Arius - Where did he go wrong?

[apostoli]

Hello All,

This is a continuation of a conversation Alam and I were having on another thread in this section of TWEB. If you would like to contribute please feel free.

JWs are often accused as being Arian, but as far as I can tell the WTS doesn't teach anything of Arius' belief.

For an understanding of Arianism, it would be worth having a read of post #446 Alam to Oldmonk on this thread
http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showthread.php?p=1435191#post1435191


To a large extent I agree with Alam's comment to Oldmonk that "in the end, I think Arius did overstep what could be justified, and this prejudiced what he was trying to do." Most writers I have read parrot each other denigrating Arius and misapply the term Arian, tagging whomever disagrees with their opinion as Arian. So I thought it might be useful to have a look at what Arius did say.


Arius fragment 6: "there are two wisdoms, first, the attribute co-existent with God, and next, that in this wisdom the Son was originated, and was only named Wisdom and Word as partaking of it. For Wisdom, saith he, by the will of the wise God, had its existence in Wisdom. In like manner, that there is another Word in God besides the Son, and that the Son again, as partaking of it, is named Word and Son according to grace. your bolded portion above is accurate in that Arius did ascribe the generation of the Son to the grace of God, as well as the will of God. At this point, why someone would think there is a contradiction between the will of God and the grace of God, as though God's will could not be gracious, is beyond me.I guess it comes down to the meaning each of us puts on "grace". It seems that Arius opinion as understood by Athanasius, makes the Son a participant in our reception of grace, rather than the source/cause of our receipt of that grace. Best I can figure, in Athanasius' opinion, Arius was arguing that the "first principal" was "grace" and not the Son himself - aka the Father is not manifested in the Son = "There is full proof that God is invisible to all beings; both to things which are through the Son, and to the Son He is invisible. I will say it expressly, how by the Son is seen the Invisible; by that power by which God sees, and in His own measure, the Son endures to see the Father, as is lawful." (Arius, Fragment 2)The Father is the first principle, the "arche anarchos" as the eastern church has it.Agreed 100%. The entire OT & NT testifies that our primary objective is to be brought back to fellowship with the Father, and all things are attributable to the Father.

I had a read through a concordance, and found grace mostly depicts God's kindness in bestowing some benefit to mankind, aka be obedient to God in fullness of love for him, and his "kindness" will be bestowed upon you. The WTS publication "Insight on the Scriptures" (p155) notes that grace has 14 meanings. kharis (KJV=grace) occurs 150 times in the NT. "RC Trench in Synonyns of the New Testament says, kharis implies 'a favour freely done, without expectation of return'...Thayer in his lexicon says: 'The word [kharis] contains the idea of kindness which bestows upon one what he has not deserved."

In Arius' writings (those extant to us) I haven't found him "ascribing the generation of the Son to the grace of God" but rather that the Son's attributes are by grace. From the fragments: "(6) In like manner, that there is another Word in God besides the Son, and that the Son again, as partaking of it, is named Word and Son according to grace...
(8)the Word is not the very God though He is called God, yet He is not very God, but by participation of grace, He, as others, is God only in name."
http://home.zonnet.nl/chotki/fragments%20from%20arius.htm

Where I see Arius as failing, is that in his defense of the principality of the Father, he removes the Son, who is the actual manifestation of the grace and wisdom of God, the ultimate benefit given to us by the Father, through the Son (Col 1:3-6). The message I get from texts such as 2 Cor 13:14: It is through the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, by which we derive our salvation. Acts 15:11 says "We believe that through the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ we shall be saved". God, our Father, is indeed the source and cause (1 Jn 4:9) but so has the Son also come to be (Titus 1:3-4; 3:4-7) as the Father intended (Col 1:16).

Arius imo is being extra-biblical saying "He also is by grace called Logos and Son"and denies the fact that the Son is the very manifestation of God to us. John 1:1,4,14,18 and Col 1:19-20, oppose him.

However, there is nothing in or about God Himself from which one could deduce the existence of another being.God is agape (love), and by implication, not puffed up, might suggest it (1 Jn 4:8; 1 Cor 13:4) :wink:

The WTS publication "Insight on the Scriptures" (vol2 p274) cites Vine's Expository Dictionery of Old and New Testment Words saying "[Agape] can be known only from the actions it prompts...It an excercise of the Divine will in deliberate choice, without assignable cause save that which lies in the nature of God himself"

One can believe that God sacrificed a disposable asset (one of his creations, created from nothing) for our sins, or sacrificed something meaningful to him, in a natural love for the things created through the Son. With the promise of our adoption, the later seems the most reassuring.

A philosophical difficulty in Arius' proposition is that for God to become Father (even by adoption), would imply a changeability. But for the Son, to be actual Son might imply divisibility. Theologically, another problem arises, as our immediate creator is the Son, through whom and for whom all things have been created (Col 1:16), for it pleased the Father that in him should all fullness dwell.

In my opinion, Arius leaves all considerations in limbo, by saying "That the Son is not begotten (agennetos) nor in any way a part of an Unbegotten, nor derived from some (alien) substratum, but that he exists by will and counsel before times and ages, full of truth, and grace, God, Only-begotten, unaltering. And before he was begotten, or created or determined or established, he did not exist. For he was not unbegotten (or unoriginated)."
http://home.zonnet.nl/chotki/fragments%20from%20arius.htm

Where I would agree with Arius is that the scriptures declare the Son to be begotten in regard to his pre-existence, so logically he is originate of the Father. The when, why or how is not mentioned in scripture, so not worth speculating upon.

This seems to have been the attitude of Athanasius who follows the testimony of the ANF by responding that the Son was truely Son, begotten of the Father.

Theodoret, in his Ecclesiastical History notes: "But the insane folly of imagining that the Son of God came into being out of that which had no being, and that His sending forth took place in time, is plain from the words 'which had no being,' although the foolish are incapable of perceiving the folly of their own utterances. For the phrase 'He was not' must either have reference to time, or to some interval in the ages. If then it be true that all things were made by Him, it is evident that every age, time, all intervals of time, and that 'when' in which 'was not' has its place, were made by Him. And is it not absurd to say that there was a time when He who created all time, and ages, and seasons, with which the 'was not' is confused, was not? For it would be the height of ignorance, and contrary indeed to all reason, to affirm that the cause of any created thing can be posterior to that caused by it. The interval during which they say the Son was still unbegotten of the Father was, according to their opinion, prior to the wisdom of God, by whom all things were created."
http://www.brainfly.net/html/books/brn0181.htm


To my understanding, the existence of other beings flows from a disposition of God which we call His will. The ability of God to will (as distinct from the fact that He does will, and the content of His will) follows from the fact that He is omnipotentAs the ancients wrote and scripture teaches: The Father begot the Son but all things we know about were created by the Son - he is the manifestation of the power and wisdom of God, and in the salvation plan the manifestation of God's love. In my reading of scripture, God is very knowable in all important ways. As no man can know the inner self of any other, so it is in our perception of God - as with anything, we know what is revealed.

and the statement "God is omnipotent" is a rephrasing in positive terms of the fact that God is unconditioned, i.e. that He is God.But imo of more import - He is Father. To quote A.Paul "I bow my knees unto the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, Of whom the whole family in heaven and earth is named."

Concerning the Son, again I'll quote Theodoret "Is it not then impious to say that there was a time when the wisdom of God was not? Who saith,' I was by Him as one brought up with Him: I was daily His delight?' Or that once the power of God was not, or His Word, or anything else by which the Son is known, or the Father designated, defective? To assert that the brightness of the Father's glory' once did not exist,' destroys also the original light of which it is the brightness; and if there ever was a time in which the image of God was not, it is plain that He Whose image He is, is not always: nay, by the non-existence of the express image of God's Person, He also is taken away of whom this is ever the express image. Hence it may be seen, that the Sonship of our Saviour has not even anything in common with the sonship of men. For just as it has been shown that the nature of His existence cannot be expressed by language, and infinitely surpasses in excellence all things to which He has given being, so His Sonship, naturally partaking in His paternal Divinity, is unspeakably different from the sonship of those who, by His appointment, have been adopted as sons. He is by nature immutable, perfect, and all-sufficient, whereas men are liable to change, and need His help. What further advance can be made by the wisdom of God? What can the Very Truth, or God the Word, add to itself? How can the Life or the True Light in any way be bettered? And is it not still more contrary to nature to suppose that wisdom can be susceptible of folly?"


The will of God is gracious in that, at minimum it confers being upon beings, without any deservingness in them to exist. Will is a disposition of God which causes beings to be and to become, and it is gracious. Thus, His will is the means whereby He is the first principle, the Arche Anarchos. Apart from His will God is Anarchos; but He is an Arche (source) or Aitia (cause) at His will. He produced these attributes for Himself with the same activity whereby He created another being. This would seem to be Tertullian's view (Adv. Herm. 3; 18 (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0313.htm)); and I do not think it is anything other than Arius' view. If grace is the first principle in any sense, it is because it is the disposition of God whereby He is the principle of other beings.
By making the Father, invisible to the Son, Arius in effect disolves the Father and replaces him with a mere artificer.

Reading Arius, I think he would have focused on where Tetullian said (Chapter XVII)"[God] is incomprehensible, though in grace He is manifested. He is beyond our utmost thought, though our human faculties conceive of Him. He is therefore equally real and great. But that which, in the ordinary sense, can be seen and handled and conceived, is inferior to the eyes by which it is taken in, and the hands by which it is tainted, and the faculties by which it is discovered; but that which is infinite is known only to itself. This it is which gives some notion of God, while yet beyond all our conceptions-our very incapacity of fully grasping Him affords us the idea of what He really is. He is presented to our minds in His transcendent greatness, as at once known and unknown."

I think Arius was at variance with Tetulian. In Tetullian's own words (Chapter XXI) "And so the supreme Head and Master of this grace and discipline, the Enlightener and Trainer of the human race, God's own Son, was announced among us, born-but not so born as to make Him ashamed of the name of Son or of His paternal origin...Christ is Spirit of Spirit, and God of God, as light of light is kindled. The material matrix remains entire and unimpaired, though you derive from it any number of shoots possessed of its qualities; so, too, that which has come forth out of God is at once God and the Son of God, and the two are one. In this way also, as He is Spirit of Spirit and God of God, He is made a second in manner of existence-in position, not in nature; and He did not withdraw from the original source, but went forth. This ray of God, then, as it was always foretold in ancient times, descending into a certain virgin, and made flesh in her womb, is in His birth God and man united."


"There is full proof that God is invisible to all beings; both to things which are through the Son, and to the Son He is invisible. I will say it expressly, how by the Son is seen the Invisible; by that power by which God sees, and in His own measure, the Son endures to see the Father, as is lawful." (Arius, Fragment 2)This means that the Son sees God by the grace of God, a.k.a . the beatific vision. The interface between the Father and the Son is actively maintained by the Father.Arius went on to say "nothing which is called comprehensible does the Son know to speak about [God]; for it is impossible for Him to investigate the Father, who is by Himself. For the Son does not know His own essence, For, being Son, He really existed, at the will of the Father. What argument then allows, that He who is from the Father should know His own parent by comprehension? For it is plain that for that which hath a beginning to conceive how the Unbegun is, or to grasp the idea, is not possible."

I guess Arius wasn't big on A.Paul who said "the spirit searches all things, yea, the deep things of God...the natural man receive not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolish unto him, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned...For who has known the mind of the Lord, that he may instruct him? But we have the mind of Christ." (1 Cor 2:10-16).

Jesus said "I am the good shepherd, and know my sheep, and am known of mine. As the Father knoweth me, even so I know the Father; and I lay down my life for the sheep." (Jn 10:14-15).


As we have discussed in the past, Arius may have been misunderstood by Athanasius, we can't really tell as we only have Athanasius' testimony and Athanasius quoting Arius.

Mai kô mashma lan = What does this mean for us?

A clarifying comment on my reference to Arche (as grace) in my earlier post. It seems that it was believed Arius taught that grace was the First principle or the beginning of all things. See Newman's notes on Athanasius - Arche, The Geneton/Genneton and Epinoia...

[Kat' epinoian, epinoein], conception. This is a word very common with Athanasius. It expresses the view taken by the mind of theological realities, whether that view be the true view or not...Thus [Arius] in the Thalia, “He is conceived in numberless conceptions, [epinoiais].” de Syn. § 15. Hence Athan. says they held that “He who is really Son is but [kat' epinoian] Word, as He is Vine, and Way, and Door, and Tree of Life, and that He is called Wisdom also only in name (vid. art. [Onomata]),
This does not seem to be a good interpretation of Arius. In the Logos cosmology to which Arius probably subscribed, the Logos is the middle term between One God and the world of many. The Logos is a one-in-many. In a discussion of the titles of Christ, Origen said:

Now God is altogether one and simple; but our Saviour, for many reasons, since God set Him forth a propitiation and a first fruits of the whole creation, is made many things, or perhaps all these things; the whole creation, so far as capable of redemption, stands in need of Him. And, hence, He is made the light of men, because men, being darkened by wickedness, need the light that shines in darkness, and is not overtaken by the darkness; had not men been in darkness, He would not have become the light of men. The same thing may be observed in respect of His being the first-born of the dead . . . . Thus if we collect the titles of Jesus, the question arises which of them were conferred on Him later, and would never have assumed such importance if the saints had begun and had also persevered in blessedness. Perhaps Wisdom would be the only remaining one, or perhaps the Word would remain too, or perhaps the Life, or perhaps the Truth, not the others, which He took for our sake. And happy indeed are those who in their need for the Son of God have yet become such persons as not to need Him in His character as a physician healing the sick, nor in that of a shepherd, nor in that of redemption, but only in His characters as wisdom, as the word and righteousness, or if there be any other title suitable for those who are so perfect as to receive Him in His fairest characters ([i]In Joannis. i. 22).I doubt Arius would have apealed to Origen. Arius' opponents could quote Origen to refute Arius' teaching from multiple directions.

"(27) Further, the Only-begotten is the truth, because He embraces in Himself according to the Father's will the whole reason of all things, and that with perfect clearness, and being the truth communicates to each creature in proportion to its worthiness. And should any one enquire whether all that the Father knows, according to the depth of His riches and His wisdom and His knowledge, is known to our Saviour also, and should he, imagining that he will thereby glorify the Father, show that some things known to the Father are unknown to the Son, although He might have had an equal share of the apprehensions of the unbegotten God, we must remind him that it is from His being the truth that He is Saviour, and add that if He is the truth complete, then there is nothing true which He does not know; truth must not limp for the want of the things which, according to those persons, are known to the Father only. Or else let it be shown that some things are known to which the name of truth does not apply, but which are above the truth...(32) None of these testimonies, however, sets forth distinctly the Saviour's exalted birth; but when the words are addressed to Him, "Thou art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee," this is spoken to Him by God, with whom all time is to-day, for there is no evening with God, as I consider, and there is no morning, nothing but time that stretches out, along with His unbeginning and unseen life. The day is to-day with Him in which the Son was begotten, and thus the beginning of His birth is not found, as neither is the day of it...(42) As, then, from His activity in enlightening the world whose light He is, Christ is named the Light of the World, and as from His making those who sincerely attach themselves to Him put away their deadness and rise again and put on newness of life, He is called the Resurrection, so from an activity of another kind He is called Shepherd and Teacher, King and Chosen Shaft, and Servant, and in addition to these Paraclete and Atonement and Propitiation. And after the same fashion He is also called the Logos, because He takes away from us all that is irrational, and makes us truly reasonable, so that we do all things, even to eating and drinking, to the glory of God, and discharge by the Logos to the glory of God both the commoner functions of life and those which belong to a more advanced stage. For if, by having part in Him, we are raised up and enlightened, herded also it may be and ruled over, then it is clear that we become in a divine manner reasonable, when He drives away from us what in us is irrational and dead, since He is the Logos (reason) and the Resurrection.Consider, however, whether all men have in some way part in Him in His character as Logos."

Origen: Commentary on John, Book 1 (Roberts-Donaldson)
http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/text/origen-john1.html

Given Origen's paragraphs 27 & 32, it is evident that Arius' thoughts had a basis in a teaching that had a history in the Church from the late 2nd century, if not earlier - presumeably gnostic or ebionite.


the proper and {408} true Wisdom of the Father, which co-exists ingenerately with Him, being other than the Son, by which He even made the Son, and named Him Wisdom as partaking of Wisdom.” Orat. ii. § 37.Athanasius makes too much of this, imo. As you know--the distinction between the begotten and the immanent logos was an orthodox distinction common in the early fathers. St. Justin describes the relation between the immanent and the begotten Logos as that of one fire kindling another (Dial. Tryph. 61 (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/01283.htm); 128 (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/01284.htm)). Tatian, when he was still orthodox, probably explicating Justin's view, describes the "immanent" logos in terms of a "λογικη δυναμις" or Logos-power by virtue of which God generated the Son, his "εργον πρωτοτοκον" or firstborn work (Address to the Greeks, 5 (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0202.htm)). The principle is the same as Psalm 94:9: "He that formed the eye, shall he not see?" He that begat Wisdom is Wise (cf. Prov. 8:22-26).Arius seems to follow this idea, but introduces his own opinion "Understand that the Monad was; but the Dyad was not, before it was in existence. It follows at once that, though the Son was not, the Father was God. Hence the Son, not being (for He existed at the will of the Father), is God Only-begotten, and He is alien from either. Wisdom existed as Wisdom by the will of the Wise God. Hence He is conceived in numberless conceptions: Spirit, Power, Wisdom, God's glory, Truth, Image, and Word. Understand that He is conceived to be Radiance and Light. One equal to the Son, the Superior is able to beget; but one more excellent, or superior, or greater, He is not able. At God's will the Son is what and whatsoever He is. And when and since He was, from that time He has subsisted from God. He, being a strong God, praises in His degree the Superior." (Arius Frag 2)

There is a lot of extra-biblical ideas in what he expounds. Possibly he was heavily influenced by the Alexandrian environment...

"Alexandria, like many burgeoning cities in the eastern Hellenistic world, was a riotously cosmopolitan city. Indian Buddhists in orange robes were seen in its vast marketplaces as far back as the first century. Persian magi, merchant Athenians, Roman tourists, Palestinian rabbis, Syrian ecstatics, Ethiopian emissaries, and other Africans from further south down the Nile crowded its grain markets and the stalls where the world's strange gifts could be bought and bartered.

Thus it can come as no surprise that Alexandria was a metropolis of mixture and blending, a place where culture held hands with culture, and where nothing stayed "pure" for long. Indeed, this blending of cultures, this easy syncretism in the urban Hellenistic Roman Empire, was especially visible in the public religious life of the people."

Arius in the Mirror: The Alexandrian Dissent And How It Is Reflected in Modern Unitarian Universalist Practice and Discourse by Mark Belletini, M. Div., D. D.
http://firstuucolumbus.org/sermons/ariuspaper.htm


Not that they even allowed Him really to be Son, except in the sense that we are sons of God, that is, because adoption involves a gift of the Spirit, which is a real principle of a new birth. Thus Athan. quotes or charges Arius elsewhere as saying, “He is not the very and only Word of the Father, but is in name only called Word and Wisdom, and is called by grace Son and Power.” Orat. i. § 9; and just after he contrasts “true” Son with the Arian tenet, Son “by adoption, which is from participation” of the Spirit “and [kat' epinoian].” vid. also de Sent. D. 2. Ep. Æg. 12, 13, 14. Orat. iv. § 2."
http://www.newmanreader.org/works/athanasius/volume2/file13.htmlArius said the Son is a Son not in semblance, but in truth. In good faith, we must assume that this is what he thought his theology led up to. In his letter to Alexander (frag 3 from the link) he implies that God, by generation, conferred upon the Son everything He has to confer. What was not conferred to the Son through his generation was αγεννησια, ingeneracy -- that would be self-defeating. Thus, only God the Father is αγεννητος, αναρχος, and the rest. If the SOn has to be unbegotten in order to be a real Son, there could not be a Son of God; an unbegotten Son is contradictory. Arius may have believed he was protecting the doctrine of Sonship from the occult doctrine of an αυτογενης or "self-begotten" or the Sabellianist 'υιοπατωρ (Sonfather). Alexandar was saying the Son is an "αγεννητογενης" or unbegotten-begotten and similar things; this crossed a line for Arius.I have reservations about Arius' phrase "perfect creature (ktisma) of God" as it could be understood in numerous ways. In the main though I find Arius' letter to Alexander reasonable.

"Our faith from our forefathers, which also we have learned from thee, Blessed Pope, is this:--We acknowledge One God, alone Ingenerate, alone Everlasting, alone Unbegun, alone True, alone having Immortality, alone Wise, alone Good, alone Sovereign; Judge, Governor, and Providence of all, unalterable and unchangeable, just and good, God of Law and Prophets and New Testament; who begat an Only-begotten Son before eternal times, through whom He has made both the ages and the universe; and begat Him, not in semblance, but in truth; He made Him subsist at His own will, unalterable and unchangeable; perfect creature (ktisma) of God, but not as one of the creatures; offspring, but not as one of things begotten; nor as Valentinus pronounced that the offspring of the Father was an issue nor as Mani taught that the offspring was a portion of the Father, one in essence (homoousion) or as Sabellius, dividing the Monad, speaks of a Sonfather nor as Hieracas, of one torch from another, or as a lamp divided into two nor that He who was before, was afterwards generated or new-created into a Son, as thou too thyself." (Arius Frag 3)

Arius' Letter to Alexander of Alexandria
http://www2.evansville.edu/ecoleweb/arians/arius2.htm


In Athanasius' opinion Arius taught...

5. "`For God,' he says, `was alone, and the Word as yet was not, nor the Wisdom. Then, wishing to form us, thereupon He made a certain one, and named Him Word and Wisdom and Son, that He might form us by means of Him.' Accordingly, he says that there are two wisdoms, first, the attribute co-existent with God, and next, that in this wisdom the Son was originated, and was only named Wisdom and Word as partaking of it. `For Wisdom,' saith he, `by the will of the wise God, had its existence in Wisdom.' In like manner, he says, that there is another Word in God besides the Son, and that the Son again, as partaking of it, is named Word and Son according to grace...Moreover he has dared to say, that `the Word is not the very God;' `though He is called God, yet He is not very God,' but `by participation of grace, He, as others, is God only in name.'."

Athanasius responds in great length. The main point being...

16. "Such thoughts then being evidently unseemly and untrue, we are driven to say that what is from the essence of the Father, and proper to Him, is entirely the Son; for it is all one to say that God is wholly participated, and that He begets; and what does begetting signify but a Son? And thus of the Son Himself, all things partake according to the grace of the Spirit coming from Him; and this shews that the Son Himself partakes of nothing, but what is partaken from the Father, is the Son; for, as partaking of the Son Himself, we are said to partake of God...

The relevant paragraphs are 5,9,16,20,36,37,38,40,42,43,45,50,56,59(7)&(8),60(9)
http://biblestudy.churches.net/CCEL/FATHERS2/NPNF204/NPNF2066.HTMAthanasius was aware that the Arians too believed that the generality of creations participate in God through the Son, a la Origen (In Joann. ii. 2).I think Arius' explanation is problematic. To Athanasius the Son is in perception (what has been revealed) the very action of the Father in creation, it is through the Son that all things are accomplished and therefore, from our perception, the Son is the very wisdom and power of God - which is what the scriptures say. Arius went extra-biblical, he conceived there had to be two wisdoms, powers etc, which is a neccessity if one conceives the Son as mutable.

If the Father is unknowable, even by the Son, as Arius' did write "God is ineffable to His Son. For He is to Himself what He is, that is, unspeakable. So that nothing which is called comprehensible does the Son know to speak about" (Arius, Frag 2) then there is no way that we can draw to a relationship with God let alone become "perfect in one" with the Father and Son as Jesus prayed (Jn 17:23). The best I can derive from Arius, God is but a conception "For it is plain that for that which hath a beginning to conceive how the Unbegun is, or to grasp the idea, is not possible." Romans 1:20 refutes Arius' immediately "For the invisible things of [God] from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even the eternal power and Godhead"

A question that Arius fails to address (at least in the writings we do have): If God is ineffable, too great for words, how is it that "the only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, has explained him!" (Jn 1:18) ?

[alam]

Hello Apostoli;



Hello All,

This is a continuation of a conversation Alam and I were having on another thread in this section of TWEB. If you would like to contribute please feel free.

JWs are often accused as being Arian, but as far as I can tell the WTS doesn't teach anything of Arius' belief.

For an understanding of Arianism, it would be worth having a read of post #446 Alam to Oldmonk on this thread
http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showthread.php?p=1435191#post1435191


To a large extent I agree with Alam's comment to Oldmonk that "in the end, I think Arius did overstep what could be justified, and this prejudiced what he was trying to do."


Yes, and so in the following in some respects .




Most writers I have read parrot each other denigrating Arius and misapply the term Arian, tagging whomever disagrees with their opinion as Arian. So I thought it might be useful to have a look at what Arius did say.


Thank-you for your moderate approach to this subject.


This discussion began when I responded to the following critique you had passed along on Arius :

Recently I read an orthodox teacher who made the point that the differentuator between Arius and his opposers was that in most things all were in total agreement but whereas Arius caused the Son to be by the will of God, the orthodox proposed it was by the grace (love) of God. A differential that may be lost in the modern world (* (http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showpost.php?p=1427785&postcount=415)).


To me this commentator seemed to be off base. Afaik, Nicenes today do not claim the Son is begotten of grace, under the definition given:

'The word [kharis] contains the idea of kindness which bestows upon one what he has not deserved."

If the Son's existence is not of grace for Arius, and grace or kharis is the idea of kindness which one bestows upon one which he has not deserved, and existence is a good so that conferral of existence could be considered a kindness, all of which things I consider to be true, then you would be saying that according to Airus God conferred existence on the Son because the Son deserved to exist, had some claim upon God that he should exist.


That is probably not what Arius taught.


He existed at the will of the Father... At God's will the Son is what and whatsoever He is. And when and since He was, from that time He has subsisted from God (Frag. 2 (http://home.zonnet.nl/chotki/fragments%20from%20arius.htm)).


If the Son exists at God's will, and we assume that for Arius, God's will in this matter was not bound, but free, nothing having a claim on Him that He should choose one way or the other, and existence is a good such that conferral of existence is a kindness or benefit, this sounds like χαρις or grace.




Where I see Arius as failing, is that in his defense of the principality of the Father, he removes the Son, who is the actual manifestation of the grace and wisdom of God, the ultimate benefit given to us by the Father, through the Son (Col 1:3-6).



What did he remove the Son from, and how? Nowhere in Arius' fragments does he say, "I am about to remove the Son. Notice how I do it."


Such imputations to Arius are common in intra-homousian dialogue; they are accustomed to have Arius as the fall guy. But here I do not want to let assumptions like Arius "removed the Son" pass by unquestioned. Maybe he did, but it is not obvious that he did.




The message I get from texts such as 2 Cor 13:14: It is through the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, by which we derive our salvation. Acts 15:11 says "We believe that through the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ we shall be saved". God, our Father, is indeed the source and cause (1 Jn 4:9) but so has the Son also come to be (Titus 1:3-4; 3:4-7) as the Father intended (Col 1:16).



That is exactly what Arius taught. The Son has come to be everything he is as the Father intended. There is no basis to think Arius denied that the Son is the principle of salvation.



Arius imo is being extra-biblical saying "He also is by grace called Logos and Son"and denies the fact that the Son is the very manifestation of God to us. John 1:1,4,14,18 and Col 1:19-20, oppose him.


With due respect that would be your opinion. Since we have discussed these scriptures at great length before, with no change of view on either side, there seems to be no point doing it again.


God is agape (love),



There is nothing in and about God Himself -- as distinct from His gracious will -- from which one could deduce the existence of another being.


Agape is a disposition toward the welfare of another which seeketh not its own. This is the ultimate category which integrates our positive concepts of God, because it describes all acts of an unconditioned being which distributes value outside itself.



and by implication, not puffed up, might suggest it (1 Jn 4:8; 1 Cor 13:4) :wink:


To say that God was proud or morally "puffed up" before the creation is to interject a human idea or state of consciousness where we are unentitled to assert one: none that is obvious or given in scriptrure at least.


The WTS publication "Insight on the Scriptures" (vol2 p274) cites Vine's Expository Dictionery of Old and New Testment Words saying "[Agape] can be known only from the actions it prompts...It an excercise of the Divine will in deliberate choice, without assignable cause save that which lies in the nature of God himself"


Let us not debate on the basis of WT definitions. I have no axe to grind with the WT but am not a member.



One can believe that God sacrificed a disposable asset (one of his creations, created from nothing) for our sins, or sacrificed something meaningful to him, in a natural love for the things created through the Son. With the promise of our adoption, the later seems the most reassuring.



Perhaps you would show how for Arius, the Son being ex-nihilo amounted to the Son being a disposable asset. I have a feeling this is not Arius, but Athanasius reading between Arius' lines. ;-)

It would seem that God can attach real value to things, even things created ex-nihilo. In the reality which God has chosen, they have an importance which exceeds what we understand by the word "disposable".


In that day it shall be said to Jerusalem, Fear thou not: and to Zion, Let not thy hands be slack. The LORD thy God is in the midst of thee; a mighty one who will save; he will rejoice over thee with joy; he will be silent in his love, he will joy over thee with singing.


Is this foolishness because Jerusalem is disposable? Regardless of whether the Father or the Son is described here, both could be said to be the creator from a certain perspective, and Jerusalem is created ex-nihilo....





A philosophical difficulty in Arius' proposition is that for God to become Father (even by adoption), would imply a changeability.



No more than God changed by becoming a creator. ;-)




But for the Son, to be actual Son might imply divisibility. Theologically, another problem arises, as our immediate creator is the Son, through whom and for whom all things have been created (Col 1:16), for it pleased the Father that in him should all fullness dwell.

In my opinion, Arius leaves all considerations in limbo, by saying "That the Son is not begotten (agennetos) nor in any way a part of an Unbegotten, nor derived from some (alien) substratum, but that he exists by will and counsel before times and ages, full of truth, and grace, God, Only-begotten, unaltering. And before he was begotten, or created or determined or established, he did not exist. For he was not unbegotten (or unoriginated)."
http://home.zonnet.nl/chotki/fragments%20from%20arius.htm


The site which I said was "reliable" has a typo. :-S Most do however... The first line should be, "the Son is not unbegotten." That might help clear it up.



Where I would agree with Arius is that the scriptures declare the Son to be begotten in regard to his pre-existence, so logically he is originate of the Father. The when, why or how is not mentioned in scripture, so not worth speculating upon.


Ok.


This seems to have been the attitude of Athanasius who follows the testimony of the ANF by responding that the Son was truely Son, begotten of the Father.


Arius too said the Son was truly Son, begotten of the Father. He saw Athanasius and Alexander ultimately making the Father and the Son something like brothers. He believed that they left no real way in which the Son could be said to be generated of the Father. He said Alexander (probably under Athanasius' influence) was teaching, "always God, always Son, he is an unbegotten-begotten" (Letter to Eusebius). Reading this letter one can almost sense Arius' dizziness and the fact that he has a headache. ;-)

For Arius this all amounted to the Son being a Son in semblance, phantasmally, not in truth. In truth, he would say, this would make them either "brothers", or two modes of a modalist monad seeming to beget itself



Theodoret, in his Ecclesiastical History notes: "But the insane folly of imagining that the Son of God came into being out of that which had no being, and that His sending forth took place in time, is plain from the words 'which had no being,' although the foolish are incapable of perceiving the folly of their own utterances. For the phrase 'He was not' must either have reference to time, or to some interval in the ages. If then it be true that all things were made by Him, it is evident that every age, time, all intervals of time, and that 'when' in which 'was not' has its place, were made by Him. And is it not absurd to say that there was a time when He who created all time, and ages, and seasons, with which the 'was not' is confused, was not? For it would be the height of ignorance, and contrary indeed to all reason, to affirm that the cause of any created thing can be posterior to that caused by it. The interval during which they say the Son was still unbegotten of the Father was, according to their opinion, prior to the wisdom of God, by whom all things were created."
http://www.brainfly.net/html/books/brn0181.htm



The problem with this is that if he is right, we should not even speak of God as existing "before" time, as this would imply a time before time. Talking about things going on "before" time is a figure of speech that everyone used/uses, including Arius.



As the ancients wrote and scripture teaches: The Father begot the Son but all things we know about were created by the Son - he is the manifestation of the power and wisdom of God, and in the salvation plan the manifestation of God's love. In my reading of scripture, God is very knowable in all important ways. As no man can know the inner self of any other, so it is in our perception of God - as with anything, we know what is revealed.



Ok.




But imo of more import - He is Father. To quote A.Paul "I bow my knees unto the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, Of whom the whole family in heaven and earth is named."


I do not believe that "Father" alone is an adequate understanding. Who is the Father and what is He like? His character is set forth in scripture, but something is still incomplete. How would we know that what we think of as God does not have the ontological status of a fly in the total scheme of things and is going to get wiped out by some other entity?


We must have faith that this is not the case, but how do we articulate this faith to ourselves? Imho, the attributes of God in classic theism.


A person cannot take the "God" part out of the Father and remain doctrinally sound. Who is our Father if He is not God-- is He a space man of some sort?


I would never belabor this point except that we often get into it over this and it is for nothing, imo.



Concerning the Son, again I'll quote Theodoret "Is it not then impious to say that there was a time when the wisdom of God was not?


Arius did not say that, afaict. He avoided the idea of a "time" the Son was not.


Who saith,' I was by Him as one brought up with Him: I was daily His delight?' Or that once the power of God was not, or His Word, or anything else by which the Son is known, or the Father designated, defective? To assert that the brightness of the Father's glory' once did not exist,' destroys also the original light of which it is the brightness; and if there ever was a time in which the image of God was not, it is plain that He Whose image He is, is not always: nay, by the non-existence of the express image of God's Person, He also is taken away of whom this is ever the express image. Hence it may be seen, that the Sonship of our Saviour has not even anything in common with the sonship of men. For just as it has been shown that the nature of His existence cannot be expressed by language, and infinitely surpasses in excellence all things to which He has given being, so His Sonship, naturally partaking in His paternal Divinity, is unspeakably different from the sonship of those who, by His appointment, have been adopted as sons. He is by nature immutable, perfect, and all-sufficient, whereas men are liable to change, and need His help. What further advance can be made by the wisdom of God? What can the Very Truth, or God the Word, add to itself? How can the Life or the True Light in any way be bettered? And is it not still more contrary to nature to suppose that wisdom can be susceptible of folly?"


From last year's correspondence,

"Sometimes, we think of eternity as an endless span of time going backwards from a point arbitrarily defined as the "beginning" of time.

But when we say that time had a beginning, that is exactly what we mean. God lives in "Eternity" as though it were a place (Isa. 57:15), and we can think of it in spatial as much as temporal terms. From His abiding eternality it pleased God to create, and creation happened; in time of course, for there is nowhere else it might occur. It is not like God had to "wait" for eternity before creating.

The analogy of sun and its light or the spring and a stream are fine as long as we do not take it too literally and think of eternity past as some overwhelming stretch of time. The world of space and time [and more importantly, the Logos] is the sunbeam and the stream. Eternity is its sun and wellspring."




By making the Father, invisible to the Son, Arius in effect disolves the Father and replaces him with a mere artificer.



Again, this would be an opinion, and in lieu of anything to support it, I see no basis to abandon my own view: "this means that the Son sees God by the grace of God, a.k.a . the beatific vision. The interface between the Father and the Son is actively maintained by the Father."



I think Arius was at variance with Tetulian.


Not in everything of course. However, it belonged to Tertullian, not Arius, to say, "There was, however, a time when neither sin existed with Him, nor the Son; the former of which was to constitute the Lord a Judge, and the latter a Father" (Adv. Herm. 3 (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0313.htm)).



In Tetullian's own words (Chapter XXI) "And so the supreme Head and Master of this grace and discipline, the Enlightener and Trainer of the human race, God's own Son, was announced among us, born-but not so born as to make Him ashamed of the name of Son or of His paternal origin...Christ is Spirit of Spirit, and God of God, as light of light is kindled. The material matrix remains entire and unimpaired, though you derive from it any number of shoots possessed of its qualities; so, too, that which has come forth out of God is at once God and the Son of God, and the two are one. In this way also, as He is Spirit of Spirit and God of God, He is made a second in manner of existence-in position, not in nature; and He did not withdraw from the original source, but went forth. This ray of God, then, as it was always foretold in ancient times, descending into a certain virgin, and made flesh in her womb, is in His birth God and man united."



This is vague. What does it mean to be "made a second in manner of existence--in position, not in nature" ? Tertullian even wrote that the Father and the Son are "one substance" but these expressions were not fixed in meaning. To understand what the ambiguous and isolated terms mean for the writers, we have to do so within the broader context of their writings. For most homousians, the nature of God implies full eternality etc, and yet Tertullian negated that when he said there was a time when the Son was not. His concept of what qualities go into the general nature of God vis a vis what is unique to God the Father is idifferent from the modern concept.





Arius went on to say "nothing which is called comprehensible does the Son know to speak about [God]; for it is impossible for Him to investigate the Father, who is by Himself. For the Son does not know His own essence, For, being Son, He really existed, at the will of the Father. What argument then allows, that He who is from the Father should know His own parent by comprehension? For it is plain that for that which hath a beginning to conceive how the Unbegun is, or to grasp the idea, is not possible."

I guess Arius wasn't big on A.Paul who said "the spirit searches all things, yea, the deep things of God...the natural man receive not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolish unto him, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned...For who has known the mind of the Lord, that he may instruct him? But we have the mind of Christ." (1 Cor 2:10-16).



Based on Romans 11:33 the "deep things of God" (τα βαθη του θεου) of 1 Cor. 2:10 may simply refer to God's purposes, counsels and judgments toward other things. It seems the knowability of such things is distinct from whether God in Himself is knowable to creatures.



Jesus said "I am the good shepherd, and know my sheep, and am known of mine. As the Father knoweth me, even so I know the Father; and I lay down my life for the sheep." (Jn 10:14-15).


There is another reading:


I am the good shepherd; and I know mine own, and mine own know me, even as the Father knoweth me, and I know the Father; and I lay down my life for the sheep.



I doubt Arius would have apealed to Origen. Arius' opponents could quote Origen to refute Arius' teaching from multiple directions.


This has nothing to do with why I quoted Origen. Your were quoting Newman quoting Athanasius which is cumulatively a very negative slant on Arius.


I quoted Origen to elucidate what Arius probably meant by describing the Son existing in innumerable epinoiai. I did not suggest Arius agreed with Origen in all ways.


Both sides can quote Origen when necessary. At the end of the day I still believe the "Arians", particularly the moderate ones such as Eusebius of Caesarea, had better claim to represent Origenistic thinking than the homousians, who seem to value Origen because of his teaching on eternal generation, not fully attending to the fact that for him the consequence was an eternal universe; Origen was within the basic paradigm of the Logos cosmology.




"(27) Further, the Only-begotten is the truth, because He embraces in Himself according to the Father's will the whole reason of all things, and that with perfect clearness, and being the truth communicates to each creature in proportion to its worthiness. And should any one enquire whether all that the Father knows, according to the depth of His riches and His wisdom and His knowledge, is known to our Saviour also, and should he, imagining that he will thereby glorify the Father, show that some things known to the Father are unknown to the Son, although He might have had an equal share of the apprehensions of the unbegotten God, we must remind him that it is from His being the truth that He is Saviour, and add that if He is the truth complete, then there is nothing true which He does not know; truth must not limp for the want of the things which, according to those persons, are known to the Father only. Or else let it be shown that some things are known to which the name of truth does not apply, but which are above the truth...(32) None of these testimonies, however, sets forth distinctly the Saviour's exalted birth; but when the words are addressed to Him, "Thou art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee," this is spoken to Him by God, with whom all time is to-day, for there is no evening with God, as I consider, and there is no morning, nothing but time that stretches out, along with His unbeginning and unseen life. The day is to-day with Him in which the Son was begotten, and thus the beginning of His birth is not found, as neither is the day of it...(42) As, then, from His activity in enlightening the world whose light He is, Christ is named the Light of the World, and as from His making those who sincerely attach themselves to Him put away their deadness and rise again and put on newness of life, He is called the Resurrection, so from an activity of another kind He is called Shepherd and Teacher, King and Chosen Shaft, and Servant, and in addition to these Paraclete and Atonement and Propitiation. And after the same fashion He is also called the Logos, because He takes away from us all that is irrational, and makes us truly reasonable, so that we do all things, even to eating and drinking, to the glory of God, and discharge by the Logos to the glory of God both the commoner functions of life and those which belong to a more advanced stage. For if, by having part in Him, we are raised up and enlightened, herded also it may be and ruled over, then it is clear that we become in a divine manner reasonable, when He drives away from us what in us is irrational and dead, since He is the Logos (reason) and the Resurrection.Consider, however, whether all men have in some way part in Him in His character as Logos."

Origen: Commentary on John, Book 1 (Roberts-Donaldson)
http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/text/origen-john1.html

Given Origen's paragraphs 27 & 32, it is evident that Arius' thoughts had a basis in a teaching that had a history in the Church from the late 2nd century, if not earlier - presumeably gnostic or ebionite.



Let us be circumspect about such presumptions. Nothing in Origen's text indicates that he is speaking of heretics.


Apparently some of these people were quite orthodox, very far from being Gnostics or Ebionites.


6. But, beyond reason inflated [with your own wisdom], ye presumptuously maintain that ye are acquainted with the unspeakable mysteries of God; while even the Lord, the very Son of God, allowed that the Father alone knows the very day and hour of judgment, when He plainly declares, "But of that day and that hour knoweth no man, neither the Son, but the Father only." If, then, the Son was not ashamed to ascribe the knowledge of that day to the Father only, but declared what was true regarding the matter, neither let us be ashamed to reserve for God those greater questions which may occur to us (St. Irenaeus, [i]Adv. Haer. 2.28.6 (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0103228.htm)).




Arius seems to follow this idea, but introduces his own opinion "Understand that the Monad was; but the Dyad was not, before it was in existence. It follows at once that, though the Son was not, the Father was God. Hence the Son, not being (for He existed at the will of the Father), is God Only-begotten, and He is alien from either. Wisdom existed as Wisdom by the will of the Wise God. Hence He is conceived in numberless conceptions: Spirit, Power, Wisdom, God's glory, Truth, Image, and Word. Understand that He is conceived to be Radiance and Light. One equal to the Son, the Superior is able to beget; but one more excellent, or superior, or greater, He is not able. At God's will the Son is what and whatsoever He is. And when and since He was, from that time He has subsisted from God. He, being a strong God, praises in His degree the Superior." (Arius Frag 2)

There is a lot of extra-biblical ideas in what he expounds. Possibly he was heavily influenced by the Alexandrian environment...



Possibly, but why bold "understand that He is conceived to be Radiance and Light"? Do you not conceive the Son to be radiance and light?



"Alexandria, like many burgeoning cities in the eastern Hellenistic world, was a riotously cosmopolitan city. Indian Buddhists in orange robes were seen in its vast marketplaces as far back as the first century. Persian magi, merchant Athenians, Roman tourists, Palestinian rabbis, Syrian ecstatics, Ethiopian emissaries, and other Africans from further south down the Nile crowded its grain markets and the stalls where the world's strange gifts could be bought and bartered.

Thus it can come as no surprise that Alexandria was a metropolis of mixture and blending, a place where culture held hands with culture, and where nothing stayed "pure" for long. Indeed, this blending of cultures, this easy syncretism in the urban Hellenistic Roman Empire, was especially visible in the public religious life of the people."

Arius in the Mirror: The Alexandrian Dissent And How It Is Reflected in Modern Unitarian Universalist Practice and Discourse by Mark Belletini, M. Div., D. D.
http://firstuucolumbus.org/sermons/ariuspaper.htm



I remember reading this a few years back and that it was a good article. Thank-you for the link.





I have reservations about Arius' phrase "perfect creature (ktisma) of God" as it could be understood in numerous ways. In the main though I find Arius' letter to Alexander reasonable.

"Our faith from our forefathers, which also we have learned from thee, Blessed Pope, is this:--We acknowledge One God, alone Ingenerate, alone Everlasting, alone Unbegun, alone True, alone having Immortality, alone Wise, alone Good, alone Sovereign; Judge, Governor, and Providence of all, unalterable and unchangeable, just and good, God of Law and Prophets and New Testament; who begat an Only-begotten Son before eternal times, through whom He has made both the ages and the universe; and begat Him, not in semblance, but in truth; He made Him subsist at His own will, unalterable and unchangeable; perfect creature (ktisma) of God, but not as one of the creatures; offspring, but not as one of things begotten; nor as Valentinus pronounced that the offspring of the Father was an issue nor as Mani taught that the offspring was a portion of the Father, one in essence (homoousion) or as Sabellius, dividing the Monad, speaks of a Sonfather nor as Hieracas, of one torch from another, or as a lamp divided into two nor that He who was before, was afterwards generated or new-created into a Son, as thou too thyself." (Arius Frag 3)

Arius' Letter to Alexander of Alexandria
http://www2.evansville.edu/ecoleweb/arians/arius2.htm



Yes, it seems to have achieved a semi-official status among so-called Arians in a way his other writings did not.



I think Arius' explanation is problematic. To Athanasius the Son is in perception (what has been revealed) the very action of the Father in creation, it is through the Son that all things are accomplished and therefore, from our perception, the Son is the very wisdom and power of God - which is what the scriptures say.


From our perception! But this is just what Arius said--"Wisdom existed as Wisdom [something we can appreciate; wisdom for us, cf. 1 Cor. 1:30] by the will of the Wise God. Hence He is conceived in numberless conceptions..." (Frag 2).




Arius went extra-biblical, he conceived there had to be two wisdoms, powers etc,


There is a power with God which can be distinguished from the Son inasmuch as it is αιδιος or eternal (ie. unbegotten; Rom. 1:20):


Jesus saith unto him, Thou hast said: nevertheless I say unto you, Hereafter shall ye see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of the Power, and coming in the clouds of heaven.


Hereafter shall the Son of man sit on the right hand of the power of God.


which is a neccessity if one conceives the Son as mutable.


In its basics this is the distinction between the Logos endiathetos or immanent Logos, and the Logos prophorikos. As per last post,

"...the distinction between the begotten and the immanent logos was an orthodox distinction common in the early fathers. St. Justin describes the relation between the immanent and the begotten Logos as that of one fire kindling another (Dial. Tryph. 61 (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/01283.htm); 128 (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/01284.htm)). Tatian, when he was still orthodox, probably explicating Justin's view, describes the "immanent" logos in terms of a "λογικη δυναμις" or Logos-power by virtue of which God generated the Son, his "εργον πρωτοτοκον" or firstborn work (Address to the Greeks, 5 (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0202.htm)). The principle is the same as Psalm 94:9: "He that formed the eye, shall he not see?" He that begat Wisdom is Wise (cf. Prov. 8:22-26)."


If the Father is unknowable, even by the Son, as Arius' did write "God is ineffable to His Son. For He is to Himself what He is, that is, unspeakable. So that nothing which is called comprehensible does the Son know to speak about" (Arius, Frag 2) then there is no way that we can draw to a relationship with God let alone become "perfect in one" with the Father and Son as Jesus prayed (Jn 17:23).


The unity is one of "power and disposition of unity of mind", Hippolytus Against Noetus 7 (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0521.htm).


The best I can derive from Arius, God is but a conception "For it is plain that for that which hath a beginning to conceive how the Unbegun is, or to grasp the idea, is not possible."


I do not think that is the best you can do toward understanding Arius. ;-)


Romans 1:20 refutes Arius' immediately "For the invisible things of [God] from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even the eternal power and Godhead"


The eastern church is serious in the belief that God is essentially unknowable.


In this regard at least, in his apophaticism, Arius was a chip off the block.


However, a distinction is observed between God in Himself (called 'essence'), and God in His energies/activities/workings, which are knowable. The distinction was certainly present in the fourth century; Eunomius used it much to his advantage.


However, Eunomius was diametrically opposed to both Airus and the Cappadocians on the knowability of God. He said that God, in Himself or in "Essence", is an absolutely knowable being. God is the most knowable of all beings for Eunomius.


This was refuted (or a refutation was at least attempted) using Romans 1:19:


Because because that which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath shewed [it] unto them.


"That which may be known" implies a "that which may not be known," or so the argument against Eunomius goes.


In orhtodoxy, God in Himself = unknowable. God in His energies/activities/works etc = knowable. This is actually the orthodox view, and there is no reason to think Arius held anything different. Dr. John McDowell, whose article we have discussed before, writes:



"Williams is on surer ground when identifying several points of striking correspondence between Philo and Arius:


i. a concern for divine freedom and grace, signalised by the insistence on a beginning for creation and on the mind’s need to be raised up by God;

ii. the idea of the Logos as essentially a mediator of God’s gifts and multiplicity, and also reflecting the divine simplicity.

iii. the austerely apophatic tone stressing the radical difference between knowing the transcendent God in his gifts and knowing him as he is;

iv. and the correlation of our incapacity to form a concept of our own ousia with our incapacity to know God’s ‘essence’" (Arius: A Theological Conservative Persecuted? (http://www.geocities.com/johnnymcdowell/Arius.htm)).



I anticipate you might say the "unknowable" part, even if true is irrelevant and not worth dwelling on to the extent that Arius did.


However, to the best of my understanding it is relevant, because this is a way we articulate to ourselves that the One we know by revelation as the Father is, in fact, God. You have said before you do not like the word "God" but I do not know another way to put it. He is not like a space man with super powers. He is not going to get wiped out by some greater cosmic entity. And in articulating what He would be like for these things to be true, we will not find better than the concepts of classical theism imo, including the fact that He is infinite, but not as an aggregate or quantitatively. And this is either humanly comprhensible or it is not. Back to either Eunomius and divine comprhensibility-in-essence, or Arius that this is not humanly comprehensible.


Arius:


What argument then allows, that He who is from the Father should know His own parent by comprehension? For it is plain that for that which hath a beginning to conceive how the Unbegun is, or to grasp the idea, is not possible (Frag 2).


He seems to have a point. :shrug:


A question that Arius fails to address (at least in the writings we do have): If God is ineffable, too great for words, how is it that "the only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, has explained him!" (Jn 1:18) ?


In explicating Arius it is useful to observe the orthodox essence/energy distinction. God in His energy(-ies) is what is exegeted by the Logos; and the Logos does so as a living icon of the activity or energy of God; "who gave subsistence to His glories together with Him" (Frag 3).


For she is the brightness of the everlasting light, the unspotted mirror of the power of God (του θεου ενεργειας), and the image of his goodness. And being but one, she can do all things: and remaining in herself, she maketh all things new: and in all ages entering into holy souls, she maketh them friends of God, and prophets.



Yours in Christ!

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

Thankyou for your response, you have given me much to think upon. And once I have thought upon your remarks (without any bias), I'll give a fuller response.

My primary objection to Arius: although he pronounced much we would agree upon, he introduced ideas more readily assimilated from Aristotle than from Cristianitiity. Whether or not this is a fair judgement is yet to be proved between us and all ;-)

Peace in Christ, and all the best

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

Sorry for the delay in replying. I needed to do some reflection on the thoughts in your last post.

To make this discussion manageable (at least for me ;-), I won't reply to your last post point by point, but give a general response which I hope covers most of the points you raised. For which I am most grateful, using them as a guide in my contemplations.

From time to time we have discussed Arianism, but it occurred to me we have never really discussed Arius' teaching (the little we actually know of it) and I must admit, like most, I had previously never made any attempt to understand him. But now, as a result of your indirect prompting, I have reread and thought on Arius (hopefully without bias) and compared him to earlier christian writers. Having done so, I concede, that it seems that in many respects he held "the faith and thought of the Church and of the sacred Scriptures" as he had written to Emperor Constantine.

In his letter to Constantine, Arius makes mention of "useless questions and disputes", which from things he says elsewhere, I perceive him to mean: How is the Son begotten? What does it mean that the Son was begotten? If so, and especially in this regard, I am in agreement with him.

Given what Arius wrote to Eusebius concerning "Philogonius, Hellanicus, and Macarius, who are unlearned men, and who have embraced heretical opinions. Some of them say that the Son is an eructation , others that He is a production, others that He is also unbegotten", imo Arius' starting point was that God did not have substance (actual physical/seeable bits) - which everyone seems to agree upon.

In his letter to Alexander, Arius lists all the heresies that he does not follow, concluding "But if the terms 'from Him,' and 'from the womb,' and 'I came forth from the Father, and I am come' (Rom. xi. 36; Ps. cx. 3; John xvi. 28) be understood by some to mean as if a part of Him, one in essence or as an issue, then the Father is according to them compounded and divisible and alterable and material, and, as far as their belief goes, has the circumstances of a body, Who is the incorporeal God." From this, I get the idea that Arius was hooked on words and like me, wasn't fond of applying abstract ideas to God. In some respect I feel this was a defect affecting his thinking - words can grow in meaning, all they require is clear definition and Arius doesn't seem to permit this.

Arius' conviction "there was a time the Son was not" is logical, simply by the fact that the Logos is called Son. Arius could easily appeal to the ANF, to such as Hippolytus, who a hundred or so years earlier had written "[God] was One, alone in Himself. By an excercise of His will He created things that are, which antecedently had no existence, except that He willed to make them".

To Arius' arguments, Athanasius asks "is it not a grievous error, to have material thoughts about what is immaterial, and because of the weakness of their proper nature to deny what is natural and proper to the Father?" Athanasius could have appealed to Hippolytus read more fully: "Therefore this solitary and supreme Deity, by an exercise of reflection, brought forth the Logos first; not the word in the sense of being articulated by voice, but as a ratiocination [reason] of the universe, conceived and residing in the divine mind. Him alone He produced from existing things; for the Father Himself constituted existence, and the being born from Him was the cause of all things that are produced...The Logos alone of this God is from God himself; wherefore also the Logos is God, being the substance of God." I'll assume Hippolytus wasn't meaning substance in the usual sence but as essence. As I understand it, the terms were often used interchangeably.

One idea of Arius that baffles me is "the Word...what He knows and what He sees, He knows and sees `in proportion to His own measure,' as we also know according to our own power." I guess it is possible Athanasius misquots/misinterprets the Thalia. Athanasius says that Arius "[maintains] that the Son is distinct by Himself, and in no respect partaker of the Father." If all Arius means is that the Son isn't a part of the person of the Father, I'd agree. But according to Athanasius, Arius goes beyond this saying "For the Son...not only knows not the Father exactly, for He fails in comprehension, but `He knows not even His own essence;'-and that `the essences of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost, are separate in nature, and [b]estranged, and disconnected, and alien, and without participation of each other." In a concept of physicality this would have to be considered very true, but otherwise it goes against scripture and the ANFs...

Origen gives a view that I find agreeable...

"But these assertions will perhaps be held to have little by those whose desire is to be instructed out of the Holy Scriptures in the things of God, and who require that from that source should be drawn the proof of the preïminence of the nature of God over that of the human body. Consider whether the Apostle does not say the same thing when he speaks thus of Christ: “Who is the image of the invisible God, the first born of every creature.” The nature of God is not, as some think, visible to some and not to others, for the Apostle does not say The image of God who is invisible to men, or to sinners; but he speaks quite distinctly of the nature of God in itself, where he says “The image of the invisible God.” John also says in his Gospel, “No man hath seen God at any time,” by which he distinctly declares: to all who can understand, that there is no being to whom God is visible; not as if he were naturally visible and, like a being of attenuated substance, escaped and eluded our glance; but that, in his own nature it is impossible for him to be seen. But perhaps you will ask me my opinion as to the Only begotten himself. Well, if I should say that even to [the Son] the nature of God is invisible, since it is its very nature to be invisible, do not dismiss my answer as if it were impious or absurd, for I will at once give you my reason for it. Observe that seeing is a different thing from knowing. Seeing and being seen belong to bodies; to know and to be known belong to the intellectual nature. Whatever then is merely a property of bodies, this we must not attribute to the Father or the Son; but that which belongs to the nature of Deity governs the relations of the Father and the Son. Moreover, Christ himself in the Gospel did not say “No man seeth the Son but the Father nor the Father but the Son,” but “No man knoweth the Son but the Father, neither doth any one know the Father but the Son.” By this it is clearly shown that what is called seeing and being seen in the case of bodily existence is called knowledge in the case of the Father and the Son: their intercourse is maintained through the power of knowledge not through the weakness of visibility. Since, therefore, an incorporeal nature cannot properly be said to see or to be seen, therefore in the Gospel it is not said either that the Father is seen by the Son or the Son by the Father but that each is known by the other. And if any one should ask how it is that it is said “Blessed are the pure in heart for they shall see God,” I think that this text will confirm my assertion still more. For what else is it to see God with the heart than, according to the explanation I have given above, to understand Him with the mind and to know Him?”


Alam, thankyou for providing the counter to the KJV (ie: ASV) rendering of Jn 10:14-15. Imo it provides an interesting basis for exegesis. If it is to be read as the Son only knows the Father as sheep to shepherd. Then we might consider that if the sheep have the mind of the sheperd (1 Cor 2:16), then the Son has the mind of the Father ;-)

Last post, you mentioned "Based on Romans 11:33 the "deep things of God" (ta ßa?? t?? ?e??) of 1 Cor. 2:10 may simply refer to God's purposes, counsels and judgments toward other things. It seems the knowability of such things is distinct from whether God in Himself is knowable to creatures." I concur with your interpretation of Rom 11:33, as this seems the primary revelation of scripture - God is "a revealer of secrets" (Dan 2:22,28,29,47) and there is nothing that "shall not be known" (Matt 10:26) concerning the fullfilment of the salvation plan. However, 1 Cor 2:10, in the context of vs6-9, doesn't seem to limit our "spiritual knowledge" of God. Especially as read in the NEB "For the Spirit explores everything, even the depths of God's own nature." Logically, we may be limited in our comprehension or expression of God's might, power and other attributes but A.Paul suggests such inquiries are for those with a fleshly mindset. In contrast, those not of the flesh but of the spirit search out the spiritual things of God.


Last post you mentioned "The eastern church is serious in the belief that God is essentially unknowable." True. But it is their context which is of interest...

"There is only one Source of Divinity outside of time in the Godhead and within time in creation and that is the Father. We believe that God in His essence is unknowable and we must respect, therefore, the Mystery which is God. On the other hand God made Himself known in the Law and the Prophets and then perfectly and uniquely in the Incarnation, Life, Death and Resurrection of Christ. He continues to reveal Himself consistently by the Holy Spirit. God may, therefore, be known realistically and personally by His communicated energies which are uncreated and from Himself."

What do Orthodox Christians Believe?
http://www.antiochian-orthodox.co.uk/orthodox_christian_faith.htm

I will stop here for now. Here are the links to the quotes above.


Athanasius, Discourse I
http://biblestudy.churches.net/CCEL/FATHERS2/NPNF204/NPNF2066.HTM

Hippolytus, Refutation of all Heresies, Book 10, Chapters xxviii & xxix
http://www.ccel.org/fathers2/ANF-05/anf05-14.htm#P2309_744389

Arius, Fragments (also see Athanasius' Discourse I)
http://home.zonnet.nl/chotki/fragments%20from%20arius.htm

Origen, Explanation of the words “The Son does not see the Father.”
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf203.vi.xi.ii.xviii.html?bcb=0

Origen, Commentary on John, Book 1 (Roberts-Donaldson)
http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/text/origen-john1.html

Peace and all the best, in Jesus the Christ.


ps.

I think Arius' explanation is problematic. To Athanasius, the Son is in perception (what has been revealed) the very action of the Father in creation, it is through the Son that all things are accomplished and therefore, from our perception, the Son is the very wisdom and power of God - which is what the scriptures say.From our perception! But this is just what Arius said--"Wisdom existed as Wisdom [something we can appreciate; wisdom for us, cf. 1 Cor. 1:30] by the will of the Wise God. Hence He is conceived in numberless conceptions..." (Frag 2).Fragment 6 is more precise in what Arius meant...

"there are two wisdoms, first, the attribute co-existent with God, and next, that in this wisdom the Son was originated, and was only named Wisdom and Word as partaking of it. For Wisdom, saith he, by the will of the wise God, had its existence in Wisdom. In like manner, that there is another Word in God besides the Son, and that the Son again, as partaking of it, is named Word and Son according to grace."

On face value I could go along with that. Even Athanasius calls the Son "Wisdom Only-begotten". I think the thought that there are two wisdoms is a bit problematical. I'd phrase it "there are two minds, but one wisdom". The Father endowing the Son with his wisdom. Which might accord with Arius' "Wise is God, for He is the teacher of Wisdom." (Frag 2)

Romans 1:20 would suggests there can only be one wisdom. Taking Arius literally, all we experience is the Son's wisdom, and believe it is a reflection of the Father's. I guess Arius' would have appealed to Heb 1:3 and explained, "Ah, but it is an exact replica of the Father's, as would my image in a mirror be of me." Which I find acceptable.

pss:

Arius in Frag 2 says "Thus there is a Triad...Foreign from the Son in essence is the Father, for He is without beginning." It seems Arius has essence requiring all properties - which might assume that for the Son to participate in the essence of the Father he'd have to derive the attribute of unoriginate. To me that seems plainly silly. In essence, I am a man, but my Father, also a man, proceeded me. Arius used "a father precedes a son" to illustrate the "there was a time, the Son was not". I can only assume Arius believed that any son does not have the same essence as his father or he uses essence in a unique way.

In an earlier post you made a passing remark about Alexander/Athanasius teaching a begotten-unbegotten. Reading Athanasius he was talking about potential and kenetic begetals. He responds to Arius' logic that "a father precedes a son" by making reference to Levi "For Levi too was already in the loins of his great-grandfather, before his own actual generation, or that of his grandfather. When then the man comes to that age at which nature supplies the power, immediately, with nature, unrestrained, he becomes father of the son from himself." Athanasius goes on to say "the divine generation must not be compared to the nature of men, nor the Son considered to be part of God, nor the generation to imply any passion whatever; God is not as man; for men beget passibly, having a transitive nature, which waits for periods by reason of its weakness. But with God this cannot be; for He is not composed of parts, but being impassible and simple, He is impassibly and indivisibly Father of the Son...a work is external to the nature, but a son is the proper offspring of the essence; it follows that a work need not have been always, for the workman frames it when he will; but an offspring is not subject to will, but is proper to the essence...what is proper to [the Father's] essence must always be; and this is His Word and His Wisdom."

(Discource I, Chapter 8)

[alam]

Greetings Apostoli,


Thank you for your response; you have also given me some things to think about. God willing, I will respond soon. Thank you for your kind comments regarding my initial response. Having read it again, its tone seems more combative than I intended or the circumstances called for. If you took any offense from that, I am sorry.


It might be worthwhile to make another observation about Arianism in the fourth century. An underlying issue was whether the trinity exists by God's nature or by His will. For example, we as human beings breathe by nature; breathing is involuntary (thanks to God). That does not mean we breath against our will--for the most part we are both willing and glad to breath--but it does mean that someone who willed to stop breathing would fail, at least once they had blacked out.


For homousianism, even the pluralistic kinds, the relation of God to the generation is like this. Most would add that unlike our involuntary breathing, God could not will against the generation even in principle, just as He could not will to cease being God; the generation is something more basic to God than His will: antecedent to His will.


For "Arianism", the generation is posterior (in whatever sense) to God's will; it occurs at His will. This is where Arianism parts ways with Origen (if I understand Origen correctly, which is not guaranteed), and follows Justin Martyr (as well as Philo and others):


"I shall give you another testimony, my friends, from the Scriptures, that God begat before all creatures a Beginning, [who was] a certain rational power [proceeding] from Himself, who is called by the Holy Spirit, now the Glory of the Lord, now the Son, again Wisdom, again an Angel, then God, and then Lord and Logos; and on another occasion He calls Himself Captain, when He appeared in human form to Joshua the son of Nave (Nun). For He can be called by all those names, since He ministers to the Father's will, and since He was begotten of the Father by an act of will; just as we see happening among ourselves: for when we give out some word, we beget the word; yet not by abscission, so as to lessen the word [which remains] in us, when we give it out: and just as we see also happening in the case of a fire, which is not lessened when it has kindled [another], but remains the same; and that which has been kindled by it likewise appears to exist by itself, not diminishing that from which it was kindled. The Word of Wisdom, who is Himself this God begotten of the Father of all things, and Word, and Wisdom, and Power, and the Glory of the Begetter, will bear evidence to me, when He speaks by Solomon the following: 'If I shall declare to you what happens daily, I shall call to mind events from everlasting, and review them. The Lord made me the beginning of His ways for His works...." (Justin, Dial Tryph. 61 (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/01283.htm)).

Again,

"And that this power which the prophetic word calls God, as has been also amply demonstrated, and Angel, is not numbered [as different] in name only like the light of the sun but is indeed something numerically distinct, I have discussed briefly in what has gone before; when I asserted that this power was begotten from the Father, by His power and will, but not by abscission, as if the essence of the Father were divided; as all other things partitioned and divided are not the same after as before they were divided: and, for the sake of example, I took the case of fires kindled from a fire, which we see to be distinct from it, and yet that from which many can be kindled is by no means made less, but remains the same" (Justin, Dial Tryph. 128 (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/01284.htm)).

It is tempting to say this was the fundamental issue of the Arian controversy, but that wouldn't quite be true. Nevertheless it is hard to overestimate its importance. Eunomius went so far as to regard God's title "Father" as synonymous with God's Will.

The spiritual value that is strengthened by emphasizing God's will is Grace, Kharis. Thus this is also very important to Arianism, and to previous thinking in that tradition.

The opposing concept, which sees the generation as antecedent to God's will (in the sense described above) is platonic in that it coincides with "the Hellenistic insight that the Good must be in some sense self-sharing" (Fr. John Hopko, "The Trinity in the Cappadocians", Christian Spirituality: Origins to the Twelfth Century; McGinn and Meyendorff eds; Crossroad New York, 1996; p. 266).

"God must express himself to be God. And he must do so divinely, according to nature, and not merely by his goodwill. He must do so in a manner befitting his majesty and glory, an ineffable and incomprehensible manner appropriate to his Godhead. The creation of the world cannot possibly satisfy the essential need of God for perfect self-expression" (ibid.).

God must in some sense eternally communicate Himself. If He did not, He would not be God. His doing so via the generation is no more conditioned upon His will than His being God is conditioned upon His will..

Both of these were eastern views and more or less pluralistic. The former, as I understand it, was more Jewish (via Philo), the latter, more typically Greek.

In addition to these, there was a so-called Western view most fully represented by Modalism, which fits into neither of the above schemes, inasmuch as it was not pluralistic. Some would say it also was Jewish (monarchian), others that it was pagan. Personally I don't care. ;-)

Through homousianism, the more Greek view (via the Cappadocians) made an uneasy alliance with the Western view (as mediated by Augustine and others) to put down the former view, whose adherents came to be called Arians after Arius. In the end, the alliance broke down over the difference of pluralism (shared with the Arians) versus monism, as represented in the Filioque dispute- Photius calling the Western view "semi-Sabellianism," and Westerners sometimes still thinking the Eastern trinity resembles tritheism. What happened was that in its opposition to the Visigothic Arianism, the West took a more radical monistic stance than the East could accept.

To be accurate to reality it is necessary to blur these lines: sometimes quite a lot. These are simply three angles that explain much of went on in the fourth century. Other non-muutually-excluding templates could be applied.

Yours in Christ,

[alam]

A correction/ addendum to above: the reference for Photius' assertion.

Such in outline are the positions taken up by either side; let us now consider the Orthodox objections to the western position. The filioque leads either to ditheism or to semi-Sabellianism (Sabellius, a heretic of the second century, regarded Father, Son, and Spirit not as three distinct persons, but simply as varying ‘modes’ or ‘aspects’ of the deity). If the Son as well as the Father is an arche, a principle or source of Godhead, are there then (the Orthodox asked) two independent sources, two separate principles in the Trinity? Obviously not, since this would be tantamount to belief in two Gods; and so the Reunion Councils of Lyons (1274) and Florence (1438-1439) were most careful to state that the Spirit proceeds from Father and Son ‘as from one principle,’ tanquam ex (or ab) uno principio. From the Orthodox point of view, however, this is equally objectionable: ditheism is avoided, but the persons of Father and Son are merged and confused. The Cappadocians regarded the ‘monarchy’ as the distinctive characteristic of the Father: He alone is a principle or arche within the Trinity. But western theology ascribes the distinctive characteristic of the Father to the Son as well, thus fusing the two persons into one; and what else is this but ‘Sabellius reborn, or rather some semi-Sabellian monster,’ as Saint Photius put it? (P.G. [Migne, Patrologia Graeca] 102, 289B) (Kallistos Ware, The Orthodox Church (http://www.fatheralexander.org/booklets/english/history_timothy_ware_2.htm)).


In the above post I was just thinking out loud (sometimes not a good practice), not at all attempting to dictate a paradigm. Within a couple days, God willing, I will respond to your post.

All the best!

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

Thankyou for the last post and the synopsis on 4th century views.

Having read [my last post] again, its tone seems more combative than I intended or the circumstances called for. If you took any offense from that, I am sorry.It is understandable given the tedium of the subject. The "Oh, not again" response which is natural to us. My Syrian studies have made me reinvestigate the 4th century but from a different perspective.

Never fear of offending me. I do not hold that I am right on anything but in discussions like ours one needs to have an opinion - otherwise we'd get strained neck muscles from all the nodding ;-)

If at anytime I seem antagonistic, say a prayer for me. It is only the result of the effort of inquiry, possibly my frustration in thoughts conflicted or frustration of those of my thoughts that lack adequate expression, or physical infirmity, rather than some closed mindset.

In the above post I was just thinking out loud (sometimes not a good practice), not at all attempting to dictate a paradigm. Within a couple days, God willing, I will respond to your post.No hurry. I appreciate the difficulties of time.

In the below, I'm just thinking aloud. In the following, please consider my reply/thoughts as universal and not personal. But if you find something of interest your response would be most welcome.


In your last post you noted "It might be worthwhile to make another observation about Arianism in the fourth century. An underlying issue was whether the trinity exists by God's nature or by His will." Possibly, this is a subject that Arius would have put in the category of "useless questions and disputes" ;-)

I had a think on the view that "the generation is posterior (in whatever sense) to God's will".

Obviously something cannot become, if it already is, but it can change states and/or form (eg: the incarnation). Activity (will) is posterior to some passive state, so I guess to hold the "Arian" view, there are times when God does not do anything. I guess the key is in the word "generation". A craftsman usually has a perpetual will to generate, though at times he may be passive, but his creation is usually conceived in the mind before he actually does anything.

I also had a think on the view that "the generation is...antecedent to His will".

Given my example of the craftsman, if "will" is taken as physically bringing something into being, this view is particularly valid, as the craftsman first conceived his creation in his mind. As an example: Does a building come into existence once it is built, once the plans are drawn or at the time the architect conceived it? I guess it is a matter of perspective depending on whether you are the architect, the builder or the buildings owner.

My opinion would be: God in essence/nature is love and all things he does (wills) is by/in love. So to my mind the Trinity is both implicit (potential - in God's mind) and explicit (kenetic - God in action).

As an observation, there is, imo, nothing in scripture or the creeds to preclude the Spirit as proceeding in the begetal of the Son. In the usual formula: the Spirit proceeds from the Father but the Son is begotten of the Father. Tertullian, Against Praxeas (Chapter 8), suggested "But the Word was formed by the Spirit." Mind you, Tertullian seems to identify the Spirit in various senses but in this regards (Chapter 7) he says "Do you then, (you ask) grant that the Word is a certain substance, constructed by the Spirit and the communication of Wisdom? Certainly I do but..."
http://www.ccel.org/fathers2/ANF-03/anf03-43.htm

I also thought on the view "the generation is something more basic to God than His will" and it occurred to me that predisposition and motivation are pre-determinate/pre-existent to will. The question arises: was God motivated by a need to reveal his wisdom and power (a negative) or was his motivation to reveal his love in wisdom and power (a positive)?


I perceive the "Arians" as getting carried away with anthromorphizing everything.

As I understand it, regarding the Spirit, the Anomoeans (but via Gregory of Nyssa maybe not earlier/other Arians (see below)) argued from the premise that if the Spirit is a thing/person then he must have been created by the Son (for obvious reasons). To which I quote Athanasius: "is it not a grievous error, to have material thoughts about what is immaterial, and...deny what is natural and proper to the Father?" Which I admit is a bit of a non response, so I'll try to explain...

If the Son is a creature, and all other things were made by him, and the Spirit is also a creature, then it is obvious that the Spirit was created by the Son. However, scripture plainly shows that we receive the Spirit from the Father, albeit through (because of) the Son (and imo this can't be construed as a metaphor). The obvious solution to this conflict, is the opinion, that the Spirit is not a thing/person but the power, active force of the Father. However, in scripture, the Spirit is given a personality in accord but distinct from the Father. For me: The conflicts are soon resolved by thinking of the divine activity in the salvation plan and the two things we are told about the Father = he is spirit and he is love. Which draws me to a conclusion that in the immaterial/spiritual realm the Son and the Spirit are distinct from the Father but also "natural and proper to the Father".

Gregory of Nyssa - Against Eunomius (p56, para 2)
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2901.htm


"The whole controversy, then, between the Church and the Anomoeans turns on this: Are we to regard the Son and the Holy Spirit as belonging to created or uncreated existence? Our opponent declares that to be the case which all deny: he boldly lays it down, without looking about for any proof, that each being is the work of the preceding being. What method of education, what school of thought can warrant him in this, it is difficult to see...it is a truly blind and unsupported statement to say that the Creator and Maker of all things is a creature made and to this they link on a conclusion that is also blind: namely, that the Son is alien in nature unlike in being to the Father, and quite devoid of His essential character."


It is tempting to say this was the fundamental issue of the Arian controversy, but that wouldn't quite be true. Nevertheless it is hard to overestimate its importance. Eunomius went so far as to regard God's title "Father" as synonymous with God's Will.Gregory of Nyssa says (p51) "He did wrong, when mentioning life Doctrines of Salvation, in adopting
terms of his own choosing instead of the traditional terms Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The reason for this invention of new words I take to be manifest to every one--namely: that every one, when the words father and son are spoken, at once
recognizes the proper and natural relationship to one another".

Alam, I couldn't locate where Eunomius does this. Could you guide me to a source.

in Eunomius' First Apology he gives an interesting perspective...

"XXIV. Wherefore if the Word of God demonstrates that his Will is his Operation, and not that his Substance is such; and that the Only-begotten subsisted by the Will of the Father; 'tis certainly necessary that the Son preserve this Likeness, not as to Substance, but as to Operation, which is also his Will. Whence also we ought to be persuaded to preserve that true Notion of his being his Father's Image, which the blessed Apostle Paul declar'd, when he said, Who is the Image of the Invisible God, the first-born of every Creature; for in him were all things created, both things in Heaven, and things on Earth, visible and invisible.9 For therefore is he call'd, The Image of God. Now these words, All things were created in him, together with the Appellation of the First-born, do not give us the Character of an Unbegotten Substance : for here is nothing about Substance, but about that Operation whereby he, as a Son, performs all things. The Expression of Image does not bear any resemblance to the Substance, but to that Operation which was hidden, without any Generation, in God's Foreknowledge, even before the Constitution of the Son, and of those things which were created in him. For who is there that knowing the Only-begotten himself, and considering that all things, were made by him, will not acknowledg that he at once contemplates the whole Power of the Father?"

http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/eunomius_apology01.htm



God must in some sense eternally communicate Himself. If He did not, He would not be God.Except to himself ;-)

His doing so [communicating himself] via the generation is no more conditioned upon His will than His being God is conditioned upon His will.This seems highly speculative.

I respect the opinion that within the limits of language, "God" is the universal word by which we refer to him. But it is a word constrained by the fact that their are many gods around and so, we must be careful not to confuse speculation on them, with what has been revealed regarding the one true God, the Father of Jesus the Christ.

A view I might take: a god can only come to exist once there is some intelligence that can perceive him as such. That is to say: the eternal, superior, unoriginate Being, communicated himself to us, using our conceptions of gods, to prove himself to be the only true God. Thus guiding men away from the god/s they created in their imaginations. To Moses, YHWH didn't declare himself to be God, but revealed himself to be the god of Moses ancestors, in opposition to the various gods of the nations. The simple definition he gave to Moses of himself is "I shall prove to be" (NWT) / "I am that I am" (KJV). To the Israelites, this god was just another god, but at least their fore-fathers god, and seemed to view him, as just another god, not unlike the Egyptian gods. YHWH had to reveal himself as The God! (Ex 32:1; 19:9)

With this in mind, I'd suggest, that there are preconditions to the will of God (eg: motivation). We only know his existence from the things he makes manifest and we only know his will by his direct guidance (the Law, prophets, Jesus, the Spirit) and we only pay attention because his motivation is revealed.

One might take the view that the will and the manifestation are the same thing, each a condition of the other. In clearer terms: when God wills, it happens, simultaneously. And so, it might be said, that God doesn't will unless he wants to reveal himself (even if only to himself). In my opinion, it is not the fact that God wills, but why he wills, that is important to us.

Another view might be: God doesn't will as such, but loves. God loving, is, God willing.

[alam]

Hi Apostoli:

Hello Alam,

Sorry for the delay in replying. I needed to do some reflection on the thoughts in your last post.

To make this discussion manageable (at least for me ;-), I won't reply to your last post point by point, but give a general response which I hope covers most of the points you raised.
Point by point responses get unmanageable quickly. Unfortunately this will be another one. I do not expect you to have to respond in kind. Next week is another busy one for me, and so after the weekend will have to delay responses a bit.

Having done so, I concede, that it seems that in many respects he held "the faith and thought of the Church and of the sacred Scriptures" as he had written to Emperor Constantine.
Glad to hear it. :-)

In his letter to Constantine, Arius makes mention of "useless questions and disputes", which from things he says elsewhere, I perceive him to mean: How is the Son begotten? What does it mean that the Son was begotten?
If so then he conceded too much. If the meaning of the Son's generation is a useless question, then it could mean anything, or nothing. But the question of "how" he was begotten, in the sense of a descriptive account like the Gnostics gave for their emanations, should be rejected. Again Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. 2.28.6 (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0103228.htm).

c. 319, Eusebius of Nicomedia wrote,

"We believe that the mode of His beginning not only cannot be expressed by words but even in thought, and is incomprehensible not only to man, but also to all beings superior to man" (Letter to Paulinus (http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf203.iv.viii.i.vi.html)).

He describes the generation in mostly negative terms- what it is not.

Given what Arius wrote to Eusebius concerning "Philogonius, Hellanicus, and Macarius, who are unlearned men, and who have embraced heretical opinions. Some of them say that the Son is an eructation , others that He is a production, others that He is also unbegotten", imo Arius' starting point was that God did not have substance (actual physical/seeable bits) - which everyone seems to agree upon.
Yes.

In his letter to Alexander, Arius lists all the heresies that he does not follow, concluding "But if the terms 'from Him,' and 'from the womb,' and 'I came forth from the Father, and I am come' (Rom. xi. 36; Ps. cx. 3; John xvi. 28) be understood by some to mean as if a part of Him, one in essence or as an issue, then the Father is according to them compounded and divisible and alterable and material, and, as far as their belief goes, has the circumstances of a body, Who is the incorporeal God." From this, I get the idea that Arius was hooked on words and like me, wasn't fond of applying abstract ideas to God. In some respect I feel this was a defect affecting his thinking - words can grow in meaning, all they require is clear definition and Arius doesn't seem to permit this.
It may be.

Arius' conviction "there was a time the Son was not" is logical, simply by the fact that the Logos is called Son. Arius could easily appeal to the ANF, to such as Hippolytus, who a hundred or so years earlier had written "[God] was One, alone in Himself. By an excercise of His will He created things that are, which antecedently had no existence, except that He willed to make them".
Yes. But it is better to observe Arius' words, "there was when he was not" rather than "there was a time when he was not." Arius did not mean there was time before time. For Arius the Son existed for all time, "before eternal times" (* (http://home.zonnet.nl/chotki/fragments%20from%20arius.htm); Gk.: "προ χρονων αιωνιων", cf. 2 Tim. 1:9); the "was" when he "was not" is the same as presupposed by people when we speak of God decreeing something "before time." It is a figure of speech. It was Arius' way of expressing the ontological priority of God to the Monogenes.

To Arius' arguments, Athanasius asks "is it not a grievous error, to have material thoughts about what is immaterial, and because of the weakness of their proper nature to deny what is natural and proper to the Father?" Athanasius could have appealed to Hippolytus read more fully: "Therefore this solitary and supreme Deity, by an exercise of reflection, brought forth the Logos first; not the word in the sense of being articulated by voice, but as a ratiocination [reason] of the universe, conceived and residing in the divine mind. Him alone He produced from existing things; for the Father Himself constituted existence, and the being born from Him was the cause of all things that are produced...The Logos alone of this God is from God himself; wherefore also the Logos is God, being the substance of God." I'll assume Hippolytus wasn't meaning substance in the usual sence but as essence. As I understand it, the terms were often used interchangeably.
In the early fathers there is no clear view about the relation of other beings to God's substance/essence. In his Against Noetus vii Hippolutus seems to reject that the Father and the Son are one "substance".

7. If, again, he [Noetus] allege His own word when He said, "I and the Father are one," let him attend to the fact, and understand that He did not say, "I and the Father am one, but are one." For the word are is not said of one person, but it refers to two persons, and one power. He has Himself made this clear, when He spake to His Father concerning the disciples, "The glory which Thou gavest me I have given them; that they may be one, even as we are one: I in them, and Thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one; that the world may know that Thou hast sent me." What have the Noetians to say to these things? Are alI one body in respect of substance (κατα την ουσιαν), or is it that we become one in the power and disposition of unity of mind? (* (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0521.htm))

Hippolytus may have believed that although the Son came from the Father's essence, he is now a second essence, much as a fire kindled from a fire, per Justin, is a second fire.

Irenaeus writes,

For with Him were always present the Word and Wisdom, the Son and the Spirit, by whom and in whom, freely and spontaneously, He made all things, to whom also He speaks, saying, "Let Us make man after Our image and likeness;" He taking from Himself the substance of the creatures [formed] (ipse a semetipso substantiam creaturarum... accipiens), and the pattern of things made, and the type of all the adornments in the world (Adversus Haereses iv. 20. 1 (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0103420.htm)).

Even so, not long after St Hippolytus' death, the Council of Antioch c. 260 ruled that the Son is of differing essence from the Father (* (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07449a.htm)). The picture I get of the period is that there was a lack of consensus on the meaning of 'essence' language. There is no telling that when Arius denied that the Son participates in the essence of the Father he was talking about the same thing as earlier writers.

For him, the ex-nihilo origin of the Son just meant, "the Son is not unbegotten nor part of the Unbegotten; and that He does not derive his subsistence from any matter," and again, "He is neither part of God, nor of any [prior] essential being" (Letter to Eusebius (http://www2.evansville.edu/ecoleweb/arians/arius1.htm)).

In defense of the ex-nihilo doctrine Eunomius somewhere said that although an ex-nihilo generation is counterintuitive, creating something ex-nihilo is also counterintuitive- we are used to there always being a previous substance which undergoes a transformation, whether through biological generation, or through human labor. For Eunomius, and for Arius, I think the purpose of the "ex-nihilo" doctrine was to assert that God can beget and create without need of a formal cause.

Fwiw, I disagree with Arius and Eunomius that the Son is begotten ex-nihilo.

One idea of Arius that baffles me is "the Word...what He knows and what He sees, He knows and sees `in proportion to His own measure,' as we also know according to our own power."
"What logic then permits the one who is from a Father to know by comprehension the one who begot him?" (Thalia, A New Eusebius, Stevenson & Frends eds., p. 331). The Son knows/sees in proportion to his power of understanding. His power is incalculably greater than that of any other, but falls short of "comprehension" of God. There is a saying that what a person comprehends becomes finite to him--he encompasses or encircles it with his mind. Arius thought the Son cannot do this when it comes to the Father.

I guess it is possible Athanasius misquots/misinterprets the Thalia. Athanasius says that Arius "[maintains] that the Son is distinct by Himself, and in no respect partaker of the Father." If all Arius means is that the Son isn't a part of the person of the Father, I'd agree.
That is probably what he meant..

But according to Athanasius, Arius goes beyond this saying "For the Son...not only knows not the Father exactly, for He fails in comprehension, but `He knows not even His own essence;'
To comprehend himself, a person would have to mentally encompass himself, take a fully objective view of himself, a view like God's view. We cannot do this, we cannot transcend ourselves in that way. According to Arius, neither does the Son.

-and that `the essences of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost, are separate in nature, and [b]estranged, and disconnected, and alien, and without participation of each other." In a concept of physicality this would have to be considered very true, but otherwise it goes against scripture and the ANFs...
It is true that for Arius the trinity consists of three very distinct members in a descending order, a vertical trinity. For him they are essentially incomparable to one another.

The question of what justifies describing such different beings as a "Father" and "Son" may not have occurred to him. According to Harnack, for Arius begettal and creation were synonyms (History of Dogma vol. iv. p.15). He would have thought that in a universal sense it is obvious that God is the Father of all rational beings, at least those within His will. The great original exemplar of such beings is the Monogenes, who is thus the Son par excellence.

Perhaps Arius' boldness in stressing the difference of God and Christ stemmed from his purpose to deny and refute modalism. His lack of inhibition against what may seem to be an exaggerated view of their difference suggests that he was in a different frame of mind on this subject. He probably found it likely and natural, given the scriptures (eg. Psalm 27:10; 68:5; 103:13), that the Most High Source of being should be described in parental or fatherly terms. If Psalm 82:6 etc is true of inferior beings, it must also be true of the Logos, Qal waHomer. God is wise, good and gracious, and as the Source of all being, in some sense all beings may ultimately regard Him as Father (cf. Acts 17:28). For Arius, even the ineffability of God is expressed in the context of His fatherhood:

What logic then permits the one who is from a Father to know by comprehension the one who begot him?
For clearly for what has a beginning to encompass by thought or apprehension the one who is unbegun, is impossible (A New Eusebius ibid.).

He sees the munificence of God revealed in the Son, to whom God gave "the inheritance of all things" (Letter to Alexander). He wrote,

One equal to the Son the Supreme is able to beget,
but more excellent, superior or greater he cannot (ibid.).

God made the Son so great that none greater is possible. The simple fact remains that God does not "deprive Himself of what he has ingenerately in Himself; for he is the Fountain of all things" (frag 3).

Origen gives a view that I find agreeable...

"But these assertions will perhaps be held to have little by those whose desire is to be instructed out of the Holy Scriptures in the things of God, and who require that from that source should be drawn the proof of the preïminence of the nature of God over that of the human body. Consider whether the Apostle does not say the same thing when he speaks thus of Christ: “Who is the image of the invisible God, the first born of every creature.” The nature of God is not, as some think, visible to some and not to others, for the Apostle does not say The image of God who is invisible to men, or to sinners; but he speaks quite distinctly of the nature of God in itself, where he says “The image of the invisible God.” John also says in his Gospel, “No man hath seen God at any time,” by which he distinctly declares: to all who can understand, that there is no being to whom God is visible; not as if he were naturally visible and, like a being of attenuated substance, escaped and eluded our glance; but that, in his own nature it is impossible for him to be seen. But perhaps you will ask me my opinion as to the Only begotten himself. Well, if I should say that even to [the Son] the nature of God is invisible, since it is its very nature to be invisible, do not dismiss my answer as if it were impious or absurd, for I will at once give you my reason for it. Observe that seeing is a different thing from knowing. Seeing and being seen belong to bodies; to know and to be known belong to the intellectual nature. Whatever then is merely a property of bodies, this we must not attribute to the Father or the Son; but that which belongs to the nature of Deity governs the relations of the Father and the Son. Moreover, Christ himself in the Gospel did not say “No man seeth the Son but the Father nor the Father but the Son,” but “No man knoweth the Son but the Father, neither doth any one know the Father but the Son.” By this it is clearly shown that what is called seeing and being seen in the case of bodily existence is called knowledge in the case of the Father and the Son: their intercourse is maintained through the power of knowledge not through the weakness of visibility. Since, therefore, an incorporeal nature cannot properly be said to see or to be seen, therefore in the Gospel it is not said either that the Father is seen by the Son or the Son by the Father but that each is known by the other. And if any one should ask how it is that it is said “Blessed are the pure in heart for they shall see God,” I think that this text will confirm my assertion still more. For what else is it to see God with the heart than, according to the explanation I have given above, to understand Him with the mind and to know Him?”
This seems to be an excellent teaching.

Alam, thankyou for providing the counter to the KJV (ie: ASV) rendering of Jn 10:14-15. Imo it provides an interesting basis for exegesis. If it is to be read as the Son only knows the Father as sheep to shepherd. Then we might consider that if the sheep have the mind of the sheperd (1 Cor 2:16), then the Son has the mind of the Father ;-)
You are welcome, and yes, he does.

Last post, you mentioned "Based on Romans 11:33 the "deep things of God" (ta ßa?? t?? ?e??) of 1 Cor. 2:10 may simply refer to God's purposes, counsels and judgments toward other things. It seems the knowability of such things is distinct from whether God in Himself is knowable to creatures." I concur with your interpretation of Rom 11:33, as this seems the primary revelation of scripture - God is "a revealer of secrets" (Dan 2:22,28,29,47) and there is nothing that "shall not be known" (Matt 10:26) concerning the fullfilment of the salvation plan. However, 1 Cor 2:10, in the context of vs6-9, doesn't seem to limit our "spiritual knowledge" of God. Especially as read in the NEB "For the Spirit explores everything, even the depths of God's own nature."
τα βαθη του θεου literally means "the depths of (the) God". Considering Rom. 11:33 and the context of 1 Cor. 2:10 such as v. 9 or 12, to me it still makes sense to understand these "depths" to be counsels, judgments and sacred secrets of God, as distinct from God in Himself:

But as it is written, Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him.

Now we have received, not the spirit of the world, but the spirit which is of God; that we might know the things which are freely given to us of God.

Logically, we may be limited in our comprehension or expression of God's might, power and other attributes but A.Paul suggests such inquiries are for those with a fleshly mindset. In contrast, those not of the flesh but of the spirit search out the spiritual things of God.
Agreed.

Last post you mentioned "The eastern church is serious in the belief that God is essentially unknowable." True. But it is their context which is of interest...

"There is only one Source of Divinity outside of time in the Godhead and within time in creation and that is the Father. We believe that God in His essence is unknowable and we must respect, therefore, the Mystery which is God. On the other hand God made Himself known in the Law and the Prophets and then perfectly and uniquely in the Incarnation, Life, Death and Resurrection of Christ. He continues to reveal Himself consistently by the Holy Spirit. God may, therefore, be known realistically and personally by His communicated energies which are uncreated and from Himself."

What do Orthodox Christians Believe?
http://www.antiochian-orthodox.co.uk/orthodox_christian_faith.htm

I will stop here for now. Here are the links to the quotes above.
Thank you for the links.

Athanasius, Discourse I
http://biblestudy.churches.net/CCEL/FATHERS2/NPNF204/NPNF2066.HTM

Hippolytus, Refutation of all Heresies, Book 10, Chapters xxviii & xxix
http://www.ccel.org/fathers2/ANF-05/anf05-14.htm#P2309_744389

Arius, Fragments (also see Athanasius' Discourse I)
http://home.zonnet.nl/chotki/fragments%20from%20arius.htm

Origen, Explanation of the words “The Son does not see the Father.”
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf203.vi.xi.ii.xviii.html?bcb=0

Origen, Commentary on John, Book 1 (Roberts-Donaldson)
http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/text/origen-john1.html

Peace and all the best, in Jesus the Christ.

ps.

Fragment 6 is more precise in what Arius meant...

"there are two wisdoms, first, the attribute co-existent with God, and next, that in this wisdom the Son was originated, and was only named Wisdom and Word as partaking of it. For Wisdom, saith he, by the will of the wise God, had its existence in Wisdom. In like manner, that there is another Word in God besides the Son, and that the Son again, as partaking of it, is named Word and Son according to grace."

On face value I could go along with that. Even Athanasius calls the Son "Wisdom Only-begotten". I think the thought that there are two wisdoms is a bit problematical. I'd phrase it "there are two minds, but one wisdom". The Father endowing the Son with his wisdom.
That would be the more precise expression imo.

Romans 1:20 would suggests there can only be one wisdom. Taking Arius literally, all we experience is the Son's wisdom, and believe it is a reflection of the Father's. I guess Arius' would have appealed to Heb 1:3 and explained, "Ah, but it is an exact replica of the Father's, as would my image in a mirror be of me." Which I find acceptable.
Agreed.

pss:

Arius in Frag 2 says "Thus there is a Triad...Foreign from the Son in essence is the Father, for He is without beginning." It seems Arius has essence requiring all properties - which might assume that for the Son to participate in the essence of the Father he'd have to derive the attribute of unoriginate. To me that seems plainly silly. In essence, I am a man, but my Father, also a man, proceeded me. Arius used "a father precedes a son" to illustrate the "there was a time, the Son was not". I can only assume Arius believed that any son does not have the same essence as his father or he uses essence in a unique way.

In an earlier post you made a passing remark about Alexander/Athanasius teaching a begotten-unbegotten. Reading Athanasius he was talking about potential and kenetic begetals. He responds to Arius' logic that "a father precedes a son" by making reference to Levi "For Levi too was already in the loins of his great-grandfather, before his own actual generation, or that of his grandfather. When then the man comes to that age at which nature supplies the power, immediately, with nature, unrestrained, he becomes father of the son from himself." Athanasius goes on to say "the divine generation must not be compared to the nature of men, nor the Son considered to be part of God, nor the generation to imply any passion whatever; God is not as man; for men beget passibly, having a transitive nature, which waits for periods by reason of its weakness. But with God this cannot be; for He is not composed of parts, but being impassible and simple, He is impassibly and indivisibly Father of the Son...a work is external to the nature, but a son is the proper offspring of the essence; it follows that a work need not have been always, for the workman frames it when he will; but an offspring is not subject to will, but is proper to the essence...what is proper to [the Father's] essence must always be; and this is His Word and His Wisdom."

(Discource I, Chapter 8)
According to scripture, offspring can be a product of will. "Which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God" (John 1:13). Conversely, monkeries and seminaries contain many men who came "to that age at which nature supplies the power," but did not "immediately, with nature, unrestrained" begin producing offspring. So this is kind of a weird argument. Did Athanasius even have any children? It seems to me that offspring are more or less subject to will and so I agree with Justin that God produced His Son by "an act of will" (Tryph. 61 (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/01283.htm)) just as He "worketh all things after the counsel of his own will" (Eph. 1:11).

Never fear of offending me. I do not hold that I am right on anything but in discussions like ours one needs to have an opinion - otherwise we'd get strained neck muscles from all the nodding ;-)
;-) :yes:

If at anytime I seem antagonistic, say a prayer for me.
Okay. Please do so for me too.

In the below, I'm just thinking aloud. In the following, please consider my reply/thoughts as universal and not personal. But if you find something of interest your response would be most welcome.


In your last post you noted "It might be worthwhile to make another observation about Arianism in the fourth century. An underlying issue was whether the trinity exists by God's nature or by His will." Possibly, this is a subject that Arius would have put in the category of "useless questions and disputes" ;-)
Well, yes and no. ;-) Useless in that, in absence of specification either way, the voluntaristic view would be orthodox by default. As per above, God works all things according to the counsel of His own will (Eph. 1:11). To make the generation the exception, or to entirely exclude it from the "activities" of God per se would require further specification. Nevertheless, the Nicea view as normally undestood does require this.

I had a think on the view that "the generation is posterior (in whatever sense) to God's will".

Obviously something cannot become, if it already is, but it can change states and/or form (eg: the incarnation). Activity (will) is posterior to some passive state, so I guess to hold the "Arian" view, there are times when God does not do anything. I guess the key is in the word "generation". A craftsman usually has a perpetual will to generate, though at times he may be passive, but his creation is usually conceived in the mind before he actually does anything.
What seems to be true in this analogy is that for Arianism, God is not active by nature but by will. Where the craftsman analogy fails is that for the craftsman, willing to do something is only the first step toward a finished product, but as you said, to omnipotence there is no distance between willing something and the thing coming to pass.

Perhaps we can't boil this down to a temporal frame: that there are "times" that God doesn't do anything. For Philo, time was a measurement of change, "the interval of the motion of the heavens" (On the Creation vii (http://www.earlyjewishwritings.com/text/philo/book1.html)). More explicitly Eunomius wrote, "Time is a certain motion of the Stars" (* (http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/eunomius_apology01.htm)). The presence of time means that God wills something; it describes the realm of becoming, which from Eph. 1:11 would seem to be governed by God's will.

I also had a think on the view that "the generation is...antecedent to His will".

Given my example of the craftsman, if "will" is taken as physically bringing something into being, this view is particularly valid, as the craftsman first conceived his creation in his mind. As an example: Does a building come into existence once it is built, once the plans are drawn or at the time the architect conceived it? I guess it is a matter of perspective depending on whether you are the architect, the builder or the buildings owner.
Carrying over this analogy from finitude and time to omnipotence and eternity would be difficult. For me the bottom line is that the building exists because of the architect, whereas the architect might exist even if he did not design the building, and in college had chosen to be something else.

My opinion would be: God in essence/nature is love and all things he does (wills) is by/in love. So to my mind the Trinity is both implicit (potential - in God's mind) and explicit (kenetic - God in action).
What does it mean to say that "Joe is honest"? Does it mean he is honest when he is stuck on a desert island? It means that Joe is such a person that when he is confronted with the choice of telling either the truth or lie, even with a strong motivation to lie, he tells the truth.

Christ is the Door of the sheep, but that does not mean he must have had sheep from eternity, so that he could always be the Door. It just means that when he has sheep, he is their Door. He is the Way to the Father (according to His nature, I believe), but that does not mean there must have always been beings beside him and the Father, so that he could be their Way to the Father. It would mean that if there are other beings, he is their Way to the Father. Christ is the Light of men, but this does not mean there must have always been men in need of light. It would mean that, given there are beings in need of light, he is such as to be their Light (cf. again Origen In Joannis. i. 22 (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/101501.htm)). In the same way, God is such that, to other beings He is Agape or Love. I do not think this means that He was always restless and waiting to create things so He could show them His love. It means that given He has graciously created things, through no compulsion but at His free will, to them He is Agape. These titles do not reach into essences. They describe the effects which certain natures have upon contingent circumstances, but they do not entail that the circumstances obtain, unless tautologously in the way that it is necessary that, as long as Joe is sitting, he is sitting. The circumstances themselves have come to be at God's will. Apart from such circumstances, as Arius wrote, "He [God] is to Himself what He is, that is, unspeakable" (* (http://home.zonnet.nl/chotki/fragments%20from%20arius.htm)).

Clement of Alexandria wrote,

"For the One is indivisible; wherefore also it is infinite, not considered with reference to inscrutability, but with reference to its being without dimensions, and not having a limit. And therefore it is without form and name.

And if we name it, we do not do so properly, terming it either the One, or the Good, or Mind, or Absolute Being, or Father, or God, or Creator or Lord. We speak not as supplying His name; but for want, we use good names, in order that the mind may have these as points of support, so as not to err in other respects. For each one by itself does not express God; but all together are indicative of the power of the Omnipotent. For predicates are expressed either from what belongs to things themselves, or from their mutual relation. But none of these are admissible in reference to God. Nor any more is He apprehended by the science of demonstration. For it depends on primary and better known principles. But there is nothing antecedent to the Unbegotten" (* (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/02105.htm)).

As an observation, there is, imo, nothing in scripture or the creeds to preclude the Spirit as proceeding in the begetal of the Son. In the usual formula: the Spirit proceeds from the Father but the Son is begotten of the Father. Tertullian, Against Praxeas (Chapter 8), suggested "But the Word was formed by the Spirit." Mind you, Tertullian seems to identify the Spirit in various senses but in this regards (Chapter 7) he says "Do you then, (you ask) grant that the Word is a certain substance, constructed by the Spirit and the communication of Wisdom? Certainly I do but..."
http://www.ccel.org/fathers2/ANF-03/anf03-43.htm
Sometimes Tertullian calls Christ the Spirit. "Now, that the very Lord Himself of all might, the Word and Spirit of the Father, was operating and preaching on earth, it was necessary that the portion of the Holy Spirit which, in the form of the prophetic gift, had been through John preparing the ways of the Lord, should now depart from John, and return back again of course to the Lord, as to its all-embracing original."(Adversus Marcionem iv. 18 (http://www.webcom.com/gnosis/library/ter_marc4.htm)). Again, " For He [Christ] had Himself been present in Moses, who heard such a rejection--even He, the Spirit of the Creator" (28). Again, "Since even then by Isaiah it was Christ, the Word and Spirit of the Creator, who prophetically described John as "the voice of one crying in the wilderness to prepare the way of the Lord" (33).

In Against Praxeas:

"Now the Spirit indeed is third from God and the Son; just as the fruit of the tree is third from the root, or as the stream out of the river is third from the fountain, or as the apex of the ray is third from the sun. Nothing, however, is alien from that original source whence it derives its own properties. In like manner the Trinity, flowing down from the Father through intertwined and connected steps, does not at all disturb the Monarchy, whilst it at the same time guards the state of the Economy" (Adv, Prax. viii (http://www.ccel.org/fathers2/ANF-03/anf03-43.htm)).

Tertullian apparently believed, even in his Montanist stage, that the Paraclete is third from God and Christ.

I also thought on the view "the generation is something more basic to God than His will" and it occurred to me that predisposition and motivation are pre-determinate/pre-existent to will.
It seems questionable to me to speak of God's will as an outcome of predispositions or motivations that inhere in God presumably(?) apart from His will. The result of this, carried through all the way, would seem to be fatalism for God.

The question arises: was God motivated by a need to reveal his wisdom and power (a negative) or was his motivation to reveal his love in wisdom and power (a positive)?
Perhaps He was not motivated by need at all, as you have expressed before. Perhaps everything created is just of grace. If we cannot see that living with God is good in its own right for us, and want to find out why it is also good for God, or better for Him than any alternative, we may not find an answer.

It is like the question of whether our praises to God are good for God or help Him. The traditional answer is that they are not; praising God is good for us. If someone can accept that even praising God does not add to God but is ultimately for our own good, it should not be hard to see that ultimately the creation has not helped God, improved Him, relieved Him of a need, or discharged Him from an obligation. The ones benefited by creation are creatures, because the creation is Kharis or undeserved kindness.
I perceive the "Arians" as getting carried away with anthromorphizing everything.
That may be true of many so-called Arians today, but anthropomorphism doesn't seem to have impressed the fourth century Arians. IIRC, Eunomius somewhere argued to the effect that unbegottenness is the sole unique identifier of the True God because he is not corporeal or spatial in any way. The Audians, the fourth century anthropomorphist sect, were not connected to the Arians and seem to have been closer to homoousians. "...they [Audians] were far closer in doctrine to the Catholics than to the Arians, as our authority [Epiphanius, 230. 2.f, 233. 21 f., 26, 29; 230. 4] repeatedly emphasizes" (E.A. Thompson, The Visigoths in the Time of Ulfila, Oxford 1966, p. 95 & ftn. 1.). "Antropians" appear in the catalogue of sects which Wulfila condemned (* (http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/jod/texts/auxentius.trans.html)). As quoted in your earlier message, Arius himself wrote, "the Father is according to them [homoousians] compounded and divisible and alterable and material, and, as far as their belief goes, has the circumstances of a body, Who is the Incorporeal God" (* (http://home.zonnet.nl/chotki/fragments%20from%20arius.htm)).

As I understand it, regarding the Spirit, the Anomoeans (but via Gregory of Nyssa maybe not earlier/other Arians (see below)) argued from the premise that if the Spirit is a thing/person then he must have been created by the Son (for obvious reasons).
This view was shared by the Macedonians/binitarians (Catholic Encyclopedia (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12174a.htm)) and the Homoians. But for all of them, the Paraclete was not a "thing" per se but a real, living being.

To which I quote Athanasius: "is it not a grievous error, to have material thoughts about what is immaterial, and...deny what is natural and proper to the Father?" Which I admit is a bit of a non response, so I'll try to explain...

If the Son is a creature, and all other things were made by him, and the Spirit is also a creature, then it is obvious that the Spirit was created by the Son. However, scripture plainly shows that we receive the Spirit from the Father, albeit through (because of) the Son (and imo this can't be construed as a metaphor).
Agreed.

The obvious solution to this conflict, is the opinion, that the Spirit is not a thing/person but the power, active force of the Father. However, in scripture, the Spirit is given a personality in accord but distinct from the Father. For me: The conflicts are soon resolved by thinking of the divine activity in the salvation plan and the two things we are told about the Father = he is spirit and he is love. Which draws me to a conclusion that in the immaterial/spiritual realm the Son and the Spirit are distinct from the Father but also "natural and proper to the Father".
How does the previous statement create a conflict, and how does the statement above solve it? I would make guesses as to your meaning but would rather not..

The basis of the fourth century Arians' view on the Paraclete is texts like John 15:26, where there is a difference of precisely one person between the modalist and the dynamic monarchian read. That was probably too close a resemblance for them.

Gregory of Nyssa - Against Eunomius (p56, para 2)
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2901.htm


"The whole controversy, then, between the Church and the Anomoeans turns on this: Are we to regard the Son and the Holy Spirit as belonging to created or uncreated existence? Our opponent declares that to be the case which all deny: he boldly lays it down, without looking about for any proof, that each being is the work of the preceding being. What method of education, what school of thought can warrant him in this, it is difficult to see...it is a truly blind and unsupported statement to say that the Creator and Maker of all things is a creature made and to this they link on a conclusion that is also blind: namely, that the Son is alien in nature unlike in being to the Father, and quite devoid of His essential character."


Gregory of Nyssa says (p51) "He did wrong, when mentioning life Doctrines of Salvation, in adopting
terms of his own choosing instead of the traditional terms Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The reason for this invention of new words I take to be manifest to every one--namely: that every one, when the words father and son are spoken, at once
recognizes the proper and natural relationship to one another".
The term αγεννητος (Unbegotten) which Eunomius used was traditional and used by the Cappadocians themselves. It does not appear in the New Testament, though the concept may be derived from the description of God the Father as μονος αληθινος θεος in John 17:3.

Alam, I couldn't locate where Eunomius does this. Could you guide me to a source.
Section 24 of the Apology should work:

"...the Word of God demonstrates that [God's] Will is his Operation, and not that his Substance is such; and that the Only-begotten subsisted by the Will of the Father; 'tis certainly necessary that the Son preserve this Likeness, not as to Substance, but as to Operation, which is also his Will. We therefore call him the Image of the Father, not as comparing a Begotten Being with that which is Unbegotten; for that is certainly disagreeable, and in all Beings impossible; but as owning him the Only begotten, and First-born of the Father : the appellation of Son declaring the Substance [of the Son,] as does that of Father the Operation [=Will] of him that begat him" (* (http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/eunomius_apology01.htm)).

Eunomius observed that "the principle of paternity in God is not the ousia but the energeia" (* (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05605a.htm)) and the energeia of God is His Will.

Except to himself ;-)
To my understanding, the homousians deny that He would be anything even to himself.

This seems highly speculative.
Agreed.

I respect the opinion that within the limits of language, "God" is the universal word by which we refer to him. But it is a word constrained by the fact that their are many gods around and so, we must be careful not to confuse speculation on them, with what has been revealed regarding the one true God, the Father of Jesus the Christ.
Most people I meet that talk about "God" with a capital "G" seem to mean the same One that I do. There is a category that "have a zeal for God, but not according to knowledge" (Rom. 10:2).
A view I might take: a god can only come to exist once there is some intelligence that can perceive him as such. That is to say: the eternal, superior, unoriginate Being, communicated himself to us, using our conceptions of gods, to prove himself to be the only true God. Thus guiding men away from the god/s they created in their imaginations. To Moses, YHWH didn't declare himself to be God, but revealed himself to be the god of Moses ancestors, in opposition to the various gods of the nations. The simple definition he gave to Moses of himself is "I shall prove to be" (NWT) / "I am that I am" (KJV). To the Israelites, this god was just another god, but at least their fore-fathers god, and seemed to view him, as just another god, not unlike the Egyptian gods. YHWH had to reveal himself as The God! (Ex 32:1; 19:9)
Basically agree. The names YHWH and 'Ehyeh 'asher 'ehyeh appear to be ways of expressing the ultimacy or omnipotence of God. 'Ehyeh 'asher 'ehyeh for example does not tie God down to a specific function: it is a kind of meta-name which encompasses everything God has become relative to creatures in the past, and everything He will be in the future. In a sense it is a "blank check" and the only being of whom it could be true in an unqualified, open-ended way is an omnipotent, unconditioned being. The form YHWH, which, following the vocalization transmitted by the early fathers, is widely believed to be causative from binyan Hif`il, is similar in that "He causes/will cause to become" could only be categorically true of the omnipotent. The implied equivalence between this causative form and 'Ehyeh in the simple active stem may mean that from our pov God is as God does-- God produces for Himself names/attributes with the same activity whereby He causes things to be and become.

With this in mind, I'd suggest, that there are preconditions to the will of God (eg: motivation). We only know his existence from the things he makes manifest and we only know his will by his direct guidance (the Law, prophets, Jesus, the Spirit) and we only pay attention because his motivation is revealed.

One might take the view that the will and the manifestation are the same thing, each a condition of the other. In clearer terms: when God wills, it happens, simultaneously. And so, it might be said, that God doesn't will unless he wants to reveal himself (even if only to himself). In my opinion, it is not the fact that God wills, but why he wills, that is important to us.
I am not sure we could find a "motive" for God's total will, in the sense of an ultimate tie-breaker tipping the balance inevitably toward our world, our history: what is. At most I believe we may inquire into how the things God wills are consistent with God...

Another view might be: God doesn't will as such, but loves. God loving, is, God willing.
This is very close to my belief.

Btw- sorry, Apostoli, about the length of the reply. Please feel free to respond in whatever way you wish.

Peace and the best,

[apostoli]

Hi alam,

Thankyou for your past, and especially all the time it would have taken to prepare. As usual I'll need a little time to digest and respond. Later in the week perhaps.

I'm still reorganising my archives and in doing so, co-indently, came across the following article that should clarify what the orthodox fellow meant by "grace" (what started this discussion).

"When those thinking in different paradigms say the same things, they are not saying the same things; so let's not confuse everyone with Western terms laden with distinctive meanings that conflict with Orthodox import. The medium is much of the message, since it invokes an atmosphere, connotations, and a lot of background....

Thus, Orthodox @Grace@ is the uncreated Energy and Life of God; Latin #Grace# is a created (but supernatural) habit or quality of the soul of a believer; and Reformation %Grace% is divine benignity which overlays reality with a virtual reality that for adherents to this will-based paradigm is more real than reality itself. Orthodox "#unity" with Christ is partaking of His uncreated Energies and being assimilated to God; it involves God's energizing Christ's members to do His will and eventually culminates in Theosis. Latin "@unity" with Christ is achieved in intellectual vision, according to Thomas Aquinas; it is unity with the imparticipable divine Essence but apparently virtual: non autem quantum ad modum essendi. Reformation "% unity" with Christ's Essence (it is admitted that God's Essence is imparticipable) is intentional, virtual, will-based--covenantal. These examples show how misleading it is for Orthodox writers to use Western terms that bring in a huge amount of non-Orthodox baggage in the mind of a Western reader. If the Orthodox are ever to be understood, it is essential to avoid this error."

USINGING ORTHODOX TERMINOLOGY IN ENGLISH
http://orlapubs.com/AR/R191.html

Have a great weekend!

[alam]

Hi alam,

Thankyou for your past, and especially all the time it would have taken to prepare. As usual I'll need a little time to digest and respond. Later in the week perhaps.

I'm still reorganising my archives and in doing so, co-indently, came across the following article that should clarify what the orthodox fellow meant by "grace" (what started this discussion).

"When those thinking in different paradigms say the same things, they are not saying the same things; so let's not confuse everyone with Western terms laden with distinctive meanings that conflict with Orthodox import. The medium is much of the message, since it invokes an atmosphere, connotations, and a lot of background....

Thus, Orthodox @Grace@ is the uncreated Energy and Life of God; Latin #Grace# is a created (but supernatural) habit or quality of the soul of a believer; and Reformation %Grace% is divine benignity which overlays reality with a virtual reality that for adherents to this will-based paradigm is more real than reality itself. Orthodox "#unity" with Christ is partaking of His uncreated Energies and being assimilated to God; it involves God's energizing Christ's members to do His will and eventually culminates in Theosis. Latin "@unity" with Christ is achieved in intellectual vision, according to Thomas Aquinas; it is unity with the imparticipable divine Essence but apparently virtual: non autem quantum ad modum essendi. Reformation "% unity" with Christ's Essence (it is admitted that God's Essence is imparticipable) is intentional, virtual, will-based--covenantal. These examples show how misleading it is for Orthodox writers to use Western terms that bring in a huge amount of non-Orthodox baggage in the mind of a Western reader. If the Orthodox are ever to be understood, it is essential to avoid this error."

USINGING ORTHODOX TERMINOLOGY IN ENGLISH
http://orlapubs.com/AR/R191.html

Have a great weekend!



Hello Apostoli,

That clears it up. I did not know the EO see a dichotomy between grace and will. the original comment makes sense in this context. That they would see one seems to cohere, at least with my sketch in post 5 of issues between them and the Arians.


"Reformation %Grace% is divine benignity which overlays reality with a virtual reality that for adherents to this will-based paradigm is more real than reality itself."


FOr the "will-based paradigm" God's beneficence does not merely overlay reality, it also underlies it. All is of grace. But thank you for the interesting link.


Peace and the best,

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

If only I could contract time, I would reply to your last post more comprehensively and precisely. For now I'll just respond in part, in a prose style (which as a worthy response I feel is still inadequate - my apologies). There are many items in your last post I'd like to discuss. Possibly at some other time, we could revisit them either here or via another thread.

In this post, I am expressing something close to my random thoughts. Respond (or not) as convenient and your time avails. As always, I look forward to any further insights (avenues of thought) you might have.

An aside: This week, I received "The Works of Philo (Complete & Unabridged), New Updated Edition of Yonge's translation (Hardcover, US$20 at Amazon). I've read bits online but can now do a more relaxed study. The relevence to our conversation: Philo may not be representative of 4th century Jewish or Christian thinking (depends on the commentator), but as his works have been preserved by the church/es, it would appear that his thoughts had an influence. Among others, Eusebius of Caesarea is cited as a source for some fragments. My aim is to get into the head of the antagonists in this 4th century play.

Cites/quotes below are from the usual (previous) sources/links...

* the Catholic Encyclopedia
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/
* Yonge's translation of Philo
http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/yonge/
* Eusebius of Caesarea Fragments
http://www.seanmultimedia.com/Pie_Eusebius_Letters_Fragmented.html
* Arius Fragments
http://home.zonnet.nl/chotki/fragments%20from%20arius.htm

In his letter to Constantine, Arius makes mention of "useless questions and disputes", which from things he says elsewhere, I perceive him to mean: How is the Son begotten? What does it mean that the Son was begotten?If so then he conceded too much. If the meaning of the Son's generation is a useless question, then it could mean anything, or nothing...Its of interest that you quoted Eusebius of Nicomedia letter to Paulinus. He is asking Paulinus to imitate Eusebius of Caesarea in his zeal for the truth. Who wrote concerning the Nicene consensus that it was agreed "The Holy Scriptures teach [the Son] to be begotten of the Father, by a mode of generation which is 'incomprehensible and inexplicable to all created beings'." (Letter To The Church of Caesarea, written from Nicea). I think this is important to our conversation, as it is something all antagonists on face value agree upon.

Eusebius of Caesarea is of particular interest to me. As I am sure you are aware: Arius, once exiled, found asylum at Caesarea. Also at the opening of the Council of Nicea, Eusebius occupied the first seat on the right of the emperor, and delivered the inaugural address. Whether his prestige was merely political I don't know. But, I presume him to be largely representive of "common" orthodox opinion for the time, and at least in the early days of the controversy seems to have supported Arius.

I've read many an author accusing Eusebius of inconsequence, citing that he bent to the emporer "From the love of peace" but often ignore the end of his letter where he says "at one time we resisted firmly, even to the last hour, when doctrines improperly expressed offended us, and, at another time, we, without contention, accepted the articles which contained nothing objectionable, when after a thorough and candid investigation of their signification, they appeared perfectly comformable with what had been confessed by us in the formulary of faith which we had published."

Reflecting on the beginning of the controversary: Arius' perception was that his bishop was teaching Sabellianism - given Alexander said the Son was of the same substance as the Father. Paul of Samosata, had taught that the Father, Son and Spirit were one person (prosporon) and had used the "substance" terminology. Alexander on the other hand, was talking of three
distinct prosporons, each being different subsistencies, but each being of the same incomprehensible substance. Possibly, if Alexander had chosen a different set of words, the controversary would not have arisen. Three existenses in one substance, is an unusual teaching, unless it is to be understood that three people are all of the same consistency as mankind. Again, a difficult thought, as it reduces God to a genus. However, harking to Philo, the intangible cannot be conceived as the tangible (that perceptable by touch=Oxford meaning). That which can only be perceived through the intelect could be perceived as "intellectually" of the same "interlectual" substance.

I find it perculiar, that Lucianists such as Arius, who were prone to scriptural literalism, went to the extremes they did: by arguing that the Son (in consistency) is not like that of the Father. Possibly, their terminology originated as a response to the teaching of Paul of Samosata, who said the Son or Logos is without hypostasis, being merely the wisdom and science of
God, which is in Him as reason is in a man. And having divorced the Son from the substance of the Father, imo Arius quickly distanced the Son from the Father in all ways. Aka, Arius' opponents understood him to teach extra-scripture whereby the Son was alterable, and could be of a different mind to him who begot him but chose not to be.

Admittedly, to avoid error in orthodoxy, the substantiality of the Son/Logos and the distinction between Father and Son needs to be emphasised, but to say the Son was ex-nihilo, (possibly not by Arius himself) is a worry. Arius in his letter to Alexander says "[the Son] has nothing proper to God in proper subsistence." Depending on philosophical paradigms regarding "Cause" this idea can be argued several ways. The Catholic Encyclopedia has a lengthy article on "Cause" worth a read.

Again relying on Eusebius' Nicea letter for an orthodox view: "It was concluded [at Nicea] that the expression 'being of one substance with the Father' implies that the Son of God does not resemble, in any one respect, the creatures which He has made; but that to the Father alone, who begat Him, He is in all points perfectly like: for He is of the essence and of the
substance of none save of the Father. This interpretation having been given of the doctrine, it appeared right to us to assent to it, especially as we were aware that of the ancients some learned and celebrated bishops and writers have used the term 'consubstantial' with respect to the divinity of the Father and of the Son."

In earlier correspondence elsewhere, I suggested words themselves are meaningless until they are given a universal meaning that is precise, fixed and unalterable (see below). And imo this is what I believe the Nicea meeting attempted to do. Though, as my last post here highlights, words themselves are given aspects, which change their meaning. Substance and co-substantiality are possibly not adequate English words to describe what the Nicenes meant. I quite like the word "consistency", which can be used to speak of a reality of substantiality, our perception of reality and as a predictable outcome. Admittedly, even this word has problems (eg: the possibility of describing God as a compound). However, it does appeal to me: Whenever, I see a flame, perceive its warmth and touch it. I get burnt. Very consistent ;-)

Hippolytus [said] "...the Logos is God, being the substance of God."In the early fathers there is no clear view about the relation of other beings to God's substance/essence. In his Against Noetus vii Hippolutus seems to reject that the Father and the Son are one "substance"...

"Are all one body in respect of substance, or is it that we become one in the power and disposition of unity of mind?"There is a definite echo of Philo in Hippolytus' (whether he intended or otherwise).

The "co-substantial" thought wasn't anything really new, at least in Jewish thought. Philo wrote of the "idea of ideas, the Reason of God" and said "if the image be a part of the image, then manifestly so is the entire form." (On the Creation VI). The context of Philo is that of the incorporal. That which can only be perceived by intellect (if we have the mind of God).

And so we circle back to Eusebius of Caesarea and his account of Nicea: "And here our emperor, most beloved by God, began to reason concerning [the Son's] divine origin, and His existence before all ages. He was virtually in the Father without generation, even before He was actually begotten, the Father having always been the Father, just as He has always been a King and a Saviour, and, virtually, all things, and has never known any change of being or action."

In an earlier post I suggested for the Father to become Father, is problematical. To which you responded: No moreso for him to have become creator. Constantines arguement imo solves the problem.

IMO: If the Son is the Wisdom of God seen by us, then there cannot be when that Wisdom didn't exist (as Athanasius argues).

There may have been when the Son was not, but the Wisdom existed. All things were created in/by God's Wisdom. Thus the Son, who is God's wisdom in action, was begotten as an exact image of his Father, and so cannot be a creation, as all things were created by Wisdom. Creation is that by which we perceive God's wisdom (its manifestation), and was always potentially in God
. The Son cannot be perceived as a manifestation to us, as God's actions are invisible to us and so on.

I think where the Lucians/Arians went wrong is they went beyond the historical terminology of the greater church, possibly subscribing to local traditions that were created from some local threat to accepted dogma, and that stance led them into other errors. Bit like the history of the protestant/reformed churches and the various sects that came out of them. Each have their good points but...

Eusebius of Caesarea says regarding the Nicea conference "it did not appear reasonable to assert or to teach [things like 'out of the non-existent' or that 'there was a time when He was not']...we judged it right to agree; since, indeed, we had never, at any former period, been accustomed to use such terms."

Mind you prior to Nicene, Eusebius had written to Bishop Euphration "we do not say that the Son was with the Father , but that the Father was before the Son...the Son also is himself God, but not true God [as the Son had causation]." Philo spoke of the Logos in a similar way. Elsewhere, Eusebius cites Philo to illustrate a similar point (On Providence (Frag I) also see Philo, On Dreams - Book 1, Chapter XXXVII (para 229))

After analysis, it seems to me, pre-Nicea, Arius was excommunicated because of the perception that his teaching denied the Logos' real Sonship. His doctrine of adoption gauranteed that.

Possibly, Arius went extra Lucian and was misunderstood by Alexander and Athanasius and the 100 bishops assembled at Alexandria. Maybe Arius had a different meaning when he used the word adoption. But in my mind, this is the crux of the dispute.

According to the Catholic Encylopedia Lucian in his Christological system (a compromise between Modalism and Subordinationism) the Word, though Himself the Creator of all subsequent beings was a creature, though superior to all other created things by the wide gulf between Creator and creature" (aka the Logos didn't create himself). Given the exactness of Eastern thought, the Son termed "creature" would have been a worry. After all the temporal cannot be compared to the intemporal. Imo, the whole Arian thought process seems to diverge from the ANFs.

Arius said "The Unbegun made the Son a beginning of things originated; and advanced Him as a Son to Himself by adoption (Frag 2)." On face value, that would be a fair view but for the adoption bit (see below).

As an aside: The Catholic Encyclopedia correlates the 8th century heresy of "Adoptionism" to Nestorianism. Best I can figure, Nestorius taught nothing along the lines of this heresy - which went "Christ as God is indeed the Son of God by generation and nature, but Christ as man is Son of God only by adoption and grace" the Logos indwelling in him. I find it curious that,
ignoring the obvious Islamic influences, the idea sprung up not through the Syrian/Persian churches but in Spain - a stronghold of earlier Arianism. I read somewhere that "the prophet" in early life was influenced by Arian teachings but ultimately asked "What needs God of a Son?"

Logically, if one views the Logos as a thing made, then he can only have become the Son by adoption or as an amphromorphism.

And the later seems the view of the Arian party. Eusebius of Nicomedia says the Son was "not generated from the substance of the Father", but He is "other in nature and power"; He was created, and this is not inconsistent with his Sonship, for the wicked are called sons of God (Is 1:2; Deut 32:18) and so are even the drops of dew (Job 38:28); He was begotten by God's free will.

In contrast to such a very Greek philosophical thought, the Nicenes seem to think on similar lines as the Jews. The first century, Jewish philosopher, Philo, calls the Logos, the archtype, and describes him as: not uncreated as the Father nor created as creatures. Which sounds very much like the teaching of Eusebius of Caesarea.

I didn't pick up on this previously, but I find Arius words carefully selected: "the unbegun" in contrast to those that are "begun/originated". This distances the Son from the creation (which he created), but includes him with all things that have had a beginning. On face value, that too would be acceptable, except Arius uses the word "begot" in terms of an acquisition: God created the Logos, endowed him with certain attributes and then made him as if a Son "the Son being begotten apart from time by the Father, and being created and founded before ages, was not before His generation, but being begotten apart from time before all things, alone was made to subsist by the Father. (Frag 3)"

In a cursory read, Arius' words seem acceptable but the introduction of the God's adoption of the Son, goes against the grain of scripture. Although, the Logos is spoken of as a substantiality, he is also spoken of as incorporal. Meaning, that if the Son is begotten as an exact replica of the Father (Heb 1:3), nothing can be added to him. Is there another "light to the world" beside the Logos?

We really don't have a lot of knowledge about Arius, but I detect there was always some undelying defect in his understanding. The Catholic Encyclopedia says "Arius, who had learnt his religious views from Lucian...took sides [in about 306] with Meletius, an Egyptian schismatic, against Peter, Bishop of Alexandria. But a reconciliation followed, and Peter ordained Arius deacon. Further disputes led [Peter] to excommunicate him. However, [Arius] gained the friendship of Achillas, Peter's successor, [and] was made presbyter by him in 313, and had the charge of a well-known district in Alexandria called Baucalis. This entitled Arius to expound the Scriptures officially."

Of interest to me is Arius' teacher, Lucian (martyred 7 January, 312). The Catholic Encyclopedia says "Though [Lucian] cannot be accused of having shared the theological views of Paul of Samosata, he fell under suspicion at the time of Paul's condemnation, and was compelled to sever his communion with the Church. This breach with the orthodox party lasted during the episcopates of three bishops, Domnus, Timaeus, and Cyril, whose administration extended from 268 to 303. It seems more likely that Lucian was reconciled with the Church early in the episcopate of Cyril (perhaps about 285) than in that of his successor; otherwise it is hard to understand how bishops in the Orient could have received his pupils." As a speculation, Lucians/Arius doctrine was a confrontation/refutation to that of Paul of Samosata, that went extra biblical.

Arius would have been about 63 when he became presbyter. Which is pretty late in life to become a simple priest. Lucian had died a year earlier, maybe that had something to do with the timing. In any case, there seems a 28year gap between Lucian being accepted back into orthodoxy and Arius becoming a presbyter. Something doesn't add up. Another percularity, there was a
three year gap between his protest to Alexander and his excommunication in 321. Possibly, without Lucian's guidance the Arian doctrine evolved (as it did in later years). Is it possible that Arius went beyond Lucian teachings?

It is possible that Alexander and the 100 bishops who in the second** pre-Nicene excommunication of Arius misunderstood the bulk of what he was saying. The clincher imo would have been the "adoption" clause of Arius belief. (** the first excommunication occuring years earlier in the time of Bishop Peter - specific reason unknown to me).

Eusebius of Caesarea wrote Alexander, in response to Alexanders accusations against the Arians "[b]If, therefore, the letter received from [the Arians] tells the truth, they wholly contradict thee, in that they confess that the Son of God who existed before eternal ages, and through whom he made the world, is unchangeable and a perfect creature of God, but not as one of the creatures. But thy epistle accuses them of saying that the Son was made as one of the creatures. They do not say this, but clearly declare that he was not as one of the creatures. See if cause is not immediately given them again to attack and to misrepresent whatever they please. Again thou findest fault with them for saying that He who is begat him who was not. I wonder if any one is able to say anything else than that. For if He who is one, it is plain that everything has been made by Him and after Him. But if He who is not the only one, but there was also a Son existing, how did He who is beget him who was existing? For thus those existing would be two."

To the best of my knowledge, Eusebius of Caesarea believed the Son, to be true Son, begotten by the Father in an incomprehensible manner.

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

PS: To my last post.

I've just reread Eusebius of Nicomedia's letter to Paulinus, which you cited, and had a rethink on it. As usual, please consider the following as incomplete and me just thinking aloud.

To be honest, when I read this letter in the past, it was in Athanasius' context/writings, so I was not giving it a fair reading. Reading it in isolation, imo Eusebius gives in the 2nd paragraph a seemingly orthodox view, but the third paragraph is a worry.

In the second paragraph:

1. [the Son] was not made out of [the unbegotten's] substance, and does not at all participate in the [the unbegotten's] nature.
2. [the Son is] entirely distinct in nature and in power [to the Father]
3. the Son was created, established, and begotten in the same substance and in the same immutable and inexpressible nature as the Maker.

The 1st clause, deals with a heap of philosophical obstacles starting with God is not divisable but it does open the path to ex-nihilo (which imo is closed by the third clause). The second clause combats Sabellianism but opens the path to denying equality (but not rank) in nature and power of the Son to the Father (which imo is closed by the third clause - see below). The 3rd clause would be enlightening to the average trinitarian, the usual focus is on his signing of the Nicene creed and then his withdrawal of support. Plus, the natural disposition towards bad guys, which Athanasius makes him out to be.

In the third paragraph, Eusebius gives his slant on begotten. Apparently, discounting it as a synonym or ,ore particularly a synecdoche (figure of speech, where when something is named, the whole is understood. eg: All things are begat by God, even the drops of dew. Therefore, Begetal=creation). Such literism, imo, presents a very pessimistic view with implications regarding the origin of evil and our ability to be reborn of God (1 Pe 1:23, 1 Jn 5:1,18)(see below). The scriptures are full of allegories: we are born but so are nations (Isa 66:8). We are formed in the womb (Job 31:15; Eccl 11:5), as might nations (Gen 25:23). But in contrast, when begettal and born (including rebirth) are applied to individuals, there is observable evidence and we have no need to rely on presumption.

The biblical analogy of "nations formed in the womb", might provide a view of the Son's pre-existence before his begettal. If there was an inevitibily of the nations arising, could the same not be said of the Son?

Eusebius concludes the third paragraph, with the statement "All things are of God". Which is true, though I think it would have better to have said "good things".

A little earlier he says "every thing which exists has been called into being by [God's] will. He is God; and all things were made in His likeness, and in the future likeness of His Word, being created of His free will". There is an echo here of Philo, which reduces the pessimism I mentioned earlier. Philo paraphrased, suggests that we are made in the image of God (but in interlect), but through our free will we corrupt that image, but we can, by our own free will return to the original state. But of more interest, Philo says we are made in the image of the archtype which is the actual image of God.

In my opinion the cruncher in the third paragraph is the statement, "For that which is of the unbegotten could not be said to have been created or founded, either by Him or by another, since it is unbegotten from the beginning." I don't believe any of the antagonists thought differently. Its the next part that is a worry: "But if the fact of His being called the begotten gives any ground for the belief that, having come into being of the Father’s substance, He also has from the Father likeness of nature, we reply that it is not of Him alone that the Scriptures have spoken as begotten, but that they also thus speak of those who are entirely dissimilar to Him by nature."

Considering the last sentence: God is intemporal, perceptable only by intellect. The usual English association with the word "substance" is matter. However, the actual Oxford meaning is "the essential nature underlying phenomena or the most important essence of anything". Imo, Eusebius uses the word in the second sense. aka God cannot pass on his unbegottenness. However, Eusebius doesn't seem to allow that apart from this characteristic, there are a series of characteristics that we attribute to God and of which, as maker of all things, are perceived in the Son (ie: Heb 1:3 gr: charakter=exact representation). Of interest, all the things Eusebius offers as "begot" parallels are physical compounds, not intemporal existences. And though we couldn't rationally conceive the Son as an emmission of the Father as some do, it is evident that in some inexplicable way God caused the Son to be. Eusebius, in his letter might have started with this premise, but within the letter he quickly rationalises it away by giving the result of cause, an implied definition of creation. Though his meaning is "creature but not as other creatures", there is no scriptural parallel for this idea (see below).

In my understanding of philosophical terms, nature can be used in a cascade of ways: starting with, that which is specific to an individual, that which is intrinsic to a relational group (eg: family) and so on. The first definition is how I am reading Eusebius use of the word. Imo, an individuals specific nature cannot be directly transmitted, but to be "begotten in the same substance", is to be begotten with the intrinsic nature. In this context, then the Son, imo, is true Son, not by adoption (as Arius said) but by transmission.

I need to explain "transmission", but have only a very inadequate illustration: Ewes will usually only suckle their own young. There is some essential characteristic passed to the lamb by its mother, by which she differentiates it from other lambs.

Expanding on this very inadequate illustration, I might contrast adoption with transmission: An old practice of Australian sheep ranchers: If a ewe dies when suckling a lamb, and elsewhere another lamb has died. The shepherd will skin the dead lamb, lay the skin over the motherless lamb and present it to the mother of the deceased lamb. The ewe usually accepts this lamb as her offspring, because the essence (scent?) of the dead lamb (as perceived by the mother) is given to the new lamb. Of course, in our case, with the help of the Holy Spirit, we are clothed in Christ, and take on the essential inner characteristics by which God recognises us as his children.

When Eusebius argues "If He had been from Him or of Him, as a portion of Him, or by an emanation of His substance, it could not be said that He was created or established". The terms "from Him or of Him" can never be reasoned as a portion or emanation of anyone's substance! But are obviously figurative. So imo Eusebuis is just being pedantic and pedestrian here. If he was concerned about various heresies a list of "but not as" would clarify.

Scripturally, no man can say he begot a Son, in the sense of being the primary cause, for all things are by God. The best we can do is say, as other cause, we caused a child to be and that child outwardly is the image of us.

But God, as primary and only true cause, uniquely caused the Son and so it would be fitting to say the Son is "from him" and "of him". Unlike all created things, the Son does not have any cause but the Father!

If God's energies are revealed in his creation then we have an analogy in creation: when a man begets a child, he doesn't in anyway diminish or divide himself and in usual circumstances that which is begotten is in all essential ways is a replica of his Father but always lacks one attribute, that of precedence. In Genesis, it says that God breathed into Adam's nostrils the breathe of life. Using Eusebian literism, we must ask: Was God diminished by this act? Alternatively, we might consider the Genesis account less literally, and consider that in fact God simply caused the man to breathe in a way not readily understood by us and Moses attributed a method his audience could relate to.

One final thought: Eusebius does quote Proverbs 8:22 and in private might even have backed that up with Sirach 1:4. Read literally, both imply God had no wisdom until it was created. In the Hebrew mind: all things are of God, and therefore all things perceivable are creations of God. In his creation made God's wisdom is manifest, so that we'd perceive all things were created with/in God's wisdom (compare Sirach 1:8-9). Reasoning on Sirach: Though the Son is originate, is he to be perceived as a work of God? Especially, considering all works of God are performed by the Son?

Personally, I readily accept that the Son/Logos, in his pre-existence, is neither unoriginate, nor created, but as the scriptures say the first begotten of God. The only others to be begotten are those who are reborn of God. And, in my understanding of 1 John 5:18, no creation is required for the begetal, the subjects already exist.

It is this reasoning that I can't accept Eusebius of Nicomedia's broader teaching in this letter.

All the best.

[alam]

Hello Apostoli:

Hello Alam,

If only I could contract time, I would reply to your last post more comprehensively and precisely.

Thank you for your responses. This will have to be a general response to the content of your next to last post. There is a lot to respond to in it , but more than can be done in a weekend's time.



For now I'll just respond in part, in a prose style (which as a worthy response I feel is still inadequate - my apologies). There are many items in your last post I'd like to discuss. Possibly at some other time, we could revisit them either here or via another thread.

In this post, I am expressing something close to my random thoughts. Respond (or not) as convenient and your time avails. As always, I look forward to any further insights (avenues of thought) you might have.

An aside: This week, I received "The Works of Philo (Complete & Unabridged), New Updated Edition of Yonge's translation (Hardcover, US$20 at Amazon). I've read bits online but can now do a more relaxed study. The relevence to our conversation: Philo may not be representative of 4th century Jewish or Christian thinking (depends on the commentator), but as his works have been preserved by the church/es, it would appear that his thoughts had an influence. Among others, Eusebius of Caesarea is cited as a source for some fragments. My aim is to get into the head of the antagonists in this 4th century play.

Cites/quotes below are from the usual (previous) sources/links...

* the Catholic Encyclopedia
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/
* Yonge's translation of Philo
http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/yonge/
* Eusebius of Caesarea Fragments
http://www.seanmultimedia.com/Pie_Eusebius_Letters_Fragmented.html
* Arius Fragments
http://home.zonnet.nl/chotki/fragments%20from%20arius.htm

Its of interest that you quoted Eusebius of Nicomedia letter to Paulinus. He is asking Paulinus to imitate Eusebius of Caesarea in his zeal for the truth. Who wrote concerning the Nicene consensus that it was agreed "The Holy Scriptures teach [the Son] to be begotten of the Father, by a mode of generation which is 'incomprehensible and inexplicable to all created beings'." (Letter To The Church of Caesarea, written from Nicea). I think this is important to our conversation, as it is something all antagonists on face value agree upon.

Eusebius of Caesarea is of particular interest to me. As I am sure you are aware: Arius, once exiled, found asylum at Caesarea. Also at the opening of the Council of Nicea, Eusebius occupied the first seat on the right of the emperor, and delivered the inaugural address. Whether his prestige was merely political I don't know. But, I presume him to be largely representive of "common" orthodox opinion for the time, and at least in the early days of the controversy seems to have supported Arius.

I've read many an author accusing Eusebius of inconsequence, citing that he bent to the emporer "From the love of peace" but often ignore the end of his letter where he says "at one time we resisted firmly, even to the last hour, when doctrines improperly expressed offended us, and, at another time, we, without contention, accepted the articles which contained nothing objectionable, when after a thorough and candid investigation of their signification, they appeared perfectly comformable with what had been confessed by us in the formulary of faith which we had published."

Reflecting on the beginning of the controversary: Arius' perception was that his bishop was teaching Sabellianism - given Alexander said the Son was of the same substance as the Father. Paul of Samosata, had taught that the Father, Son and Spirit were one person (prosporon) and had used the "substance" terminology. Alexander on the other hand, was talking of three
distinct prosporons, each being different subsistencies, but each being of the same incomprehensible substance. Possibly, if Alexander had chosen a different set of words, the controversary would not have arisen. Three existenses in one substance, is an unusual teaching, unless it is to be understood that three people are all of the same consistency as mankind. Again, a difficult thought, as it reduces God to a genus. However, harking to Philo, the intangible cannot be conceived as the tangible (that perceptable by touch=Oxford meaning). That which can only be perceived through the intelect could be perceived as "intellectually" of the same "interlectual" substance.

I find it perculiar, that Lucianists such as Arius, who were prone to scriptural literalism, went to the extremes they did: by arguing that the Son (in consistency) is not like that of the Father. Possibly, their terminology originated as a response to the teaching of Paul of Samosata, who said the Son or Logos is without hypostasis, being merely the wisdom and science of
God, which is in Him as reason is in a man. And having divorced the Son from the substance of the Father, imo Arius quickly distanced the Son from the Father in all ways. Aka, Arius' opponents understood him to teach extra-scripture whereby the Son was alterable, and could be of a different mind to him who begot him but chose not to be.

Admittedly, to avoid error in orthodoxy, the substantiality of the Son/Logos and the distinction between Father and Son needs to be emphasised, but to say the Son was ex-nihilo, (possibly not by Arius himself) is a worry. Arius in his letter to Alexander says "[the Son] has nothing proper to God in proper subsistence." Depending on philosophical paradigms regarding "Cause" this idea can be argued several ways. The Catholic Encyclopedia has a lengthy article on "Cause" worth a read.

Again relying on Eusebius' Nicea letter for an orthodox view: "It was concluded [at Nicea] that the expression 'being of one substance with the Father' implies that the Son of God does not resemble, in any one respect, the creatures which He has made; but that to the Father alone, who begat Him, He is in all points perfectly like: for He is of the essence and of the
substance of none save of the Father. This interpretation having been given of the doctrine, it appeared right to us to assent to it, especially as we were aware that of the ancients some learned and celebrated bishops and writers have used the term 'consubstantial' with respect to the divinity of the Father and of the Son."

In earlier correspondence elsewhere, I suggested words themselves are meaningless until they are given a universal meaning that is precise, fixed and unalterable (see below). And imo this is what I believe the Nicea meeting attempted to do. Though, as my last post here highlights, words themselves are given aspects, which change their meaning. Substance and co-substantiality are possibly not adequate English words to describe what the Nicenes meant. I quite like the word "consistency", which can be used to speak of a reality of substantiality, our perception of reality and as a predictable outcome. Admittedly, even this word has problems (eg: the possibility of describing God as a compound). However, it does appeal to me: Whenever, I see a flame, perceive its warmth and touch it. I get burnt. Very consistent ;-)

There is a definite echo of Philo in Hippolytus' (whether he intended or otherwise).

The "co-substantial" thought wasn't anything really new, at least in Jewish thought. Philo wrote of the "idea of ideas, the Reason of God" and said "if the image be a part of the image, then manifestly so is the entire form." (On the Creation VI). The context of Philo is that of the incorporal. That which can only be perceived by intellect (if we have the mind of God).

And so we circle back to Eusebius of Caesarea and his account of Nicea: "And here our emperor, most beloved by God, began to reason concerning [the Son's] divine origin, and His existence before all ages. He was virtually in the Father without generation, even before He was actually begotten, the Father having always been the Father, just as He has always been a King and a Saviour, and, virtually, all things, and has never known any change of being or action."

In an earlier post I suggested for the Father to become Father, is problematical. To which you responded: No moreso for him to have become creator. Constantines arguement imo solves the problem.

IMO: If the Son is the Wisdom of God seen by us, then there cannot be when that Wisdom didn't exist (as Athanasius argues).

There may have been when the Son was not, but the Wisdom existed. All things were created in/by God's Wisdom. Thus the Son, who is God's wisdom in action, was begotten as an exact image of his Father, and so cannot be a creation, as all things were created by Wisdom. Creation is that by which we perceive God's wisdom (its manifestation), and was always potentially in God
. The Son cannot be perceived as a manifestation to us, as God's actions are invisible to us and so on.

I think where the Lucians/Arians went wrong is they went beyond the historical terminology of the greater church, possibly subscribing to local traditions that were created from some local threat to accepted dogma, and that stance led them into other errors. Bit like the history of the protestant/reformed churches and the various sects that came out of them. Each have their good points but...

Eusebius of Caesarea says regarding the Nicea conference "it did not appear reasonable to assert or to teach [things like 'out of the non-existent' or that 'there was a time when He was not']...we judged it right to agree; since, indeed, we had never, at any former period, been accustomed to use such terms."

Mind you prior to Nicene, Eusebius had written to Bishop Euphration "we do not say that the Son was with the Father , but that the Father was before the Son...the Son also is himself God, but not true God [as the Son had causation]." Philo spoke of the Logos in a similar way. Elsewhere, Eusebius cites Philo to illustrate a similar point (On Providence (Frag I) also see Philo, On Dreams - Book 1, Chapter XXXVII (para 229))

After analysis, it seems to me, pre-Nicea, Arius was excommunicated because of the perception that his teaching denied the Logos' real Sonship. His doctrine of adoption gauranteed that.

Possibly, Arius went extra Lucian and was misunderstood by Alexander and Athanasius and the 100 bishops assembled at Alexandria. Maybe Arius had a different meaning when he used the word adoption. But in my mind, this is the crux of the dispute.

According to the Catholic Encylopedia Lucian in his Christological system (a compromise between Modalism and Subordinationism) the Word, though Himself the Creator of all subsequent beings was a creature, though superior to all other created things by the wide gulf between Creator and creature" (aka the Logos didn't create himself). Given the exactness of Eastern thought, the Son termed "creature" would have been a worry. After all the temporal cannot be compared to the intemporal. Imo, the whole Arian thought process seems to diverge from the ANFs.

Arius said "The Unbegun made the Son a beginning of things originated; and advanced Him as a Son to Himself by adoption (Frag 2)." On face value, that would be a fair view but for the adoption bit (see below).

As an aside: The Catholic Encyclopedia correlates the 8th century heresy of "Adoptionism" to Nestorianism. Best I can figure, Nestorius taught nothing along the lines of this heresy - which went "Christ as God is indeed the Son of God by generation and nature, but Christ as man is Son of God only by adoption and grace" the Logos indwelling in him. I find it curious that,
ignoring the obvious Islamic influences, the idea sprung up not through the Syrian/Persian churches but in Spain - a stronghold of earlier Arianism. I read somewhere that "the prophet" in early life was influenced by Arian teachings but ultimately asked "What needs God of a Son?"

Logically, if one views the Logos as a thing made, then he can only have become the Son by adoption or as an amphromorphism.

And the later seems the view of the Arian party. Eusebius of Nicomedia says the Son was "not generated from the substance of the Father", but He is "other in nature and power"; He was created, and this is not inconsistent with his Sonship, for the wicked are called sons of God (Is 1:2; Deut 32:18) and so are even the drops of dew (Job 38:28); He was begotten by God's free will.

In contrast to such a very Greek philosophical thought, the Nicenes seem to think on similar lines as the Jews. The first century, Jewish philosopher, Philo, calls the Logos, the archtype, and describes him as: not uncreated as the Father nor created as creatures. Which sounds very much like the teaching of Eusebius of Caesarea.

I didn't pick up on this previously, but I find Arius words carefully selected: "the unbegun" in contrast to those that are "begun/originated". This distances the Son from the creation (which he created), but includes him with all things that have had a beginning. On face value, that too would be acceptable, except Arius uses the word "begot" in terms of an acquisition: God created the Logos, endowed him with certain attributes and then made him as if a Son "the Son being begotten apart from time by the Father, and being created and founded before ages, was not before His generation, but being begotten apart from time before all things, alone was made to subsist by the Father. (Frag 3)"

In a cursory read, Arius' words seem acceptable but the introduction of the God's adoption of the Son, goes against the grain of scripture. Although, the Logos is spoken of as a substantiality, he is also spoken of as incorporal. Meaning, that if the Son is begotten as an exact replica of the Father (Heb 1:3), nothing can be added to him. Is there another "light to the world" beside the Logos?

We really don't have a lot of knowledge about Arius, but I detect there was always some undelying defect in his understanding. The Catholic Encyclopedia says "Arius, who had learnt his religious views from Lucian...took sides with Meletius, an Egyptian schismatic, against Peter, Bishop of Alexandria. But a reconciliation followed, and Peter ordained Arius deacon. Further disputes led [Peter] to excommunicate him. However, [Arius] gained the friendship of Achillas, Peter's successor, [and] was made presbyter by him in 313, and had the charge of a well-known district in Alexandria called Baucalis. This entitled Arius to expound the Scriptures officially."

Of interest to me is Arius' teacher, Lucian (martyred 7 January, 312). The Catholic Encyclopedia says "Though [Lucian] cannot be accused of having shared the theological views of Paul of Samosata, he fell under suspicion at the time of Paul's condemnation, and was compelled to sever his communion with the Church. This breach with the orthodox party lasted during the episcopates of three bishops, Domnus, Timaeus, and Cyril, whose administration extended from 268 to 303. It seems more likely that Lucian was reconciled with the Church early in the episcopate of Cyril (perhaps about 285) than in that of his successor; otherwise it is hard to understand how bishops in the Orient could have received his pupils." As a speculation, Lucians/Arius doctrine was a confrontation/refutation to that of Paul of Samosata, that went extra biblical.

Arius would have been about 63 when he became presbyter. Which is pretty late in life to become a simple priest. Lucian had died a year earlier, maybe that had something to do with the timing. In any case, there seems a 28year gap between Lucian being accepted back into orthodoxy and Arius becoming a presbyter. Something doesn't add up. Another percularity, there was a
three year gap between his protest to Alexander and his excommunication in 321. Possibly, without Lucian's guidance the Arian doctrine evolved (as it did in later years). Is it possible that Arius went beyond Lucian teachings?

It is possible that Alexander and the 100 bishops who in the second** pre-Nicene excommunication of Arius misunderstood the bulk of what he was saying. The clincher imo would have been the "adoption" clause of Arius belief. (** the first excommunication occuring years earlier in the time of Bishop Peter - specific reason unknown to me).

Eusebius of Caesarea wrote Alexander, in response to Alexanders accusations against the Arians "If, therefore, the letter received from [the Arians] tells the truth, they wholly contradict thee, in that they confess that the Son of God who existed before eternal ages, and through whom he made the world, is unchangeable and a perfect creature of God, but not as one of the creatures. But thy epistle accuses them of saying that the Son was made as one of the creatures. They do not say this, but clearly declare that he was not as one of the creatures. See if cause is not immediately given them again to attack and to misrepresent whatever they please. Again thou findest fault with them for saying that He who is begat him who was not. I wonder if any one is able to say anything else than that. For if He who is one, it is plain that everything has been made by Him and after Him. But if He who is not the only one, but there was also a Son existing, how did He who is beget him who was existing? For thus those existing would be two."

To the best of my knowledge, Eusebius of Caesarea believed the Son, to be true Son, begotten by the Father in an incomprehensible manner.



The term of Arius translated "by adoption" is τεκνοποιησας from τεκνον and ποιεω. A verb that is related is τεκνοποιεω meaning "...of the woman, to bear children... of the man, to beget them... of both parents, to breed children..." (An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon Oxford, 1992). As you can see, this is not the same word used for the adoption of sons in the NT, and it is unclear that Arius thought the Son was adopted. He was no Adoptionist as such; he believed in the pre-existence of the Logos, and he believed that the Logos came into being through generation, therefore being a Son, by definition, from his origin. A different translation of the same words of Arius:


"The Unbegun appointed the Son to be Beginning of things begotten,
and bore him as his own Son, in this case giving birth" ([i]A New Eusebius ed. J. Stevenson, 331).


Eusebius of Caesarea was orthodox. St. Lucian of Antioch, the teacher of Arius, the Eusebii and other figures, was also seen as orthodox. The second of the so-called Arian confessions, The Dedication (c. 341) (http://ecole.evansville.edu/arians/2arcon.htm), is thought to be his creed. Lucian was a biblical scholar who produced a corrected text of the GNT. This became the basis of the Byzantine or Eastern Text. The earliest witness of the Lucianic text is the Gothic scriptures of Wulfila (see James Marchand, The Sounds and Phonemes of Wulfila's Gothic, Mouton: The Hague, 1973; p. 24).


Eusebius represents most of the eastern churchmen who subscribed the homoousion despite their reservations, thinking that the explanation given at the council would be authoritative:


"On their dictating this formula, we did not let it pass without inquiry in what sense they introduced “of the essence of the Father,” and “one in essence with the Father.” Accordingly questions and explanations took place, and the meaning of the words underwent the scrutiny of reason. And they professed, that the phrase “of the essence” was indicative of the Son’s being indeed from the Father, yet without being as if a part of Him. And with this understanding we thought good to assent to the sense of such religious doctrine, teaching, as it did, that the Son was from the Father, not however a part of His essence. On this account we assented to the sense ourselves, without declining even the term “One in essence,” peace being the object which we set before us, and stedfastness in the orthodox view" (Letter of Eusebius to his Church, 5 (http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf204.ix.ii.html)).


Eusebius was not a homousian; he never used the homoousion in his theological writings. The following seems to be characteristic of his belief:


"And analogously to this there can be nothing like unto, nor a true copy of, the Supreme Father, Who is unspeakable light, except as regards this one thing only, Whom we are able to call the Son. For He is the radiance of the eternal light, and the unblurred mirror of the activity of God, and the image of His goodness [b][Wisdom 7:26]. Wherefore it was said: " Who being the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person." [[Heb. i. 3.]] Except that the radiance is inseparable from the light of sense, while the Son exists in Himself in His own essence apart from the Father. And the ray has its range of activity solely from the light, whereas (d) the Son is something different from a channel of energy, having His Being in Himself. And, moreover, the ray is coexistent with the light, being a kind of complement thereof; (for there could be no light without a ray:) they exist together and simultaneously. But the Father precedes |167 the Son, and has preceded Him in existence, inasmuch as He alone is unbegotten. The One, perfect in Himself and first in order as Father, and the cause of the Son's existence, receives nothing towards the completeness of His Godhead from the Son: the Other, as a Son begotten of Him that caused His being, came second to Him, Whose Son He is, receiving from the Father both His Being, and the character of His Being. And, moreover, the ray does (148) not shine forth from the light by its deliberate choice, but because of something which is an inseparable accident of its essence: but the Son is the image of the Father by intention and deliberate choice. For God willed to beget a Son, and established a second light, in all things made like unto Himself" (Demonstratio Evangelica iv. 3 (http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/fathers/eusebius_de_06_book4.htm)).




"Nicaea drove Eusebius to accept the term ομοόυσιος, but he never used it in his own work. The nearest he would approach was the Pauline term image, and so it was that Moses saw the likeness of God, though not God Himself. [Pr. Eccl. i. 12, P.G. xxii. 1069.] The Son is called begotten of God 'as alone bearing in Himself the image of the Godhead. . . . He is called so because of this primary likeness.' [D.E. iv. 2, G.C.S. vi, p. 152.] Marcellus pointed out that the image of God is one thing and God Himself is another. If God be the infinite, the unutterable, the transcendent, how can He have an image? Eusebius answered that there can be a living image of such a God, and cited the Scriptures in his support. [C. Marc. i. 4, P.G. xxiv. 764.] The image of the emperor is treated with the deference due to the emperor himself, and so do we regard the Son who is the image of God. [De Eccl. Theol. ii. 23, P.G. xxiv. 961.] But Marcellus' point remains: the image of the emperor is, in fact, not the emperor, and the analogy renders the Son totally different from the Father in respect of ουσία. If Eusebius had been less nervous of the Sabellian overtones of ομοόυσιος he would have spared himself much of the embarrassment inevitably attendant upon analogical definitions of the Deity when an opponent presses the analogy to its limit" (D.S. Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea; Canterbury Press 1961; 130-131 & ftns).


Honorably, Eusebius never condemned the findings of Nicea, but it is clear that he and the other eastern churchmen, especially when confronted with a character like Marcellus of Ancyra who took Nicea as a carte blanche, came to believe that something was lacking in the definition.


Eusebius' theology of the Godhead is considered to be substandard among homousians. Eusebius continued to maintain the third paradigm of the Godhead, now know as Arianism, which is pluralistic but will-based, Dem. Ev. iv. 3 above, as distinct from the pluralistic essence-based thinking now dominant in the East, and "Western" monism. It is not substandard, but is its own view.


Indeed the homousians were unkind to Eusebius; in the Acts of Nicea II, the source for his fragments to Alexander and Euphration, he is cited only to be criticized and condemned.


"In interpreting the verse `I said to the Lord, Thou art my Lord,' he has strayed far away from the true sense, for this is what he says: `By the laws of nature every son's father must be his lord; wherefore God who begat him must be at the same time God, Lord, and Father of the only-begotten Son of God.' So also in his epistle to the holy Alexander, the teacher of the great Athanasius, which begins thus: `With what anxiety and with what care have I set about writing this letter,' in most open blasphemy he speaks as follows concerning Arius and his followers: `Thy letter accuses them of saying that the Son was made out of nothing, like all men. . . . So also, in writing to the bishop Euphration, he blasphemes most openly; his letter begins thus: `I return to my Lord all thanks'; and farther on: `For we do not say that the Son was with the Father, but that the Father was before the Son.. . ." (Testimonies of the Ancients Against Eusebius (http://www.ccel.org/fathers2/NPNF2-01/Npnf2-01-03.htm#TopOfPage)).


So I do not see Eusebius' teachings as indicative of the true meaning of homuosianism. If Eusebius could know what has become of homousianism, I would not be surprised if he found his misgivings to be justified and agreed with the council of Rimini that the homoousion "was too simply inserted by the Fathers (of Nicea), and, not being understood by the people, was a cause of scandal through its not being found in the Scriptures" (Theod. E.H. ii. 16).


Philo's view that the Logos stands between the created and uncreated and Arius' "perfect creation of God, but not as one of the creations" do not conflict, to my thinking. It is a scriptural given, if one accepts the identification of the Logos with Hokhmah, that the Logos is in some sense created. It was a given for the church fathers following the LXX of Proverbs 8:22, as you mentioned below. Also considering the Hebrew original of the passages in Ben Sira. Provided that qualifications are made, which Arius did make (as per Eusebius to Alexander in your above), the description of the Logos as creation should not be faulted.


Athanasius' quotations probably represent what he saw as most typical if not the worst of Arius. If a charitable interpretation can be put on these statements, much has been done toward rehabilitating Arius.


For this cause, I am not inclined to put stock in negative generalizations. We do not have enough of his work to generalize. To me it is enough that his early efforts were seen in a positive way and supported by most eastern churchmen including Eusebius of Caesarea. As it was later stated concerning Arius:

"We have not been followers of Arius,--how could Bishops, such as we, follow a Presbyter?--nor did we receive any other faith beside that which has been handed down from the beginning. But, after taking on ourselves to examine and to verify his faith, we admitted him rather than followed him; as you will understand from our present avowals" (First Arian Confession, c. 341 (http://ecole.evansville.edu/arians/1arcon.htm)).


Hello Alam,

PS: To my last post.

I've just reread Eusebius of Nicomedia's letter to Paulinus, which you cited, and had a rethink on it. As usual, please consider the following as incomplete and me just thinking aloud.


Sure thing, and same here.

To be honest, when I read this letter in the past, it was in Athanasius' context/writings, so I was not giving it a fair reading. Reading it in isolation, imo Eusebius gives in the 2nd paragraph a seemingly orthodox view, but the third paragraph is a worry.

In the second paragraph:

1. [the Son] was not made out of [the unbegotten's] substance, and does not at all participate in the [the unbegotten's] nature.
2. [the Son is] entirely distinct in nature and in power [to the Father]
3. the Son was created, established, and begotten in the same substance and in the same immutable and inexpressible nature as the Maker.

The 1st clause, deals with a heap of philosophical obstacles starting with God is not divisable but it does open the path to ex-nihilo (which imo is closed by the third clause). The second clause combats Sabellianism but opens the path to denying equality (but not rank) in nature and power of the Son to the Father (which imo is closed by the third clause - see below). The 3rd clause would be enlightening to the average trinitarian, the usual focus is on his signing of the Nicene creed and then his withdrawal of support. Plus, the natural disposition towards bad guys, which Athanasius makes him out to be.

In the third paragraph, Eusebius gives his slant on begotten. Apparently, discounting it as a synonym or ,ore particularly a synecdoche (figure of speech, where when something is named, the whole is understood. eg: All things are begat by God, even the drops of dew. Therefore, Begetal=creation). Such literism, imo, presents a very pessimistic view with implications regarding the origin of evil and our ability to be reborn of God (1 Pe 1:23, 1 Jn 5:1,18)(see below). The scriptures are full of allegories: we are born but so are nations (Isa 66:8). We are formed in the womb (Job 31:15; Eccl 11:5), as might nations (Gen 25:23). But in contrast, when begettal and born (including rebirth) are applied to individuals, there is observable evidence and we have no need to rely on presumption.


I take Eusebius' point to be that the scriptures ascribe begettal to God analogically. Everything resembles God somewhat, simply in that it exists, and so in this sense God can be described as the Father of existence. It probably seemed natural to Eusebius and Arius to think of God, the Source of being, in parental terms.

Eusebius' paragraph 2 comes out strongly in favor of the incomprehensibility of the Generation, and the perfect resemblance of the Son to the Father in character and power. But in paragraph 3 he sets out limitations to what can be inferred, in his view, from the terminology of generation. If someone would want to reason from the generation to identity (ταυτότης, not merely "likeness" as the translation has it) of nature between God and the Son, it cannot be done on these grounds, because scripture uses the expression analogically.


As you know, the main point of Arian thought was that there is an induplicable uniqueness to God, which presented itself to them in terms of His being unoriginiate, unbegotten, underived, the ultimate. For them this was the defining characteristic of God because it logically cannot be extended beyond God. If there were two beings in possession of these traits, they would literally be Two Gods. Hence, for them, this constituted the Essence of God. Other traits of God such as power, wisdom, knowledge, or immortality, changelessness, incorporeality, are not the Essence of God, because beings can possess these traits without being God. These traits inevitably "go with" God's Essence, but can also appear in beings who do not have God's Essence.


This is why Arius maintained that "the essences of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost, are separate in nature, and estranged, and disconnected, and alien, and without participation of each other and, utterly unlike from each other in essence and glory, unto infinity..." (Frag. 10 (http://home.zonnet.nl/chotki/fragments%20from%20arius.htm)). He did not say the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost themselves are estranged, and disconnected, and alien. Again, "Not intermingling with each other are their subsistences" (Frag. 3). This is not a petty distinction. For Arius the Son and the Father have much in common: God "gave subsistence to His glories together with Him (the Son)" (To Alexander), and "One equal to the Son, the Superior is able to beget; but one more excellent, or superior, or greater, He is not able" (Frag. 3).

However, God is in Essence unbegun, unbegotten. This is the unique identifier of God the Father; this is His Essence. The Son is in Essence Begun and Begotten. That is as different as it gets. "Foreign from the Son in essence is the Father, for He is without beginning" (Frag. 3).

At that time, Ousia and Hypostasis were synonyms. When Arius wrote that the Essences of the Father and the Son are utterly disconnceted, it was the same as saying their Hypostaseis are utterly disconnected, i.e., they are completely distinct individuals. The line between their individualities cannot be blurred, because what makes One, the Father, WHo He is, is the negation of what makes the Son who He is. In none of this was Arius implying that the Father and the Son are vastly separated in space, or look different, or that one is bigger than another somehow. He was dealing in the realm of what logically distinguishes them, what makes Them distinct beings.

When reading Arius or Eusebius of Nicomedia, or Eusebius of Caesarea, where they mention Essence or Subsistence, thinking of "Identity" rather than "Substance" may help bring out the real character of their views. They are speaking about the peculiar, unique, defining characteristic of God. His qualities of justice, righteousness, love and such are not that characteristic, because God wills that these qualities be possessed by all beings. Undoubtedly these are divine qualities, and come from none other than God. However, they do not distinguish God from all possible beings; instead, if God's will were to be followed by all beings, these qualities would not distinguish God from other beings at all.

What differentiates God from all beings, the Essence of God, is that which could be true of no being but God. To the Arians, this seemed to be the state of being Unoriginate: having no beginning and deriving from nothing else.

With this in view, it should not be hard to understand why they rejected all thought of things being separated out of the Essence of God. This would either treat God's unique Being as something material and divisible, which would be impious, or would be asserting that God in His unique Identity split in two.


The biblical analogy of "nations formed in the womb", might provide a view of the Son's pre-existence before his begettal. If there was an inevitibily of the nations arising, could the same not be said of the Son?

Eusebius concludes the third paragraph, with the statement "All things are of God". Which is true, though I think it would have better to have said "good things".



That may be; however he is simply quoting 1 Corinthians 11:12, and I think with a similar intent.



A little earlier he says "every thing which exists has been called into being by [God's] will. He is God; and all things were made in His likeness, and in the future likeness of His Word, being created of His free will". There is an echo here of Philo, which reduces the pessimism I mentioned earlier. Philo paraphrased, suggests that we are made in the image of God (but in interlect), but through our free will we corrupt that image, but we can, by our own free will return to the original state. But of more interest, Philo says we are made in the image of the archtype which is the actual image of God.

In my opinion the cruncher in the third paragraph is the statement, "For that which is of the unbegotten could not be said to have been created or founded, either by Him or by another, since it is unbegotten from the beginning." I don't believe any of the antagonists thought differently. Its the next part that is a worry: "But if the fact of His being called the begotten gives any ground for the belief that, having come into being of the Father’s substance, He also has from the Father likeness of nature, we reply that it is not of Him alone that the Scriptures have spoken as begotten, but that they also thus speak of those who are entirely dissimilar to Him by nature."

Considering the last sentence: God is intemporal, perceptable only by intellect. The usual English association with the word "substance" is matter. However, the actual Oxford meaning is "the essential nature underlying phenomena or the most important essence of anything". Imo, Eusebius uses the word in the second sense. aka God cannot pass on his unbegottenness. However, Eusebius doesn't seem to allow that apart from this characteristic, there are a series of characteristics that we attribute to God and of which, as maker of all things, are perceived in the Son (ie: Heb 1:3 gr: charakter=exact representation).


I agree with your interpretation of his intention. However, for him, the series of additional characteristics, were not the "Essence" of God. They would be things that go with the Essence, as the rays of the sun "go with" the sun, but they are not the Essence itself. The Essence or Hypostasis of God is simply what makes Him God and not someone else. Thus, the characteristics which God transmitted to the Son- who is someone else- could not be the Essence of God.

Stated in this way it may sound trivial, since it is obvious that the Father is not the Son. However, this perhaps wasn't so clear at the beginning of the fourth century; Arius thought he was dealing wiht people who were sliding into Modalism, or already there.


Of interest, all the things Eusebius offers as "begot" parallels are physical compounds, not intemporal existences. And though we couldn't rationally conceive the Son as an emmission of the Father as some do, it is evident that in some inexplicable way God caused the Son to be. Eusebius, in his letter might have started with this premise, but within the letter he quickly rationalises it away by giving the result of cause, an implied definition of creation.


I do not see what controverts his stated belief that the generation of the Son is incomprehensible. His reference to Job 38:28 is profoundly in keeping with it: "Has the rain a father? or who has begotten the drops of dew? out of whose womb came the ice? and the hoar frost of heaven, who has given it birth?" These were questions which YHWH put to Job, to show to Job his inability to comprehend the ways of God.

If facts of the material creation are reckoned by scripture as not humanly comprehensible, so is the generation of the One who said, "YHWH produced me the beginning of His way, before His works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, before ever the earth was. When there were no depths, I was brought forth; when there were no fountains abounding with water. Before the mountains were settled, before the hills was I brought forth..."

Though his meaning is "creature but not as other creatures", there is no scriptural parallel for this idea (see below).

In my understanding of philosophical terms, nature can be used in a cascade of ways: starting with, that which is specific to an individual, that which is intrinsic to a relational group (eg: family) and so on. The first definition is how I am reading Eusebius use of the word. Imo, an individuals specific nature cannot be directly transmitted, but to be "begotten in the same substance", is to be begotten with the intrinsic nature. In this context, then the Son, imo, is true Son, not by adoption (as Arius said) but by transmission.

I need to explain "transmission", but have only a very inadequate illustration: Ewes will usually only suckle their own young. There is some essential characteristic passed to the lamb by its mother, by which she differentiates it from other lambs.

Expanding on this very inadequate illustration, I might contrast adoption with transmission: An old practice of Australian sheep ranchers: If a ewe dies when suckling a lamb, and elsewhere another lamb has died. The shepherd will skin the dead lamb, lay the skin over the motherless lamb and present it to the mother of the deceased lamb. The ewe usually accepts this lamb as her offspring, because the essence (scent?) of the dead lamb (as perceived by the mother) is given to the new lamb. Of course, in our case, with the help of the Holy Spirit, we are clothed in Christ, and take on the essential inner characteristics by which God recognises us as his children.


Agreed! This seems to be a remarkably good analogy.

When Eusebius argues "If He had been from Him or of Him, as a portion of Him, or by an emanation of His substance, it could not be said that He was created or established". The terms "from Him or of Him" can never be reasoned as a portion or emanation of anyone's substance! But are obviously figurative.


I agree, but some people did want to take it literally. Marcellus of Ancyra, for example,

"maintained that the trinity of persons in the Godhead was but a transitory dispensation. God was originally only One Persorality, but at the creation of the universe the Word or Logos went out from the Father and was God's Activity in the world. This Logos became incarnate in Christ and was thus constituted Son of God. The Holy Ghost likewise went forth as third Divine Personality from the Father and from Christ according to St John, xx, 22. At the consummation of all things, however (1 Corinthians 20:28), Christ and the Holy Ghost will return to the Father and the Godhead be again an absolute Unity" (Catholic Encyclopedia, MARCELLUS OF ANCYRA (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09642a.htm)).




So imo Eusebuis is just being pedantic and pedestrian here. If he was concerned about various heresies a list of "but not as" would clarify.

Scripturally, no man can say he begot a Son, in the sense of being the primary cause, for all things are by God. The best we can do is say, as other cause, we caused a child to be and that child outwardly is the image of us.

But God, as primary and only true cause, uniquely caused the Son and so it would be fitting to say the Son is "from him" and "of him". Unlike all created things, the Son does not have any cause but the Father!


Yes.


If God's energies are revealed in his creation then we have an analogy in creation: when a man begets a child, he doesn't in anyway diminish or divide himself and in usual circumstances that which is begotten is in all essential ways is a replica of his Father but always lacks one attribute, that of precedence. In Genesis, it says that God breathed into Adam's nostrils the breathe of life. Using Eusebian literism, we must ask: Was God diminished by this act? Alternatively, we might consider the Genesis account less literally, and consider that in fact God simply caused the man to breathe in a way not readily understood by us and Moses attributed a method his audience could relate to.


That could be. But again, what I think Eusebius, and Arius, primarily meant by the Essence of God, is the unique identity of God, rather than supposed 'stuff' God is made of which could be diminished or divided up. This is what they thought the homousian reasoning involved: again the end of Arius Letter to Alexander.



One final thought: Eusebius does quote Proverbs 8:22 and in private might even have backed that up with Sirach 1:4. Read literally, both imply God had no wisdom until it was created.

To have created Wisdom, God Himself must be supremely Wise or the equivalent thereof. It is the principle of Psalm 94:9: "He that planted the ear, shall he not hear? he that formed the eye, shall he not see?"


In the Hebrew mind: all things are of God, and therefore all things perceivable are creations of God. In his creation made God's wisdom is manifest, so that we'd perceive all things were created with/in God's wisdom (compare Sirach 1:8-9). Reasoning on Sirach: Though the Son is originate, is he to be perceived as a work of God? Especially, considering all works of God are performed by the Son?


Here is some of what H.A. Wolfson writes about Philo's thinking on the subordinate Wisdom:


As something created by God, wisdom is conceived by him as being intermediate between God's own wisdom and human wisdom and is described as 'the fountain which He drew out of His own Wisdom' [Leg. All. II, 22, 87. In Sacr. 17, 64, God himself is said to be 'the fountain of wisdom' who 'imparts each form of knowledge to the mortal race,' but that evidently means that God is the ultimate fountain of knowledge.] or as the 'flinty rock . . . which He cut off highest and chiefest from His powers.' [Leg. All. II, 21, 86.] As in the case of the created Logos, God is called the Father of Wisdom, [Ibid. I, 19, 64.] and, while Wisdom, unlike Logos, is not called the son of God, it is called the daughter of God, because both in Greek and in Hebrew the word for wisdom is of feminine gender [Fug. 9, 50-52. In § 52, wisdom is said to be called also father because it begets learning in souls.] (Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam vol. i, pp. 255-256 & ftns).


It may be that all the works of God, plural, were contained in the one work of God whereby the Son was generated. Through the Son, this one work has been refracted into all the works of God. According to the book of Wisdom, "For she is the brightness of the everlasting light, the unspotted mirror of the power (ενεργείας, of the Energy or Operation, singular) of God, and the image of his goodness. And being but one, she can do all things: and remaining in herself, she maketh all things new: and in all ages entering into holy souls, she maketh them friends of God, and prophets" (Wis. 7:26-27).


God bless,

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

Thankyou for your reply, and time. I wasn't expecting such a prompt response.

In principal, I have to agree with what you wrote. Thoug, as usual I will think more upon it. In my method (programmers mind) I think I came to many of the conclusions you make seem so obvious. Then again I'm working from learned ignorance. It can be hard to listen to anyone (ie: Arius & the Eusebiuses), even when trying to suppress learned prejudices. So I thankyou for guiding me through the muddy waters.

I searched the web for any Greek versions of the letters but came up empty. So, again I thankyou for the Greek tidbits you provided. My gutt was telling me Arius wasn't meaning adoption in the common form of the expression.

In the data world, there is a thing called data modeling and a method called normalisation. This is where my head has been in considering the "essence/nature" issue. Through this, a computer through data associations, would "realise" that the Father is unbegotton and unique. Its a conclusion based on structure/relationships, rather than an essence/attribute.
Interestingly, without the SuperStructure (which gives a trinity) we get the filoque. With it, orthodox teaching. But as you noted: this isn't where the Arian head was. For them the conclusion is an attribute.

A simple (reduced) model might go...

Arributes--------v-------AttributeType
Structure ---- Entity
SuperStructure--^

Entity: Father, Son, Spirit, Person
Attributes: Entity+AttributeType
Structure: Father+Son, Father+Spirit, Son+Spirit
SuperStructure: Father+Son+Spirit

All the best.

[alam]

Hello Apostoli,

Hello Alam,

Thankyou for your reply, and time. I wasn't expecting such a prompt response.


I hope it wasn't too quick. This week again I have been relatively busy, and didn't know whether to do a complete response, or to respond to some points generally but be prompt. It seemed that it wouldn't do to let the coolest thread sit for a whole week. :-)

But if you would rather space the replies out more, I would be fine with that


I searched the web for any Greek versions of the letters but came up empty. So, again I thankyou for the Greek tidbits you provided. My gutt was telling me Arius wasn't meaning adoption in the common form of the expression.

The Greek is from the Patrologia Graeca (PG) Volumes, at a library near here. Athanasius De Synodis is volume 26.


In the data world, there is a thing called data modeling and a method called normalisation. This is where my head has been in considering the "essence/nature" issue. Through this, a computer through data associations, would "realise" that the Father is unbegotton and unique. Its a conclusion based on structure/relationships, rather than an essence/attribute.
Interestingly, without the SuperStructure (which gives a trinity) we get the filoque. With it, orthodox teaching. But as you noted: this isn't where the Arian head was. For them the conclusion is an attribute.

A simple (reduced) model might go...

Arributes--------v-------AttributeType
Structure ---- Entity
SuperStructure--^

Entity: Father, Son, Spirit, Person
Attributes: Entity+AttributeType
Structure: Father+Son, Father+Spirit, Son+Spirit
SuperStructure: Father+Son+Spirit

All the best.


Sorry, i don't understand the above- programming isn't my forte :-S


All the best,

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

I hope it wasn't too quick. This week again I have been relatively busy, and didn't know whether to do a complete response, or to respond to some points generally but be prompt. It seemed that it wouldn't do to let the coolest thread sit for a whole week. :-)

But if you would rather space the replies out more, I would be fine with that
I've consumed so much of your time, I thought I best not strain the friendship. I started to respond more fully your reply on Eusebius.N. But I put it down, think on it. Leave it. Read it again. Edit it. And the cycle continues. Eventually, I will formulate a hopefully intelligible reply.

The Greek is from the Patrologia Graeca (PG) Volumes, at a library near here. Athanasius De Synodis is volume 26.Thanks for the info. I'll probably have to go down to Moore College in the city. Not a big issue.

Sorry, i don't understand the above- programming isn't my forte :-S Its been my life for a long time. Hard to brake the mental pattern when its 24*7. But in simple terms: think relationships. ie: x begat y.
The logic basically traces backwards, asking who begot y. Derived parent. When you get to God the Father. The system response is "No Parent", the conclusion (logic) God is unbegotten.

Attributes and so on are pure data, think lists (eg: hair color). List items have descriptions. Attributes are associated (linked) with an Entity. If you want to find out if a child has the same color as the father and mother, you'd read the ralationship tables, and compare the hair color attribute.

Anything that can be logically derived through data association (status, state, Is this person a USA citizen etc) are not considered attributes.

Pretty elementry really. I read somewhere, that basically what the early theologians did was sit down and make a list of all the Son's attribute and likewise the Father. Then they compared them. Things like status are excluded automatically, as would "normally resides in heaven", "became man" and so on. NNUS, the association of data has a long history. Computers just take the hard work out of it.

All the best.

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

My post is too long for the system. Have had to cut it in half. Will post the rest some other time.

Just sharing my most recent contemplations - thinking aloud on a couple of points in your post #13. If anything sparks your interest, as usual, I look forward to any response your time permits.

Please keep in mind, that below is not a statement of my beliefs, just consider the below a semblance of the possibilities I have considered and imo, worth discussing.

Eusebius' [of Caesarea] theology of the Godhead is considered to be substandard among homousians. Eusebius continued to maintain the third paradigm of the Godhead, now known as Arianism, which is pluralistic but will-based, Dem. Ev. iv. 3 above, as distinct from the pluralistic essence-based thinking now dominant in the East, and "Western" monism. It is not substandard, but is its own view.Eusebius.C's seems to use "will" as a metaphor (see blue bit in the below quote). As I understand them, the early church used the term "will" in the context of presumed (but actually unkown) operation of God.

Imo, Eusebius.C's teachings seems to be divergent to Arius et al. There were things in common (he is dubbed semi-Arian).

Imo, the differential with Arius, Eusebius.N & Eunomius (as I understand them), Eusebius.C, in his Demonstratio Evangelica, Bk IV, Chaps 1-3, seems to teach the Son is true Son, even in essence and nature. Eunomius in his apology seems to have a dig at those who held similar beliefs.
http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/

"Now common to all men is the doctrine of God, the First and the Eternal, Alone, Unbegotten and Supreme Cause of the Universe, Lord of lords, and King of kings. But the doctrine of Christ is peculiar and common to the Hebrews and ourselves, and, though following their own scriptures, they confess it equally with us. yet they fall far asunder from us, in not recognizing His Divinity...

[the supreme God made] first of all existences next to Himself, His child, the first-born Wisdom, altogether formed of Mind and Reason and Wisdom, or rather Mind itself, Reason itself, and Wisdom itself...the good Child of a good Father...In agreement with which the oracles in theological phrase call Him, "God-begotten," as alone bearing in Himself the image of the Godhead...

...as the Father is One, it follows that there must be one Son and not many sons, and that there can be only one perfect God begotten of God, and not several...there can be [only one] true copy of the Supreme Father, [he] Whom we are able to call the Son. For He is the radiance of the eternal light, and the unblurred mirror of the activity of God, and the image of His goodness...the radiance is inseparable from the light of sense, [though] the Son exists in Himself in His own essence apart from the Father. And the ray has its range of activity solely from the light, whereas the Son is something different from a channel of energy, having His Being in Himself. And, moreover, the ray is coexistent with the light, being a kind of complement thereof; (for there could be no light without a ray:) they exist together and simultaneously...

...the Father...perfect in Himself and first in order as Father, and the cause of the Son's existence, receives nothing towards the completeness of His Godhead from the Son: the Other, as a Son begotten of Him that caused His being, came second to Him, Whose Son He is, receiving from the Father both His Being, and the character of His Being...

...what variation could there be from this complete likeness to the Father, except one that was a declension and an inferiority; a supposition that we must not admit into our theology of the Son: for He is a breath of the power of God, and a pure effluence of the glory of the Creator...

...these are all earthly images...the scope of the theology we are considering far transcends all illustrations, and is not connected with anything physical, but imagines with the acutest thought a Son Begotten, not at one time non-existent, and existent at another afterwards, but existent before eternal time, and pre-existent, and ever with the Father as His Son, and yet not Unbegotten, but begotten from the Father Unbegotten, being the Only-begotten, the Word, and God of God, Who teaches that He was not cast forth from the being of the Father by separation, or scission, or division, but unspeakably and unthinkably to us brought into being from all time, nay rather before all times, by the Father's transcendent and inconceivable Will and Power. "For who shall describe his generation?" he says, and "As no one knoweth the Father save the Son, so no one knoweth the Son save the Father that begat Him."

I take Eusebius' [of Nicomedia] point to be that the scriptures ascribe begettal to God analogically.Imo: if Eusebius.N took the scriptures, to consistently use, "begettal to God analogically", then the same could apply to God and his mercies. Imo: its a very slippery surface, that threatens the teaching of the salvation plan. Did Abraham begat Isacc? Was God the true Father of Isacc? After all, God intervened in causing the conception. Imo, the whole thought process is dangerous.

Eunomius seems to clarify: "XVII many words, which are different in pronunciation, have still the same signification; as He that Is; and the Only True God....Accordingly should we in all things observe the like Equity and Proportion, and not as soon as we hear the name of Son apply'd to Christ, to be displeas'd at the name of a Made Being; as if the Substance were immediately to be suppos'd common, because of this Community of the name [as occurs with men]. For he is a Being, begotten and made by a Being, which was itself unbegotten and unmade...XVIII. How if God, when he begets, does not communicate his own Substance to the Being that is begotten, according as happens among Men, for he is Unbegotten; and when he creates, he does not stand in need of any Matter, since he stands in need of nothing, and is powerful"
http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/eunomius_apology01.htm

In my understanding Eusebius.N and his fellow Lucinists were against allegory. Apparently, one of their hallmarks, was a reputation for taking things literally. Hence my reference to synonyms and synecdoches "(figure of speech, where when something is named, the whole is understood. eg: All things are begat by God, even the drops of dew. Therefore, Begetal=creation=works as Eunomius also has it."

Imo, Eusebius.N is a rationalist, and may have argued (my take on his words) "God is one and alone, seperated from all things, so all things whether they be called begot, created, made, or born of him, from him and so like, refer to his active work, where, by some operation of himself, he made things be. We commonly describe this process as creation. All things God does, is incomprehensible to us (but not always incomprehendable), and so is the begetal of the Son. We do not know how God causes things to be, or from what (if anything), but the scriptures speak of his will, and so this must be the defining perspective. As the Son was begotten by God as a beginning of his creation, the firstborn of creation, we must conclude that he is the first of God's works. A creation but not like other creations, for the later were made by the Son".

On face value, it would be easy for me to be drawn to such a teaching, especially as it is supportable by appeal to scripture. But, in my compilation, I've intentionally loaded the phrasing.

The premise "God is one and alone", would require this to be so always, even now. Thus God is made absolutely unapproachable and unknowable, except by our perceptions of him as prompted in our thoughts on creation or of the Son, and even then, we would perceive, only the Son, who is the actual creator of all things. Who, (as I understand the Arians) is himself, only a reflection of the Father.

Eunomius in his apology seems to solve this problem...

"XII...We therefore affirm the Son to be a Being Begotten, according to the Doctrine of the Scriptures; not imagining him one thing as to his Substance, and yet another thing to be describ'd by the Words apply'd to him; but that he is the very same subsisting Being which the name signifies, the Appellation rightly expressing the Substance;"

"XXIV...For who is there that knowing the Only-begotten himself, and considering that all things, were made by him, will not acknowledge that he at once contemplates the whole Power of the Father... Wherefore if the Word of God demonstrates that his Will is his Operation, and not that his Substance is such; and that the Only-begotten subsisted by the Will of the Father; 'tis certainly necessary that the Son preserve this Likeness, not as to Substance, but as to Operation, which is also his Will... We therefore call him the Image of the Father, not as comparing a Begotten Being with that which is Unbegotten; for that is certainly disagreeable, and in all Beings impossible; but as owning him the Only begotten, and First-born of the Father : the appellation of Son declaring the Substance, as does that of Father the Operation of him that begat him."

Imo: Eunomius side steps, Heb 1:3. The Greek word Charakter, would require the image to go beyond emulation of the Father's power and operation. It requires more, understanding the sensibilities concerning essence and nature, I appeal to the English word Character, and suggest that in this the Son is the same as the Father.

Regarding the Greek word Charakter: If the Son is a replica of the Father. And the Father is unknowable, so must be the Logos/Son. Paul of Samosata seems to argue along these lines. The knee jerk reaction, is to discount the Son to be a reflection as if in a mirror.

In contrast, Eusebius.C seems to have the Son as analogeous to a ray of light, inseperate and undiminished from its source "there could be no light without a ray, they exist together and simultaneously". Which accords with the first part of Hebrews 1:3 where A.Paul describes the Son as "being the brightness of [the Father's] glory".

In the greater arts, we generally admire the artist and not the patron that commissioned the works. And this, imo, is the distinuishing feature of Christianity and the beauty of the doctrine of tri-unity - The artist gives all credit to his patron, but retains his "eminance grise". We wouldn't know of the artist or his works, but for our guide, the Holy Spirit.

The Son being the creator of all things, is by common definition, God. It is this God, the God of Israel, that the scriptures talk about as interacting with mankind (cp. John 5:37). But, ultimately it is this God, who tells us about the Father, his God and our God, his Father and our Father, who is superior, even to the maker of this world. In my perspective, the revelation is not that God has a Son, but the creator of all things is originate and has a Father, who is the originator of our God. This view, leads to a different perspective of texts such as John 20:17, Eph 4:14-15 and particularly Phil 2:6-11.

Philo says that "the angel of the Lord" was God himself (On Dreams, Book 1, X1), manifested in a form that man could endure. To Moses, "the angel of the Lord" appearing in the burning bush, said he was the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. We know, the person who spoke, was he whom we came to know as the Son. And it was he who told Moses "I will take you to me for a people, and I will be to you a god." (Ex 6:7) Moses himself asked "Who is like [our god] among the gods?" (Ex 15:11). At least from an OT viewpoint, the definition of god, has nothing to do with being unbegotten, but what he does in comparison to other gods.

The ancient theist philosophers, supposed that God himself could not have created things directly but through an intermediary. And this seems to permeate all dogmas, Christian or otherwise. So it might be presumed, that this universal opinion, has some basis in group memory, as does the idea of god. Moses seems to have understood this (John 5:46), but later Jews (though opinion varies) seem to reject this, they having only "their God" in all things. But "their God", is the one who we came to know as the Son of God (John 5:39) and he came to declare the "only true God" and attest of himself as his Son (John 1:18, 17:3; 5:41-43).

All the theist philosophies relate to the creator of all things, which the NT identifies as the Son (cp: Col 1:16-17). I ask you to consider, that on the witness of scripture, the idea that the Creator has origin, that our creator is begotten, that our creator has a Father, who is our real source and cause, is more startling than God has a Son. When the Jews were asked to believe that Jesus was the Son of God, they may in fact have been asked to believe that their God, the God of Israel, had a Father, had died for their sins and had been resurrected by his Father, the true God. And when the Gentiles were asked the same, they may have been asked to believe that the maker and regulator of the universe (see Plato), had a God, to whom all glory is reflected by the Son.

With this view, Phil 2:6-8 makes 2:5 most meaningful. And a startling implication: Led by the Holy Spirit, we now worship the Father, through the Son. As the Israelites, worshiped the god of Abraham, the creator of all things, via the High Priest. Our creator, himself, has become our High Priest.

In the OT, reference to the creator, as Father, is rare. Malachi 2:10 has it in this context. But this is not Jesus', nor the Apostles' context in the NT. A.John and A.Paul identify the creator of the world, as the Son (Jn 1:3, Col 1:16, Heb 1:2). Who died for us and was resurrected by his Father. Also consider, there are metaphors of the Israelites being adulterous to their husband (=God). In the NT, the Father is emphasised as the ultimate ruler, but the bride remains with the Son. Also, thinking on the early chapters of Exodus, the God of Israel, put the Egyptians through a series of events to prove himself superior to their gods. In the NT, this God, dies but is resurrected by the only true God, who is superior even to him. Thus the Father is proved, superior even to the maker of this world.

Philo and other ancient philosophers speculated that God caused an archtype to exist, which he called Son and even a second God, by which all things would come to be. But if you compare Philo and the NT, his explanation more readily applies to the Holy Spirit than the Son. Admittedly, Philo describes the Son, the second God, as the Logos, and by familiar association we make the Logos, the Son. Which in A.John's context he is! However, A.John says the Logos was "face to face" (gr: pros) with God, before anything was made and so from the first words of A.John, we depart from Philo.

The NT tells us the whole purpose of the being of intelligent things, is for us to approach and know God. In the NT, one of the endowments we might receive through the Holy Spirit is, we too, might participate in the divine nature (2 Pe 1:4) but it is through participation in the Son that we achieve this (cp. Jn 17:21-23). And it seems to me that this goes beyond, having the mind of Christ. A.Paul at 1 Thes 1:23 implies in all ways we should emulate the Son - take on his character.

To Arius's "God could create another equal to the Son" (Frag 3)(see below), I respond simply that he can't, if equality is requisite on precedence. If the Father is true God, simply on the basis of precedence, being unbegotten, then he cannot be God. Eunomius argues in his apology (XVIII) that we should "not allow...to ascribe entirely different Characters to the same Nature; for we have demonstrated, by all our foregoing Discourse, that those Characters are significative of the Substances themselves." To which I would reply...

In ancient Hebrew thought, God is he who proved himself to be superior to all over gods. And the God of Israel was him whom we call the Son. In a philosophical sence, God is the source and cause of all things that exist, which, in NT scripture, the Son is described as the creator. However, the Father, as true God, is so defined in the NT because he is the source and cause of the Son, and that everything that Son knows and does, he derived from the Father. And, that the creator of the world did die but was resurrected by his Father. And so the individual Characters are preserved, not by an unsubstantiated presumption but by known facts. Consider, Col 2:8.

In Philo's understanding "knowing God" was by intellect/wisdom, know and do the will of God and you will benefit. A.Paul was big on us achieving epignosis, but it was in the context of God sending his only Son and the implications. A.Paul sets his teaching apart from the philosophers, as it is not intellect that is important, but true belief in what we learn, "God has chosen even those who seem foolish" (cp. 1 Cor 1:27; 3:18-20). In Philo's view, the Logos, this "second God", but not true God (see On Dreams, Book 1, section 39 (para 229)) is the prototype of all creation, coming to be by an act of intelligence. In contrast all creatures were formed. In the NT, it is not obeying the will of the Father, that is important, but us making a free will choice to be obedient, led to obedience by faith in the Son. To a Jew, this would seem a departure from the OT, where faith is invested in the God of Israel. But is it?

If we take Philo as representive of at least early first century Alexandrian, Judaic thought, and accept that the angel of the Lord was God himself (in a form we could endure), then Christianity, departs from Judaism. As their God is our mediator with the true God.

If the Son is truely our mediator with God, then one presumes he is in the presence of God, and therefore partakes of his nature, even if only thought of as a transmission. By analogy: Moses became so radiant to the Israelites, he had to cover his head. And all Moses participated in, was the presence of the true Son of God.

Everything resembles God somewhat, simply in that it exists, and so in this sense God can be described as the Father of existence. It probably seemed natural to Eusebius and Arius to think of God, the Source of being, in parental terms.

Eusebius' paragraph 2 comes out strongly in favor of the incomprehensibility of the Generation, and the perfect resemblance of the Son to the Father in character and power. But in paragraph 3 he sets out limitations to what can be inferred, in his view, from the terminology of generation. If someone would want to reason from the generation to identity (ταυτότης, not merely "likeness" as the translation has it) of nature between God and the Son, it cannot be done on these grounds, because scripture uses the expression analogically.As I understand it, most theist believe in a creator, a Father/Mother figure, but not all believe in a God who interacts with us. Which if Eusebius.N thought the scriptures taught analogically is a worry. As I said previously, I perceive him as seeing the term begatal, as a synecdoche. Imo, it would be a better argument for him, than appealing to analogy.

In my opinion there is a contradiction in Eusebius.N's premises. To accept God, the Father, to be unbegetton, we have to examine presumed relationships. As there is none prior to the Father, the conclusion is he is unbegotten. But (as I have in the past) I argue that the concept of "god" is the issue examined at least in Exodus, if not thoughout all scripture. Imo: the scriptural starting point needs to be: what is god? Unbegotten, doesn't tells us anything about his nature or essence, only an unprovable status, believed as a truth, by faith alone.

The implications of applying status to essence/nature are, imo, all negative, and have no basis in scripture. God never relies on status to reveal himself, but by action. The OT is a continuous story of the God of Israel in competition with other gods (whether they be men or demon). In all cases he proves himself, the God above all gods, not by some imperceptable operation, but by an observable activity.

It is by manifestion of essential character, that things are known, that give it identity, not the presumptions of status or state of existence. In Exodus, God is seen to prove who he is. For me, it is the revealed character of God, that makes me want to know him. Those that drowned when the waters of the Red sea closed probably cursed him or more likely the failure of their gods, but Moses praised him. It is encouraging, that despite all the failures of such patriarchs, the god of Israel has led us to the only true God, who is revealed as having sent his very Son, throughout the ages, to guide mankind, not just in mental activity, but even in the trivial activity of day to day life (the Law).

There are implications, in my viewing, as a focal point, the manifestation of the Father of the God of Israel. It might imply duality, but if one accepts a Philo type explanation of the term God referred to above (and which follows the usual contra to the common understanding of John 1:1), and the differentiation between true God and God, this is quickly resolved. Imo: the need is to appreciate what the word means and not the word itself.

Where I see Arius and Eusebius.N failing: They use ambiguous language. "There was when the Son was not" says nothing. Their prime enemies, the Sabellianists would have rapidly agreed. The Sabellianists would also agree with the opposing view "the Son existed always in potentiality, in the mind of God."

Imo: the battle was about defeating Sabellianism. And it seems to me the only defense is that the Son existed in real hypostasis before all things came into existence.

Imo: the Arians thought in negatives and adopted a negative premise of the Father, forcing them to denigrate the Son (whether intentionally or not), and in consequence denigrate the relevence of his sacrifice for us (whether intentionally or not). The last words of Col 1:16 underline my stance "all things were created by [the Son] and for [the Son]" for that was the will of the Father (vs 19).

Unless it is clearly and unambiguiosly taught that in all ways the Son is the exact replica of the Father, then, as the Son is the actual creator of all things, it allows the potential, to understand that creation could be flawed (as the philosophers did and do).

Possibly, the Arians didn't see the implications of their explanations, but history shows what other people can do with flawed teaching. If "God can create another equal to the Son", no matter how one qualifies it, such a thought potentialy discounts the Son. If the Son is only spiritually/accademically aligned with God, and is changeable, but chose not to be. Then we must assume, that should he have chosen unwisely, he would have been disposed of (compare Satan's future fate).
Imo: the "Arian" ideas, would ultimately lead to a solution such as Islam's "What needs God of a Son?"

Imo: Belief in true sonship, his incarnation, his death and ressurection are what differentiates Christianity from Judaism and Islam. And while most in the 4th century seem to hold this belief, some teachings seem highly suspect, in their actual meaning.

Imo: the Arians discount the sonship and strived to remove the teaching of actual sonship. With such a view, one has to gravitate towards the beliefs that evolved through Abrahams waring children.

Imo: For our salvation to be true, the apostle's testimony must be taken at its word. God sent his only begotten Son to be saviour of the world. It is the Arian idea of lumping the son with all God's other "sons", that puts distance between all Arian beliefs and the faith of the apostles. What the Arians seemed to have failed to acknowledge, using Eusebius.N's view of the word begotten, all sons of God are begotten by the firstborn Son, just as the dew drops are begotten by the Son (Eph 3:9-10).

All the best!

[alam]

Hello Apostoli,

Thanks for your response. The time you put into these discussions is appreciated. Thank you also for being patient when I am quiet around here for a few days. Recently in RL I have had a lot of writing to do. Your posts are always interesting and contain much to think upon.


Hopefully catch up with you in a few days (Btw- if you wanted, you could post the next segment of your reply, since there is now an intervening post)

God bless

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

Thanks for your response. The time you put into these discussions is appreciated. Thank you also for being patient when I am quiet around here for a few days. Recently in RL I have had a lot of writing to do. Your posts are always interesting and contain much to think upon.Ditto in all. As I said in the past. I'm tired of disputes and the tinkling of bells. So, I am very appreciative of the opportunity to have a reasoned discussion. I never hold that I am right on anything, so I am also appreciative to have guidance (direct and indirect) in my contemplations.

Hopefully catch up with you in a few daysFirst principal: you are the temple of God. Take care of it ;-)

Please, make reponding to me a low priority in the things of your life. I fear I may become a burden to you. But in the same breathe, I eagerly await your responses. Ah! Life is full of contradictions.

Btw- if you wanted, you could post the next segment of your reply, since there is now an intervening post
Thankyou. And so I have. I just reread my last post, and in a couple of spots there are gaps in thoughts. Put it down to editing ;-) It is such a broad topic, it is hard to be concise.


[Arius] did not say the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost themselves are estranged, and disconnected, and alien.But that is how he was and must be understood. The scriptures tell us to put on the nature of Christ. Without it we are estranged from God. But whats the point unless the Son has the same nature as God. I have to suppose that in the ancient world, nature and essence had different meanings, to that understood today. I differentiate them as disposition and quality. And I view them as action words. Aka, something only exists as a reality to us if it is made manifest. Which, if I understand scriptures such as John 1:18 correctly, that is what the whole NT is about!

In book 4, Chapter 3 of Demonstratio Evangelica, Eusebius of Caesarea explains "..light being of one essence, we are absolutely obliged to regard the perfect thing that is begotten of light to be one also. For what other thing would it be possible to conceive of as begotten of light, but the ray only, which proceeds from it, and fills and enlightens all things?"

If the Arians wanted to highlight the seperate identities of Father and Son, causation is more than adequate, Eusebius.C does this more than adequately.

To combat Sabellianism and the like, all that would be required is the statement that the Son was caused to exist in actuality, with his own hypostasis, before anything else came into existence, and set face to face with God, and obeying his Father, the Son caused all things to come into existence as the Father named them. John 1:1-2, puts it nicely, but as these text are argued, a legalistic interpretation, substantiated by scripture, seems appropriate.


At that time, Ousia and Hypostasis were synonyms. When Arius wrote that the Essences of the Father and the Son are utterly disconnected, it was the same as saying their Hypostaseis are utterly disconnected, i.e., they are completely distinct individuals. The line between their individualities cannot be blurred, because what makes One, the Father, WHo He is, is the negation of what makes the Son who He is. In none of this was Arius implying that the Father and the Son are vastly separated in space, or look different, or that one is bigger than another somehow. He was dealing in the realm of what logically distinguishes them, what makes Them distinct beings.Imo, Cause is a better distinction. Eunonius seems to tread this path. Various schools of philosophy argued that matter was unbegotten. But even they perceived God as, that which caused matter to be formed into things, the First Cause - his most universally accepted distinction. To use the "unbegotten" even against philosophers would be disingeneous and it wouldn't be useful to make this an attribute, but as I harp on, as a conclusion, it would be self evident. And as I noted above, "unbegotten" provides no defense against Sabellianism.

In his introduction to Book 5, of Demonstratio Evangelica, Eusebius of Caesarea seems to have no problem associating the nature and essence of God with the Son...

"Two ways of considering our Saviour Jesus Christ have been illustrated in of the Proof of the Gospel: the first takes us above nature and beyond it: on its road we defined Him to be the Only-begotten Son of God, or the Word [b]Who is of the essence of God, the secondary cause of the Universe, or a spiritual substance, and the firstborn nature of God all-perfect, His holy and perfect Power before things created, or the spiritual image of the Unbegotten nature. The second was akin and more familiar to ourselves; on its road we defined Christ as the Word of God, proclaiming in human nature the holiness of the Father, according as He appeared in human form long before to those with Abraham, that famous ruler of the men of God, and was predicted to appear again among men by human birth, and with flesh like ours, and to suffer the extremest shame.
http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/eusebius_de_07_book5.htm

My gut is telling me, when Eusebius.N and Arius use the words they do, they are falling back to philosophical speculation that God is knowable and approachable but by intellect=mind alone. This seems to put a limitation on God's ability to fully communicate himself, should he will to do so. It is a contradiction in concept.

If this "unknowability, ineffable" thing is true, then the Son himself, as the exact replica (Heb 1:3) of the Father, has to be defined as such also. Which is a major threat to the standard concept of the salvation plan. I guess this is the starting point of those who deny the real pre-existence of the Son, whereby, the Son was just a man, who in intellect was endowed with the mind of Adam, the image of the mind of God. Imo, the same might be said of the Buddhas (see Oxford dictionary), and, imo, Budhism has a better explanation of that view. In any case, extreme unitarism and the like, shows how dangerous the Arian philosophies can be.


The Catholic Encyclopedia, discussing Homoousion, says: ...homos [is] ambiguous; [and] the word ousia itself was often taken as equivalent to hypostasis (person), as apparently is the case in the anathema attached to the Nicene Symbol. And therefore the affirmation of the identity of nature might be taken in the heretical sense of the Sabellians, who denied the distinction of person...Tertullian had used the Latin equivalent of Homoousion, conceding to Praxeas, the Sabellian, that the Father and the Son were unius substantiae, of one substance, but adding duarum personarum, of two persons (Adv. Prax., xiii).

Imo, the word argument of Homoosion, Homoiosion, Heteroousion, Homean and any other such words, is unhelpfull. Heb 1:3, Charakter, is the only biblical term that I know of that gives a satisfactory definition, that distinguishes the Son from the Father, and from created things and to convey the idea that "the Son is like the Father in all ways", yet it doesn't get a look in. But, imo, Homoosion or Homoiosion are closer than the alternatives. Though, I would only use them with qualification as Tertullian did.

Turning to philosophy: Hippolytus (book VII, Chap. VI), sets out Aristotle's opinion on substance where "substance is threefold, viz, genus, species and individual...I comprehend under a name the man who constitutes a species that is generated from a genus, I denominate a substance of this description an individual...(as regards) the individual, since it has been comprehended under a name, it is not possible that, according to its own nature, it could be divided into anything else." Aka, what distinguishes one individual from another is the unique, manifested characteristics, but more particularly its name. And by definition, character is only perceived from activities of an individual. In the Father's case, the begettal of the Son. And the name Father makes him distinct from the Son.

Eunomius has an insight on this "XI. Now 'tis plainly impossible that any things should have place in the Essence of God, of such a Nature as Species, or Magnitude, or Quantity; because on all accounts God, must be free from all Composition."

In completeness, God is ineffable, but in scripture there are aspects of him made manifest. Only in our minds is he composed of these aspects. But in truth, that is the only way we can realistically conceive him. So to us, this is the substance of him (though to be pious we must assume, not how he is of himself). And the Son, excluding the aspect of precedence (which belongs to the Father), is spoken of as having the same aspects. But with the addition of the aspects of Son and Lord.

Imo: the whole argument about co-substantiality, on all sides, isn't helpful in combating Sabellian and like arguments. Nor in defining the true God and his Son.

Imo: Apart from the pre-existence of the Son, Sabellians (variously) would agree with the "H" definitions presented in the 4th century. The only defence is emphasising the actual pre-existence of the Son, in a real hypostasis, and his actual distinction of one individual being Father and another Son.

Imo: The Arians were more attuned to the arguments of Paul of Samosata, that orthodoxy. The major differentiator between them: though Paul.S argued that the Son had pre-existence, but without hypostasis, the Arians argued the Son had hypostasis, but made it existing without any semblance to the Father's (created from nothing). Quoting the Catholic Encyclopedia, Paul.S taught...

"Union of two Persons is possible only by agreement of will, issuing in unity of action, and originating by love. By this kind of union Christ had merit; He could have had none had the union been by nature. By the unchangeableness of His will He is like God, and was united to Him by remaining pure from sin. By striving and suffering He conquered the sin of our first parent, and was joined to God, being one with Him in intention and action."

Of course Paul.S is talking of the Son/Christ and not the Son/Logos, whom he described as "merely the wisdom and science of God, which is in Him as reason is in a man" and is without hypostsis. At least the Arians didn't follow Paul.S in this regard, but they do attach his teaching of the Son/Christ, to the Son/Logos. Paul.S strived to distinguish the Son/Christ and God. Though he used the word homoousios, his sense was the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are but a single Person (prosopon), his focus was that the Son/Christ was no part of that substance.

Imo: Modern Sabellian teaching, draws much from Arianism: starting with "there was when the Son was not" and "the Son was created from nothing". Their context being the Son's conception in the womb of Mary. When they say that God "tented" in the flesh, they tend towards the Arian view of attribution. The semi-Arian and Athanasian view, where the Son, in both his pre-existence and incarnation, having attributes natural to him, defeats these presumptions. Standard modalism is also defeated, as the Son is given a real pre-existence, as a real individual, distinct from the Father, begotten in a real hypostasis before all things that came to exist.

When reading Arius or Eusebius of Nicomedia, or Eusebius of Caesarea, where they mention Essence or Subsistence, thinking of "Identity" rather than "Substance" may help bring out the real character of their views.Imo, you have hit the nail on the head, regarding the fault in Arius' and Eusebius.N's teaching. As there is one church with many members, there is only one identity of the church. Imo, Eusebius of Caesarea may have understood this, but Arius and Eusebuis.N confounded the issue. Imo, it is a fine line, to seperate the Father and Son, individual identities indeed, but individuals working as one.

Referring to the first words of Paul.S cited above, it would be hard to disagree with him. But focusing on the highlighted bit, I ask: Is it neccessary for the Son to have merit, in the sense that Paul.S and Arians use it? The primary meaning in the Oxford of "merit" is "commendable quality". In my understanding of John 10:18,15 (paraphrased), Jesus says "No one [can take my life from me] but I lay it down willingly. I have the right to surrender it, and the right to receive it again. This I have received of my Father, who desires me to exercise this right [on behalf of my sheep]." (cp. NWT Interlinear, NEB, KJV). Imu, this authority/right/power, is the Son's by nature (col 1:19). To exercise it, is the will of the Father and the Son's disposition is to do the will of his Father (Phil 2:5).

Again, "Not intermingling with each other are their subsistences" (Frag. 3). This is not a petty distinction. For Arius the Son and the Father have much in common: God "gave subsistence to His glories together with Him (the Son)" (To Alexander), and "One equal to the Son, the Superior is able to beget; but one more excellent, or superior, or greater, He is not able" (Frag. 3).If precedence is the defining essence of an individual, then "one equal to the Son", cannot be created by the Father. Unless of course, precedence as a defining essence of an individual, does not disallow "equality" to be invested in whatever is begotten. But, my understanding is, the Arians taught the Son is not equal to the Father in all conceivable ways.

Imo, as the exact image of the Father, the Son, in his heavenly state, is equal in all elemental ways to the Father. Only in his individuality and status as Son is he different.

Imo, Arius and Eusebius.N use a lot of high language. And this is, imo, the greatest danger of their teaching, whether it was meant as orthodox or not. Politicians and used car salesmen use this technique to let the hearers, hear what they want, while hiding what the actually mean. Sends a red alert, when I encounter it. Eunomius seems more reasonable, though I find his baseline argument flawed, but I understand his point.

Compare Eusebius.C. He seems uncomplicated to me, saying exactly what he believed, in a clear and precise manner, without double meaning. And I don't see too many issues with his stance.

All the best.

[alam]

Greetings Apostoli:
Hello Alam,

My post is too long for the system. Have had to cut it in half. Will post the rest some other time.
In the following I have not been able to respond to all your points, but have tried to hit the main ones. You'll be the judge if they are the right ones ;-)
Just sharing my most recent contemplations - thinking aloud on a couple of points in your post #13. If anything sparks your interest, as usual, I look forward to any response your time permits.

Please keep in mind, that below is not a statement of my beliefs, just consider the below a semblance of the possibilities I have considered and imo, worth discussing.
My gut is telling me, when Eusebius.N and Arius use the words they do, they are falling back to philosophical speculation that God is knowable and approachable but by intellect=mind alone. This seems to put a limitation on God's ability to fully communicate himself, should he will to do so. It is a contradiction in concept.

If this "unknowability, ineffable" thing is true, then the Son himself, as the exact replica (Heb 1:3) of the Father, has to be defined as such also. Which is a major threat to the standard concept of the salvation plan. I guess this is the starting point of those who deny the real pre-existence of the Son, whereby, the Son was just a man, who in intellect was endowed with the mind of Adam, the image of the mind of God.
As per #2 (http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showpost.php?p=1437057&postcount=2), Arius didn't consider God fully unknowable. Eunomians faulted Arius for teaching God is partly knowable, implying for them that God has parts (Philostorgius, Epitome x. 2 (http://www.vitaphone.org/history/philostorgius.html)). A fully unknowable God is not an issue to Arius. He probably knew a distinction between the essence and energy of God, as Eunomius did, and as is standard theology today. The writer (Fr. Romanides) you directed me to considers the "Arians" as distinct from the Eunomians, to have conformed with subsequent Orthodox (Nicene) views on this matter (http://www.romanity.org/htm/rom.18.en.augustine_unknowingly_rejects_the_doctrine.02.htm).
Eusebius.C's seems to use "will" as a metaphor (see blue bit in the below quote). As I understand them, the early church used the term "will" in the context of presumed (but actually unkown) operation of God.

Imo, Eusebius.C's teachings seems to be divergent to Arius et al. There were things in common (he is dubbed semi-Arian).

Imo, the differential with Arius, Eusebius.N & Eunomius (as I understand them), Eusebius.C, in his Demonstratio Evangelica, Bk IV, Chaps 1-3, seems to teach the Son is true Son, even in essence and nature. Eunomius in his apology seems to have a dig at those who held similar beliefs.
http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/

"Now common to all men is the doctrine of God, the First and the Eternal, Alone, Unbegotten and Supreme Cause of the Universe, Lord of lords, and King of kings. But the doctrine of Christ is peculiar and common to the Hebrews and ourselves, and, though following their own scriptures, they confess it equally with us. yet they fall far asunder from us, in not recognizing His Divinity...

[the supreme God made] first of all existences next to Himself, His child, the first-born Wisdom, altogether formed of Mind and Reason and Wisdom, or rather Mind itself, Reason itself, and Wisdom itself...the good Child of a good Father...In agreement with which the oracles in theological phrase call Him, "God-begotten," as alone bearing in Himself the image of the Godhead...

...as the Father is One, it follows that there must be one Son and not many sons, and that there can be only one perfect God begotten of God, and not several...there can be [only one] true copy of the Supreme Father, [he] Whom we are able to call the Son. For He is the radiance of the eternal light, and the unblurred mirror of the activity of God, and the image of His goodness...the radiance is inseparable from the light of sense, [though] the Son exists in Himself in His own essence apart from the Father. And the ray has its range of activity solely from the light, whereas the Son is something different from a channel of energy, having His Being in Himself. And, moreover, the ray is coexistent with the light, being a kind of complement thereof; (for there could be no light without a ray:) they exist together and simultaneously...

...the Father...perfect in Himself and first in order as Father, and the cause of the Son's existence, receives nothing towards the completeness of His Godhead from the Son: the Other, as a Son begotten of Him that caused His being, came second to Him, Whose Son He is, receiving from the Father both His Being, and the character of His Being...

...what variation could there be from this complete likeness to the Father, except one that was a declension and an inferiority; a supposition that we must not admit into our theology of the Son: for He is a breath of the power of God, and a pure effluence of the glory of the Creator...

...these are all earthly images...the scope of the theology we are considering far transcends all illustrations, and is not connected with anything physical, but imagines with the acutest thought a Son Begotten, not at one time non-existent, and existent at another afterwards, but existent before eternal time, and pre-existent, and ever with the Father as His Son, and yet not Unbegotten, but begotten from the Father Unbegotten, being the Only-begotten, the Word, and God of God, Who teaches that He was not cast forth from the being of the Father by separation, or scission, or division, but unspeakably and unthinkably to us brought into being from all time, nay rather before all times, by the Father's transcendent and inconceivable Will and Power. "For who shall describe his generation?" he says, and "As no one knoweth the Father save the Son, so no one knoweth the Son save the Father that begat Him."
His beliefs were not identical to Arius'. Nonetheless, I do not think Eusebius should be considered a partisan of homousianism or a counterargument to Arius. One can read the source for his letter to Alexander etc. from Nicea II to see how poorly later ones thought of his theology (Testimonies of the Ancients Against Eusebius (http://www.ccel.org/fathers2/NPNF2-01/Npnf2-01-03.htm#P449_282059)). Nearer his time, Philostorgius, a Eunomian, faults him for teaching "the Deity as unintelligible and incomprehensible" (Epitome i. 2 (http://www.vitaphone.org/history/philostorgius.html)); Jerome calls him "most open defender of the heresy of Arius" (Epistle 65 (http://www.aroundomaha.com/ecf/volume24/ECF00003.htm)), saying: "Eusebius, bishop of Caesarea, formerly leader of the Arian party, has written six books in defense of Origen... with much evidence he has proved that Origen was, from his point of view, a Catholic, that is, from ours, an Arian" (Apology against Rufinus i. 8 (http://www.aroundomaha.com/ecf/volume24/ECF00003.htm)). The links given contain much more information.

Twice you cited "the ray is coexistent with the light, being a kind of complement thereof; (for there could be no light without a ray:) they exist together and simultaneously" followed by ellipses, indicating that you believe this was Eusebius' view. To me it is clear, in context (given in #13 (http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showpost.php?p=1453857&postcount=13)), that Eusebius was contrasting this with: "But the Father precedes the Son, and has preceded Him in existence, inasmuch as He alone is unbegotten. The One, perfect in Himself and first in order as Father, and the cause of the Son's existence, receives nothing towards the completeness of His Godhead from the Son... And, moreover, the ray does not shine forth from the light by its deliberate choice, but because of something which is an inseparable accident of its essence: but the Son is the image of the Father by intention and deliberate choice. For God willed to beget a Son, and established a second light, in all things made like unto Himself" (Demonstratio Evangelica iv. 3 (http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/fathers/eusebius_de_06_book4.htm)). No analogy holds in all respects; for Eusebius, this is where the analogy of light and ray fails.
Eusebius.C's seems to use "will" as a metaphor (see blue bit in the below quote). As I understand them, the early church used the term "will" in the context of presumed (but actually unknown) operation of God.
It may be a metaphor, but I don't think it's a contentless filler for an unknown operation. "Will" is the term for God's power to produce and have deliberate dealings with things whose existence follows from no necessity in God. It describes the realm of free divine activity.

In terms of a syllogism, God is "him who worketh all things after the counsel of his will" (Eph. 1:11); Generation is a working or operation of God, therefore it is after the counsel of His will. Homousianism denies the minor premise, but this appears to be arbitrary. Cp. parallel use of "generation" in respect of the Son, and in respect of the elect, in 1 John 3:9; 5:18; John 1:13.

There is the question of what difference it makes. There are various ways of approaching this. One way of approach is that will is the domain of freedom, essence is that of necessity. Freedom transcends necessity. We have a concept of this when we deny that our thoughts and actions are either fully determined, or merely random, or again a mere combination of the two. Our intuition (correct me if you disagree) is that they chart a course over these alternatives. Whether this intuition is true is another matter. Nevertheless, from it we do get a concept of freedom, even if negative in its form. I submit that it is in exercising this freedom (as it seems to us) that our behavior is most reflective of who we are. In contrast, involuntary mechanisms, reflexes, instinct-driven behaviors are not expressive of our 'who', but of our 'what'. And a 'what' as such is inherently inpersonal. It is about essence, necessity, determinations. In our experience, these are never self-explanatory. They are always caused by something else and, should there be no cause, they are assumed to be random. However, a free act is in a certain sense its own explanation. There may be things that influenced it, but these externals do not fully determine the act; it transcends them in this way

Theism holds that the ultimate reality is more like a person, a Who, than a thing or What. It holds that a free act (creation) is the real explanation of things. Although in our experience will is often subject to nature, the idea of theism is that at the ultimate level, the opposite obtains: nature is subordinate to will. Nature does not explain itself, rules do not account for themselves, they just are; the ultimate account of things looks less like a thing, less like a rule, and more like a person freely acting. Accordingly this person's acts transcend the possibility of a full explanation either in terms of previous conditions, or as mere random chance. Kharis and Agape, the terms descriptive of His acts, also defy such analysis.

Now the Person of the ultimate is either also a 'What', or is not. If He too, at least in part, is a What, an It, where is the explanation of this final What? The assumption that leads us to a Person rather than a Thing as the real cause of things is that 'things' do not explain themselves.

The definitions of theism, teaching that this Person is incorporeal, uncompounded, immutable, etc, are ways of phasing the determinable, quantifiable 'whats' out of our concept of this Person. The direction is toward a 'Who' attached to no conceivable 'What,' One who is to us in positive terms pure 'Who,' limited or conditioned in no way.

This One produces for Himself attributes with the same, free, operation whereby He creates and engages with the world. Thus, His resultant nature, insofar as comprehensible, is subordinate to His will. By participating with Him in these operations, beings can partake of His 'nature', but this nature is not the source of Who He is, rather the reflection of it.

So for the will-based paradigm, the Who comes before the What. A free and gracious choice is prior to any delimitable nature or necessity. God's will expresses clearly and knowably Who He is; but it does not flow from 'What' He is; it rather produces What He is, relative to creatures. This may well be the meaning of the equivalence Exodus implies for 'Ehyeh asher Ehyeh in the Qal stem, "I am becoming what I am becoming," and YHWH in Hif'`il, "He causes to become." He becomes what He becomes by causing things to become, and, as per Eph. 1:11, this is at the counsel of His own will.

It would change things around if we learned from Ephesians, not that He has worked all things according to His will, but that all things are outworkings of the necessity of His nature. This would deeply affect how we think of God and of ourselves relative to God. We would be more in the realm of Spinozism than monotheism in its traditional understanding. It would change how we think of the grace of God and His love. Gregory of Nazianzus was aware of the fear: he describes it in his First Oration Concerning the Son (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/310229.htm):

"For we shall not venture to speak of "an overflow of goodness," as one of the Greek Philosophers dared to say, as if it were a bowl overflowing, and this in plain words in his Discourse on the First and Second Causes. Let us not ever look on this Generation as involuntary, like some natural overflow, hard to be retained, and by no means befitting our conception of Deity."

But it seems we cannot easily get away from this in the essence-based framework. In his Second Oration on Easter v. (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/310245.htm), Gregory used a similar metaphor not merely of the generation, but the creation.

"But since this movement of Self-contemplation [viz. the Trinity's self-contemplation, cf. iv.] alone could not satisfy Goodness, but Good must be poured out and go forth beyond Itself, to multiply the objects of Its beneficence (for this was essential to the highest Goodness), He first conceived the Angelic and Heavenly Powers. And this conception was a work fulfilled by His Word and perfected by His Spirit. And so the Secondary Splendours came into being..."

Why shouldn't the Good be like an overflowing bowl? This is depersonalized and mechanistic, it is simple necessity. When and if this becomes the dominant metaphor, the concept of the divine grace and agape in its fullest sense is lost, imo. For the so-called Arian,

"But the Jew says, "Well, does God have a Son? Should this be believed?" Listen: God most certainly has a Son, Whom He begat not as men, but as it befits God to beget, impassibly, incorruptibly, God-like. One begat One, Only begat Only, God begat God, King begat King, Unbegotten begat Only-Begotten, Father begat Son; Author begat Word; Creator begat Creator; Eternal begat Eternal; Spirit begat Spirit; Light begat Light; Splendor begat Splendor; Faithful begat Faithful; Good begat Good; Merciful begat Merciful; Perfect begat Perfect" (Maximinus, Contra Iudaeos xii. 8, from Gryson's latin text).
This is revelatory of Who God is, because it is at His gracious Will.
"Who being alone, not to the division or diminution of His divinity, but to the display of His goodness and power by His will and power alone, passionless passionlessly, incorruptible incorruptibly, immovable immovably, did create and beget, make and establish an only-begotten God" (Auxentius on Wulfila James Marchand tr. (http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/jod/texts/auxentius.trans.html)).Imo: if Eusebius.N took the scriptures, to consistently use, "begettal to God analogically", then the same could apply to God and his mercies. Imo: its a very slippery surface, that threatens the teaching of the salvation plan. Did Abraham begat Isacc? Was God the true Father of Isacc? After all, God intervened in causing the conception. Imo, the whole thought process is dangerous.
Understood. Apparently for Eusebius N. the fatherhood of God was the default for all beings. For all beings, in lieu of anyone who more closely matches the description of father, God is the father (cf. Luke 3:38). Although this mysterious, universal relation of fatherhood between Being and beings, God and creatures, must be stretched very thin to extend to the drops of rain, it becomes concentrated and concrete in the person of the Son. That the first of creation is a Son, sets the tone for the rest of creation. I think this would be close to their view.
Eunomius seems to clarify: "XVII many words, which are different in pronunciation, have still the same signification; as He that Is; and the Only True God....Accordingly should we in all things observe the like Equity and Proportion, and not as soon as we hear the name of Son apply'd to Christ, to be displeas'd at the name of a Made Being; as if the Substance were immediately to be suppos'd common, because of this Community of the name [as occurs with men]. For he is a Being, begotten and made by a Being, which was itself unbegotten and unmade...XVIII. How if God, when he begets, does not communicate his own Substance to the Being that is begotten, according as happens among Men, for he is Unbegotten; and when he creates, he does not stand in need of any Matter, since he stands in need of nothing, and is powerful"
http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/eunomius_apology01.htm

In my understanding Eusebius.N and his fellow Lucinists were against allegory. Apparently, one of their hallmarks, was a reputation for taking things literally. Hence my reference to synonyms and synecdoches "(figure of speech, where when something is named, the whole is understood. eg: All things are begat by God, even the drops of dew. Therefore, Begetal=creation=works as Eunomius also has it."

Imo, Eusebius.N is a rationalist, and may have argued (my take on his words) "God is one and alone, seperated from all things, so all things whether they be called begot, created, made, or born of him, from him and so like, refer to his active work, where, by some operation of himself, he made things be. We commonly describe this process as creation. All things God does, is incomprehensible to us (but not always incomprehendable), and so is the begetal of the Son. We do not know how God causes things to be, or from what (if anything), but the scriptures speak of his will, and so this must be the defining perspective. As the Son was begotten by God as a beginning of his creation, the firstborn of creation, we must conclude that he is the first of God's works. A creation but not like other creations, for the later were made by the Son".

On face value, it would be easy for me to be drawn to such a teaching, especially as it is supportable by appeal to scripture. But, in my compilation, I've intentionally loaded the phrasing.

The premise "God is one and alone", would require this to be so always, even now. Thus God is made absolutely unapproachable and unknowable, except by our perceptions of him as prompted in our thoughts on creation or of the Son, and even then, we would perceive, only the Son, who is the actual creator of all things. Who, (as I understand the Arians) is himself, only a reflection of the Father.

Eunomius in his apology seems to solve this problem...

"XII...We therefore affirm the Son to be a Being Begotten, according to the Doctrine of the Scriptures; not imagining him one thing as to his Substance, and yet another thing to be describ'd by the Words apply'd to him; but that he is the very same subsisting Being which the name signifies, the Appellation rightly expressing the Substance;"

"XXIV...For who is there that knowing the Only-begotten himself, and considering that all things, were made by him, will not acknowledge that he at once contemplates the whole Power of the Father... Wherefore if the Word of God demonstrates that his Will is his Operation, and not that his Substance is such; and that the Only-begotten subsisted by the Will of the Father; 'tis certainly necessary that the Son preserve this Likeness, not as to Substance, but as to Operation, which is also his Will... We therefore call him the Image of the Father, not as comparing a Begotten Being with that which is Unbegotten; for that is certainly disagreeable, and in all Beings impossible; but as owning him the Only begotten, and First-born of the Father : the appellation of Son declaring the Substance, as does that of Father the Operation of him that begat him."

Imo: Eunomius side steps, Heb 1:3. The Greek word Charakter, would require the image to go beyond emulation of the Father's power and operation. It requires more, understanding the sensibilities concerning essence and nature, I appeal to the English word Character, and suggest that in this the Son is the same as the Father.

Regarding the Greek word Charakter: If the Son is a replica of the Father. And the Father is unknowable, so must be the Logos/Son. Paul of Samosata seems to argue along these lines. The knee jerk reaction, is to discount the Son to be a reflection as if in a mirror.

In contrast, Eusebius.C seems to have the Son as analogeous to a ray of light, inseperate and undiminished from its source "there could be no light without a ray, they exist together and simultaneously". Which accords with the first part of Hebrews 1:3 where A.Paul describes the Son as "being the brightness of [the Father's] glory".

In the greater arts, we generally admire the artist and not the patron that commissioned the works. And this, imo, is the distinuishing feature of Christianity and the beauty of the doctrine of tri-unity - The artist gives all credit to his patron, but retains his "eminance grise". We wouldn't know of the artist or his works, but for our guide, the Holy Spirit.

The Son being the creator of all things, is by common definition, God. It is this God, the God of Israel, that the scriptures talk about as interacting with mankind (cp. John 5:37). But, ultimately it is this God, who tells us about the Father, his God and our God, his Father and our Father, who is superior, even to the maker of this world. In my perspective, the revelation is not that God has a Son, but the creator of all things is originate and has a Father, who is the originator of our God. This view, leads to a different perspective of texts such as John 20:17, Eph 4:14-15 and particularly Phil 2:6-11.

Philo says that "the angel of the Lord" was God himself (On Dreams, Book 1, X1), manifested in a form that man could endure. To Moses, "the angel of the Lord" appearing in the burning bush, said he was the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. We know, the person who spoke, was he whom we came to know as the Son. And it was he who told Moses "I will take you to me for a people, and I will be to you a god." (Ex 6:7) Moses himself asked "Who is like [our god] among the gods?" (Ex 15:11). At least from an OT viewpoint, the definition of god, has nothing to do with being unbegotten, but what he does in comparison to other gods.

The ancient theist philosophers, supposed that God himself could not have created things directly but through an intermediary. And this seems to permeate all dogmas, Christian or otherwise. So it might be presumed, that this universal opinion, has some basis in group memory, as does the idea of god. Moses seems to have understood this (John 5:46), but later Jews (though opinion varies) seem to reject this, they having only "their God" in all things. But "their God", is the one who we came to know as the Son of God (John 5:39) and he came to declare the "only true God" and attest of himself as his Son (John 1:18, 17:3; 5:41-43).

All the theist philosophies relate to the creator of all things, which the NT identifies as the Son (cp: Col 1:16-17). I ask you to consider, that on the witness of scripture, the idea that the Creator has origin, that our creator is begotten, that our creator has a Father, who is our real source and cause, is more startling than God has a Son. When the Jews were asked to believe that Jesus was the Son of God, they may in fact have been asked to believe that their God, the God of Israel, had a Father, had died for their sins and had been resurrected by his Father, the true God. And when the Gentiles were asked the same, they may have been asked to believe that the maker and regulator of the universe (see Plato), had a God, to whom all glory is reflected by the Son.

With this view, Phil 2:6-8 makes 2:5 most meaningful. And a startling implication: Led by the Holy Spirit, we now worship the Father, through the Son. As the Israelites, worshiped the god of Abraham, the creator of all things, via the High Priest. Our creator, himself, has become our High Priest.

In the OT, reference to the creator, as Father, is rare. Malachi 2:10 has it in this context. But this is not Jesus', nor the Apostles' context in the NT. A.John and A.Paul identify the creator of the world, as the Son (Jn 1:3, Col 1:16, Heb 1:2). Who died for us and was resurrected by his Father. Also consider, there are metaphors of the Israelites being adulterous to their husband (=God). In the NT, the Father is emphasised as the ultimate ruler, but the bride remains with the Son. Also, thinking on the early chapters of Exodus, the God of Israel, put the Egyptians through a series of events to prove himself superior to their gods. In the NT, this God, dies but is resurrected by the only true God, who is superior even to him. Thus the Father is proved, superior even to the maker of this world.
Under some interpretation this is true... One could get this from Auxentius on Wulfila (http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/jod/texts/auxentius.trans.html) for example. However, to my understanding the fundamental concept was that the Father and the Son are united in their operations, so that, in one sense one could say the Son is the creator, but in another, the Father is the creator through the Son: "God, who created all things through Jesus Christ" (Eph. 3:9).

According to mainline Arian belief, as I understand it, the Father and the Son operated the same operation of creation at different levels of causality. Depending on one's perspective, they are each the creator, but not two creators. If this is true, then it is true for all the divine works, because for Scripture the same double agency prevails between the Father and the Son in everything, 1 Cor. 8:6. The Father is Savior and the Son is Savior, but They are not two Saviors because they operate at different levels of causality in one activity of salvation: "the kindness of God our Saviour toward man appeared... he shed on us abundantly through Jesus Christ our Saviour" (Titus 3:4,6). Again, the Father is Judge and the Son is Judge, but they are not two judges, because they operate at distinct levels of causality in this one work of judgment--so much so that in the respect in which Christ judges, the Father does not judge, as he said, "The Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son" (John 5:22); and yet it is still true that "God shall judge the secrets of men through Jesus Christ, according to my gospel" (Rom. 2:16, cp. John 12:47-50).

Did OT monotheism have no concept of a primary divine cause, only of the secondary divine cause identified as the Son? I find that hard to believe. Given John 8:54 I had always assumed the God of the OT was, if no one else, the Father. The Son can also be recognized, in that he is the secondary cause of the divine acts, through whom the Father created all things, parted the Red Sea, and everything else.
Philo and other ancient philosophers speculated that God caused an archtype to exist, which he called Son and even a second God, by which all things would come to be. But if you compare Philo and the NT, his explanation more readily applies to the Holy Spirit than the Son. Admittedly, Philo describes the Son, the second God, as the Logos, and by familiar association we make the Logos, the Son. Which in A.John's context he is! However, A.John says the Logos was "face to face" (gr: pros) with God, before anything was made and so from the first words of A.John, we depart from Philo.
Re bolded portion: :huh: ?
The NT tells us the whole purpose of the being of intelligent things, is for us to approach and know God. In the NT, one of the endowments we might receive through the Holy Spirit is, we too, might participate in the divine nature (2 Pe 1:4) but it is through participation in the Son that we achieve this (cp. Jn 17:21-23). And it seems to me that this goes beyond, having the mind of Christ. A.Paul at 1 Thes 1:23 implies in all ways we should emulate the Son - take on his character.

To Arius's "God could create another equal to the Son" (Frag 3)(see below), I respond simply that he can't, if equality is requisite on precedence. If the Father is true God, simply on the basis of precedence, being unbegotten, then he cannot be God.
Between ingeneracy versus generacy as such there is an absolute difference, whereas differences among generate beings in respect of their generacy must be matters of degrees. I believe this was implicit in Arius' statement.
Eunomius argues in his apology (XVIII) that we should "not allow...to ascribe entirely different Characters to the same Nature; for we have demonstrated, by all our foregoing Discourse, that those Characters are significative of the Substances themselves." To which I would reply...

In ancient Hebrew thought, God is he who proved himself to be superior to all over gods. And the God of Israel was him whom we call the Son. In a philosophical sence, God is the source and cause of all things that exist, which, in NT scripture, the Son is described as the creator. However, the Father, as true God, is so defined in the NT because he is the source and cause of the Son, and that everything that Son knows and does, he derived from the Father. And, that the creator of the world did die but was resurrected by his Father. And so the individual Characters are preserved, not by an unsubstantiated presumption but by known facts. Consider, Col 2:8.

In Philo's understanding "knowing God" was by intellect/wisdom, know and do the will of God and you will benefit. A.Paul was big on us achieving epignosis, but it was in the context of God sending his only Son and the implications. A.Paul sets his teaching apart from the philosophers, as it is not intellect that is important, but true belief in what we learn, "God has chosen even those who seem foolish" (cp. 1 Cor 1:27; 3:18-20). In Philo's view, the Logos, this "second God", but not true God (see On Dreams, Book 1, section 39 (para 229)) is the prototype of all creation, coming to be by an act of intelligence. In contrast all creatures were formed. In the NT, it is not obeying the will of the Father, that is important, but us making a free will choice to be obedient, led to obedience by faith in the Son. To a Jew, this would seem a departure from the OT, where faith is invested in the God of Israel. But is it?

If we take Philo as representive of at least early first century Alexandrian, Judaic thought, and accept that the angel of the Lord was God himself (in a form we could endure), then Christianity, departs from Judaism. As their God is our mediator with the true God.

If the Son is truely our mediator with God, then one presumes he is in the presence of God, and therefore partakes of his nature, even if only thought of as a transmission. By analogy: Moses became so radiant to the Israelites, he had to cover his head. And all Moses participated in, was the presence of the true Son of God.

As I understand it, most theist believe in a creator, a Father/Mother figure, but not all believe in a God who interacts with us. Which if Eusebius.N thought the scriptures taught analogically is a worry. As I said previously, I perceive him as seeing the term begatal, as a synecdoche. Imo, it would be a better argument for him, than appealing to analogy.
Ok (have to bypass some interesting things to keep in the limits of this post).
In my opinion there is a contradiction in Eusebius.N's premises. To accept God, the Father, to be unbegetton, we have to examine presumed relationships. As there is none prior to the Father, the conclusion is he is unbegotten. But (as I have in the past) I argue that the concept of "god" is the issue examined at least in Exodus, if not thoughout all scripture. Imo: the scriptural starting point needs to be: what is god? Unbegotten, doesn't tells us anything about his nature or essence, only an unprovable status, believed as a truth, by faith alone.

The implications of applying status to essence/nature are, imo, all negative, and have no basis in scripture. God never relies on status to reveal himself, but by action. The OT is a continuous story of the God of Israel in competition with other gods (whether they be men or demon). In all cases he proves himself, the God above all gods, not by some imperceptable operation, but by an observable activity.

It is by manifestion of essential character, that things are known, that give it identity, not the presumptions of status or state of existence. In Exodus, God is seen to prove who he is. For me, it is the revealed character of God, that makes me want to know him. Those that drowned when the waters of the Red sea closed probably cursed him or more likely the failure of their gods, but Moses praised him. It is encouraging, that despite all the failures of such patriarchs, the god of Israel has led us to the only true God, who is revealed as having sent his very Son, throughout the ages, to guide mankind, not just in mental activity, but even in the trivial activity of day to day life (the Law).
It is a matter of faith that the events of the Exodus, for instance, were acts of the Supreme Being (or His Son). Some say it was done by aliens. If so would that make a difference? It would seem to; when someone says it was a UFO that came down to Sinai, most shake their heads. That is not what is meant by 'God came down to Sinai'.

The events of scripture acquire their deep significance from their association with the Person of the ultimate. They are attached to no further quantifiable 'what,' but to Him Who precedes all of them. Thus they partake of His ultimacy as revelations of Who He is. As per above, the usefulness of essence-based talk about God is not clear. It is the talk of necessities, cause and effect, bowls overflowing, and instinct driven behaviors. These are not good as dominant metaphors for God.

You wrote, "Unbegotten [..is..] only an unprovable status, believed as a truth, by faith alone." Yes, it is, and the need to have such a faith one way or the other is shown in the fact that we do see a difference between the assertion that it was the Unbegotten (or His Son) who parted the Red Sea, and the assertion that it was extraterrestrials using super technology. The actual event would be the same in either case. The difference, which makes all the difference, is in Who or what is responsible for the event. This is something we take on faith.
There are implications, in my viewing, as a focal point, the manifestation of the Father of the God of Israel. It might imply duality, but if one accepts a Philo type explanation of the term God referred to above (and which follows the usual contra to the common understanding of John 1:1), and the differentiation between true God and God, this is quickly resolved. Imo: the need is to appreciate what the word means and not the word itself.

Where I see Arius and Eusebius.N failing: They use ambiguous language. "There was when the Son was not" says nothing. Their prime enemies, the Sabellianists would have rapidly agreed. The Sabellianists would also agree with the opposing view "the Son existed always in potentiality, in the mind of God."

Imo: the battle was about defeating Sabellianism. And it seems to me the only defense is that the Son existed in real hypostasis before all things came into existence.
We have no historical instance of Sabellianism emerging from Arianism or vice versa. However, it does seem that two strenuous early Nicenes, Eustathius of Antioch and Marcellus of Ancyra, were modalistic. Marcellus, as mentioned earlier, was an economic trinitarian, thinking that at the end of time the Triad would revert to a Monad. Despite this, Marcellus was long accepted among the Nicenes. The Council of Sardica was, among other things, convened to exonerate him. The moving personalities of the council were Athanasius of Alexandria and Hosius of Cordoba.
Imo: Modern Sabellian teaching, draws much from Arianism: starting with "there was when the Son was not" and "the Son was created from nothing". Their context being the Son's conception in the womb of Mary. When they say that God "tented" in the flesh, they tend towards the Arian view of attribution. The semi-Arian and Athanasian view, where the Son, in both his pre-existence and incarnation, having attributes natural to him, defeats these presumptions. Standard modalism is also defeated, as the Son is given a real pre-existence, as a real individual, distinct from the Father, begotten in a real hypostasis before all things that came to exist.
To get from "once the Son was not" to Modalism, one has to equivocate between 'Son' as a being, and 'Son' as a mere attribute or title. When Arians said that once the Son was not, they meant it in the former, not the latter sense. For instance an Arian would never say that once the Father was not. That is because by 'the Father', we mean not an attribute or title but an individual Who bears this title. It is characteristic of homousianism to equivocate freely between 'Father' and 'Son' as mere titles or attributes, and 'Father' and 'Son' as denotations of beings. This is a sign of its own latent modalism: a person would not think the statement "God was not always Father" was equivalent to "once the Father was not" unless they already thought that the Father, the individual, might be nothing more than a mask overlaying the Godhead. Arianism rejects this. When Arius said that "God was not always Father", he did not mean that "once the Father was not", because the Father is not merely a name; the Father is God. Even if He has not always borne the title 'father', He has ingenerately existed. Conversely, the One denoted as 'the Son' does not have this ingenerate existence. Accordingly 'the Father' and 'the Son' denote different beings.
If the Arians wanted to highlight the seperate identities of Father and Son, causation is more than adequate, Eusebius.C does this more than adequately.

To combat Sabellianism and the like, all that would be required is the statement that the Son was caused to exist in actuality, with his own hypostasis, before anything else came into existence, and set face to face with God, and obeying his Father, the Son caused all things to come into existence as the Father named them. John 1:1-2, puts it nicely, but as these text are argued, a legalistic interpretation, substantiated by scripture, seems appropriate.


Imo, Cause is a better distinction. Eunonius seems to tread this path. Various schools of philosophy argued that matter was unbegotten. But even they perceived God as, that which caused matter to be formed into things, the First Cause - his most universally accepted distinction. To use the "unbegotten" even against philosophers would be disingeneous and it wouldn't be useful to make this an attribute, but as I harp on, as a conclusion, it would be self evident. And as I noted above, "unbegotten" provides no defense against Sabellianism.
If the Father is ingenerate, and the Son is generate, using 'generate' unequivocally, then following non-contradiction they are distinct property-bearers, i.e. distinct beings. The relations going into the generation could not present such clear distinction unless we were able to rule out a reflexive generation, an Autogenes or 'self-begotten'. Granted, such a thing would be extremely paradoxical. But what really stands in the way of it? In temporal terms, it is clear that a cause is prior to its effect. For a cause to be its own effect temporally, there would have to be a point when it both was and was not, which again violates non-contradiction. But in homousianism, we are abstracting space, time, and ontological distinctions from the concept of generation: imagine a cause which precedes its effect neither 'by thought (επινοία, conceptually) nor by any interval' (Letter To Eusebius (http://ecole.evansville.edu/arians/arius1.htm)) What prevents such a causal relation from becoming reflexive? What prevents the existence of an Autogenes or a Sonfather at that ultimate level?

According to Boethius (St. Severinus, or father of scholasticism), Catholics "rightly regard the statement 'the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God, and this Trinity is one God,' not as an enumeration of different things but as a reiteration of one and the same thing, like the statement 'blade and brand are one sword' or 'sun, sun, and sun are one sun'" (The Trinity is One God, iii. (url=http://www.ccel.org/b/boethius/trinity/trinity.html)). He does qualify, "'Father, Son, and Holy Spirit' though the same, are not identical" (ibid.); this seems to be because these terms describe the distinct relations of one thing to itself: "the category of relation, then, has nothing to do with the substance of the subject; it simply denotes a condition of relativity, and that not necessarily to something else, but sometimes to the subject itself... Accordingly those predicates which do not denote the essential property of a thing cannot alter, change or disturb its nature in any way. Wherefore if Father and Son are predicates of relation... it will effect no real difference in its subject, but, in a phrase which aims at interpreting what we can hardly understand, a difference of persons" (ibid. v.). In this context it is not clear what is meant by 'persons,' beyond self-relations of one and the same thing.

According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/boethius/) "there are some relationships which a thing can have to itself—for example, that of equality. Being-a-father and being-a-son are not, among created things, such relations: no one can be his own father or his own son. But it is here, says Boethius, that creaturely logic breaks down when it tries to comprehend the Trinity: we have in some way to try to grasp the idea of a relation of fatherhood or filiation which is reflexive."

You might want to follow these links and view the arguments. My point is that homousianism and its cause-based distinctions of the Father and the Son do not present anything more compelling against Modalism than Arianism does, arguably less. You said, "the battle was about defeating Sabellianism. And it seems to me the only defense is that the Son existed in real hypostasis before all things came into existence", which all Arians did believe. The term Three Hypostases, τρεις υποστάσεις, was proposed by Arius long before the Cappadocians took it up (Frag. 3 (http://home.zonnet.nl/chotki/fragments%20from%20arius.htm)). I think refuting Sabellius was Arius' objective, but I doubt that was the objective of Nicea; the objective of that council was apparently to refute Arius.
Imo: the Arians thought in negatives and adopted a negative premise of the Father, forcing them to denigrate the Son (whether intentionally or not), and in consequence denigrate the relevence of his sacrifice for us (whether intentionally or not). The last words of Col 1:16 underline my stance "all things were created by [the Son] and for [the Son]" for that was the will of the Father (vs 19).
Via negativa is a widely acknowledged way of doing theology. It is preferred in the EO. This is not a specifically Arian issue and it does not result in denigration of the Son. There is nothing in your bolded portion above that Arius need disagree with.
Unless it is clearly and unambiguiosly taught that in all ways the Son is the exact replica of the Father, then, as the Son is the actual creator of all things, it allows the potential, to understand that creation could be flawed (as the philosophers did and do).
Why would the Son have to be a carbon copy of the Father in order to be Perfect and for His work to be perfect? Did the autographs of the bible contain errors because the writers were not homoosios to God? At any rate, as I think you said later on, the relevance of speculations about the essence of God and who has or doesn't have it is not clear. The nature of God is not the cause but the reflection of Who God is, and it is in this sense, as the possessor of God's nature by generation, that the Son is the imprint of the Father's Hypostasis (Heb. 1:3).
Possibly, the Arians didn't see the implications of their explanations, but history shows what other people can do with flawed teaching. If "God can create another equal to the Son", no matter how one qualifies it, such a thought potentialy discounts the Son. If the Son is only spiritually/accademically aligned with God, and is changeable, but chose not to be. Then we must assume, that should he have chosen unwisely, he would have been disposed of (compare Satan's future fate).
Imo: the "Arian" ideas, would ultimately lead to a solution such as Islam's "What needs God of a Son?"
It was always logically possible that the Son could disobey the Father. He does not of necessity behave a certain way, neither does God. He did not have to say, "nevertheless not as I will, but as thou [wilt]" (Matthew 26:39). According to Scripture, he could have called upon the Father and received over twelve legions of angels (Matthew 26:53-54). What would have been the relation between him and the Father after that? There are no grounds to speculate.
Imo: Belief in true sonship, his incarnation, his death and ressurection are what differentiates Christianity from Judaism and Islam. And while most in the 4th century seem to hold this belief, some teachings seem highly suspect, in their actual meaning.

Imo: the Arians discount the sonship and strived to remove the teaching of actual sonship.
If by 'actual' you mean something to do with the necessities or essence of God's nature apart from His Will, they did deny that. They also seem to have questioned that this was 'actual' sonship; it removes the last hard impediments to the concept of God as an Autogenes or Self-begotten as per above.
With such a view, one has to gravitate towards the beliefs that evolved through Abrahams waring children.

Imo: For our salvation to be true, the apostle's testimony must be taken at its word. God sent his only begotten Son to be saviour of the world.
They may well have taken 1 John 4:9 at its word. Christ is the monogenes or uniquely-generated Son. I do not know of anything in the Arian teachings, even Eunomius, where this is denied.
It is the Arian idea of lumping the son with all God's other "sons", that puts distance between all Arian beliefs and the faith of the apostles. What the Arians seemed to have failed to acknowledge, using Eusebius.N's view of the word begotten, all sons of God are begotten by the firstborn Son, just as the dew drops are begotten by the Son (Eph 3:9-10).
Scripture teaches that the Son is both superior to us and in another sense with us. Ultimately all things are from the Father (1 Cor. 8:6). Scripture refers to this idea in explaining how we can be brethren with the Logos: "For both he that sanctifieth and they who are sanctified [are] all of one [εξ ενος, 'from One']" (Heb. 2:11).

This is all I have for now. Hopefully it is adequate as a basis for further discussion.

Yours in Christ

[apostoli]

Greetings Alam,

Thankyou for your response. As usual much for me to think upon. I'll respond more fully during the week once I've done that ;-)

As I mentioned in the earlier posts, I was working through my random thoughts, so I apologise for your head scratch. In regards to Philo, I forgot to mention, that one avenue I've been thinking on, is whether Lucian's pupils thought along Philo's lines. I decided its a possibility but I doubt it.

Another thought path I have considered: If Arius et al, thought they held the apostolic belief, and if Paul.S thought he wasn't onto anything new, then could there be something in common between them. Yes, the "Arians" were very anti-sabellian. But often the closer adversaries are, the more strenuous they struggle. I'm still reflecting on whether this applies to the Son/Logos and Son/Christ views of Paul.S. The "Arians" seem to apply Paul.S's view of the Christ to the Logos. To be fair, I have to assume that Paul.S distorted an older view, which the "Arians" defended. But, A.Paul seems to have fought against views like Paul.S. So I think his views might have antecedence to those of the Arians. I'm thinking on it ;-)

I've been arguing with myself, regarding to what extent Greek philosophy influenced the reasoning of the 4th century antagonists, and more particularly A.Paul's concepts of the Son as creator (battling against the gnostics). To date nothing has a definite crystalisation in my thoughts, but, given my recent posts, I thought it worth mentioning. I asked myself, whether my last posts might imply some aspect of the idea of the demiurge. I think not.

This week I've been reading Basil's letters. I've a series of quotes you might find useful one day and might add to our discussion.
http://www.geocities.com/sd_au/theology/basil.html

If you get a Yahoo "site is currently unavailable" message. I'll email them you. Yahoo keeps deactivating my site for exceeding hit limits. Fair enough. It is a free service.

All the best

[alam]

Greetings Alam,

Thankyou for your response. As usual much for me to think upon. I'll respond more fully during the week once I've done that ;-)

As I mentioned in the earlier posts, I was working through my random thoughts, so I apologise for your head scratch. In regards to Philo, I forgot to mention, that one avenue I've been thinking on, is whether Lucian's pupils thought along Philo's lines. I decided its a possibility but I doubt it.

Another thought path I have considered: If Arius et al, thought they held the apostolic belief, and if Paul.S thought he wasn't onto anything new, then could there be something in common between them. Yes, the "Arians" were very anti-sabellian. But often the closer adversaries are, the more strenuous they struggle. I'm still reflecting on whether this applies to the Son/Logos and Son/Christ views of Paul.S. The "Arians" seem to apply Paul.S's view of the Christ to the Logos. To be fair, I have to assume that Paul.S distorted an older view, which the "Arians" defended. But, A.Paul seems to have fought against views like Paul.S. So I think his views might have antecedence to those of the Arians. I'm thinking on it ;-)

I've been arguing with myself, regarding to what extent Greek philosophy influenced the reasoning of the 4th century antagonists, and more particularly A.Paul's concepts of the Son as creator (battling against the gnostics). To date nothing has a definite crystalisation in my thoughts, but, given my recent posts, I thought it worth mentioning. I asked myself, whether my last posts might imply some aspect of the idea of the demiurge. I think not.

This week I've been reading Basil's letters. I've a series of quotes you might find useful one day and might add to our discussion.
http://www.geocities.com/sd_au/theology/basil.html

If you get a Yahoo "site is currently unavailable" message. I'll email them you. Yahoo keeps deactivating my site for exceeding hit limits. Fair enough. It is a free service.

All the best


Thank you Apostoli, your page was functioning fine. I received the quotes and will try to study them this week.


About Paul of Samosata- his connection to Arius would have been through Lucian of Antioch. However, it would seem that Lucian could not have enjoyed the good reputation that he did, nor could his textual work on the NT have been accepted as definitive in the Eastern church, unless he were known to be free from Paul's errors. Lucian's creed, reproduced in the Second Arian Confession (De Synodis ii. 23 (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/28172.htm)), contradicts the distinctive teachings of Paul of Samosata, while containing nothing but what would have been purely orthodox by ante-Nicene standards, and even by charitable Nicene standards.


But whatever the results of your study, I look forward to hearing about them, at your convenience.


Peace and the best,

[apostoli]

Greetings Alam,

About Paul of Samosata- his connection to Arius would have been through Lucian of Antioch. However, it would seem that Lucian could not have enjoyed the good reputation that he did, nor could his textual work on the NT have been accepted as definitive in the Eastern church, unless he were known to be free from Paul's errors. According to the CE, Lucian lost his seat and set apart for a lot of years under suspicion. It is on my list of things to investigate further. As for his accademic prestege, consider what Jerome had to say about Eusebius.C (re: links you provided earlier).

Which reminds me: thankyou for all those links. Most appreciated.

Ok (have to bypass some interesting things to keep in the limits of this post).Ditto. If its OK with you, and as your time permits, possibly we might revisit various things as I crystalise my thoughts.

For now, I'll respond to just a couple of your points.

Along the way you suggested much has been done to rehabilitate history's view of Arius. I submit that the same must be considered of Eusebius of Caesarea. I think it was Newman who makes the remark that in contrast to Arius and Eusebius.N Athanasius never really attacks Eusebius.C. Yet to be proved. I'm avoiding rereading Athanasius for a while.

[Eusebius.C's (EC)] beliefs were not identical to Arius'. Nonetheless, I do not think Eusebius should be considered a partisan of homousianism or a counterargument to Arius.I agree in part. However, I perceive him as being particularly Orthodox in his time. Something akin to a subordinationist.

Twice you cited "the ray is coexistent with the light, being a kind of complement thereof; (for there could be no light without a ray:) they exist together and simultaneously" followed by ellipses, indicating that you believe this was Eusebius' view.Definitely! The analogy was well worn by his time. Just prior, EC says "there can be [only one] true copy of the Supreme Father...the Son. For He is the radiance of the eternal light...the radiance is inseparable from the light of sense, [though] the Son exists in Himself...the ray has its range of activity solely from the light, whereas the Son is something different from a channel of energy, having His Being in Himself."

To me it is clear, in context (given in #13), that Eusebius was contrasting this with: "But the Father precedes the Son, and has preceded Him in existence, inasmuch as He alone is unbegotten..."I don't see a contrast but an affirmation. EC did say "the ray does not shine forth from the light by its deliberate choice...the Son is the image of the Father by intention and deliberate choice [of the Father]. For God willed to beget a Son"

No analogy holds in all respects; for Eusebius, this is where the analogy of light and ray fails.There is no pessimism in EC in this regard. To EC the analogy holds, especially in a subordination aspect, as the Ray is wholly dependent on the Source and is Caused to exist, directly from that source. In opposition to the "Arian's" - "from nothing", the Son in EC's view is begotten "from something".

Jerome calls him "most open defender of the heresy of Arius"It should be noted that Jerome is defending himself. From your cite: "I have praised Eusebius [writings and translated them] into Latin...Am I therefore an Arian, because Eusebius who wrote these books is an Arian?" and "Eusebius, a very learned man (I have said learned, not Catholic; lest...thou heap calumny upon me)...show Origen to be of his own faith; that is, of the Arian heresy."

One can read the source for his letter to Alexander etc. from Nicea II to see how poorly later ones thought of his theology.Or one can read Socrates account. From your cite: "...what ground is there for assuming that he was himself an Arian? The Arians are certainly deceived in supposing [EC] to be a favorer of their tenets...ecclesiastical writers often use this mode of expression, and others of a similar kind denoting the economy of our Saviour's humanity...Moreover, inasmuch as Arius has dared to say that the Son is a creature, as one of the others, observe what Eusebius says on this subject in his first book against Marcellus..."

At this stage, I am avoiding accessing anything but the original writings of the adversaries in the main contest, and forming my own opinion of each. There was a lot of name calling at the time. eg: Based on his letters, poor old Basil was accused of anything his adversaries could think of. Seems one side would selectively quote him, and the other selectively reply from him. Whoever lost the argument would then disparage him. Seems to be the way of eastern politics.

It may be a metaphor, but I don't think it's a contentless filler for an unknown operation. "Will" is the term for God's power to produce and have deliberate dealings with things whose existence follows from no necessity in God. It describes the realm of free divine activity.With respect, imu, in philosophy to apply "will" to God, implies neccessity, a choice - to do or not to do. This goes beyond morality or free will, knowledge, wisdom, power etc but simple action. God being simple, he making decisions would cause complexity. God therefore doesn't will to do, but does and it becomes. God doesn't have body parts, but the scriptures assign him such, just as they explain his operation as "will", a most human condition.

In philosophy the question arises, if God "wills" is he conscious of it - can any entity simultaneously observe what it is that he wills to do and also be aware of the reasons why he wills to do that and not something else. Imo, if you believe in the Logos, the scriptures say yes.

In the past, you have defended philosophy as a useful way to explain spiritual things and I am slowly coming to agree. But, to view God as simple in all ways, isn't very upbuilding. There are times I feel it better to just think on scripture in a literal but figurative way (God is what he is, my conception of him is by reference to the things I behold).

I think refuting Sabellius was Arius' objective, but I doubt that was the objective of Nicea; the objective of that council was apparently to refute Arius.As far as I know, there were no Sabellian churches around at the time but the ideas were in currency in some areas. Basil seems to suggest it was raising its head in his time.

Realistically, though: Arius charged Alexander with Sabellianism. Arius had already been cast out and his political buddies were trying to have him readmitted to the flock. Logically, as "homoousios" had been used by "Paul of Samosata" and the focus came to be on this term, the focus was, imo, in defining the faith while avoiding Sabellian ideas as well as Arius' errors. The anathemas make this clear.

Arius, imo, had no significance at the conference, other than as a question regarding his reinstatement to the church. He was quickly discarded with on the reading of his Thalia. I think it was Eusebius.N who later said something like "We are Bishops, we do not follow Arius, he follows us".

An unbiased view: Arius was an insignificant priest from a suburb of Alexandria who had had a troubled past. He had been excluded from the flock twice (presumably for different reasons) before Nicea for opposing various Bishops. However, he had powerful friends.

The Nicene council had many objectives:

1. The Arian question,
2. The celebration of Passover, Now Called Easter,
3. The Meletian schism,
4. The Father and Son one in operation only or also in ousia
5. The baptism of heretics, and
6. The status of the lapsed in the persecution under Licinius.
7. The primacy of Rome (establish another centre in Constantinople)
8. Various matters in church order

The Council enacted 20 canons...

1. prohibition of self-castration; (see Origen)
2. establishment of a minimum term for catechism;
3. prohibition of the presence in the house of a cleric of a younger woman who might bring him under suspicion;
4. ordination of a bishop in the presence of at least three provincial bishops and confirmation by the metropolitan;
5. provision for two provincial synods to be held annually;
6. exceptional authority acknowledged for the bishops of Alexandria and Rome, for their respective regions;
7. recognition of the honorary rights of the see of Jerusalem;
8. provision for agreement with the Novatians;
9–14. provision for mild procedure against the lapsed during the persecution under Licinius;
15–16. prohibition of the removal of priests;
17. prohibition of usury among the clergy;
18. precedence of bishops and presbyters before deacons in receiving Holy Communion, the Eucharist;
19. declaration of the invalidity of baptism by heretics;
20. prohibition of kneeling during the liturgy, on Sundays and in the fifty days of Eastertide ["the pentecost"]. Standing was the normative posture for prayer at this time, as it still is among the Eastern Orthodox. (In time, Western Christianity adopted the term Pentecost to refer to the last Sunday of Eastertide, the fiftieth day.)

Why would the Son have to be a carbon copy of the Father in order to be Perfect and for His work to be perfect?Hebrews 1:3 doesn't say "carbon copy" but moreso replica. Before the days of photocopiers and personal computers, actual "carbon copies" always contained defects.

If you have ever done any carpentry, car maintenance or house repairs, you quickly learn that the right tool makes the job easier and delivers the desired result. By analogy, when I was a kid I worked for a small furniture shop, when things were slow, he was always sending me to look for things, "skyhooks" etc. One day, we were installing some shelves and my boss asked me to hand him the "American". He meant "hammer", he didn't have a screwdriver to fit the screw. On face value the hammer did the job but a couple of weeks later the shelves fell down. When you hammer a screw you tear (actually rip) the target making the fastener unstable and unreliable, when you fasten a screw with a screwdriver you integrate the target. To get a perfect job, it is best to use the perfect tool.

My views are based on A.John's view of what it means to be "born of God" and "begotten of God". Whether it be applied to the Son or believers in the Son.

Did the autographs of the bible contain errors because the writers were not homoosios to God?Probably. Does God have body parts? The scriptures say only the Father knows the Son, and only the Son knows the Father.

The ancient writings were "inspired" not "dictated" by God. So there is an element of human fraility in them. I once had a Mormon describe the Song of Solomon as pornographic. Imo, he missed the beauty of the message, the inspired content.


The nature of God is not the cause but the reflection of Who God is, and it is in this sense, as the possessor of God's nature by generation, that the Son is the imprint of the Father's Hypostasis.Taking Hebrews 1:3 as the context of what A.Paul goes on to say, and with respect, I think you misinterpret what is being told us.

Possibly, I've misunderstood your meaning. I agree that "The nature of God is not the cause". A.Paul tells us four things at Heb 1:2-3: 1. God, through [the Son] made created all orders of existence, 2. the Son is the brightness of the Father's glory, 3. the Son is the exact representation of his being and 4. the Son sustains the universe by his word of power. (cp NWT interlinear, NEB, KJV)

It was always logically possible that the Son could disobey the Father. He does not of necessity behave a certain way, neither does God.Not according to 1 John 5:18.

Scripture teaches that the Son is both superior to us and in another sense with us. Ultimately all things are from the Father (1 Cor. 8:6). Scripture refers to this idea in explaining how we can be brethren with the Logos: "For both he that sanctifieth and they who are sanctified [are] all of one [εξ ενος, 'from One']" (Heb. 2:11).Yes and no. Heb 2:11 is qualified by 2:13-16.

John 5:11-13 says "God has given us eternal life, and this life is in the Son. He that has the Son has life...believe on the name of the Son of God."

Indeed all things are by the Father, but we only receive them through the Son.

Just an interesting observation on Heb 2:13 - we are "the children that God has given" the Son. The implication being that the Son is our Father. But in context of Hebrew thought, though David was the son of Jesse, Abraham was anterior as his Father. So, the Father of the Son is also our Father.

All the best.

[alam]

Greetings, Apostoli:


According to the CE, Lucian lost his seat and set apart for a lot of years under suspicion. It is on my list of things to investigate further. As for his accademic prestege, consider what Jerome had to say about Eusebius.C (re: links you provided earlier).


Jerome praises Lucian, and makes no mention of his being unorthodox

"Lucianus, a man of great talent, presbyter of the church at Antioch, was so diligent in the study of the Scriptures, that even now certain copies of the Scriptures bear the name of Lucian. Works of his, On faith, and short Epistles to various people are extant. He was put to death at Nicomedia for his confession of Christ in the persecution of Maximinus, and was buried at Helenopolis in Bithynia" (De Viris Illustribus 77 (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2708.htm)).

Eusebius of Caesarea says this about Lucian:

"Among the martyrs at Antioch was Lucian, a presbyter of that parish, whose entire life was most excellent. At Nicomedia, in the presence of the emperor, he proclaimed the heavenly kingdom of Christ, first in an oral defense, and afterwards by deeds as well" (Ecclesiastical History[/i] viii. 13 (]Ecclesiastical History ix. 6 (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/250109.htm)).


Your wrote: "As for his accademic prestege, consider what Jerome had to say about Eusebius.C (re: links you provided earlier)". And yet you see Eusebius as orthodox. So it is not clear how Eusebius would be a counterexample to the supposition that Lucian, as a saint and widely recognized scholar, was orthodox.


If you mean that he might have been unorthodox by the same Nicene lights which found Eusebius unorthodox, well, he might have, but these weren't necessarily the standards of the 3rd century.


Lucian's theology contradicted Paul's by identifying the pre-existent Logos with the incarnate Son and affirming that this pre-existent Logos was a distinct being from God. Lucian's creed is unequivocally incarnationist and cites John 6:38. If his acquaintance with Paul of Samosata had any effect on Lucian, it would seem to be in the form of a negative reaction against Paul's distinctive teachings.

The only fourth-century party we know to have involved or evolved Modalists is the homousian party. Photinus of Sirmium, the fourth century character with some obvious claim to the tradition of Paul of Samosata, emerged out of the Nicene bloc.



Ditto. If its OK with you, and as your time permits, possibly we might revisit various things as I crystalise my thoughts.

No problem!

Along the way you suggested much has been done to rehabilitate history's view of Arius.

Some has been done but not enough. all I wrote was that,

Athanasius' quotations probably represent what he saw as most typical if not the worst of Arius. If a charitable interpretation can be put on these statements, much has been done toward rehabilitating Arius.


For this cause, I am not inclined to put stock in negative generalizations. We do not have enough of his work to generalize. To me it is enough that his early efforts were seen in a positive way and supported by most eastern churchmen including Eusebius of Caesarea. As it was later stated concerning Arius:

"We have not been followers of Arius,--how could Bishops, such as we, follow a Presbyter?--nor did we receive any other faith beside that which has been handed down from the beginning. But, after taking on ourselves to examine and to verify his faith, we admitted him rather than followed him; as you will understand from our present avowals" (First Arian Confession, c. 341 (http://ecole.evansville.edu/arians/1arcon.htm)).

----------


[Eusebius.C's (EC)] beliefs were not identical to Arius'. Nonetheless, I do not think Eusebius should be considered a partisan of homousianism or a counterargument to Arius.
I agree in part. However, I perceive him as being particularly Orthodox in his time. Something akin to a subordinationist.

He was orthodox. But he was one of the most active early supporters of Arius. This should speak in Arius' favor. It should allow for some balance to the probably one-sided view of Arius that appears in Athanasius' work.

Twice you cited "the ray is coexistent with the light, being a kind of complement thereof; (for there could be no light without a ray:) they exist together and simultaneously" followed by ellipses, indicating that you believe this was Eusebius' view.

Definitely! The analogy was well worn by his time. Just prior, EC says "there can be [only one] true copy of the Supreme Father...the Son. For He is the radiance of the eternal light...the radiance is inseparable from the light of sense, [though] the Son exists in Himself...the ray has its range of activity solely from the light, whereas the Son is something different from a channel of energy, having His Being in Himself."

See the words I bolded above -- "the light of sense," "[though]", "whereas," "different." In the above, Eusebius is showing ways in which the analogy does not express the relation of the Son to the Father.


Here is the statement again in full. Please note the use of the adversatives, "except," "while," "whereas," "but."


Wherefore it was said: " Who being the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person." [[Heb. i. 3.]] Except that the radiance is inseparable from the light of sense, while the Son exists in Himself in His own essence apart from the Father. And the ray has its range of activity solely from the light, whereas the Son is something different from a channel of energy, having His Being in Himself. And, moreover, the ray is coexistent with the light, being a kind of complement thereof; (for there could be no light without a ray:) they exist together and simultaneously. But the Father precedes the Son, and has preceded Him in existence, inasmuch as He alone is unbegotten. The One, perfect in Himself and first in order as Father, and the cause of the Son's existence, receives nothing towards the completeness of His Godhead from the Son: the Other, as a Son begotten of Him that caused His being, came second to Him, Whose Son He is, receiving from the Father both His Being, and the character of His Being. And, moreover, the ray does not shine forth from the light by its deliberate choice, but because of something which is an inseparable accident of its essence: but the Son is the image of the Father by intention and deliberate choice. For God willed to beget a Son, and established a second light, in all things made like unto Himself (* (http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/fathers/eusebius_de_06_book4.htm)).

The analogy of light and ray was well worn. However, it had been used interchangeably with other analogies such as that of a root, a tree, and its fruit, where simultaneity does not figure in.

I don't see a contrast but an affirmation.

EC did say "the ray does not shine forth from the light by its deliberate choice...the Son is the image of the Father by intention and deliberate choice [of the Father]. For God willed to beget a Son"

Yes, this was his view.

No analogy holds in all respects; for Eusebius, this is where the analogy of light and ray fails.

There is no pessimism in EC in this regard.

Respectfully, introducing a word like 'pessimism' without explanation does not help me understand what you are saying. What does the analogy of light and ray have to do with pessimism?


Jerome calls him "most open defender of the heresy of Arius"

It should be noted that Jerome is defending himself. From your cite: "I have praised Eusebius [writings and translated them] into Latin...Am I therefore an Arian, because Eusebius who wrote these books is an Arian?" and "Eusebius, a very learned man (I have said learned, not Catholic; lest...thou heap calumny upon me)...show Origen to be of his own faith; that is, of the Arian heresy."

Fair enough

One can read the source for his letter to Alexander etc. from Nicea II to see how poorly later ones thought of his theology.

Or one can read Socrates account. From your cite: "...what ground is there for assuming that he was himself an Arian? The Arians are certainly deceived in supposing [EC] to be a favorer of their tenets...ecclesiastical writers often use this mode of expression, and others of a similar kind denoting the economy of our Saviour's humanity...Moreover, inasmuch as Arius has dared to say that the Son is a creature, as one of the others,

Then Socrates did not understand what Arius' view was. Arius specifically rejected "a creature, as one of the others." In his own words


"...perfect creature of God, but not as one of the creatures; offspring, but not as one of things begotten..." (Letter to Alexander).


Someone who cannot correctly state Arius' view cannot be trusted to judge who was "Arian" and who wasn't. Socrates attributes the same thing to Arius that Eusebius himself reprimanded Alexander for:


"But thy epistle accuses them of saying that the Son was made as one of the creatures. They do not say this, but clearly declare that he was not as one of the creatures. See if cause is not immediately given them again to attack and to misrepresent whatever they please" (Letter to Alexander).


At this stage, I am avoiding accessing anything but the original writings of the adversaries in the main contest, and forming my own opinion of each. There was a lot of name calling at the time. eg: Based on his letters, poor old Basil was accused of anything his adversaries could think of. Seems one side would selectively quote him, and the other selectively reply from him. Whoever lost the argument would then disparage him. Seems to be the way of eastern politics.


Again, fair enough,

It may be a metaphor, but I don't think it's a contentless filler for an unknown operation. "Will" is the term for God's power to produce and have deliberate dealings with things whose existence follows from no necessity in God. It describes the realm of free divine activity.

With respect, imu, in philosophy to apply "will" to God, implies neccessity, a choice - to do or not to do. This goes beyond morality or free will, knowledge, wisdom, power etc but simple action.

The above did not make sense to me. It should have been clear from my post that I believe the will of God is free.


God being simple, he making decisions would cause complexity.

God therefore doesn't will to do, but does and it becomes. God doesn't have body parts, but the scriptures assign him such, just as they explain his operation as "will", a most human condition.

For the sake of the argument, let's use the definition of divine 'will' I proposed:

"Will" is the term for God's power to produce and have deliberate dealings with things whose existence follows from no necessity in God. It describes the realm of free divine activity.

If you see something else needed to make this definition useful, please add it in.

In philosophy the question arises, if God "wills" is he conscious of it - can any entity simultaneously observe what it is that he wills to do and also be aware of the reasons why he wills to do that and not something else. Imo, if you believe in the Logos, the scriptures say yes.

Sure.

In the past, you have defended philosophy as a useful way to explain spiritual things and I am slowly coming to agree.

:cheers:

But, to view God as simple in all ways, isn't very upbuilding. There are times I feel it better to just think on scripture in a literal but figurative way (God is what he is, my conception of him is by reference to the things I behold).

I see no problem with that.


I think refuting Sabellius was Arius' objective, but I doubt that was the objective of Nicea; the objective of that council was apparently to refute Arius.

As far as I know, there were no Sabellian churches around at the time but the ideas were in currency in some areas. Basil seems to suggest it was raising its head in his time.

Realistically, though: Arius charged Alexander with Sabellianism. Arius had already been cast out and his political buddies were trying to have him readmitted to the flock. Logically, as "homoousios" had been used by "Paul of Samosata" and the focus came to be on this term, the focus was, imo, in defining the faith while avoiding Sabellian ideas as well as Arius' errors. The anathemas make this clear.

Arius, imo, had no significance at the conference, other than as a question regarding his reinstatement to the church. He was quickly discarded with on the reading of his Thalia. I think it was Eusebius.N who later said something like "We are Bishops, we do not follow Arius, he follows us".

An unbiased view: Arius was an insignificant priest from a suburb of Alexandria who had had a troubled past. He had been excluded from the flock twice (presumably for different reasons) before Nicea for opposing various Bishops. However, he had powerful friends.

The Nicene council had many objectives:

1. The Arian question,
2. The celebration of Passover, Now Called Easter,
3. The Meletian schism,
4. The Father and Son one in operation only or also in ousia
5. The baptism of heretics, and
6. The status of the lapsed in the persecution under Licinius.
7. The primacy of Rome (establish another centre in Constantinople)
8. Various matters in church order

The Council enacted 20 canons...

1. prohibition of self-castration; (see Origen)
2. establishment of a minimum term for catechism;
3. prohibition of the presence in the house of a cleric of a younger woman who might bring him under suspicion;
4. ordination of a bishop in the presence of at least three provincial bishops and confirmation by the metropolitan;
5. provision for two provincial synods to be held annually;
6. exceptional authority acknowledged for the bishops of Alexandria and Rome, for their respective regions;
7. recognition of the honorary rights of the see of Jerusalem;
8. provision for agreement with the Novatians;
9–14. provision for mild procedure against the lapsed during the persecution under Licinius;
15–16. prohibition of the removal of priests;
17. prohibition of usury among the clergy;
18. precedence of bishops and presbyters before deacons in receiving Holy Communion, the Eucharist;
19. declaration of the invalidity of baptism by heretics;
20. prohibition of kneeling during the liturgy, on Sundays and in the fifty days of Eastertide ["the pentecost"]. Standing was the normative posture for prayer at this time, as it still is among the Eastern Orthodox. (In time, Western Christianity adopted the term Pentecost to refer to the last Sunday of Eastertide, the fiftieth day.)

These things didn't seem relevant to the focus of the thread as expressed in the OP, so to avoid being pedantic I left them out. Nowhere in the above is there anything about refuting Sabellius.

You wrote: "Logically, as "homoousios" had been used by "Paul of Samosata" and the focus came to be on this term, the focus was, imo, in defining the faith while avoiding Sabellian ideas as well as Arius' errors. The anathemas make this clear" What anathemas make it clear that avoiding Sabellian ideas was the objective of Nicea?


Why would the Son have to be a carbon copy of the Father in order to be Perfect and for His work to be perfect?

Hebrews 1:3 doesn't say "carbon copy" but moreso replica.

It says χαρακτηρ, which has these main definitions

"a mark engraved or impressed, the impress or stamp on coins and seals... the mark impressed (as it were) on a person or thing, a distinctive mark, characteristic, character..." (An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon).



Before the days of photocopiers and personal computers, actual "carbon copies" always contained defects.

If you have ever done any carpentry, car maintenance or house repairs, you quickly learn that the right tool makes the job easier and delivers the desired result.

Yes.

By analogy, when I was a kid I worked for a small furniture shop, when things were slow, he was always sending me to look for things, "skyhooks" etc. One day, we were installing some shelves and my boss asked me to hand him the "American". He meant "hammer", he didn't have a screwdriver to fit the screw. On face value the hammer did the job but a couple of weeks later the shelves fell down. When you hammer a screw you tear (actually rip) the target making the fastener unstable and unreliable, when you fasten a screw with a screwdriver you integrate the target. To get a perfect job, it is best to use the perfect tool.

Yes.


My views are based on A.John's view of what it means to be "born of God" and "begotten of God". Whether it be applied to the Son or believers in the Son.

Did the autographs of the bible contain errors because the writers were not homoosios to God?

Probably.

Couldn't God get an accurate text written through a human author, if He chose?

Does God have body parts?

Not literally.

The scriptures say only the Father knows the Son, and only the Son knows the Father.

"All things are delivered unto me of my Father: and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and [he] to whomsoever the Son will reveal [him]."

The nature of God is not the cause but the reflection of Who God is, and it is in this sense, as the possessor of God's nature by generation, that the Son is the imprint of the Father's Hypostasis.

Taking Hebrews 1:3 as the context of what A.Paul goes on to say, and with respect, I think you misinterpret what is being told us.

Possibly, I've misunderstood your meaning. I agree that "The nature of God is not the cause". A.Paul tells us four things at Heb 1:2-3: 1. God, through [the Son] made created all orders of existence, 2. the Son is the brightness of the Father's glory, 3. the Son is the exact representation of his being and 4. the Son sustains the universe by his word of power. (cp NWT interlinear, NEB, KJV)

It would help me if you would clarify what you thought my meaning was, and why you think it is a misinterpretation.

Here is some of what the Theological Dictionary of the New Testament says about the two key words in Hebrews 1:3, χαρακτηρ and υποστασις,

"In the NT carakthr occurs only at Hb. 1:3 (--> VIII, 585, 16 ff.): oV wn apaugasma ths doxhV kai carakthr thV upostasewV autou, ferwn th ta panta tw rhmati thV dunamewV autou. The two statements correspond to the two preceding statements in v. 2b c. Viewing Christ's exaltation and pre-existence together, they sing in hymnal style the eternal (or eternalised) nature of the Son --> IV, 339, n. 5. The two members of the first statement (v. 3a) are in parallelism. They thus intentionally say the same thing. As doxa (--> II, 233, 35, ff.) and upostasiV (--> VIII, 572, 1 ff.) are synonymous to the degree that God's glory is His nature, so the same function of the Son is expressed by apaugasma (--> I, 508, 13 ff.) and carakthr. Since God's glory has impressed itself on Him as the One exalted by God, He is its reflection and image. The meaning of the two terms can best be explained from Wisdom and Philo (--> 420, 17 ff.) in so far as one simply takes note of the complex of tradition to which all three belong. As Philo's logos and the wisdom of Wis. 7 are the image of God inasmuch as God's nature, his radiant light and glory, is impressed on them, so Christ as the Son of God is the impress of God's nature, cf. Col. 1:15" (TDNT, vol. ix., "χαρακτηρ", pp. 418-423, Kelber; pp. 420-421).



"The passages in which upostasiV is used in Hb. (1:3; 3:14; 11:1) are essentially much more difficult to assess.... A more or less fixed and developed usage is plainest in 1:3: oV wn apaugasma thV doxhV kai carakthr thV upostasewV autou. Here upostasiV is parallel to doxa. Both words are obviously describing God's essence --> IV, 339, n. 5. It is thus inadvisable to render upostasiV specifically by "essence." The translation should rather express the degree to which doxa and upostasiV denote two special qualities in God's nature that are both present in the Son as their apaugasma (--> I, 508, 13 ff.) and --> carakthr. The fact that these are developed theological terms and not just incidental metaphors is shown especially by the parallels in Philo (--> 583, 18 ff.), above all for carakthr thV upostasewV. In Hb. 1:3, as in Philo, upostasiV denotes the actuality of the transcendent reality, i.e., God, while in distinction from this doxa expresses His mighty "glory" --> II, 247, 27 ff. As the "impress" (carakthr) of this "being" (upostasiV) which alone is real in contrast to all earthly phenomena (skia in Philo [--> VII, 396, 39 ff.] and Hb. [--> VII, 398, 35 ff.]) Christ is the wholly valid revelation of this transcendent reality of God. Here, then, upostasiV as "invisible, transcendent reality" is a term in the vocabulary of dualism" (TDNT, vol. viii., "υποστασις" pp. 572-589, Köster; p. 585).


It was always logically possible that the Son could disobey the Father. He does not of necessity behave a certain way, neither does God.

Not according to 1 John 5:18.

This verse was cited in my last main response to you. What do you see in it that contradicts what I wrote, and how does it integrate with Matthew 26:53 cited above ?


We know that no one who is born of God sins; but He who was born of God keeps him, and the evil one does not touch him.

Scripture teaches that the Son is both superior to us and in another sense with us. Ultimately all things are from the Father (1 Cor. 8:6). Scripture refers to this idea in explaining how we can be brethren with the Logos: "For both he that sanctifieth and they who are sanctified [are] all of one [εξ ενος, 'from One']" (Heb. 2:11).

Yes and no. Heb 2:11 is qualified by 2:13-16.

Not relevantly to my point, I don't believe. At the ultimate level, at which all things are from the Father, both the Monogenes and ourselves are "all from One." We are from the One indirectly, by way of the Monogenes, whereas the Monogenes is from the One directly. No so-called Arian ever taught otherwise.


John 5:11-13 says "God has given us eternal life, and this life is in the Son. He that has the Son has life...believe on the name of the Son of God."

God be magnified.


Indeed all things are by the Father, but we only receive them through the Son.

Nor did I imply otherwise.

Just an interesting observation on Heb 2:13 - we are "the children that God has given" the Son. The implication being that the Son is our Father. But in context of Hebrew thought, though David was the son of Jesse, Abraham was anterior as his Father. So, the Father of the Son is also our Father.

All the best.

He may be father in a Messianic sense, the sense in which the rulers in Old Israel could be called fathers of their people, Isaiah 22:21.

God bless

[apostoli]

Greetings Alam,

I suspect my last reply irritated you a little. If so, I apologise.

Please take into account I am in a progression of study and I readily accept, whatever thoughts I present, require refinement and might be full of errors and misunderstanding on my part. I am trying to look at the events from an historical perspective and remain dogmatically neutral. I may not always be successful, especially in side topics that encompass dogma ;-)

Jerome praises Lucian, and makes no mention of his being unorthodoxConsider: Lucian had been martyred. Eusebius.C's failure to be martyred was questioned by his enemies. Martyres were highly esteemed. And those who survived the persecutions were often viewed suspiciously. From the CE, I gather, in Jerome's time, veneration of the martyres was in high gear. It is just a perspective I feel needs to be considered.

As quoted previously, the CE says "Though [Lucian] cannot be accused of having shared the theological views of Paul of Samosata, he fell under suspicion at the time of Paul's condemnation, and was compelled to sever his communion with the Church (for a couple of decades)." One usually becomes a suspect if evidence points in one's direction. Though, later the evidence might prove fabricated or uncollaborated or misunderstood.

Lucian is on my list of things to investigate. At this stage I've been looking for collaborated evidence. Finding reliable material about him has been a problem. Lots of speculation, from all sides, but as yet nothing I consider proof.

A thought: As far as I am aware, Lucian had never been accused of being a schismatic (he wouldn't be considered a martyr if he had). So, privately he may have discussed "non standard" views for his time, but if he properly, debated doctrine behind closed doors, he would have been held publicly orthodox. Another perspective I feel needs to be considered.

Another thought: Best I can figure, by Jerome's time (if not earlier) anyone that held a subordinationist view was dubbed an Arian.

The only fourth-century party we know to have involved or evolved Modalists is the homousian party. Photinus of Sirmium, the fourth century character with some obvious claim to the tradition of Paul of Samosata, emerged out of the Nicene bloc.That seems a very categorical assertion. When I read Athanasius and Basil, its champions, I didn't detect any form of modalism in their writings - far from it.

I'm reading you as putting forward the proposition that "the homousian party" evolved from modalism. I haven't come across any evidence. Imo: it is the exact opposite. Jesus said he and his Father are one, the homoousians, said the Father, Son and Spirit are one in power and wisdom but not in person. The modalist view said they are the same person. The two views imo, don't blend.

Isn't it possible that the homoousian position was neccessitated, as a response to Deut 6:4 and a refutation of gnostic type speculations (the demiurge). And as a response to the incarnation. As the later controversies show, the issue of "God in the flesh" was a big one! Imo, "Arianism" by making the Son created from nothing, is a philosophic solution to these types of issues. I've come to the conclusion that Arius, if not in a later period, at least initially, went beyond "what we have always understood from scripture" of the rest of the church (see below).

In my studies, I'm trying to be neutral, weighing the arguments as I encounter them. The best I can ascertain is the majority opinion didn't support the opinions of Arius as presented in his Thalia and put open for debate that of Alexander. Undoubtedly they would have been suspicious of Alexander's terminolgy, but as Eusebius.C said, it had been used by the church Fathers long before Paul of Samasota. Was Hippolytus a Sabellian? I think not!

I was thinking on Arius the other day: If Alexander was so out of wack with the rest of the church, and Arius was so in tune, why was it, that Arius got hammered? If later "Arianism" was so "true", and it did have"court" control for many years, and is supposed to have had "popular" support with the people, why did it decline? This led me to reread the The Synodal Letter, To the Church of Alexandria, from the the bishops assembled at Nicea...

"First of all...investigation was made of matters concerning the impiety and transgression of Arias and his adherents; and it was unanimously decreed that he and his impious opinion should be anathematized, together with the blasphemous words and speculations in which he indulged, blaspheming the Son of God, and saying that he is from things that are not, and that before he was begotten he was not, and that there was a time when he was not, and that the Son of God is by his free will capable of vice and virtue; saying also that he is a creature. All these things the holy Synod has anathematized, not even enduring to hear his impious doctrine and madness and blasphemous words. And of the charges against him and of the results they had, ye have either already heard or will hear the particulars, lest we should seem to be oppressing a man who has in fact received a fitting recompense for his own sin."
http://www.bible.ca/history/fathers/NPNF2-14/Npnf2-14-27.htm

In the context of your comment below (that Eusebius.C was an early supporter of Arius), imo: it must be remembered that Eusebius.C appears to have been highly placed at the council of Nicea, and himself wrote to his Diocese: "Since then no divinely inspired Scripture has used the phrases, 'out of nothing', and 'once He was not', and the rest which follow, there appeared no ground for using or teaching them; to which also we assented as a good decision, since it had not been our custom hitherto to use these terms." Eusebius.C himself paticipated in condemning Arius, and to date, I have found no evidence that he did a Eusebius.N.

I am particularly intrigued by Eusebius.C writing: "Moreover to anathematize 'Before His generation He was not', did not seem preposterous, in that it is confessed by all, that the Son of God was before the generation according to the flesh." Now, where was the neccessity for this to be an interpretation of Arius' favorite phrase. On their investigation, had Arius or one of his supporters already hit on an extreme unitarian view? Something I will need to investigate.

[Eusebius.C] was orthodox. But he was one of the most active early supporters of Arius. This should speak in Arius' favor. It should allow for some balance to the probably one-sided view of Arius that appears in Athanasius' work.I think supporter is too strong a word. Would a Bishop follow a priest? Especially a priest, who found the vocation so late in life and who had a schismatic history.

Protector is more probable. Eusebius.C did write to Alexander "If, therefore, the letter received from [the Arians] tells the truth" and though I don't read too much into that, it does show Eusebius.C was prudent. It has occurred to me, that Arius' supporters, trying to have him readmitted to the faith, did insist that Arius affirm the creeds as a condition of re-entry.

Another aspect of the initial Arius/Alexander exchange that intrigues me: How is it that none of the Bishops joined Arius in his attack on Alexander. Even if the 100 bishops that cast Arius out colluded with Alexander in fear of him; Arius, as later events show, had access to Bishops close to the emporer. Even with their initial support, he was still cast out as a schismatic.

According to Arius, in his letter to Eusebius.N "Eusebius, your brother bishop of Caesarea, Theodotus, Paulinus, Athanasius, Gregorius, Aetius, and all the bishops of the East, have been condemned because they say that God had an existence prior to that of his Son." But curiously, only Arius and two supporters were cast out. Why? This is another sub issue I must investigate.

There is a clause in the letter that, I suggest, many who protected Arius, would have found equally offensive as Alexander's use of homoousia - "we say that He is of the non-existent." However, he does qualify that: "And this we say, because He is neither part of God, nor of any essential being." We discussed this earlier. Trying to think as the Bishops might have: I find the statement to be too ambiguous to give any indication of what he meant. And the Nicene Bishops, including Eusebius.N, (though he might have been preasured) seems to have taken it in a very negative sense.

Taking even the most positive view of Arius, When I compare him with what Eusebius.C writes, I find little compatibility in their ultimate views. In "Demonstratio Evangelica", Book V, Chapter 4, Eusebius.C says : "[the Son] is, with regard to essence, and gives an image of the Father that grows from His nature and is not something added to Him, because of the actual source of His existence. Wherefore He is by nature both God and Only-begotten Son, not being made such by adoption...But He is celebrated as Only-begotten Son by nature and as our God, but not as the first God, but as the first Only-Begotten Son of God, and therefore God. And the general cause also of His being God, would be the fact that He alone is Son of God by nature, and is called Only-begotten, and that He completely preserves the living and vivid spiritual image of the One God, being made in all things like the leather, and bearing the likeness of His actual Divinity."
http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/eusebius_de_07_book5.htm

See the words..."the light of sense," "[though]", "whereas," "different."...Eusebius is showing ways in which the analogy does not express the relation of the Son to the Father.I don't see Eusebius.C as discussing the analogy but what it indicates. Hence my comment: The "though, if, buts" are neccessary so one doesn't think the Son is an emanation etc. Its very wise to include them. The "of sence" bit is simply referring to our perceptions of light.

Imo: the important phrase is "there can be [only one] true copy of the Supreme Father...the Son", the light/ray thing is just about their unity (but seperate existence) and one precedes the other.

In this regard, I think of the Egyptian use of mirrors as a means of illuminating dark places. If you are working in a mine, lit via mirrors, you can't see the sun but you perceive its light all around you. By nature the ray is not its own source, seperate but dependent on the source, even though the source may not be seen.

No analogy holds in all respects; for Eusebius, this is where the analogy of light and ray fails.
There is no pessimism in EC in this regard.Respectfully, introducing a word like 'pessimism' without explanation does not help me understand what you are saying. What does the analogy of light and ray have to do with pessimism?Imo: Eusebius wasn't writing about Physics. Nor was he giving a critique regarding the failure of analogies.

Imo: He was using the light and ray to present a positive analogy of the relationship of the Father and the Son, which he qualifies to avoid people misinterpreting him.

Socrates attributes the same thing to Arius that Eusebius himself reprimanded Alexander for: "But thy epistle accuses them of saying that the Son was made as one of the creatures. They do not say this, but clearly declare that he was not as one of the creatures. See if cause is not immediately given them again to attack and to misrepresent whatever they please" (Letter to Alexander).Imo: Your criticism of Socrates, would have to apply to Jerome as well. They are retrospects. Was Origen an Arian? Jerome, seems to think Eusebius.C proved him so. Is this true. I haven't investigated it yet. I don't know.

As for what Eusebius.C wrote to Alexander, the important bit to me is "If, therefore, the letter received from [the Arians] tells the truth". I have doubts whether Arius was upfront and honest. His supporters did seem to insist he confess the faith, as they defined it.

Will is the term for God's power to produce and have deliberate dealings with things whose existence follows from no necessity in God. It describes the realm of free divine activity.With respect, imu, in philosophy to apply "will" to God, implies neccessity, a choice - to do or not to do...The above did not make sense to me. It should have been clear from my post that I believe the will of God is free.My apology for not being clear. I spent some time reading the philosophic opinion on "will" and "free will" and was just sharing what I learnt. Apparently it is a very controversial subject.

To me it is just a word, like homoousia is just a word. Give it a fixed definition and as far as I am concerned thats its meaning. Unfortunately, people find aspects to debate about. Often with justification, where the definition applied is ambiguous or incomplete.

For the sake of the argument, let's use the definition of divine 'will' I proposed: "Will" is the term for God's power to produce and have deliberate dealings with things whose existence follows from no necessity in God. It describes the realm of free divine activity. If you see something else needed to make this definition useful, please add it in.The word "will" is problematic. Your above definition only applies to one aspect. For instance...

How do we obey the "realm of free divine activity" of God? How do we do the "realm of free divine activity" of God?

In the original languages the term translated "will" might have fuller meanings, as for English, there are many "aspects".

To me: "will" doesn't describe how I think of God as acting towards us, nor how I am suppose to react to him. My view might be expressed with an alternative statement...

The only alternative english term to "will" that I can think of is "passionless desire": God provides all amenity for his creation. Through this we perceive him, and realise that all things are for our benefit. Recognising this we are drawn to him. We don't need to know the hows and whys, just accept, and show gratitude for the gift. But if someone asks of the hows and whys, they are the passionless desire of God.

The "passionless" bit, is just a bit of philosophical gooble'd'gook, to qualify which meaning of desire I am using.

As time permits, I must look into the Greek.

What anathemas make it clear that avoiding Sabellian ideas was the objective of Nicea?I presume you have Marcellus as a retort. Basil, Letter CXXV1, paragraph 1, specifies which anathema and explains how Marcellas misunderstood the intention of Nicene.
http://www.ccel.org/fathers2/NPNF2-08/Npnf2-08-143.htm

Hebrews 1:3 doesn't say "carbon copy" but moreso replica.It says χαρακτηρ, which has these main definitions "a mark engraved or impressed, the impress or stamp on coins and seals..."Very true. There are some interesting implications of A.Paul's choice of words. I think it was Basil that makes a comment about not thinking of the Son as being cast as a coin. Even so, the implication of A.Paul's choice of words: it indicates that the Son was created from something. By analogy: the impress and the metal from which a coin is cast, are both pre-existent to the coin itself. Hmm. Something I must think on.

Did the autographs of the bible contain errors because the writers were not homoosios to God?
Probably.Couldn't God get an accurate text written through a human author, if He chose?Alam ;-) God can do anything!

I'll repeat my context "The ancient writings were "inspired" not "dictated" by God. So there is an element of human fraility in them...Does God have body parts?"

Does Jesus say God made allowances for divorce? Or, was such a contrivance of Moses, tolerated by God? Imo: the scriptures are as much about revealing the fraility of mankind and the inability of men to follow God or understand God or speak about God, as it is about God himself.

The nature of God is not the cause but the reflection of Who God is, and it is in this sense, as the possessor of God's nature by generation, that the Son is the imprint of the Father's Hypostasis.Taking Hebrews 1:3 as the context of what A.Paul goes on to say, and with respect, I think you misinterpret what is being told us.
It would help me if you would clarify what you thought my meaning was, and why you think it is a misinterpretation.The bit I've highlighted is what I thought you said. My response was meant to suggest, that the "imprint" thing is not A.Paul's focus. Of the four things he describes of the Son, the first and last is what we usually ascribe to God, the second could be construed as describing the Son as an emanation, but the third qualifies the Son's substantiality. Imo: the middle two act as qualifiers, identifying the Father as the source of what the Son is, but also showing they are, even before creation, two individuals.

It was always logically possible that the Son could disobey the Father. He[the Son] does not of necessity behave a certain way, neither does God.Not according to 1 John 5:18.This verse was cited in my last main response to you. What do you see in it that contradicts what I wrote, and how does it integrate with Matthew 26:53 cited above ?

1 John 5:18, NASB
We know that no one who is born of God sins; but He who was born of God keeps him, and the evil one does not touch him.The bit I've highlighted in your original post, imo, is contradicted by the bit I highlighted in 1 John 5:18. If sin is missing the standard/target set by the Father, then according to A.John anyone born of God, always hits the target, meets that standard or as A.John says does not sin.

In your other post you did indeed cited 1 Jn 3:9;5:18 & Jn 1:13. Which is why I thought your satement perculiar. Law of contradictions as Py would say ;-)

I'm perplexed what Jesus having the ability to ask his Father for legions of angels has to do with the possibility of the Son choosing to ignore the Father's will (Matt 26:53). If anything the fact he says he can and doesn't do so, just shows he does what the Father requests of him - no matter what, confirming 1 John.

Samewise Matthew 26:39 which you cite. I see these as affirmations of 1 Jn 3:9;5:18.

Guess you are speculating on the Son as having choices, and the free will to make his own choices. As a fleshy thing, he was subject to the fraility of the flesh. But to my mind, as our example, he showed it possible to conquer any weakness of the flesh.

For years I held that the Son had to have free will, and assumed he could have chosen not to do the will of the Father. But thats before I thought on 1 John without a dogmatic bias (=the Son is not God). Imo: A.Johns argument fits into the God wills freely idea. The Son and believers, being born of God are imitative of God. God cannot sin, nor can those born of him.

Scripture teaches that the Son is both superior to us and in another sense with us. Ultimately all things are from the Father (1 Cor. 8:6). Scripture refers to this idea in explaining how we can be brethren with the Logos: "For both he that sanctifieth and they who are sanctified [are] all of one [εξ ενος, 'from One']" (Heb. 2:11).Yes and no. Heb 2:11 is qualified by 2:13-16.Not relevant to my point, I don't believe. At the ultimate level, at which all things are from the Father, both the Monogenes and ourselves are "all from One." We are from the One indirectly, by way of the Monogenes, whereas the Monogenes is from the One directly. No so-called Arian ever taught otherwise.I'm baffled as to what prompted your response, especially the Arian bit.

I was responding to your "Scripture teaches that the Son is both superior to us and in another sense with us." Hence, my reference to A.Paul's qualification - in his humanity he is one with us. But as A.Paul pointed out at Heb 1:2, the Son is that by which God created all things, and by whom all things are upheld. Colossians says all things are for the Son. So, he is superior to all things (excluding his Father). Imu, at John 17:23, Jesus doesn't say the Father is in us, but the Son is in us, and the Father is in the Son.

I'm not suggesting you think otherwise. Your response puzzles me. I'm assuming you are just advocating that ultimately all things are attributable to the Father. Which I totally agree with. But the scriptures say all things are for the Son. So there is explicity a heirarchy of subjection.

Just an interesting observation on Heb 2:13 - we are "the children that God has given" the Son. The implication being that the Son is our Father. But in context of Hebrew thought, though David was the son of Jesse, Abraham was anterior as his Father. So, the Father of the Son is also our Father.He may be father in a Messianic sense, the sense in which the rulers in Old Israel could be called fathers of their people, Isaiah 22:21.I was thinking of the Son as our creator (Heb 1:2). Ultimately, even in the Abraham/Jesse/David analogy, the originating tier is the true God, the Father of the Son.

Nothing sinister intended.

All the best.

[alam]

Greetings Alam,

I suspect my last reply irritated you a little. If so, I apologise.


Hi Apostoli!

Thank you for your response.

Unfortunately yes- I was irritated at the time, and tried not for it to show, but failed. I don't think it was about your post specifically. What apologizing needs to be done is on my part-- sorry!

Over the weekend, God willing, I will consider your message and try to place a more collected response.

All the best!

[apostoli]

Hi Alam,

Unfortunately yes- I was irritated at the time, and tried not for it to show, but failed. I don't think it was about your post specifically. What apologizing needs to be done is on my part-- sorry!No need to say sorry. Lets just assume your irritation was justifiable from the perspective you were working in. I find I get a certain way forward, then have to go back, restart and go forward with another branch of investigation. I often irritate myself :wink:

Over the weekend, God willing, I will consider your message and try to place a more collected response.Please don't make it a priority. Enjoy the weekend!

Remembering something. I just did a search using - "Eusebius Pamphilus" rehabilitation and found the following....

You may already have this in your archives. If not, it is worth a read.
A SELECT LIBRARY OF THE NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS...EUSEBIUS PAMPHILUS
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf201.htm

ps:

The following section is relevent to our recent discussion. I had read this sometime last year, so its probably been floating about in the back of my head when I was thinking on Jerome's view of Eusebius.C.

§5. The Outbreak of the Arian Controversy. The Attitude of Eusebius.

[alam]

Hello Apostoli,

Please take into account I am in a progression of study and I readily accept, whatever thoughts I present, require refinement and might be full of errors and misunderstanding on my part. I am trying to look at the events from an historical perspective and remain dogmatically neutral. I may not always be successful, especially in side topics that encompass dogma ;-)

Same here. :-)

Consider: Lucian had been martyred. Eusebius.C's failure to be martyred was questioned by his enemies. Martyres were highly esteemed. And those who survived the persecutions were often viewed suspiciously. From the CE, I gather, in Jerome's time, veneration of the martyres was in high gear. It is just a perspective I feel needs to be considered.

As quoted previously, the CE says "Though [Lucian] cannot be accused of having shared the theological views of Paul of Samosata, he fell under suspicion at the time of Paul's condemnation, and was compelled to sever his communion with the Church (for a couple of decades)." One usually becomes a suspect if evidence points in one's direction. Though, later the evidence might prove fabricated or uncollaborated or misunderstood.

Lucian is on my list of things to investigate. At this stage I've been looking for collaborated evidence. Finding reliable material about him has been a problem. Lots of speculation, from all sides, but as yet nothing I consider proof.

We do have Lucian's purported creed. (http://ecole.evansville.edu/arians/2arcon.htm)

A thought: As far as I am aware, Lucian had never been accused of being a schismatic (he wouldn't be considered a martyr if he had). So, privately he may have discussed "non standard" views for his time, but if he properly, debated doctrine behind closed doors, he would have been held publicly orthodox. Another perspective I feel needs to be considered.

Of course, he may have had views at odds with what he publicly professed. The problem is that that could be true of anyone. I still believe that Lucian would not have enjoyed the reputation that he did, nor had his recensions of the scriptures widely received, unless he was known to be positively free of Paul of Samosata's errors. The fact that he came under suspicion in connection with Paul (for whatever reason) means that his own orthodoxy would have been subject to unusual scrutiny.

So far from sharing Paul's doctrinal inclinations, Lucian may have been opposed to them. One could gather this from his creed, as mentioned above, with its insistence on the three hypostases, the real pre-existence of Christ, and its quotation of John 6:38, "I am come down from heaven," as against Paul's teaching that "Jesus Christ is from below" (Eusebius of Caesarea, H.E. vii. 30 (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/250107.htm)). If Lucian, like Arius, maintained that the Father and the Son are different ousiai, this would show his adherence to the anti-monarchian council of Antioch.

Another thought: Best I can figure, by Jerome's time (if not earlier) anyone that held a subordinationist view was dubbed an Arian.

Early on, the homoousians began calling anyone who held a certain kind of subordinationist view an 'Arian.' That is the basis for talking about 'Arianism' in the fourth century, since, as we have discussed, few so-called Arians were adherents of Arius. The distinction I have found between Arian and non-Arian subordination, which seems accurate in that it brings together those who were called Arians, including the Homoians, the Anomoians, and some semi-Arians, while excluding those who were not Arians such as the Cappadocians, is that Arianism understands the Generation to be an operation of the divine will.

That seems a very categorical assertion. When I read Athanasius and Basil, its champions, I didn't detect any form of modalism in their writings - far from it.


I mentioned Photinus within a specific context. You had speculated that the Arians were nearer than commonly thought to Sabellianism and dynamic monarchianism. My response was that they included no Sabellians or Sabellianizers and produced nobody holding such views. This was more the case of the Nicenes. You responded that you see nothing resembling modalism in the writings of Athanasius (I would reserve judgment) nor Basil (who was a late-comer to homoousianism from a semi-Arian background). My response is that nothing remotely resembles modalism in the Arian writings either, so, what would be the basis for thinking that modalism bears a stronger relation to Arianism than to homoousianism?



I'm reading you as putting forward the proposition that "the homousian party" evolved from modalism. I haven't come across any evidence. Imo: it is the exact opposite. Jesus said he and his Father are one, the homoousians, said the Father, Son and Spirit are one in power and wisdom but not in person. The modalist view said they are the same person. The two views imo, don't blend.


When stating the Nicene view for the purpose of distinguishing it from another view, it seems to me that one ought to do so using the distinctive Nicene terms, not neutral terms such as unity in wisdom and power. The homousians taught that the Father and the Son are two persons of the same 'ousia', not merely that they are one in power or in wisdom, which, in itself, could be an Arian view. Hence there is an apparent discrepancy between the homousian ideology and that of e.g., Hippolytus, whom I cited in post 8:

7. If, again, he [Noetus] allege His own word when He said, "I and the Father are one," let him attend to the fact, and understand that He did not say, "I and the Father am one, but are one." For the word are is not said of one person, but it refers to two persons, and one power. He has Himself made this clear, when He spake to His Father concerning the disciples, "The glory which Thou gavest me I have given them; that they may be one, even as we are one: I in them, and Thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one; that the world may know that Thou hast sent me." What have the Noetians to say to these things? Are alI one body in respect of substance (κατα την ουσιαν), or is it that we become one in the power and disposition of unity of mind? (* (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0521.htm))

You wrote, "...not in person." But the modalists would not necessarily say that the trinity are the same person. The words prosopon and persona could also mean a mask in theatre.

Isn't it possible that the homoousian position was neccessitated, as a response to Deut 6:4 and a refutation of gnostic type speculations (the demiurge). And as a response to the incarnation. As the later controversies show, the issue of "God in the flesh" was a big one! Imo, "Arianism" by making the Son created from nothing, is a philosophic solution to these types of issues. I've come to the conclusion that Arius, if not in a later period, at least initially, went beyond "what we have always understood from scripture" of the rest of the church (see below).

But necessitated to the exclusion of anything else? The Homoian church appears to have been theologically stable during the several centuries of its active existence. Deut. 6:4 was upheld in a way unsuggestive of Sabellianism, and gnostic speculations, and nearly all speculations beyond scripture were shunned. This form of theology, though generally classed as Arian, did not approve of the idea that the Son was generated ex-nihilo. In his debate with Augustine, Maximinus said (in a rough translation):

"Would you know how great is the wisdom of the Father? Consider the Son and you will see the wisdom of the Father. For this reason Christ said these words: 'Whosoever sees me, also sees the Father'; that is, in me he sees God's wisdom, and praises His power; he glorifies Him, who begat me so great and excellent before all ages, One begetting One, Only begetting Only. He sought no material from which He should produce a Son, and received the aid of no other substance, but, as He (only) knows, begat the Son by His own power and wisdom. Not as you all say, maliciously accusing us (since other creatures are made from nothing) that we profess that the Son too is made from nothing (ex nihilo), as one of the creatures. Listen to the authority of the narration of the synod, because in Ariminum our fathers said, with the rest of the articles : 'If anyone says the Son is from nothing, and not from God the Father, let him be anathema' (Si quis ex nihilo Filium dicit, et non ex Deo Patre, anathema sit). Of course, if you wish, I will provide testimonies. For thus says the blessed apostle John: 'Whoever loveth Him that begat, loveth him also that is begotten of him'" (Collatio cum Maximino xv. 13 (http://www.sant-agostino.it/latino/conferenza_massimino/conferenza_massimino_libro.htm)).

The teaching on ex-nihilo generation doesn't seem to have been a principal commitment of Arianism. Arius himself probably abandoned it, and later so-called Arians either rejected it or were silent on the matter. The Anomoeans are a counterexample, but the legitimacy of calling them 'Arian' is not clear, even apart from the fact that few 'Arians' looked to Arius as their founder or doctrinal spokesman. The Anomoeans saw major differences between themselves on the one hand and 'Arians' on the other, and a basic continuity from Arius to the council of Rimini, the general council which Maximinus cites above (Philostorgius, Epitome x. 2f. (http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/philostorgius.htm)). This distinction between Arian and Eunomian is reflected in Canon 7 of Constantinople 381 (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3808.htm) which prescribes different treatments for 'Arians' and 'Eunomians' seeking entry to the Nicene church.

So, in evaluating the relative merits or lack of them of Arianism, there may be a pitfall in laying great stress on the ex-nihilo teaching. Arius' concern doesn't seem to have been to define the generation, but to make clear what it was not: "if the terms 'from Him,' and 'from the womb,' and 'I came forth from the Father, and I am come' (Rom. xi. 36; Ps. cx. 3; John xvi. 28), be understood by some to mean as if a part of Him, one in essence or as an issue, then the Father is according to them compounded and divisible and alterable and material" (Fragment 3). The next step, given Arius' mainly apophatic premises, would simply have been to deny that the generation was from the non-existent. This can be done if God is incomprehensible in essence. This step was taken by the subsequent Arians and perhaps by Arius himself. It was not so for the Anomoeans who believed that God IS the Ingenerate Essence. For them the doctrine of ex-nihilo generation became a dialectical necessity that it was not for the Arians.


In my studies, I'm trying to be neutral, weighing the arguments as I encounter them. The best I can ascertain is the majority opinion didn't support the opinions of Arius as presented in his Thalia and put open for debate that of Alexander. Undoubtedly they would have been suspicious of Alexander's terminolgy, but as Eusebius.C said, it had been used by the church Fathers long before Paul of Samasota. Was Hippolytus a Sabellian? I think not!

Hippolytus does not say that the Father and the Son are homoousios, afaik. As above, he actually seems to deny this. He does teach that the Son was not produced from the non-existent (Refutation of all Heresies x. 29 (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/050110.htm)), but this doesn't quite equate to homoousianism. As I wrote in post #8, "Hippolytus may have believed that although the Son came from the Father's essence, he is now a second essence, much as a fire kindled from a fire, per Justin, is a second fire."

As you know, the homoousion was banned at the anti-monarchian council of Antioch: "the Fathers seem to have rejected Homoousion, even going so far as to propose the phrase heteras ousias, that is, Heteroousion, 'of other or different ousia'" (Catholic Encyclopedia, HOMOOUSION (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07449a.htm)). "Heteroousios" is supposedly the radical Arian term, and yet it may have been prescribed as orthodox 70 years before Nicea. If that is true, the supposition that Arius went out of orthodoxy when he affirmed that the Father and the Son are utterly distinct and different ousiai (=beings) would seem unjustified. Rather than a sign of modalism or of Samosatene leanings, this would show his adherence to the anti-monarchian formula of the council of Antioch. A failure by Alexander to respect this would explain Arius' apparent, and to my reading, unfeigned alarm at his teaching.


I was thinking on Arius the other day: If Alexander was so out of wack with the rest of the church, and Arius was so in tune, why was it, that Arius got hammered? If later "Arianism" was so "true", and it did have"court" control for many years, and is supposed to have had "popular" support with the people, why did it decline? This led me to reread the The Synodal Letter, To the Church of Alexandria, from the the bishops assembled at Nicea...

I do not know what is being expressed by the scare quotes. When you suffer defeat in a worthy cause, you regroup and try again. This is what the Arians did. There is no reason to think they were more involved in political intrigues than the homoousians. Nor was Arius necessarily more in tune with the general view of the church. There does not seem to have been a 'general view' at the beginning of the fourth century. With the possible exception of his ex-nihilo doctrine, Arius was in tune with the view of one part of the church, the part which appears to have been least compromised by the myohypostatic heresies of the 3rd century. Nevertheless, that part of the church did not come through for him at Nicea.

We could spend a long time discussing why, as we have done in other threads. Whatever the significance of this, it is diminished by the eastern bishops' soon withdrawal of explicit support for homoousianism, their readmission of Arius, and deposition of Athanasius (Pronouncement of the Synod of Tyre and Jerusalem, c. 335 (http://www2.evansville.edu/ecoleweb/arians/tyre1.htm)). Eusebius of Caesarea had a prominent role in this. According to Epiphanius he was the judge at the Synod of Tyre (see D.S. Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea; The Canterbury Press, 1961; pp. 33-34).

The eastern bishops came to believe that the pretexts under which they had subscribed to homoousianism were flawed.

"The new creed expressed a theology which seemed to Eusebius to be dangerous, but which was not explicitly heretical as it was expounded, clause by clause, by the council. With some misgiving he therefore subscribed it, his subscription being later used as a stick to beat the Arians, as though he had been a full Arian who had seen the error of his ways and had changed sides. To stigmatize the apologia he wrote to Caesarea as 'pitiful and insincere' is not altogether unjust, but we need not attribute his later animosity against Athanasius and Eustathius solely to the reaction of an uneasy conscience. He had subscribed the Nicene document unwillingly, on the assurance that it was not going to be interpreted in a sense repugnant to him. Within five years he found that this assurance had been worthless. Eustathius was pushing his interpretation of the creed to an extreme which appeared positively heretical, and Eusebius was in consequence understandably angry. We may also think that he was regretting his signature at Nicaea as having been too hasty despite its delay and that he was not reluctant to counteract the harmful effects of what had been done. The reaction against Nicaea was certainly not confined to the convinced Arians, but was felt also by men who were not Arians at all. Gwatkin concludes, 'Athanasius had pushed the easterns further than they wished to go, and his victory recoiled on him'" (Wallace-Hadrill, ibid. 30).


In the context of your comment below (that Eusebius.C was an early supporter of Arius), imo: it must be remembered that Eusebius.C appears to have been highly placed at the council of Nicea,


But he also seems to have been a bit in the hot seat, considering that he had been provisionally excommunicated earlier that year at Antioch.


and himself wrote to his Diocese: "Since then no divinely inspired Scripture has used the phrases, 'out of nothing', and 'once He was not', and the rest which follow, there appeared no ground for using or teaching them; to which also we assented as a good decision, since it had not been our custom hitherto to use these terms." Eusebius.C himself paticipated in condemning Arius, and to date, I have found no evidence that he did a Eusebius.N.

I am particularly intrigued by Eusebius.C writing: "Moreover to anathematize 'Before His generation He was not', did not seem preposterous, in that it is confessed by all, that the Son of God was before the generation according to the flesh." Now, where was the neccessity for this to be an interpretation of Arius' favorite phrase. On their investigation, had Arius or one of his supporters already hit on an extreme unitarian view? Something I will need to investigate.


Again, I understand Eusebius' explication of the Nicene creed and anathemas in the way set forth by D.S.Wallace-Hadrill:

"Constantine had applauded [Eusebius'] theology, and had recommended it to the Council 'with the single addition of the word omoousioV'. Eusebius was then prepared to swallow this much, though it must remain doubtful whether he would have meant by omoousioV what the orthoxox would have meant by it. . . . . But it did not turn out so easily for him. What the Council proposed was not a creed based upon Eusebian theology plus omoousioV, but a theology which was wholly strange to him and very distasteful, and which appeared even to bypass the emperor's expressed intentions. Faced with this situation, and the prospect of his excommunication being reaffirmed, all he could do was to shut his eyes to the broad theological position of the creed and to work through it piecemeal, interpreting each phrase in such a way as to render it innocuous. . . . . Eusebius had only the verbal assurance of the Council that omoousioV was not to be pushed to a Sabellian extreme. It was what appeared to be to him the realization of this fear which caused his violent opposition to Marcellus a decade after Nicaea" (ibid. 134-135).

Concerning the actual line to which you referred:

"Moreover to anathematize “Before His generation He was not,” did not seem preposterous, in that it is confessed by all, that the Son of God was before the generation according to the flesh.

Nay, our most religious Emperor did at the time prove, in a speech, that He was in being even according to His divine generation which is before all ages, since even before He was generated in energy, He was in virtue with the Father ingenerately, the Father being always Father, as King always, and Saviour always, being all things in virtue, and being always in the same respects and in the same way" (Letter of Eusebius to His Church (http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf204.ix.ii.html) ix-x.)

1) When Eusebius says, 'it is confessed by all,' it seems this would include Arius and the Arians.

2) The argument, which he ascribes to Constantine, that the Son pre-existed his generation in potency rather than act, does not seem to be a strong rebuttal to an Arian view. Few Arians could be found to deny that the 'Son' pre-existed his generation in the eternal power of God, in potentiality, albeit not as an actual entity.

Given the Council's other circumstances it is not surprising that the eastern bishops signed the Nicene creed, when such interpretations were being given by the Emperor himself. However, the resulting consensus was artificial. Eusebius and those of like mind had agreed to a document of questionable teaching without any written assurance, ratified along with the creed, guaranteeing that the interpretation under which they had subscribed would be honored.


I think supporter is too strong a word. Would a Bishop follow a priest? Especially a priest, who found the vocation so late in life and who had a schismatic history.

Rumors of Arius' involvement with the Meletians should perhaps be taken as such. I am not aware of good evidence linking him to them.

Protector is more probable.

In his Letter to Paulinus (http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf203.iv.viii.i.vi.html), Eusebius of Nicomedia mentions the zeal of Eusebius of Caesarea in behalf of their cause. So, I don't believe support is too strong a word. It seems to be a neutral way of describing what Eusebius of Caesarea was actually doing. Eusebius did not have to be a "follower" of Arius to be a supporter of Arius. The statement "We have not been followers of Arius... But, after taking on ourselves to examine and to verify his faith, we admitted him rather than followed him" itself 'supports' Arius (First Arian Confession 341 A.D. (http://ecole.evansville.edu/arians/1arcon.htm)).


Eusebius.C did write to Alexander "If, therefore, the letter received from [the Arians] tells the truth" and though I don't read too much into that, it does show Eusebius.C was prudent. It has occurred to me, that Arius' supporters, trying to have him readmitted to the faith, did insist that Arius affirm the creeds as a condition of re-entry.

When we discussed this before, what I seem to recall boiling out of it was that we do not know that Arius made a specific gesture of accepting the homoousion. His joint statement of faith with Euzoius was judged to be adequate (Arius' Letter to the Emperor Constantine, 327 CE (http://ecole.evansville.edu/arians/arius3.htm)).


Another aspect of the initial Arius/Alexander exchange that intrigues me: How is it that none of the Bishops joined Arius in his attack on Alexander. Even if the 100 bishops that cast Arius out colluded with Alexander in fear of him; Arius, as later events show, had access to Bishops close to the emporer. Even with their initial support, he was still cast out as a schismatic.

Yes, for a while.


There is a clause in the letter that, I suggest, many who protected Arius, would have found equally offensive as Alexander's use of homoousia - "we say that He is of the non-existent." However, he does qualify that: "And this we say, because He is neither part of God, nor of any essential being." We discussed this earlier. Trying to think as the Bishops might have: I find the statement to be too ambiguous to give any indication of what he meant.

That is a fair statement. But it does seem that Eusebius of Caesarea's support of Arius, and that of others, should curb one's tendency to read the worst into it.


And the Nicene Bishops, including Eusebius.N, (though he might have been preasured) seems to have taken it in a very negative sense.

Taking even the most positive view of Arius, When I compare him with what Eusebius.C writes, I find little compatibility in their ultimate views. In "Demonstratio Evangelica", Book V, Chapter 4, Eusebius.C says : "[the Son] is, with regard to essence, and gives an image of the Father that grows from His nature and is not something added to Him, because of the actual source of His existence. Wherefore He is by nature both God and Only-begotten Son, not being made such by adoption...But He is celebrated as Only-begotten Son by nature and as our God, but not as the first God, but as the first Only-Begotten Son of God, and therefore God. And the general cause also of His being God, would be the fact that He alone is Son of God by nature, and is called Only-begotten, and that He completely preserves the living and vivid spiritual image of the One God, being made in all things like the leather, and bearing the likeness of His actual Divinity."
http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/eusebius_de_07_book5.htm


In the majority of his teaching Arius may have been indistinguishable from Eusebius above. Otoh, sometimes Eusebius expressed himself in a way similar to Arius, "the Son exists in Himself in His own essence apart from the Father". We may not be able to generalize to Arius' teaching as a whole from Athanasius' fragments. I think the fact that Eusebius knew and supported/protexted Arius outweighs generalizations about the compatibility of their beliefs based on Athanasius' polemic quotations of Arius.



I don't see Eusebius.C as discussing the analogy but what it indicates. Hence my comment: The "though, if, buts" are neccessary so one doesn't think the Son is an emanation etc. Its very wise to include them. The "of sence" bit is simply referring to our perceptions of light.

Of course.

Imo: the important phrase is "there can be [only one] true copy of the Supreme Father...the Son", the light/ray thing is just about their unity (but seperate existence) and one precedes the other.

It would seem that what God has done once, He could do twice. The generation didn't weary God, deplete Him of His strength. Whatever it took to generate the Son, God still has. To deny this would be a harmful speculation, as it would question the impassibility of God

However, there could not be two supreme Logoi any more than the universe could follow two conflicting sets of physical laws.

Perhaps the solution to the apparent discrepancy between Arius and Eusebius would be that although there cannot be more than one Son (with capital S, the Monogenes), the power whereby God begat the Son still inheres in God, so in principle He does have the power to beget the Son's equal.

Again, Arius' "one equal to the Son, the Superior is able to beget" is the point of contrast for his following statement: "one more excellent, or superior, or greater, He is not able" (Fragment 2 (http://home.zonnet.nl/chotki/fragments%20from%20arius.htm)). God has withheld nothing at all from the Son. It is only the case that "the Father did not, in giving to [the Son] the inheritance of all things, deprive Himself of what He has ingenerately in Himself; for He is the Fountain of all things" (Frag. 3).

In this regard, I think of the Egyptian use of mirrors as a means of illuminating dark places. If you are working in a mine, lit via mirrors, you can't see the sun but you perceive its light all around you. By nature the ray is not its own source, seperate but dependent on the source, even though the source may not be seen.

Agreed.


Imo: Eusebius wasn't writing about Physics. Nor was he giving a critique regarding the failure of analogies.


He was just explaining in simple terms where the analogy of light and ray does not apply, along the lines you have set forth above.

Imo: He was using the light and ray to present a positive analogy of the relationship of the Father and the Son, which he qualifies to avoid people misinterpreting him.

Yes.


Imo: Your criticism of Socrates, would have to apply to Jerome as well.

I think it would apply to lots of people. To the extent that someone cannot correctly state Arius' view, there is no need to acknowledge their opinions about what doctrines are and are not Arian, particularly when fine distinctions are involved.


They are retrospects. Was Origen an Arian? Jerome, seems to think Eusebius.C proved him so. Is this true. I haven't investigated it yet. I don't know.

As for what Eusebius.C wrote to Alexander, the important bit to me is "If, therefore, the letter received from [the Arians] tells the truth". I have doubts whether Arius was upfront and honest.

Do you have specific reasons for this?

My apology for not being clear. I spent some time reading the philosophic opinion on "will" and "free will" and was just sharing what I learnt. Apparently it is a very controversial subject.

LOL ! Yes.

To me it is just a word, like homoousia is just a word. Give it a fixed definition and as far as I am concerned thats its meaning. Unfortunately, people find aspects to debate about. Often with justification, where the definition applied is ambiguous or incomplete.

The word "will" is problematic. Your above definition only applies to one aspect. For instance...

How do we obey the "realm of free divine activity" of God? How do we do the "realm of free divine activity" of God?

We can distinguish between what God wills for us to do, and what He wills to do. In the latter case there is no distance or intervening step between God's will to do a thing, and the thing's being done.

וֵאלֹהֵינוּ בַשָּׁמָיִם כֹּל אֲשֶׁר־חָפֵץ עָשָׂה

But our God is in the heavens; all that he hath willed/desired, he hath done.

This is the realm of free divine activity corresponding to the definition I gave in the other two posts.

In the original languages the term translated "will" might have fuller meanings, as for English, there are many "aspects".

To me: "will" doesn't describe how I think of God as acting towards us, nor how I am suppose to react to him. My view might be expressed with an alternative statement...

The only alternative english term to "will" that I can think of is "passionless desire": God provides all amenity for his creation. Through this we perceive him, and realise that all things are for our benefit. Recognising this we are drawn to him. We don't need to know the hows and whys, just accept, and show gratitude for the gift. But if someone asks of the hows and whys, they are the passionless desire of God.

The "passionless" bit, is just a bit of philosophical gooble'd'gook, to qualify which meaning of desire I am using.

As time permits, I must look into the Greek.


'Passionless desire' seems like a fine expression, but it may not be specific enough to help us distinguish between Arianism per se and homoousianism. Something more specific is meant by the assertion that the generation is at the Father's will, versus the Nicene avoidance of such. Perhaps both could have agreed that God has a passionless (=impassible, or without appetition?) desire to generate the Son. The Nicenes wished to ascribe this passionless desire to God's nature, in the sense of something prior to God's free will. For the Arians, that was an impertinent speculation. For them it was a basic fact that God does 'will' things or exercise a passionless desire, and it is not meaningful to ask what makes God will as He does, that is, overall and in the sense of sufficient cause. We must regard the content of God's will as neither arbitrary nor as an outworking of determinations in the divine nature, nor as a combination of the two, but as valid in a way that transcends these alternatives.


I presume you have Marcellus as a retort. Basil, Letter CXXV1, paragraph 1, specifies which anathema and explains how Marcellas misunderstood the intention of Nicene.
http://www.ccel.org/fathers2/NPNF2-08/Npnf2-08-143.htm


Please try to consider mention of Marcellus not a retort but expressing a genuine concern about the composition of the early Nicene party.

Basil looks for a distinction in meaning between 'ousia' and 'hypostasis' as they appear in the anathema in the 325 creed. From what I have read, at the time of the Council there was no real distinction between 'ousia' and 'hypostasis.' c. 369, Athanasius wrote, "now subsistence (hypostasis) is essence (ousia), and means nothing else but very being" (Ad Afros iv. (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2819.htm)). Is Athanasius therefore a party to "the impious following of the Libyan Sabellius, who understand hypostasis and substance to be identical," in the words of Basil?


Very true. There are some interesting implications of A.Paul's choice of words. I think it was Basil that makes a comment about not thinking of the Son as being cast as a coin. Even so, the implication of A.Paul's choice of words: it indicates that the Son was created from something. By analogy: the impress and the metal from which a coin is cast, are both pre-existent to the coin itself. Hmm. Something I must think on.

Alam ;-) God can do anything!

That is all I wanted to hear. :-) It is possible for the Logos to be perfect and for his work to be perfect, regardless of his relation to the 'essence' of the Father. I am sorry for not responding more fully to this, and would try to do so later.

I'll repeat my context "The ancient writings were "inspired" not "dictated" by God. So there is an element of human fraility in them...Does God have body parts?"

Does Jesus say God made allowances for divorce? Or, was such a contrivance of Moses, tolerated by God? Imo: the scriptures are as much about revealing the fraility of mankind and the inability of men to follow God or understand God or speak about God, as it is about God himself.

The bit I've highlighted is what I thought you said. My response was meant to suggest, that the "imprint" thing is not A.Paul's focus. Of the four things he describes of the Son, the first and last is what we usually ascribe to God, the second could be construed as describing the Son as an emanation, but the third qualifies the Son's substantiality. Imo: the middle two act as qualifiers, identifying the Father as the source of what the Son is, but also showing they are, even before creation, two individuals.

The bit I've highlighted in your original post, imo, is contradicted by the bit I highlighted in 1 John 5:18. If sin is missing the standard/target set by the Father, then according to A.John anyone born of God, always hits the target, meets that standard or as A.John says does not sin.

In your other post you did indeed cited 1 Jn 3:9;5:18 & Jn 1:13. Which is why I thought your satement perculiar. Law of contradictions as Py would say ;-)

I'm perplexed what Jesus having the ability to ask his Father for legions of angels has to do with the possibility of the Son choosing to ignore the Father's will (Matt 26:53). If anything the fact he says he can and doesn't do so, just shows he does what the Father requests of him - no matter what, confirming 1 John.

Samewise Matthew 26:39 which you cite. I see these as affirmations of 1 Jn 3:9;5:18.

Guess you are speculating on the Son as having choices, and the free will to make his own choices. As a fleshy thing, he was subject to the fraility of the flesh. But to my mind, as our example, he showed it possible to conquer any weakness of the flesh.

For years I held that the Son had to have free will, and assumed he could have chosen not to do the will of the Father. But thats before I thought on 1 John without a dogmatic bias (=the Son is not God). Imo: A.Johns argument fits into the God wills freely idea. The Son and believers, being born of God are imitative of God. God cannot sin, nor can those born of him.

You wrote, "he can and doesn't." Yes, that is what I was trying to say.

The Greek word for free will is autexousia, meaning self-determination. For the church fathers, every rational being possesses autexousia.

Free will is not necessarily fickle or variable. For classical theology, angels and devils possess free will. Nevertheless, it is a traditional dogma that no more angels will turn into devils, and that no devils will repent and regain the status of angels. The idea is that these intelligences have such power of self-determination that when one of them makes up its mind in full knowledge, its mind is made up. Only God could make it change, and then only by removing its autexousia.

So it seems to me that the Son's possession of autexousia is compatible with the reality that he never will sin, and never would have. It does mean that his sinlessness is due to his freely chosen, perpetual constancy in the will of God. It is not that he logically could not have done anything other than the will of the Father; as Jesus said, he could have called upon those legions of angels; even though he never, ever would have. Does this make sense?


I'm baffled as to what prompted your response, especially the Arian bit.

I was responding to your "Scripture teaches that the Son is both superior to us and in another sense with us."

It was a response to your summation of the problem with Arianism, in all its forms, as its overly close association of Jesus with the adopted sons. I simply do not see this. Everything in your following paragraph could agree with some form of Arianism.

Hence, my reference to A.Paul's qualification - in his humanity he is one with us. But as A.Paul pointed out at Heb 1:2, the Son is that by which God created all things, and by whom all things are upheld. Colossians says all things are for the Son. So, he is superior to all things (excluding his Father). Imu, at John 17:23, Jesus doesn't say the Father is in us, but the Son is in us, and the Father is in the Son.

I'm not suggesting you think otherwise. Your response puzzles me. I'm assuming you are just advocating that ultimately all things are attributable to the Father. Which I totally agree with. But the scriptures say all things are for the Son. So there is explicity a heirarchy of subjection.

I am sorry that it was not clear. Perhaps it will make more sense if you trace back this sub-issue to the original comment you made, which prompted my response from Hebrews.

I was thinking of the Son as our creator (Heb 1:2). Ultimately, even in the Abraham/Jesse/David analogy, the originating tier is the true God, the Father of the Son.

Nothing sinister intended.

All the best.

Understood.


Remembering something. I just did a search using - "Eusebius Pamphilus" rehabilitation and found the following....

You may already have this in your archives. If not, it is worth a read.
A SELECT LIBRARY OF THE NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS...EUSEBIUS PAMPHILUS
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf201.htm

ps:

The following section is relevent to our recent discussion. I had read this sometime last year, so its probably been floating about in the back of my head when I was thinking on Jerome's view of Eusebius.C.

§5. The Outbreak of the Arian Controversy. The Attitude of Eusebius.

Thank you for the link.

All the best.

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

Thankyou for the time taken in responding. As always I'll have a think on what you provided and get back to you later in the week.

Reading your post, I had a couple of chukkles to myself. I think any difference in our views might me measured in microns. Time will tell ;-)

I must admit, I found my study overwhelming me, and it was getting difficult to think without bias. So, this week, I've put it on hold. Well sort of. I've chosen to think on John 5:46 and "the angel of the Lord".

Today I was looking at Ex 3:2 and thinking on Ex 23:20; 32:34; 33:2 and also on Shiloh.

Later & all the best :smile: .

[alam]

Hello Apostoli,

Hello Alam,

Thankyou for the time taken in responding. As always I'll have a think on what you provided and get back to you later in the week.

Reading your post, I had a couple of chukkles to myself. I think any difference in our views might me measured in microns. Time will tell ;-)

Glad you found some cause for humor in there. ;-)

"I think any difference in our views might me measured in microns" - so it has seemed to me.


I must admit, I found my study overwhelming me, and it was getting difficult to think without bias. So, this week, I've put it on hold. Well sort of. I've chosen to think on John 5:46 and "the angel of the Lord".

Today I was looking at Ex 3:2 and thinking on Ex 23:20; 32:34; 33:2 and also on Shiloh.

Later & all the best :smile: .


No rush. I am a little under the weather now and would not be responding very quickly. The above sounds like an interesting study.


Judging from Acts 3:20-23; 7:37, Deuteronomy 18:15ff. is a key messianic passage of the Torah. The doctrine of the True Prophet and the parallels and contrasts between Moses and Christ are bound up with it: even the role of Christ as agent of the revelation to Moses.


Of course, as often as it is written to the effect that "the word of the LORD came to me, saying ... Thus saith the LORD" (Jeremiah 2:1,2), this is the Logos, bringing the message given by YHWH, as he said, "I have not spoken of myself; but the Father which sent me, he gave me a commandment, what I should say, and what I should speak" (John 12:50).



God bless,

[apostoli]

Greetings Alam,

Glad you found some cause for humor in there. ;-)I'm easily amused. :lol:

In the case of your post, it was wasn't humor but your fidelity that brightened my day.

No rush. I am a little under the weather now and would not be responding very quickly.I've got a head cold, so my brain is a bit befuddled at the moment. During the week I've download more pages into my archives. Mainly searching on Lucian. There seems a variety of views on what he believed, but no one gives a cite to prove their opinion. Very frustrating. So, today, I started to investigate more fully Paul of Samosata, adoptionism and the who's who of the 4th century, to see where I might find a match.

I have opinions, but I want to give them more substance before I reply to your last post.

[Ex,Jn, Shiloh etc] sounds like an interesting study.It is a study I revisit (in various contexts) from time to time. In this case, it is the Immanuel as the presence of the Lord (cp: Ex 33:12-15). I've also been thinking on Zechariah 12:8.

Judging from Acts 3:20-23; 7:37, Deuteronomy 18:15ff. is a key messianic passage of the Torah. The doctrine of the True Prophet and the parallels and contrasts between Moses and Christ are bound up with it: even the role of Christ as agent of the revelation to Moses.Schofields also cites Jn 1:21,45;6:14

Of course, as often as it is written to the effect that "the word of the LORD came to me, saying ... Thus saith the LORD" (Jeremiah 2:1,2), this is the Logos, bringing the message given by YHWH, as he said, "I have not spoken of myself; but the Father which sent me, he gave me a commandment, what I should say, and what I should speak" (John 12:50).A valid observation.

I guess an extreme unitarian would say: that such proves Jesus to be just a man, a prophet, instructed by God (cp. Ex 4:16). In part, this is the impetus of my study - imu, I find such a position contradicted by scripture but as people sincerely believe the Son was not pre-existent prior to his human birth, I want to investigate, how they might understand the scriptures that suggest it.

God bless

[alam]

Hello Apostoli,

A valid observation.

I guess an extreme unitarian would say: that such proves Jesus to be just a man, a prophet, instructed by God (cp. Ex 4:16).

No doubt they would, but from the perspective of the True Prophet doctrine, John 12:49 is another allusion to Christ's station as the prophet like Moses.

"He shall speak unto them all that I shall command him" (Deut. 18:18).

Given the uniqueness of Moses as a prophet - Num. 12:6-8; Deut. 34:10ff - one could expect a prophet like Moses to have similar unique access to the divine. How did Christ's knowledge of divine things differ from that of other prophets, to whom YHWH spoke in visions and dreams (Num. 12:6)? The answer in John's context is that he was the Logos made flesh, come down from heaven, speaking what he had seen with the Father (John 8:38).

As the Theos Logos, the concrete Dvar YHWH through whom YHWH gave revelation to the prophets (cp. John 1:18), in yet another respect he fulfils the type of Moses, who was made 'God' to a second prophet.


In part, this is the impetus of my study - imu, I find such a position contradicted by scripture but as people sincerely believe the Son was not pre-existent prior to his human birth, I want to investigate, how they might understand the scriptures that suggest it.

God bless


Once I was one, but of the kind that don't care much about biblical inerrancy. For the others, OT monotheism and the thoroughly Jewish and human Messiah of the synoptic gospels, as perceived by them, necessitate a freer and allegorical reading of the more otherworldly teachings of John and Paul.

Professor Buzzard's site (http://www.mindspring.com/~anthonybuzzard/) and the Biblical Unitarian site (http://www.biblicalunitarian.com/) help explain the radical unitarian view.

Get well soon! God bless

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

Get well soon!You too!

Its the middle of autumn here, and our windy month. So hayfever/sinus time for me. Apart from a head cold and irritated (red) eyes I'm surviving pretty well this year.

I've only had time to reply in part to your post #28. I follow up through the week. Hopefully, the moderators will be forgiving if I end up with one or two back to back posts.


Lucian is on my list of things to investigate. At this stage I've been looking for collaborated evidence. Finding reliable material about him has been a problem. Lots of speculation, from all sides, but as yet nothing I consider proof.We do have Lucian's purported creed.Imo, if that is Lucian's creed, and meant to be taken literally, then Arius, Eusebius.N and similar Lucian claimants were asleep in class when he delivered it. They missed some rather important teaching, such as, Lucian describing the Son as "unchangeable and unalterable, the immutable likeness of the Godhead, both of the substance and will and power and glory of the Father"

Most commentators say, it is/was, widely disputed, that it was a work of Lucian. But, like all things about Lucian, no one offers any proof for whatever their opinion. Lucian has been a most frustrating study! Imo, this is the most authoritive source on Lucian.
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/wace/biodict.Lucianus_12.html

A thought: As far as I am aware, Lucian had never been accused of being a schismatic (he wouldn't be considered a martyr if he had). So, privately he may have discussed "non standard" views for his time, but if he properly, debated doctrine behind closed doors, he would have been held publicly orthodox. Another perspective I feel needs to be considered.Of course, he may have had views at odds with what he publicly professed. The problem is that that could be true of anyone.Definitely. But the head of a theological school might have been held more accountable.

Seems there is a bit of dispute amongst "authorities" if the martyr and herectic are the same person.

The general consesus in both pro & anti commentators is that the only difference between Lucian and Paul.S is that Lucian granted the Logos a seperate existence to the Father. It is still unclear to me, which of the Syrian options he adopted in regards to the Logos becoming flesh. On gut, I'd speculate he took the view of the Logos replacing the human soul.

A difficulty with Lucian is that he was set outside of the church from 268, and readmitted sometime before 312, some commentators speculate, without proof, around 285, which just happens to be a mid point. No one knows when he was actually readmitted. It could be that for most of his adult life he was an outcast. Or even upto his imprisonment.

An aside: There appears to be another martyr (250/1, Decius persecution, not sure if he survived) named Lucian (of Carthage?), who was hooked up with someone called Paulus. Cyprian wrote against him - worth a read.
ANF V5, Epistles XX to XXII
http://www.ccel.org/fathers2/ANF-05/

I still believe that Lucian would not have enjoyed the reputation that he did, nor had his recensions of the scriptures widely received, unless he was known to be positively free of Paul of Samosata's errors.Why? Even the works of the philosophers were highly regarded. Apparently, Lucian's work on the septuagint was a collaboration. Some commentators attribute his "works" to be actually the work of his school. This fits with Greek tradition. Eg: Though a lot is attributed to the "brillant" Pythagoras, most "accademics" attribute most of his accreditions to the pythagorean school and not the person.

In regards to "widely received" consider the English Bible translation committees over the last century. Most consisted of accademics with diverse theological views. Imo, if he was accademically reputable, and his work could be independently verified, then his theology wouldn't have counted.

Also, consider that few of his "works" are preserved and apart from his being a Schoolmaster and a martyr we know nothing about him. Apparently, even Jerome is inconsistent about him...

"Lucianus is known also by his critical revision of the text of the Septuagint and the Greek Testament. Jerome mentions that copies were known in his day as "exemplaria Lucianea," but in other places he speaks rather disparagingly of the texts of Lucian, and of Hesychius, a bishop of Egypt (who distinguished himself in the same field). In the absence of definite information it is impossible to decide the merits of his critical labors. His Hebrew scholarship is uncertain, and hence we do not know whether his revision of the Septuagint was made from the original. As to the New Testament, it is likely that he contributed much towards the Syrian recension (if we may so call it), which was used by Chrysostom and the later Greek fathers, and which lies at the basis of the textus receptus."
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/hcc2.v.xv.xxxvi.html


The fact that he came under suspicion in connection with Paul (for whatever reason) means that his own orthodoxy would have been subject to unusual scrutiny. So far from sharing Paul's doctrinal inclinations, Lucian may have been opposed to them. One could gather this from his creed, as mentioned above, with its insistence on the three hypostases, the real pre-existence of Christ, and its quotation of John 6:38, "I am come down from heaven," as against Paul's teaching that "Jesus Christ is from below" (Eusebius of Caesarea, H.E. vii. 30). If Lucian, like Arius, maintained that the Father and the Son are different ousiai, this would show his adherence to the anti-monarchian council of Antioch.From memory Paul.S defended himself with something like "does it matter that I exalt the Christ". In comparison to the everyone elseI think he was working in the opposite direction. Most "authorities" imply (without offering proof) that Lucian took a middle ground, was adoptionist in his views and the only difference between him and Paul.S is Lucian granted the Logos a real pre-existence. Of interest, at least to me, Paul.S (according to the "authorities") wasn't a modalist. Basically, he had God sitting up in heaven complete in himself, and investing creation with the Logos/Sprit - including Jesus. The way I see it: if Lucian was an "Arian", the there is a big difference between him and Paul.S. Imo, ultimately in Arianism, we end up with the demiurge that became flesh. Which I think is a problem that Nicea solved.

Another thought: Best I can figure, by Jerome's time (if not earlier) anyone that held a subordinationist view was dubbed an Arian.Early on, the homoousians began calling anyone who held a certain kind of subordinationist view an 'Arian.'Which to our amusement, the debate in the Anglican church here in Sydney, about the ordination of women, goes to prove things haven't changed in 1,681 years.

That is the basis for talking about 'Arianism' in the fourth century, since, as we have discussed, few so-called Arians were adherents of Arius. The distinction I have found between Arian and non-Arian subordination, which seems accurate in that it brings together those who were called Arians, including the Homoians, the Anomoians, and some semi-Arians, while excluding those who were not Arians such as the Cappadocians, is that Arianism understands the Generation to be an operation of the divine will.It amuses me that "Arians" are so insistent on scriptural definitions and yet resort to speculation. As we have discussed, the scriptures are silent on the "how" of the generation. So why speculate? And if we do speculate, then why not speculate on how the Son created all things. If by his will, then does he have the same will as the Father and we'd end up finding a term that says they have the same energy, wisdom and power. I just find the Arian argument unsatisfying and unconvincing.



I mentioned Photinus within a specific context. You had speculated that the Arians were nearer than commonly thought to Sabellianism and dynamic monarchianism. My response was that they included no Sabellians or Sabellianizers and produced nobody holding such views. This was more the case of the Nicenes. You responded that you see nothing resembling modalism in the writings of Athanasius (I would reserve judgment) nor Basil (who was a late-comer to homoousianism from a semi-Arian background). My response is that nothing remotely resembles modalism in the Arian writings either, so, what would be the basis for thinking that modalism bears a stronger relation to Arianism than to homoousianism?I had originally thought Paul.S was an evolved modalist. So I withdraw what I had previously written. My objection to "Arianism" is adoptionist theology.

As for who was Sabellian, I'd speculate we could find modalist teaching somewhere on all sides. Have a rigid think on "Arianism", here we have God operating through a linear progression of Father, then Son, then Holy Spirit. The later two receiving hypostasis only through the will of their precursor.


I'm reading you as putting forward the proposition that "the homousian party" evolved from modalism. I haven't come across any evidence. Imo: it is the exact opposite. Jesus said he and his Father are one, the homoousians, said the Father, Son and Spirit are one in power and wisdom but not in person. The modalist view said they are the same person. The two views imo, don't blend.When stating the Nicene view for the purpose of distinguishing it from another view, it seems to me that one ought to do so using the distinctive Nicene terms, not neutral terms such as unity in wisdom and power. The homousians taught that the Father and the Son are two persons of the same 'ousia', not merely that they are one in power or in wisdom, which, in itself, could be an Arian view. Hence there is an apparent discrepancy between the homousian ideology and that of e.g., Hippolytus, whom I cited in post 8:Iwas working from memory (which is not always reliable) regarding Athanasius' apologies.
http://biblestudy.churches.net/CCEL/FATHERS2/NPNF204/NPNF2035.HTM
http://biblestudy.churches.net/CCEL/FATHERS2/NPNF204/NPNF2071.HTM

"Are all one body in respect of substance (κατα την ουσιαν), or is it that we become one in the power and disposition of unity of mind?" (Against Noetus vii)

This is how I understand Athanasius arguments.

I'd assume Arius would have gone to lengths to qualify "same power as the Father". For instance: if the Son was changeable and alterable, and he failed in his assignment, the Father would have to have the ability to remove/limit the Son's powers.


You wrote, "...not in person." But the modalists would not necessarily say that the trinity are the same person. The words prosopon and persona could also mean a mask in theatre.I've mentioned previously, back when I did theatre. We had a Sri Lankan stage fight master, who had us do mask work. Very big in his culture. Actually a bit spooky. The interesting thing in the method we learnt: we do not become the mask but the mask becomes us (possesses us). Its all to do with removing inhibitions. In the greek tragedies and comedies, one actor might play many characters. The only differentiator, as far as the audience is concerned, is the mask he holds in front of him. This idea is lost in our days (though Eddie Murphy sometimes simulates it). The point is: this is what classic modalism is all about. As we'd say in English: One actor/person many masks.

In English when we say three actors/person, we mean three actors/person.

Here is a good article on persona and its usage
http://www.everything2.com/index.pl?node=persona

modalists would not necessarily say that the trinity are the same personDepends whether they are talking about God in heaven or his earthly manifestations.

All the best

[alam]

Hello Apostoli,

Thank you for your response,


You too!

Its the middle of autumn here, and our windy month. So hayfever/sinus time for me. Apart from a head cold and irritated (red) eyes I'm surviving pretty well this year.



Thanks; winter hung on pretty hard this year (we had snow on the ground just a couple weeks ago) and seems to have prolonged the flu season.

Briefly, I would like to comment on two points you brought up, and wait on the rest till you have placed your next installment(s) -


"Imo, ultimately in Arianism, we end up with the demiurge that became flesh. Which I think is a problem that Nicea solved."


What do you mean by demiurge? Greek 'demiourgos' is a way to say 'creator' and the church fathers generally described the Logos as demiourgos. I want to be sure we are not bringing in something too ill-defined to shed light on our subject.



"It amuses me that "Arians" are so insistent on scriptural definitions and yet resort to speculation. As we have discussed, the scriptures are silent on the "how" of the generation. So why speculate?"


In #20 (http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showpost.php?p=1468410&postcount=20), six or seven paragraphs down, I presented some reasons why voluntary generation is a reasonable inference scripturally. At least it is no more speculative than attributing the generation to the divine nature


There could be a third view which refuses to acknowledge the whole question on the grounds that the trinity sets the limits of human intelligibility, regardless of what God's limits are, if any. That might be more consistent with the belief that the generation is incomprehensible, but to my understanding this was not the homoousian/Athanasian view (cp. Athanasius' Discourse i. 8 above (http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showpost.php?p=1441059&postcount=4))


Peace and the best.

[apostoli]

Hi Alam,

Continuation of my reply to your post #28.

Re your post #34. I'll reply for fully later.

The demiurge I refer to, is something I've been thinking on: "a subordinate god who fashions and arranges the physical world to make it conform to a rational and eternal ideal...Plato used the term in the dialog Timaeus, an exposition of cosmology in which the Demiurge is the agent who takes the preexisting materials of chaos, arranges them according to the models of eternal forms, and produces all the physical things of the world, including human bodies."
http://www.atar.com/alexmars/demiurge.htm.

Isn't it possible that the homoousian position was neccessitated, as a response to Deut 6:4 and a refutation of gnostic type speculations (the demiurge). And as a response to the incarnation. As the later controversies show, the issue of "God in the flesh" was a big one! Imo, "Arianism" by making the Son created from nothing, is a philosophic solution to these types of issues. I've come to the conclusion that Arius, if not in a later period, at least initially, went beyond "what we have always understood from scripture" of the rest of the church (see below).But necessitated to the exclusion of anything else?There are several problems (as I see it) had to be resolved: The idea, that the Son was just some type of demiurge had to resolved and therefore the idea that the Son was a secondary God (a demi God) had to be resolved. Imo, Arianism only aggravated the problem. I admit that Homoousians might have muddied the waters, but at least they resolved these two issues, and kept the Father and Son distinct as individual existences.

The Homoian church appears to have been theologically stable during the several centuries of its active existence.I'm ignorant on this subject. Though I suspect you are equating this with the Gothic and Vandal churches.

Deut. 6:4 was upheld in a way unsuggestive of Sabellianism, and gnostic speculations, and nearly all speculations beyond scripture were shunned.Can you substantiate these assertions? The first I'd agree on, the other two I'm not sure about. The Goths and Vandals, like the Romans and Greeks would readily accept secondary God's in their idea of things. The idea of a demiurge is at home with any concept that makes the Son other than born of the Father. And I again underline, I do not mean born as a temporal birth, but God being spirit, so the birth be of the spirit and incomprehensible to us.

This form of theology, though generally classed as Arian, did not approve of the idea that the Son was generated ex-nihilo.I'm wondering how universal the understanding actually was. There were multiple understandings in the homoousian party, so I presume the same applied with the homians.


In his debate with Augustine, Maximinus said (in a rough translation):

"Would you know how great is the wisdom of the Father? Consider the Son and you will see the wisdom of the Father. For this reason Christ said these words: 'Whosoever sees me, also sees the Father'; that is, in me he sees God's wisdom, and praises His power; he glorifies Him, who begat me so great and excellent before all ages, One begetting One, Only begetting Only. He sought no material from which He should produce a Son, and received the aid of no other substance, but, as He (only) knows, begat the Son by His own power and wisdom. Not as you all say, maliciously accusing us (since other creatures are made from nothing) that we profess that the Son too is made from nothing (ex nihilo), as one of the creatures. Listen to the authority of the narration of the synod, because in Ariminum our fathers said, with the rest of the articles : 'If anyone says the Son is from nothing, and not from God the Father, let him be anathema' (Si quis ex nihilo Filium dicit, et non ex Deo Patre, anathema sit). Of course, if you wish, I will provide testimonies. For thus says the blessed apostle John: 'Whoever loveth Him that begat, loveth him also that is begotten of him'" (Collatio cum Maximino xv. 13).Thankyou for the ref to Maximinus, until now, I'd been unaware of him. I must look into him.

The teaching on ex-nihilo generation doesn't seem to have been a principal commitment of Arianism. Arius himself probably abandoned it, and later so-called Arians either rejected it or were silent on the matter.Given there is no evidence that Arius recanted his teachings, imo, you are being too generous towards him. I'd estimate that, if he had lived and as time progressed, he would have sided with the Eunomians. Once it is deduced that the Son is a creature, then it is a logical conclusion that he must have been created ex-nihilio. There is no other option. His letter to Alexender (which you cited) makes this clear...

"But if the terms 'from Him,' and 'from the womb,' and 'I came forth from the Father, and I am come' be understood by some to mean as if a part of Him, one in essence or as an issue, then the Father is according to them compounded and divisible and alterable and material, and, as far as their belief goes, has the circumstances of a body, Who is the incorporeal God."

The problem for Arius seems to be (my words), "the Son can only be spoken of begotten as a metaphor. To think of his begetal in any other way, is to make God alterable". On this basis, imo, Arius would have rejected Maximinus. Maximinus, seems to start with an ex-nihilio as regards substance "He sought no material from which He should produce a Son, and received the aid of no other substance", which is defendable as God and his Son are spirits and not made of matter. The next clause would have caused Arius distress "but, as He (only) knows, begat the Son by His own power and wisdom". I say Arius would become distressed, as such a phrase smells of emanationism. Arius and like, would need to reject such a teaching as it implies that God's power and wisdom are consumerables, and as such, can be diminished. If I recall correctly Athanasius argues along lines not dissimilar to Maximinus, which is another reason Arius would reject such an idea.

The Anomoeans are a counterexample, but the legitimacy of calling them 'Arian' is not clear, even apart from the fact that few 'Arians' looked to Arius as their founder or doctrinal spokesman. The Anomoeans saw major differences between themselves on the one hand and 'Arians' on the other, and a basic continuity from Arius to the council of Rimini, the general council which Maximinus cites above (Philostorgius, Epitome x. 2f.). This distinction between Arian and Eunomian is reflected in Canon 7 of Constantinople 381 which prescribes different treatments for 'Arians' and 'Eunomians' seeking entry to the Nicene church.Given a choice between Arius and Eunomius, I find the later more intelligible. Though as you know, of all parties I'd have probably sided with the semi-arians.

So, in evaluating the relative merits or lack of them of Arianism, there may be a pitfall in laying great stress on the ex-nihilo teaching. Arius' concern doesn't seem to have been to define the generation, but to make clear what it was not: "if the terms 'from Him,' and 'from the womb,' and 'I came forth from the Father, and I am come' (Rom. xi. 36; Ps. cx. 3; John xvi. 28), be understood by some to mean as if a part of Him, one in essence or as an issue, then the Father is according to them compounded and divisible and alterable and material" (Fragment 3). The next step, given Arius' mainly apophatic premises, would simply have been to deny that the generation was from the non-existent. This can be done if God is incomprehensible in essence. This step was taken by the subsequent Arians and perhaps by Arius himself. It was not so for the Anomoeans who believed that God IS the Ingenerate Essence. For them the doctrine of ex-nihilo generation became a dialectical necessity that it was not for the Arians.I guess Arius might be defended through his letter to Constantine "We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, and in His Son the Lord Jesus Christ, who was begoten from Him before all ages..." On face value, nothing ontoward there, but seven years earlier he made his meaning very clear in his letter to Alexander "We ackowledge One God, alone Ingenerate, alone Everlasting, alone Unbegun, alone True, alone having Immortality, alone Wise, alone Good, alone Sovereign; Judge, Governor, and Providence of all, unalterable and unchangeable, just and good, God of Law and Prophets and New Testament; who begat an Only-begotten Son before eternal times, through whom He has made both the ages and the universe; and begat Him, not in semblance, but in truth; and that He made Him subsist at His own will, unalterable and unchangeable; perfect creature of God, but not as one of the creatures; offspring, but not as one of things begotten.

To me it is obvious that Arius' concern wasn't simply to identify the Father and Son as seperate individualities but to ensure that the Son be defined as exterior and independent of the Father. Previously we have discussed the clause I find most disadvantageous to Arius' ideas "[God] made Him subsist at His own will, unalterable and unchangeable". To me, scriptures such as John 17:21,23; 1 John 5:18 and Ephesians 4:6 guide me to believe that those born of God, do not subsist entirely of their own will. But assuming Arius was not concerned of the spiritual existence but the ousia of the Son, imo, Arius makes the Son a parrallel ousia to God. Making him everything the Father is, bar unbegotten - in short Arius creates (despite any denials) a second God. The Father only differentiated from the Son, by the fact he precedes him. In effect, Arius is at odds with Deut 6:4.

At this stage: I am still convinced that Arius put a positive spin on the gnostic dimiurge. Trapped in thought by the Greek concept that God should he interact with matter would cause it to disolve - thus God had to make a replica that was soluable in matter. Admittedly, I'm locked into seeing in some writers, gnostic thinking in regard to the incarnation of the Son. The only scriptural solution I've found, is to believe that the Son was born of the Father (in some unkowableable way) and is the only true Son of God. Given we are talking of spiritual and not material things, our entire thinking on material begetal can't be applied literally.


Allowing myself some free thought...

The other day, I was thinking on the philosophical speculation that God is simple and indivisable, and asked myself: how might we think on this? is it a neccesity? Logically, God must be undiminished in anything he does. This led me to think on the reproduction of single cell organisms (simple organisms). When the cell "splits", it is not cut into two, and the caused cell is a 100% replication of the source cell. Neither cell is diminished nor enhanced by the process. The obvious philosophic observation is that we now have two cells which need to compete for scarce resources. However, I see that as very humanistic reasoning. There are numerous organisms in nature that demonstrate a symbiosis. In some cases, the organism we perceive, is in fact a collection of multiple individuals working in harmony (coral might be an example).

Of course the difficulty of thinking of the begettal of the Son in this way, suggests that the Son is 100% equal to the Father in all ways (bar precedence). Thus as the Father cannot interact with matter, nor can the Son. The remedy is simple, the Father can interact with matter, but to demonstrate his magnanimity, chooses to do so through the Son.

In my studies, I'm trying to be neutral, weighing the arguments as I encounter them. The best I can ascertain is the majority opinion didn't support the opinions of Arius as presented in his Thalia and put open for debate that of Alexander. Undoubtedly they would have been suspicious of Alexander's terminolgy, but as Eusebius.C said, it had been used by the church Fathers long before Paul of Samasota. Was Hippolytus a Sabellian? I think not!Hippolytus does not say that the Father and the Son are homoousios, afaik. As above, he actually seems to deny this. He does teach that the Son was not produced from the non-existent (Refutation of all Heresies x. 29), but this doesn't quite equate to homoousianism. As I wrote in post #8, "Hippolytus may have believed that although the Son came from the Father's essence, he is now a second essence, much as a fire kindled from a fire, per Justin, is a second fire."However, Hippolytus does seem to use unambiguous phrases that homoousios summarises. You mentioned "Refutation of all Heresies, Book X, Chapter XXIX". Here, Hippolytus' understanding is unambiguous. The first third of para one is relevant, but moreso the beginning of para two: "The Logos alone of this God is from God himself; wherefore also the Logos is God, being the substance of God".

As you know, the homoousion was banned at the anti-monarchian council of Antioch: "the Fathers seem to have rejected Homoousion, even going so far as to propose the phrase heteras ousias, that is, Heteroousion, 'of other or different ousia'" (Catholic Encyclopedia, HOMOOUSION).Imu, Origen used the term Heteroousion. As you have previously mentioned ousia and hypostsis were ill defined terms. Given, that ousia in its simple meaning, means "being=to exist" I see no difficulty with Heteroousion in this context. Origen does not appear to have used the term in the context of "substance".
Imu, Hippolytus, uses the term in the context of "being", whereby what we know of God the Father, is via the Logos. Thus, imu of Origen, the Logos is the "being" of God to us.

Consider, ANF V4, Contra Celsus, Book 6, Chapter 64...

"Celsus, again, brings together a number of statements, which he gives as admissions on our part, but which no intelligent Christian would allow. For not one of us asserts that "God partakes of form or colour." Nor does He even partake of "motion," because He stands firm, and His nature is permanent, and He invites the righteous man also to do the same..."God does not partake even of substance." For He is partaken of (by others) rather than that Himself partakes of them, and He is partaken of by those who have the Spirit of God. Our Saviour, also, does not partake of righteousness; but being Himself "righteousness," He is partaken of by the righteous. A discussion about "substance" would be protracted and difficult, and especially if it were a question whether that which is permanent and immaterial be "substance " properly so called, so that it would be found that God is beyond" substance," communicating of His "substance," by means of office and power, to those to whom He communicates Himself by His Word, as He does to the Word Himself; or even if He is "substance," yet He is said be in His nature "invisible," in these words respecting our Saviour, who is said to be "the image of the invisible God," while from the term "invisible" it is indicated that He is "immaterial." It is also a question for investigation, whether the "only-begotten" and "first-born of every creature" is to be called "substance of substances," and "idea of ideas," and the "principle of all things," while above all there is His Father and God."
http://www.ccel.org/fathers2/ANF-04/anf04-61.htm

Origen in his commentary on the gospel of John, Book 2, para 18, shows his thinking on the differences between the Father and the Son..."The Saviour is [] called simply light. But in the Catholic Epistle of this same John we read that God is light. This, it has been maintained, furnishes a proof that the Son is not in substance different from the Father. Another student, however, looking into the matter more closely and with a sounder judgment, will say that the light which shines in darkness and is not overtaken by it, is not the same as the light in which there is no darkness at all."
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/101502.htm

In De Pricipiis, Book 1, Capter 1, Para 6, Origen says "Our eyes frequently cannot look upon the nature of the light itself--that is, upon the substance of the sun; but when we behold his splendour or his rays pouring in, perhaps, through windows or some small openings to admit the light, we can reflect how great is the supply and source of the light of the body. So, in like manner. the works of Divine Providence and the plan of this whole world are a sort of rays, as it were, of the nature of God, in comparison with His real substance and being. As, therefore, our understanding is unable of itself to behold God Himself as He is, it knows the Father of the world from the beauty of His works and the comeliness of His creatures. God, therefore, is not to be thought of as being either a body or as existing in a body, but as an uncompounded intellectual nature..."
http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/text/origen122.html

"Heteroousios" is supposedly the radical Arian termBeing pedantic, I might suggest, it is simply a term they found acceptable and adopted. Aparently, it had a history in Dionysius and Origen. But, imu, neither assigned it to the substance of God, merely the ousia in its prime meaning.

and yet it may have been prescribed as orthodox 70 years before Nicea.The Catholic Encyclopedia notes on Paul of Samosata: "It must be regarded as certain that the council which condemned Paul rejected the term homoousios; but naturally only in a false sense used by Paul; not, it seems because he meant by it an unity of Hypostasis in the Trinity (so St. Hilary), but because he intended by it a common substance out of which both Father and Son proceeded, or which it divided between them, — so St. Basil and St. Athanasius; but the question is not clear. The objectors to the Nicene doctrine in the fourth century made copious use of this disapproval of the Nicene word."

Referring to your reference to the Catholic Encyclopedia's article on Homoousion, I thought the full context of the argument should be cited. "The question was brought into discussion by the Council of Antioch (264-272); and the Fathers seem to have rejected Homoousion, even going so far as to propose the phrase heteras ousias, that is, Heteroousion, "of other or different ousia". Athanasius and Basil give as the reason for this rejection of Homoousion the fact that the Sabellian Paul of Samosata took it to mean "of the same of similar substance". But Hilary says that Paul himself admitted it in the Sabellian sense "of the same substance or person", and thus compelled the council to allow him the prescriptive right to the expression. Now, if we may take Hilary's explanation, it is obvious that when...Arius denied the Son to be of the Divine ousia or substance, the situation was exactly reversed. Homoousion directly contradicted the heretic. In the conflicts which ensued, the extreme Arians persisted in the Heteroousion Symbol. But the Semi-Arians were more moderate, and consequently more plausible, in their Homoiousion (of like substance), there may be a temptation to think that the question was one of words only; and the Councils of Rimini and Seleucia may seem to have been well advised in their conciliatory formula "that the Son was like the Father in all things, according to the Holy Writ". But this very formula was forced from the Fathers by the Emperor Constantius; and the force...which the Semi-Arians used throughout the greater part of the fourth century, are proof sufficient that the dispute was not merely verbal. The dogma of the Trinity was at stake, and Homoousion proved itself to be in the words of Epiphanius "the bond of faith", or, according to the expression of Marius Victorinus, "the rampart and wall of orthodoxy."

Given the bits in blue, imo, the "Arian" modus operandi (and in this regard I definitely exclude the semi-Arians), was to deny the Son was substantively the same as the Father. The obvious implication being, that the Father is in fact unknowable, but we can perceive him through his creation (which includes the Son). I find this defective theology.

If that is true, the supposition that Arius went out of orthodoxy when he affirmed that the Father and the Son are utterly distinct and different ousiai (=beings) would seem unjustified.My perception is that Arius while making the distinction between the indivuality of Father and Son, caused to be denied, that they were "one in being". The obvious ramification, is that the Christian congregation is incapable as existing "one in being" which is contra to A.Paul. Imo, this "one in being" goes beyond having the same power, wisdom, mind, will etc. Conceptually it is, though individuals, to exist in such unity that the ability to distinguish one from another, is by name and perception only. Immind, this applies as much to the "body of Christ" as it does to the Godhead.

Rather than a sign of modalism or of Samosatene leanings, this would show his adherence to the anti-monarchian formula of the council of Antioch.Fair comment. However, imu, the council didn't go down the path of adoptionism, as Arius seems to have done. I guess we have the fable of Pinochio to justify Arius' view of a creaturion becoming Son without adoption but I don't find any scriptural support for such a view.

A failure by Alexander to respect this would explain Arius' apparent, and to my reading, unfeigned alarm at his teaching.I must reread the sources for the beginning of the conflict. Alexander seems to have been criticised for leaving Arius to his own devices for too long (years). It seems Arius' parish at Baucalis was established by the schismatic Meletius. Regarding Meletius and his followers, I read somewhere that during the various persecutions of the church between the 2nd/3rd centuries, a lot of Egyptians folded, including priests and bishops, and offered sacrifices to idols etc, and so were variously excluded from the church. Meletius was in this batch.

As I mentioned above, Origen doesn't seem to use ousia in the context of substance. Arius on the other hand, via the letter to Alexander, is definitely thinking in the context of constituancy. I've only skimmed Origen's Against Celcus, but in a high level read, Arius seems to have more in common with Celsus' opinions, which Origen goes to lengths to show are in error. This and Arius' association with Meletius needs more study.

I was thinking on Arius the other day: If Alexander was so out of wack with the rest of the church, and Arius was so in tune, why was it, that Arius got hammered? If later "Arianism" was so "true", and it did have"court" control for many years, and is supposed to have had "popular" support with the people, why did it decline? This led me to reread the The Synodal Letter, To the Church of Alexandria, from the the bishops assembled at Nicea...I do not know what is being expressed by the scare quotes.You should know by now I try to speak plainly. The quotes are simply to highlight ambiguous terms. No scare tactics involved. It disappoints me that you'd think I'd resort to such emotive manipulations.

When you suffer defeat in a worthy cause, you regroup and try again. This is what the Arians did.I think what you said, has some validity regarding the semi-Arians and possibly the court party, but not followers of Arius.

From what we know of Arius he appears to have conceded, or as often said "pretended" to do so.

Arius letter to Constantine is revealing moreso for its lack of a clear statement of faith and exagerated ambiguity "If we do not...truly receive the doctrines concerning the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, as they are taught by the whole Catholic Church and by the sacred Scriptures, as we believe in every point, let God be our judge, both now and in the day which is to come. Wherefore we appeal to your piety...[that] we may be openly reconciled to our mother, the Church, through your peacemaking and pious piety; so that useless questions and disputes may be cast aside, and that we and the Church may dwell together in peace..."

There is no reason to think they were more involved in political intrigues than the homoousians.Except history shows it to be so. Then again, the victors often write the history so judgment needs to be suspended. Seems the Arians had a habit of "burning out" the hermit monks and this is supported by pagan secular history. Imo, nothing much to do with being Arian, there seems a bit of parallel with Calvin, the Round Heads and various other radical movements who were anti Catholic & Orthodoxy.

Nor was Arius necessarily more in tune with the general view of the church. There does not seem to have been a 'general view' at the beginning of the fourth century. With the possible exception of his ex-nihilo doctrine, Arius was in tune with the view of one part of the church, the part which appears to have been least compromised by the myohypostatic heresies of the 3rd century. Nevertheless, that part of the church did not come through for him at Nicea.Which Is circumstantial evidence, that Arius taught a doctrine foreign to all. Eusebius.C says it in plain words.

We could spend a long time discussing why, as we have done in other threads. Whatever the significance of this, it is diminished by the eastern bishops' soon withdrawal of explicit support for homoousianismAnd yet, all that happened was disagreement on the best term to use and its final acceptance in 381.

their readmission of AriusWhich needs to be qualified by the conditions placed on him.

deposition of Athanasius (Pronouncement of the Synod of Tyre and Jerusalem, c. 335). Eusebius of Caesarea had a prominent role in this. According to Epiphanius he was the judge at the Synod of Tyre (see D.S. Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea; The Canterbury Press, 1961; pp. 33-34).Eusebius.C was notorius for his "peace in the church" stance, and Athanasius was a bit of a thorn in the emporers side. Mind you the Alexandian's weren't keen on his replacement and the emporer had to reinstate him to stop the riots.

The problem with the Arian accusations against Athanasius, is that all charges were proved fabricated (eg: that Athanasius killed some priest, which was disproved when Athanaasius produced the priest). In the end, Athanasius was disposed for purely polical motives, the rumour given to the Emperor that Athanasius was going to restrict supply of corn to Constantinople.

The eastern bishops came to believe that the pretexts under which they had subscribed to homoousianism were flawed.Even Athanasius was willing to concede the term, he just thought it the best available.

"The new creed expressed a theology which seemed to Eusebius to be dangerous, but which was not explicitly heretical as it was expounded, clause by clause, by the council. With some misgiving he therefore subscribed it, his subscription being later used as a stick to beat the Arians, as though he had been a full Arian who had seen the error of his ways and had changed sides. To stigmatize the apologia he wrote to Caesarea as 'pitiful and insincere' is not altogether unjust, but we need not attribute his later animosity against Athanasius and Eustathius solely to the reaction of an uneasy conscience. He had subscribed the Nicene document unwillingly, on the assurance that it was not going to be interpreted in a sense repugnant to him. Within five years he found that this assurance had been worthless. Eustathius was pushing his interpretation of the creed to an extreme which appeared positively heretical, and Eusebius was in consequence understandably angry. We may also think that he was regretting his signature at Nicaea as having been too hasty despite its delay and that he was not reluctant to counteract the harmful effects of what had been done. The reaction against Nicaea was certainly not confined to the convinced Arians, but was felt also by men who were not Arians at all. Gwatkin concludes, 'Athanasius had pushed the easterns further than they wished to go, and his victory recoiled on him'" (Wallace-Hadrill, ibid. 30).I'll have to look into Eustathius. The CE says "Eustathius, Bishop of Antioch...accused Eusebius of tampering with the faith of Nicæa; the latter retorted with the charge of Sabellianism." My stance is that the accusations of "Sabellianism" is like the accusation of "Arianism". Neither reflect the actual teachings of a particular person but are emotional responses.

Mind you, Eustathius, makes me think on what you suggested regarding the disposition of the homoousians towards Sabellianism. Your earlier appeal to Marcellus as proof didn't impress me, as I detected no more modalism in his teaching than I might detect in "Arian" teachings (see my last post). However, from the little information I've managed to glean from the CE, makes my gut stir, and I think you might have a point regarding some branches of the 4th century church. Especially, the Syrian church. Its just a gut feeling, yet to be proved.

Taking even the most positive view of Arius, When I compare him with what Eusebius.C writes, I find little compatibility in their ultimate views. In "Demonstratio Evangelica", Book V, Chapter 4, Eusebius.C says : "[the Son] is, with regard to essence, and gives an image of the Father that grows from His nature and is not something added to Him, because of the actual source of His existence. Wherefore [the Son] is by nature both God and Only-begotten Son, not being made such by adoption...But He is celebrated as Only-begotten Son by nature and as our God, but not as the first God, but as the first Only-Begotten Son of God, and therefore God. And the general cause also of [the Son] being God, would be the fact that He alone is Son of God by nature, and is called Only-begotten, and that He completely preserves the living and vivid spiritual image of the One God, being made in all things like the leather, and bearing the likeness of His actual Divinity."
http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/eusebius_de_07_book5.htmIn the majority of his teaching Arius may have been indistinguishable from Eusebius above. Otoh, sometimes Eusebius expressed himself in a way similar to Arius, "the Son exists in Himself in His own essence apart from the Father". We may not be able to generalize to Arius' teaching as a whole from Athanasius' fragments. I think the fact that Eusebius knew and supported/protected Arius outweighs generalizations about the compatibility of their beliefs based on Athanasius' polemic quotations of Arius.Athanasius' polemic quotations of Arius, are only a fragment of the polemic against the Arians from various sources.

The bit I've highlighted in blue seems to me a counter-thesis to Arius' views. Whether Arius changed his views, or Eusebius.C found Arius' views flawed I haven't determined. But one thing that is evident, Eusebius.C, at least, post Nicea taught a doctrine that appears anti-typical of Arius pre-Nicea.

Imo: the important phrase is "there can be [only one] true copy of the Supreme Father...the Son", the light/ray thing is just about their unity (but seperate existence) and one precedes the other.It would seem that what God has done once, He could do twice. The generation didn't weary God, deplete Him of His strength. Whatever it took to generate the Son, God still has. To deny this would be a harmful speculation, as it would question the impassibility of GodPhilosophically who could disagree. But it is an extremely dangerous teaching when matched against the salvation plan.

However, there could not be two supreme Logoi any more than the universe could follow two conflicting sets of physical laws. Perhaps the solution to the apparent discrepancy between Arius and Eusebius would be that although there cannot be more than one Son (with capital S, the Monogenes), the power whereby God begat the Son still inheres in God, so in principle He does have the power to beget the Son's equal.Imo, the issue is there is no scriptural support for ever considering such a proposition. At its best, we are into a script for Star Trek and parallel universes, with impassionate gods toying with creation.

Again, Arius' "one equal to the Son, the Superior is able to beget" is the point of contrast for his following statement: "one more excellent, or superior, or greater, He is not able" (Fragment 2). God has withheld nothing at all from the Son. It is only the case that "the Father did not, in giving to [the Son] the inheritance of all things, deprive Himself of what He has ingenerately in Himself; for He is the Fountain of all things" (Frag. 3).It is the ambiguity of Arius' statements that disturb me. As I said above there is no scriptural support for even comtemplating Arius' surmise - unless of course, one simply wants to emphasise the Son's Davidic status and wanted to limit the inheritence of the Son to that symbolic of David. If all Arius was desirous of doing was to highlight the Son's subordination, appeal to 1 cor 15:28 is sufficient but instead he resorts to philosophical gibbidy-gook, that is unbiblical and evasive to his actual meaning.

As for what Eusebius.C wrote to Alexander, the important bit to me is "If, therefore, the letter received from [the Arians] tells the truth". I have doubts whether Arius was upfront and honest.Do you have specific reasons for this?Yep. The ambiguity of his letters, lack of direct appeal to scripture, over appeal to philosophy to support his contentions. Contradictions and evasions in his letters to Alexander, Eusebius.N and Constantine. Eusebius.C's post Nicene writings. Lack of direct defense of his teachings by third parties. Thats a start.

The word "will" is problematic. Your above definition only applies to one aspect. For instance...
How do we obey the "realm of free divine activity" of God? How do we do the "realm of free divine activity" of God?
We can distinguish between what God wills for us to do, and what He wills to do. In the latter case there is no distance or intervening step between God's will to do a thing, and the thing's being done.My contention, is the idea is antromorphic without scriptural substance. Thus a philosophic answer.

Psalm 115:3 - But our God is in the heavens; all that he hath willed/desired, he hath done.

This is the realm of free divine activity corresponding to the definition I gave in the other two posts.
The KJV, NEB & RSV basically say "he does whatever pleases him". The NWT has it "Everything he delighted [to do] he has done." There seems a parallel at Ps 135:6. Both contrast YHWH with idols. Neither seem to designate "the will of God", but the inability of idols to do anything. True, God does whatever he pleases, but the scriptures, as far as I have observed, never specify that he does it via will.

As you are well aware, I'm no Hebrewist, but Proverbs 21:1 might be a better cite for your case. Though here it is talking of God working spiritually.

'Passionless desire' seems like a fine expression, but it may not be specific enough to help us distinguish between Arianism per se and homoousianism. Something more specific is meant by the assertion that the generation is at the Father's will, versus the Nicene avoidance of such. Perhaps both could have agreed that God has a passionless (=impassible, or without appetition?) desire to generate the Son. The Nicenes wished to ascribe this passionless desire to God's nature, in the sense of something prior to God's free will. For the Arians, that was an impertinent speculation. For them it was a basic fact that God does 'will' things or exercise a passionless desire, and it is not meaningful to ask what makes God will as He does, that is, overall and in the sense of sufficient cause. We must regard the content of God's will as neither arbitrary nor as an outworking of determinations in the divine nature, nor as a combination of the two, but as valid in a way that transcends these alternatives.Browsing the concordance, best I can ascertain, "will" and "the will of God" is a term restricted, in both the OT & NT, to our spirituality (eg: John 1:13, Ephesians 1:9, 1 Pe 4:1-2). My eyes are watery and puffy, the print small, so maybe I've missed something, but I didn't come across any references to God creating by will. I'll have to review this study, when my eyes clear up.

Psalms 33:6 says "By the word of YHWH were the heavens made, and all the host of heavens made by the breathe of his mouth."

All the best.

[apostoli]

NB: Moderators - if this is offside please append to post #35. Thankyou.

Hello Alam,

I had a think to myself today, and concluded that Arianism is closer in theology to modalism than homoousianism. My reason being based on Arianist progressionism. Your thoughts would be appreciated.

Here is my reasoning: Arianism required the Father caused, as a creation of himself, the son ; the Son, in turn caused, as a creation of himself, the Holy Spirit to exist. This progessionism is symbolic of sabellian thought but totally foreign to homoousianism.

In homoousianisn, the thought is a progression of revelation of the Godhead. The Father is revealed by the Son through the Holy Spirit. The three indistinuishable in harmony and action, but distinguishable as pre-existant individuals.

In an earlier post you appealed to Maximinus and though I am not in full agreement with Augustine theology, I think Augustine had validity in his defense against Maximinus theory. Imo, Maximinus, had as much validity as Mormonism.
http://matt1618.freeyellow.com/unity2.html

All the best.

[alam]

Hello Apostoli,

Thanks for your messages. I hope you are feeling better.
I had a think to myself today, and concluded that Arianism is closer in theology to modalism than homoousianism. My reason being based on Arianist progressionism. Your thoughts would be appreciated.
I do not agree. In the Arian view, the trinity was simultaneous and consisted of three beings. The Sabellian trinity was serial and consisted of one being. In post 20 I explained the false step in reasoning that tries to turn one into the other.
To get from "once the Son was not" to Modalism, one has to equivocate between 'Son' as a being, and 'Son' as a mere attribute or title. When Arians said that once the Son was not, they meant it in the former, not the latter sense. For instance an Arian would never say that once the Father was not. That is because by 'the Father', we mean not an attribute or title but an individual Who bears this title. It is characteristic of homousianism to equivocate freely between 'Father' and 'Son' as mere titles or attributes, and 'Father' and 'Son' as denotations of beings. This is a sign of its own latent modalism: a person would not think the statement "God was not always Father" was equivalent to "once the Father was not" unless they already thought that the Father, the individual, might be nothing more than a mask overlaying the Godhead. Arianism rejects this. When Arius said that "God was not always Father", he did not mean that "once the Father was not", because the Father is not merely a name; the Father is God. Even if He has not always borne the title 'father', He has ingenerately existed. Conversely, the One denoted as 'the Son' does not have this ingenerate existence. Accordingly 'the Father' and 'the Son' denote different beings (* (http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showpost.php?p=1468410&postcount=20))
Here is my reasoning: Arianism required the Father caused, as a creation of himself, the son ; the Son, in turn caused, as a creation of himself, the Holy Spirit to exist. This progessionism is symbolic of sabellian thought but totally foreign to homoousianism.
Their view wasn't that the Son causes the Spirit to the exclusion of the Father, but that the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son (Auxentius on Wulfila par. 5 (http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/jod/texts/auxentius.trans.html)). Your above is vague and does not correctly state the Arian view.

Nor does the following:
As for who was Sabellian, I'd speculate we could find modalist teaching somewhere on all sides. Have a rigid think on "Arianism", here we have God operating through a linear progression of Father, then Son, then Holy Spirit. The later two receiving hypostasis only through the will of their precursor.
The words we use have a meaning and we use them for a reason. There was a reason Arians did not say that God does things through the Father.
In homoousianisn, the thought is a progression of revelation of the Godhead. The Father is revealed by the Son through the Holy Spirit. The three indistinuishable in harmony and action, but distinguishable as pre-existant individuals.
That would be more like the Arian view. As I understand it, homoousianism does not typically embrace belief in distinct individuals. We could ask around and see, of course.
In an earlier post you appealed to Maximinus and though I am not in full agreement with Augustine theology, I think Augustine had validity in his defense against Maximinus theory. Imo, Maximinus, had as much validity as Mormonism.
http://matt1618.freeyellow.com/unity2.html
Can you substantiate these assertions? The first I'd agree on, the other two I'm not sure about.
Apparently you are not familiar with Mormonism. What the link accuses Maximinus of is teaching Bible-only with the intent of smearing Protestantism.

It is not true. Augustine was not prepared to acknowledge the tradition in which Maximinus stood (Coll. iv (http://www.sant-agostino.it/latino/conferenza_massimino/conferenza_massimino_libro.htm)), so the common ground for their debate was scripture. Maximinus was right to demand that the discussion stay on shared ground.

Though they did not hold sola ascriptura, scripture had vast importance to the Homoian religion. Maximinus seems almost to have memorized the New Testament. In the judgment of those who have studied the Homoian view, this, and lack of innovation, characterized the Homoian faith, though it's often considered a minus. "Throughout its history, as we have said, Germanic Arianism was characterized by a ponderous and earthbound reliance on the text of the Bible" (E.A. Thompson, The Visigoths in the Time of Ulfila, Oxford 1966; p. 123); "[t]here was an absence of speculation and originality, a hidebound traditionalism among Visigothic Arians which, as we have already seen, was a characteristic of Germanic Arianism as a whole" (ibid. 153).
You should know by now I try to speak plainly. The quotes are simply to highlight ambiguous terms. No scare tactics involved. It disappoints me that you'd think I'd resort to such emotive manipulations.
Scare quotes (http://www.answers.com/topic/scare-quotes) That's what that use of quotes is called. No implication that you were resorting to scare tactics.
Hello Alam,

You too!

Its the middle of autumn here, and our windy month. So hayfever/sinus time for me. Apart from a head cold and irritated (red) eyes I'm surviving pretty well this year.

I've only had time to reply in part to your post #28. I follow up through the week. Hopefully, the moderators will be forgiving if I end up with one or two back to back posts.


Imo, if that is Lucian's creed, and meant to be taken literally, then Arius, Eusebius.N and similar Lucian claimants were asleep in class when he delivered it. They missed some rather important teaching, such as, Lucian describing the Son as "unchangeable and unalterable, the immutable likeness of the Godhead, both of the substance and will and power and glory of the Father"
Arius described the Son as unalterable and unchangeable (Letter to Alexander). Lucian's "exact Image... of the Essence... of the Father" (* (http://ecole.evansville.edu/arians/2arcon.htm)) does not contradict the heteroousian symbol. See again Eusebius C.'s example of the emperor and his icon,
"Nicaea drove Eusebius to accept the term ομοόυσιος, but he never used it in his own work. The nearest he would approach was the Pauline term image, and so it was that Moses saw the likeness of God, though not God Himself. [Pr. Eccl. i. 12, P.G. xxii. 1069.] The Son is called begotten of God 'as alone bearing in Himself the image of the Godhead. . . . He is called so because of this primary likeness.' [D.E. iv. 2, G.C.S. vi, p. 152.] Marcellus pointed out that the image of God is one thing and God Himself is another. If God be the infinite, the unutterable, the transcendent, how can He have an image? Eusebius answered that there can be a living image of such a God, and cited the Scriptures in his support. [C. Marc. i. 4, P.G. xxiv. 764.] The image of the emperor is treated with the deference due to the emperor himself, and so do we regard the Son who is the image of God. [De Eccl. Theol. ii. 23, P.G. xxiv. 961.] But Marcellus' point remains: the image of the emperor is, in fact, not the emperor, and the analogy renders the Son totally different from the Father in respect of ουσία. If Eusebius had been less nervous of the Sabellian overtones of ομοόυσιος he would have spared himself much of the embarrassment inevitably attendant upon analogical definitions of the Deity when an opponent presses the analogy to its limit" (D.S. Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea; Canterbury Press 1961; 130-131 & ftns).
(* (http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showpost.php?p=1445238&postcount=8))
Most commentators say, it is/was, widely disputed, that it was a work of Lucian. But, like all things about Lucian, no one offers any proof for whatever their opinion. Lucian has been a most frustrating study! Imo, this is the most authoritive source on Lucian.
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/wace/biodict.Lucianus_12.html

Definitely. But the head of a theological school might have been held more accountable.
We have yet to establish a fault with Lucian's school for which he should be called to account.
The general consesus in both pro & anti commentators is that the only difference between Lucian and Paul.S is that Lucian granted the Logos a seperate existence to the Father.
That was the point at issue, along with the doctrine of the incarnation. Lucian's christology was incarnationist and Paul's was dynamic or adoptionist.

Judging from the creed of Lucian, and the heteroousian finding of the council of Antioch which the Colluciani supported, we would do better to conclude that Lucian opposed Paul's theology.
It is still unclear to me, which of the Syrian options he adopted in regards to the Logos becoming flesh. On gut, I'd speculate he took the view of the Logos replacing the human soul.
You're probably correct, and this was the anti-adoptionist view. This would further support that Lucian's teaching was in opposition to the dynamic monarchianism--

"Paul is very wary of being led to admit that the Word took the place of the human soul in Christ [which as a dynamic monarchian he did not believe], cf. the view put forward by C.E. Raven, Apollinarianism, that Paul's opponents, who apparently took this view, were forerunners of Apollinarius' heresy. On the whole question, cf. a fragment of the Synodal Letter in de Riedmatten, op. cit., S, 30, p. 152, for Leontius of Byzantium. (The Bishops ask): 'What is the meaning of the assertion that Jesus Christ had a constitution different from ours? We maintain that his constitution differed from ours in but one respect, admittedly of the first magnitude, that the God-Logos was in him what the inner man is in us.' (Tr. Chadwick, JTS (NS), 4 (1953), p. 93.)" (A New Eusebius, J. Stevenson ed., Cambridge, 1990; p. 262; cp. Malchion http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0617.htm).
Seems there is a bit of dispute amongst "authorities" if the martyr and herectic are the same person.
The martyr Lucian was the one the Arians revered. If this Lucian was not the one who fell under suspicion, so much the better for them.

Perhaps Alexadner's remark in Alexander to Alexander ix. (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0622.htm) needs scrutiny. He names a Lucian as successor of Paul of Samosata, which wouldn't be justified in reference to the author of the Antioch 341 creed.
A difficulty with Lucian is that he was set outside of the church from 268, and readmitted sometime before 312, some commentators speculate, without proof, around 285, which just happens to be a mid point. No one knows when he was actually readmitted. It could be that for most of his adult life he was an outcast. Or even upto his imprisonment.
That needlessly puts the worst construction on things.

If there is doubt as to whether Lucian the martyr and bible scholar and the supposed heretic Lucian were the same person, then that is a prior question and must come before pondering the duration of his supposed excommunication.
Why? Even the works of the philosophers were highly regarded.
Philosophers weren't in the league of heretics. They were just outsiders. You said "…the closer adversaries are, the more strenuous they struggle" (* (http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showpost.php?p=1469131&postcount=21)).
Apparently, Lucian's work on the septuagint was a collaboration. Some commentators attribute his "works" to be actually the work of his school. This fits with Greek tradition. Eg: Though a lot is attributed to the "brillant" Pythagoras, most "accademics" attribute most of his accreditions to the pythagorean school and not the person.

In regards to "widely received" consider the English Bible translation committees over the last century. Most consisted of accademics with diverse theological views. Imo, if he was accademically reputable, and his work could be independently verified, then his theology wouldn't have counted.
There is a disanalogy between joint authorship by a committee and authorship by an individual, or a school bearing that person's name.

Do you know of a translation attributed to a known Arian (or someone equally anathema to the Nicene view) that has entered general acceptance in the churches?
Also, consider that few of his "works" are preserved and apart from his being a Schoolmaster and a martyr we know nothing about him. Apparently, even Jerome is inconsistent about him...

"Lucianus is known also by his critical revision of the text of the Septuagint and the Greek Testament. Jerome mentions that copies were known in his day as "exemplaria Lucianea," but in other places he speaks rather disparagingly of the texts of Lucian, and of Hesychius, a bishop of Egypt (who distinguished himself in the same field). In the absence of definite information it is impossible to decide the merits of his critical labors. His Hebrew scholarship is uncertain, and hence we do not know whether his revision of the Septuagint was made from the original. As to the New Testament, it is likely that he contributed much towards the Syrian recension (if we may so call it), which was used by Chrysostom and the later Greek fathers, and which lies at the basis of the textus receptus."
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/hcc2.v.xv.xxxvi.html
Jerome's critical estimate of Lucian's work isn't necessarily the issue.
From memory Paul.S defended himself with something like "does it matter that I exalt the Christ".
was Noetus, iirc
Which to our amusement, the debate in the Anglican church here in Sydney, about the ordination of women, goes to prove things haven't changed in 1,681 years.
This use of 'Arian' must be distinguished from the fourth century application of the term, where it describes a view distinct from Nicenism.
I had originally thought Paul.S was an evolved modalist. So I withdraw what I had previously written. My objection to "Arianism" is adoptionist theology.
Again though,
The term of Arius translated "by adoption" is τεκνοποιησας from τεκνον and ποιεω. A verb that is related is τεκνοποιεω meaning "...of the woman, to bear children... of the man, to beget them... of both parents, to breed children..." (An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon Oxford, 1992). As you can see, this is not the same word used for the adoption of sons in the NT, and it is unclear that Arius thought the Son was adopted. He was no Adoptionist as such; he believed in the pre-existence of the Logos, and he believed that the Logos came into being through generation, therefore being a Son, by definition, from his origin. A different translation of the same words of Arius:


"The Unbegun appointed the Son to be Beginning of things begotten,
and bore him as his own Son, in this case giving birth" (A New Eusebius ed. J. Stevenson, 331).
(* (http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showpost.php?p=1453857&postcount=13))
Iwas wo