizers for inducing development of homologous structures.) De Beer speaks of the diffusion of “substances from a master structure called an
organizer” that will induce cells to undergo differentiations and form certain structures. He presents experimental evidence of cases in which distinct species use different “organizers” for triggering development of homologous structures. De Beer’s conclusion:
homologous structures can owe their origin and stimulus to differentiate to different organizer-induction processes without forfeiting their homology.
There are two major examples given; formation of the lens in the eye of different species of frog, and formation of the brain and spinal cord in vertebrates and tunicates. In both cases the experiments, though ground breaking, were crude by modern standards, and have since been investigated more thoroughly to elucidate the “organizers” involved.
Poor citation makes this unclear, but the frog experiments are most likely those performed by various researchers from 1901 to about 1904. Some details and better references are available in the review article,
Sequential activation of transcription factors in lens induction, by Hajime Ogino and Kunio Yasuda, in Development Growth & Differentiation, Vol. 42 Iss. 5 p 437, Oct 2000. This review pointed to a systematic re-investigation of lens formation, at
Reinvestigation of the role of the optic vesicle in embryonic lens induction, by RM Grainger et. al., in Development, Vol 102, Iss 3, pp 517-526 (March 1988).
It seems that de Beer was simply wrong. The evidence for diverse organizers is weak, and his conclusion poorly supported in the light of more careful experiments. Grainger et. al. have proposed a fairly complex multi-step process for lens formation, which is apparently well conserved.
The second example, of brain and spinal cord, has also been subject to considerable study since de Beer’s book. De Beer notes that “in true vertebrates, the spinal cord and brain develop as a result of induction by the underlying organizer; but in the ‘tadpole larva’ of the tunicates, which has a ‘spinal cord’ like the vertebrates, it differentiates without any underlying organizer at all.” De Beer is probably reporting conclusions of Spemann (uncited) who originated the organizer concept. But those conclusions are wrong. The organizers in question do not induce development of the central nervous system, but rather suppress development of epidermis. This is explained in
Organizing the Embryo: The Central Nervous System, part of an on-line biology text by Dr. John Kimball. A more formal paper is
Head induction by simultaneous repression of Bmp and Wnt signalling in Xenopus., by Andrei Glinka et. al., in Nature 389, pp 517-519 (2 October 1997).
Xenopus is a vertebrate (frog). Many more references could be found by following a trail from this paper.
That is, brain development is the default, in both tunicates and vertebrates. But vertebrates have since evolved an additional feature, which must be suppressed in cells to allow the default to proceed. This is confirmed in
Xenopus Embryos as a Model to Study the Genetic Mechanisms of Brain Development, by A. G. Zaraisky, in Molecular Biology, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2004, pp. 34–39 (trans from a Russian journal, 2004).
It would be rash to simply presume that “organizers”, or factors inducing formation of homologous structures, definitely cannot evolve or become co-opted from other parts of the genome or embryo. But I would expect this to be unusual; and the examples given by de Beer for this alleged phenomenon turn out to be invalid in the light of further research.
This research lends strong support to the common descent model, though in practice it is not necessary. Common descent is not seriously questioned by any rational biologist, and it is even accepted by many in the intelligent design movement who apparently propose that some designer has been stepping in to tweak lineages from time to time.
(10.3. Homology and germ layers.) Here de Beer refutes a claim that homologous organs must always arise from the same germ layer in the embryo. He cites his own work,
The Differentiation of Neural Crest Cells into Visceral Cartilages and Odontoblasts in Amblystoma, and a Re-Examination of the Germ-Layer Theory, in Proc. of the Royal Soc. of London. Series B, Biol Sci, Vol 134, Iss 876, pp. 377-398 (1947).
I’m uncertain on this. I’d welcome comment from a biologist in the house. As I understand it, de Beer is recognized as having disproved a germ layer theory developed around the turn of the century; but the concept of gastrulation and germinal layers remains vital in embryology. This includes the notion that various structures are developed from various layers. So what did de Beer disprove here? I’m not sure.
De Beer speaks of identifying the germinal origin of cells by certain indicators; such as “melanin granules” to indicate ectodermal cells, and “small globules of yolk” to betray endodermal and mesodermal cells. On this basis, de Beer infers that cartilage in jaws and visceral arches are ectodermal. But that is fine; it appears to match modern germinal models. De Beer also claims that tooth enamel can arise from ectodermal or endodermal cells. In this, I suspect he is wrong. Enamel arises from ectodermal cells, not endodermal.
Anyone who can clarify, please speak up!
11. Homology and genetics. This, finally, identifies the major “problems”. It starts with dramatic flair...
Because homology implies community of descent from a representative structure in a common ancestor it might be thought that genetics would provide the key to the problem of homology. This is where the worst shock of all is encountered.
He has two points, the first of which is no problem at all, and the second of which is more interesting, but wrong. Again, the subheadings are my own.
(11.1. Identical genes for non-homologous structures.) There are two major cases considered. The first is a gene in fowls, which controls formation of a crest of feathers, and also controls a cerebral hernia (knob in the skull) to accommodate it. The two structures are not homologous, yet controlled by the same gene. The second is the gene ‘antenna’, which induces Drosophila to produce an extra antenna instead of an eye. The conclusion:
characters controlled by identical genes are not necessarily homologous.
There is no particular problem here. The genes in question are control genes, that are able to trigger expression of other genes, that are
not identical. The genes actually coding for non-homologous structures are different, but triggered by the same factor. This is fascinating, but not remotely in conflict with common descent.
(11.2. Different genes for homologous structures.) This claim I find surprising, but I don’t think the case is made very well. The example is the “eyeless” gene in Drosophila, which de Beer speaks of as a gene that “deprives its possessor of eyes”; though it is recessive.
This is not quite true. Eyeless is actually a gene that
enables or triggers the formation of eyes. It was named eyeless because a mutant allele prevented it from working. A fly homozygous for the defective allele does not form eyes.
By breeding pure homozygous populations for this allele, experimenters establish a population of flies without eyes. After a time, offspring with eyes appear in that population, yet the eyeless allele is shown to still be present by its ill effects when mated back into the wild stock.
De Beer concludes:
What has happened during inbreeding is that all the other pairs of alleles making up the gene complex have been reshuffled until a gene complex has been produced that prevents the phenotypic manifestation of the ‘eyeless’ allele. Other genes must therefore deputize for the absent normal gene that controls the formation of eyes. But why should they, and by what mechanism? Nobody can deny that the restored eyes that develop in genetically ‘eyeless’ stocks are homologous to the original normal eyes.
Before one can say whether this phenomenon truly indicates a disconnect between genotype and phenotype, one really needs to know more about the processes by which these ‘eyeless’ stock actually express eyes. Basically, this work actually indicates a phenomenon known as “variable expressivity”. It is a complication of conventional Mendelian inheritance, in which an allele may express to differing degrees in different individuals. The full causes of this are not known; though it is likely associated with other genetic information, and of course is subject to selection. I don’t have a good reference for variable expressivity in the eyeless allele; and I would very much like to find one.
De Beer’s major reference is
Morgan, T.H. (1929) The variability of eyeless. Publs Carnegie Instn. 399, 139.
I could not find this paper, though I found other articles referencing it. The word “The” in the title should probably be omitted.
This, then, is the really major issue raised in the paper. The conclusion of de Beer is
Therefore, homologous structures need not be controlled by identical genes, and homology of phenotypes does not imply similarity of genotypes.
This is a very strong and surprising conclusion; but I believe that work in understanding development indicates that de Beer is wrong.
12. Revision. De Beer begins his conclusion thus:
It is now clear that the pride with which it was assumed that the inheritance of homologous structures from a common ancestor explained homology was misplaced; for such inheritance cannot be ascribed to the identity of genes. The attempt to from ‘homologous’ genes, except in closely related species, has been given up as hopeless.
He was wrong. Many homologous genes have been found in very diverse species, and continue to be found. The findings fit the basic model of common descent with spectacular success, and are rightly identified as proof of common ancestry sufficient for any reasonable investigator. The eyeless gene is a case in point; it is homologous to Pax6 in humans. There is an enormous literature on this.
De Beer well illuminates complexity of the homology concept, but his arguments for a disconnect with genetic homology are wrong, and have been disproved by the enormous strides made in genetics over the last thirty years.
Cheers -- Sylas