theos pater 2

[alam]

On this thread I am re-opening the topics of the thread theos pater from biblical languages (http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showthread.php?t=95526) for general discussion.

I think the East would think in terms which are parallel to the relationship between a "human person" and a "human substance" or "human nature". Let us take Adam, who stands in relation to the human race much as God the Father stands in relation to the other persons of the trinity. It would be absurd to say that Adam was primarily a "human substance" rather than a person. The East would also deny that there is a "human substance" that comes prior to the person Adam. Rather, the "human substance" is given in the person Adam. It is this human substance which we all share, which we inherit from Adam. We are distinct individual persons, but we are "one substance" in our humanity. Nonetheless that substance was not an abstract form that existed independently of Adam; it was given in Adam, and in a real sense, we all share Adam's nature (in fact, the Hebrew word 'adam means both the individual person, Adam, and also means "human"). This is why the NT describes everyone who is not "in Christ" as being "in Adam".

This difference is somewhat similar to the difference between Plato and Aristotle on the subject of universals. The Platonic view is called universalia ante res, "universals before things". The Aristotelian view is called universalia in rebus, "universals in things" (actually there is debate about what Aristotle's real position on this subject was, but let that slide for the moment). The bottom line is that the Eastern view is more "Aristotelian" whereas the Western view is more "Platonic".



There is a distinction, but it is more like a universal/particular distinction than a particular/particular distinction. That is, "divine nature" or "being God" is taken as an abstract form which is given in the particular person of the Father. The Son and the Holy Spirit are also instantiations of the same abstract form.

Roughly, the whole difference between the East and West can be summed up like this (read "->" as "gives"):

East: Person of Father -> Abstract form or ousia of deity -> Persons of Son and Holy Spirit
West: Abstract form or ousia of deity -> Persons of Father, Son and Holy Spirit

It is important to remember that the original discussions regarding the trinity were very much bound up in Greek metaphysics and the question of universals. If you read something like Gregory of Nyssa's There are not three gods, for example, you will see just how influenced these early trinitarian thinkers were by Greek metaphysics. So it's not possible to understand the doctrine in its classical form without understanding this metaphysics somewhat. Of course, one might want to "modernize" the doctrine and re-state it in a more contemporary form. But in doing so, we should always keep in mind that that is not how the doctrine was developed in the first place.



No problem! If I don't see your thread when it gets going, then PM me! But I'll keep an eye out for it.

God bless,

Rupert.




Hi Rupert, sorry it took much longer than I expected.

I have a basic awareness of the issues between the EO and Western trinitarians. The analysis of the trinity into universals and particulars means the Father's nature cannot be the same as the Father, even if it is implicit in the Father, because the nature is shared, but the Father's hypostasis is not shared. So, if you say the Father and the Son are the same God because they share the same nature, tthen you are calling the "nature" itself God and predicating it of the two persons. Is this what you mean to say?

The original thread had a specific focus, it was to illustrate that God the Father and God the Son, if that expression can be justified, are not the same God.

I can see how you might get around that by suggesting that besides the God who is (identity, not predication) the Father and the God who is the Son, there is a God which is (identity, not predication) the nature of the Father.

Then you can say that the Father and the Son are (PREDICATION, not identity) the same God because they have this same nature. Dizzying, and I somehow suspect it is not really what you want to say. Because then you have destroyed the monarchy, there is not one unoriginated God, the Father, but two Gods, the Father and the nature of the Father.

This problem arises from trying to call an abstraction (as you grant it is), the divine nature, "God." You can call it deity, an abstract term, and the problem is removed at the most apparent level. But then you could no longer say that the Father and the Son are the same God, only that they are the same in respect of deity.

Moreover, none of this would remove the conclusion that the God who IS the Father is not the God who IS the Son. It is simply that that other God (a third wheel as far as scripture is concerned) which IS the nature of the Father is predicable of both the Father and the Son.

The Aristotelian breakdown you described also results in that the Father and Son are only "God" to the extent they are the same. What distinguishes them from eachother, such as unbegottenness (agennesia) and begettenness (gennesis), is outside the characteristicis that make up the ousia. This diminishes these hypostatic characteristics by excluding them from what it means to "be God." Yet the Gospel calls Jesus the only-begotten God. He is begotten as deity and has his own glory, "as of the only-begotten from the Father" (John 1:14).

God bless

[Rupert Pupkin]

Hi Rupert, sorry it took much longer than I expected.

No problem! Unfortunately though I am knee-deep in a debate in the gym on hermeneutics, which will consume most of time my wife permits me to spend on the internet for about the next two weeks I suspect, so I may not be able to say a lot until the debate is over.

Anyway, what I understand the Eastern Orthodox approach to be saying, is this. The Father (the hypostasis, the particular person) instantiates the form "Godness", and does so fully; and that this form, so to speak, is entailed by the particular person, and not the other way around. But since the universal form "Godness" is a universal, there is nothing in principle to stop it being instantiated in other individuals also. So it is "subsequently" (by this I mean logical dependency, not temporal order) instantiated in the Son and, in the process, the Holy Spirit; and in each case it is instantiated "fully", in the sense that there is no aspect of it which is absent from the Son or the Holy Spirit.

Now this does raise a problem which I think you are alluding to, and which was the very issue which Gregory of Nyssa struggled with in his work "there are not three gods". That is, one might say the following. When we take three humans, Joe, Bill and Tim, they each instantiate the form "human". But we do not say that they are "one human". We of course say that they are three humans. So, by analogy, if the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, all instantiate the form "Godness", surely we should say that there are three gods, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, not that there is one God. Indeed, it seems that if it is legitimate to talk of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit as being "one God" just because they all instantiate divinity, then it would be legitimate to say that you, me and Howie are "one human", because we all instantiate humanity.

This is a significant and difficult issue. One's initial instinct would be to deal with it in relational terms (that is, that human persons are distinguished due to some relational properties), but that cannot be right, because the persons of the Trinity are also distinguished by relations. One possible avenue that I recently thought of, but haven't really explored and would probably turn out to be indefensible, is to privilege spatial relations in some way, and argue that the existence of spatial relations and a "different perspective" might solve the problem.

Apart from this suggestion that may turn out to be useless, the only remaining possibility, which would be my preferred explanation, is to postulate some kind of distinction between the way in which the persons of the Trinity instantiate divinity, and the way in which ordinary humans instantiate humanity. I have been considering this for some time, and it is one factor (there are also philosophical concerns) that has led me to drop the Aristotelian approach, and adopt the Platonic one. Plato must, I think, have been right about universalia ante res. The reasons for this are as follows.

Let us make the distinction between the two cases (the unity of persons of the Trinity and disunity of human persons) as follows. I claim that each of the persons of the Trinity instantiates the form "divinity" fully, whereas each human person instantiates the form "humanity" incompletely or partially. Thus I instantiate the form "humanity" in a partial manner, that displays a certain aspect of humanity, and you instantiate it in a partial manner, that displays a different aspect of humanity, and so forth. No individual human instantiates "humanity" fully; no-one can claim to be the full expression of what it is to be human.

There is one exception to this: I would want to say that Jesus fully instantiated humanity. Of course, some might want to say that Jesus fully instantiated the new, perfected humanity, whereas Adam fully instantiated the old, unredeemed humanity, but that introduces too sharp a disjunction between old and new humanness in my opinion - it makes them two different kinds of things. I would rather say that Jesus alone instantiated humanity, that full instantiation of humanity involves moral perfection because humans are the image of God, and that our imperfection and fallenness represents a less than full instantiation of humanness. To the extent that we are sinful, we are not human, but are "beasts" (hence the description of the antichrist as "the beast").

This has various interesting theological ramifications. It implies that the separation of humanity into those united to Christ and those cut off from him, is only finalized at the resurrection. Then all those who are in Christ will perfectly instantiate humanity, and hence be literally "one human" (Christ), in the same way that the three persons of the Trinity are one God. I think this has to do with the marriage of the lamb and his bride. It also entails that those who are not redeemed, and are in the lake of fire, will be cut off from humanity altogether, and become "beasts". I find this both interesting and plausible.

The crucial importance of Plato here is as follows. Suppose that there is a perfect realm of forms (the "Platonic heaven"), which includes the form of humanness, but also other forms, such as "is a sphere", "is a triangle", "is red", "is a tree", and so forth. By saying that this realm exists in some otherworldly and invisible domain (say, the mind of God), we can then argue that all actual occurrences of these forms in the visible world are imperfect, incomplete, and partial. This seems plausible; one does not find absolutely perfect spheres, say, in the real world; there are always imperfections. Thus the disunity of human persons can be explained by the fact that we dwell in this realm of imperfection and partial instantiation of the forms (the "earth"), whereas the unity of the persons of the trinity can be explained because they dwell in the realm of perfection and full instantiation of the forms (the "heavens").

This of course requires a concept of "partial instantiation", which I think is highly desirable philosophically anyway (to deal with the problem of vagueness in particular - see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vagueness for explanation of what I mean). But the idea of a "partial instantiation" demands that the universal form in question exist in its entirety (it makes no sense to talk of a partial instantation of something non-existent), and therefore entails Platonism - i.e. that universals must in general (perhaps God is an exception) exist before things.

For me personally this has been an incredible convergence of philosophy and theology as I have shifted from a long-standing nominalism to a realist view. A whole range of factors philosophically have caused me to realize that nominalism is simply indefensible; on the positive side, the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger and the idea that perception must have conceptual structure, and on the negative side, the realization that nominalism must, if followed consistently, result in the kind of postmodern linguistic nihilism of Derrida and Wittgenstein. Indeed, Derrida and Wittgenstein represent the final stage in the logic of nominalism in my opinion.

Theologically, I have come to realize that there simply is no way to formulate the doctrine of the Trinity without a realist view of universals. All nominalists accounts fail to be orthodox in some respect; all a nominalist can do is appeal to mystery and fail to give any account of how the three persons are one God. I have some sympathy with this kind of fideism but it won't do here, I don't think; we can't claim to have a doctrine unless we can actually coherently state it.

In fact, for philosophical reasons, I have been moving specifically to neoplatonism. But that has to do with a consideration of the concept of "object" and "substance", the flip side of the question of "forms" and "universals".

Abandoning nominalism for me was an incredibly painful thing. Being so enmeshed in empiricism and analytic philosophy, I had always considered realism to be preposterous wooly-headed metaphysical mumbo-jumbo. Acknowledging the fact that it must actually be correct has been somewhat humbling, given my virtually life-long commitment to nominalism.

Regarding the East/West thing, while I remain convinced that the Holy Spirit proceeds in his origin from the Father alone, I nonetheless think that some kind of Western "differentiation" or "logically simultaneous emergence" of persons is also required, both because of my acceptance of a Platonic doctrine of universalia ante res, and for reasons related to what in phenomenology is referred to as the problem of intersubjectivity. So in short I've moved to a more Western conception of the Trinity, while retaining the Eastern insight about the single procession. I think this is perfectly compatible with the Western view, even if it is not entailed by it; and indeed, there may be reasons other than the Aristotelian/Platonic dichotomy that lead one to prefer it (such as the principle that whatever belongs to deity is shared by all the persons, and whatever belongs to the person, is held only by the person).

Anyway, that's enough rambling for now!

God bless,

Rupert.

[alam]

No problem! Unfortunately though I am knee-deep in a debate in the gym on hermeneutics, which will consume most of time my wife permits me to spend on the internet for about the next two weeks I suspect, so I may not be able to say a lot until the debate is over.

Anyway, what I understand the Eastern Orthodox approach to be saying, is this. The Father (the hypostasis, the particular person) instantiates the form "Godness", and does so fully; and that this form, so to speak, is entailed by the particular person, and not the other way around. But since the universal form "Godness" is a universal, there is nothing in principle to stop it being instantiated in other individuals also. So it is "subsequently" (by this I mean logical dependency, not temporal order) instantiated in the Son and, in the process, the Holy Spirit; and in each case it is instantiated "fully", in the sense that there is no aspect of it which is absent from the Son or the Holy Spirit.

Now this does raise a problem which I think you are alluding to, and which was the very issue which Gregory of Nyssa struggled with in his work "there are not three gods". That is, one might say the following. When we take three humans, Joe, Bill and Tim, they each instantiate the form "human". But we do not say that they are "one human". We of course say that they are three humans. So, by analogy, if the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, all instantiate the form "Godness", surely we should say that there are three gods, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, not that there is one God. Indeed, it seems that if it is legitimate to talk of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit as being "one God" just because they all instantiate divinity, then it would be legitimate to say that you, me and Howie are "one human", because we all instantiate humanity.

This is a significant and difficult issue. One's initial instinct would be to deal with it in relational terms (that is, that human persons are distinguished due to some relational properties), but that cannot be right, because the persons of the Trinity are also distinguished by relations. One possible avenue that I recently thought of, but haven't really explored and would probably turn out to be indefensible, is to privilege spatial relations in some way, and argue that the existence of spatial relations and a "different perspective" might solve the problem.

Apart from this suggestion that may turn out to be useless, the only remaining possibility, which would be my preferred explanation, is to postulate some kind of distinction between the way in which the persons of the Trinity instantiate divinity, and the way in which ordinary humans instantiate humanity. I have been considering this for some time, and it is one factor (there are also philosophical concerns) that has led me to drop the Aristotelian approach, and adopt the Platonic one. Plato must, I think, have been right about universalia ante res. The reasons for this are as follows.

Let us make the distinction between the two cases (the unity of persons of the Trinity and disunity of human persons) as follows. I claim that each of the persons of the Trinity instantiates the form "divinity" fully, whereas each human person instantiates the form "humanity" incompletely or partially. Thus I instantiate the form "humanity" in a partial manner, that displays a certain aspect of humanity, and you instantiate it in a partial manner, that displays a different aspect of humanity, and so forth. No individual human instantiates "humanity" fully; no-one can claim to be the full expression of what it is to be human.

There is one exception to this: I would want to say that Jesus fully instantiated humanity. Of course, some might want to say that Jesus fully instantiated the new, perfected humanity, whereas Adam fully instantiated the old, unredeemed humanity, but that introduces too sharp a disjunction between old and new humanness in my opinion - it makes them two different kinds of things. I would rather say that Jesus alone instantiated humanity, that full instantiation of humanity involves moral perfection because humans are the image of God, and that our imperfection and fallenness represents a less than full instantiation of humanness. To the extent that we are sinful, we are not human, but are "beasts" (hence the description of the antichrist as "the beast").

This has various interesting theological ramifications. It implies that the separation of humanity into those united to Christ and those cut off from him, is only finalized at the resurrection. Then all those who are in Christ will perfectly instantiate humanity, and hence be literally "one human" (Christ), in the same way that the three persons of the Trinity are one God. I think this has to do with the marriage of the lamb and his bride. It also entails that those who are not redeemed, and are in the lake of fire, will be cut off from humanity altogether, and become "beasts". I find this both interesting and plausible.

The crucial importance of Plato here is as follows. Suppose that there is a perfect realm of forms (the "Platonic heaven"), which includes the form of humanness, but also other forms, such as "is a sphere", "is a triangle", "is red", "is a tree", and so forth. By saying that this realm exists in some otherworldly and invisible domain (say, the mind of God), we can then argue that all actual occurrences of these forms in the visible world are imperfect, incomplete, and partial. This seems plausible; one does not find absolutely perfect spheres, say, in the real world; there are always imperfections. Thus the disunity of human persons can be explained by the fact that we dwell in this realm of imperfection and partial instantiation of the forms (the "earth"), whereas the unity of the persons of the trinity can be explained because they dwell in the realm of perfection and full instantiation of the forms (the "heavens").

This of course requires a concept of "partial instantiation", which I think is highly desirable philosophically anyway (to deal with the problem of vagueness in particular - see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vagueness for explanation of what I mean). But the idea of a "partial instantiation" demands that the universal form in question exist in its entirety (it makes no sense to talk of a partial instantation of something non-existent), and therefore entails Platonism - i.e. that universals must in general (perhaps God is an exception) exist before things.

For me personally this has been an incredible convergence of philosophy and theology as I have shifted from a long-standing nominalism to a realist view. A whole range of factors philosophically have caused me to realize that nominalism is simply indefensible; on the positive side, the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger and the idea that perception must have conceptual structure, and on the negative side, the realization that nominalism must, if followed consistently, result in the kind of postmodern linguistic nihilism of Derrida and Wittgenstein. Indeed, Derrida and Wittgenstein represent the final stage in the logic of nominalism in my opinion.

Theologically, I have come to realize that there simply is no way to formulate the doctrine of the Trinity without a realist view of universals. All nominalists accounts fail to be orthodox in some respect; all a nominalist can do is appeal to mystery and fail to give any account of how the three persons are one God. I have some sympathy with this kind of fideism but it won't do here, I don't think; we can't claim to have a doctrine unless we can actually coherently state it.

In fact, for philosophical reasons, I have been moving specifically to neoplatonism. But that has to do with a consideration of the concept of "object" and "substance", the flip side of the question of "forms" and "universals".

Abandoning nominalism for me was an incredibly painful thing. Being so enmeshed in empiricism and analytic philosophy, I had always considered realism to be preposterous wooly-headed metaphysical mumbo-jumbo. Acknowledging the fact that it must actually be correct has been somewhat humbling, given my virtually life-long commitment to nominalism.

Regarding the East/West thing, while I remain convinced that the Holy Spirit proceeds in his origin from the Father alone, I nonetheless think that some kind of Western "differentiation" or "logically simultaneous emergence" of persons is also required, both because of my acceptance of a Platonic doctrine of universalia ante res, and for reasons related to what in phenomenology is referred to as the problem of intersubjectivity. So in short I've moved to a more Western conception of the Trinity, while retaining the Eastern insight about the single procession. I think this is perfectly compatible with the Western view, even if it is not entailed by it; and indeed, there may be reasons other than the Aristotelian/Platonic dichotomy that lead one to prefer it (such as the principle that whatever belongs to deity is shared by all the persons, and whatever belongs to the person, is held only by the person).

Anyway, that's enough rambling for now!

God bless,

Rupert.



Hello Rupert,

Something you are proposing above strikes me as odd. It is that a form can be multiply perfectly instantiated. For Plato, the forms themselves are their own most perfect exemplars. The form is one and so its most perfect instantiation is one. If you try to distinguish the alleged perfect instantiation of deity which is the Father, from the alleged perfect instanation of deity which is the Son, by specifying that the Father is unbegotten whereas the Son is begotten, you are saying that these two perfect instantiations are two in virtue of one instantiating yet another form (sonship) which the other does not. But how do you bring two universals together in a single instantiation? The instantiation of any universal, in the very sense that it instantiates that universal, instantiates that universal and not another. Things get confused down here in the world of becoming, where we can bring two universals together forcibly, albeit vicariously, through space and time. However, in the realm of pure thought, Plato's realm of being, two distinct universals cannot be united except logically. If Jesus, for instance, is the joint-instantiation of the form of "God" with the form of "Sonship," it must be because both resolve into a higher-order form of which Jesus was really the perfect instantiation.

Please respond at your own leisure. Even when inactive I check the forum about every two weeks.

God bless

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

But how do you bring two universals together in a single instantiation? Possibly ! Cor 6:16-17 gives a clue.

Peace

[Rupert Pupkin]

Something you are proposing above strikes me as odd. It is that a form can be multiply perfectly instantiated. For Plato, the forms themselves are their own most perfect exemplars. The form is one and so its most perfect instantiation is one. If you try to distinguish the alleged perfect instantiation of deity which is the Father, from the alleged perfect instanation of deity which is the Son, by specifying that the Father is unbegotten whereas the Son is begotten, you are saying that these two perfect instantiations are two in virtue of one instantiating yet another form (sonship) which the other does not. But how do you bring two universals together in a single instantiation? The instantiation of any universal, in the very sense that it instantiates that universal, instantiates that universal and not another. Things get confused down here in the world of becoming, where we can bring two universals together forcibly, albeit vicariously, through space and time. However, in the realm of pure thought, Plato's realm of being, two distinct universals cannot be united except logically. If Jesus, for instance, is the joint-instantiation of the form of "God" with the form of "Sonship," it must be because both resolve into a higher-order form of which Jesus was really the perfect instantiation.

No, this isn't right. In general, forms are instantiated in objects. In this case, the object is the hypostasis. Let us denote the hypostasis of the Father as f, that of the Son as s, and that of the holy spirit as h, and let us denote the property "is God" by G. In that case, it is true that Gf, Gs, and Gh. However, this does not entail that f, s and h cannot be distinct objects. Even if we accept the principle of the identity of indiscernables, the three persons are still distinct because they have different relational properties instantiated in them in addition to divinity. Let us denote the relational property (two-placed predicate) "a is begotten by b" as aBb, and the relational property "a begets b" by aEb. In that case, although Gf and Gs is true, nonetheless fBs is false and fEs is true, whereas sBf is true and sEf is false. So the Father and Son have different properties, and therefore are not identical objects. But they both are God (they both perfectly instantiate the property "is God").

Let me take an example. Suppose that we had a perfectly red apple, and a perfectly red tomato. Let us suppose that they both perfectly instantiated redness; that the property "is red" was fully instantiated in both. This could only happen in "Platonic heaven", not in the real world, on my hypothesis. Anyway, in that case it would make sense to say that they were "one red", that they were literally identical with respect to redness. But that would not mean that they could not be distinguished; they have other properties that are distinct.

The bottom line is this: the answer to your question "how do you bring two universals together in a single instantiation?", is this: you don't bring them together in a single instantiation, you bring them together in a single object. This theory requires that there be some "substance" of things which serves as that in which properties inhere. I think you are overlooking the existence of this substance. You are thinking like what philosophers would call a "bundle theorist". That is, you are thinking of things as just being the sum of their properties, the bundle of their properties. But I am thinking along the lines of a substance-attribute model, in which properties inhere in substance.

This also explains your question about Jesus' two natures. The form of divinity and the form of humanity are both instantiated in the one object, his hypostasis. Hence if we denote the predicate "is human" by H, then both Gs and Hs are true.

It is in accounting for the nature of substance, or what makes objects to be objects, that I turn to neoplatonism.

One final point: when I speak of substance here, I am not using it in the same sense as it was used, for instance, in the Nicene Creed. There it is actually used to refer to the form of divinity. This is just a confusing terminological issue. I am using substance to mean that in which properties inhere; that which individuates an entity.

[mastralvarado]

No, this isn't right. In general, forms are instantiated in objects. In this case, the object is the hypostasis. Let us denote the hypostasis of the Father as f, that of the Son as s, and that of the holy spirit as h, and let us denote the property "is God" by G. In that case, it is true that Gf, Gs, and Gh. However, this does not entail that f, s and h cannot be distinct objects. Even if we accept the principle of the identity of indiscernables, the three persons are still distinct because they have different relational properties instantiated in them in addition to divinity. Let us denote the relational property (two-placed predicate) "a is begotten by b" as aBb, and the relational property "a begets b" by aEb. In that case, although Gf and Gs is true, nonetheless fBs is false and fEs is true, whereas sBf is true and sEf is false. So the Father and Son have different properties, and therefore are not identical objects. But they both are God (they both perfectly instantiate the property "is God").

Let me take an example. Suppose that we had a perfectly red apple, and a perfectly red tomato. Let us suppose that they both perfectly instantiated redness; that the property "is red" was fully instantiated in both. This could only happen in "Platonic heaven", not in the real world, on my hypothesis. Anyway, in that case it would make sense to say that they were "one red", that they were literally identical with respect to redness. But that would not mean that they could not be distinguished; they have other properties that are distinct.

The bottom line is this: the answer to your question "how do you bring two universals together in a single instantiation?", is this: you don't bring them together in a single instantiation, you bring them together in a single object. This theory requires that there be some "substance" of things which serves as that in which properties inhere. I think you are overlooking the existence of this substance. You are thinking like what philosophers would call a "bundle theorist". That is, you are thinking of things as just being the sum of their properties, the bundle of their properties. But I am thinking along the lines of a substance-attribute model, in which properties inhere in substance.

This also explains your question about Jesus' two natures. The form of divinity and the form of humanity are both instantiated in the one object, his hypostasis. Hence if we denote the predicate "is human" by H, then both Gs and Hs are true.

It is in accounting for the nature of substance, or what makes objects to be objects, that I turn to neoplatonism.

One final point: when I speak of substance here, I am not using it in the same sense as it was used, for instance, in the Nicene Creed. There it is actually used to refer to the form of divinity. This is just a confusing terminological issue. I am using substance to mean that in which properties inhere; that which individuates an entity.

Rupert Pupkin,

I was wondering if an instance is the same thing as a reference. For example, the Word of god can also be a reference to scripture. Can a heavenly book not have holy wings as would the visual representation of the holy ghost and also be Written by G-d therefore be perfectly divinely begotten? Is this my imagination or don´t jews believe that books can also have wings?

regards,

the man under the mountain

[alam]

No, this isn't right. In general, forms are instantiated in objects. In this case, the object is the hypostasis. Let us denote the hypostasis of the Father as f, that of the Son as s, and that of the holy spirit as h, and let us denote the property "is God" by G. In that case, it is true that Gf, Gs, and Gh. However, this does not entail that f, s and h cannot be distinct objects. Even if we accept the principle of the identity of indiscernables, the three persons are still distinct because they have different relational properties instantiated in them in addition to divinity. Let us denote the relational property (two-placed predicate) "a is begotten by b" as aBb, and the relational property "a begets b" by aEb. In that case, although Gf and Gs is true, nonetheless fBs is false and fEs is true, whereas sBf is true and sEf is false. So the Father and Son have different properties, and therefore are not identical objects. But they both are God (they both perfectly instantiate the property "is God").

Let me take an example. Suppose that we had a perfectly red apple, and a perfectly red tomato. Let us suppose that they both perfectly instantiated redness; that the property "is red" was fully instantiated in both. This could only happen in "Platonic heaven", not in the real world, on my hypothesis. Anyway, in that case it would make sense to say that they were "one red", that they were literally identical with respect to redness. But that would not mean that they could not be distinguished; they have other properties that are distinct.

The bottom line is this: the answer to your question "how do you bring two universals together in a single instantiation?", is this: you don't bring them together in a single instantiation, you bring them together in a single object. This theory requires that there be some "substance" of things which serves as that in which properties inhere. I think you are overlooking the existence of this substance. You are thinking like what philosophers would call a "bundle theorist". That is, you are thinking of things as just being the sum of their properties, the bundle of their properties. But I am thinking along the lines of a substance-attribute model, in which properties inhere in substance.

I'm not committed to bundle-theory of things and wasn't assuming it in my previous question. "Platonic heaven" refers to the realm of forms, not a place up there, but a logical space which exists independently of space and time. I am not sure on what basis you are positing property-bearing substances in Platonic heaven along with the forms. Containing such substances is not what Platonic heaven is for - as I understand it.

That's not to say substance is material or inherently tied to space and time but that Platonic heaven concerns universals, not one particular instantiation or other, except in the sense that the forms themselves are their own most perfect exemplars. For instance nothing about an apple in virtue of which it is an apple as opposed to something else is missing from the form "Apple". The form doesn't need some contingent instantiation in order to exist, but exists perfectly in itself for the perspective universalia ante res.




This also explains your question about Jesus' two natures. The form of divinity and the form of humanity are both instantiated in the one object, his hypostasis. Hence if we denote the predicate "is human" by H, then both Gs and Hs are true.


I haven't asked that question, but thank you for your comment.

God bless

[Rupert Pupkin]

Hi alam! Sorry if I misunderstood you.

Without worrying too much about what Plato himself might have thought, in neoplatonism, and I think this is correct, the forms exist in the mind or nous of God. So they are perfectly real but just belong to a transcendent order of things.

As for substance, I certainly do think that substance is transcendent. The realm of the forms actually exists "below" it, not above it. Indeed, I think that substance as substance is identical in all its instances (or, if you like, that substance is the alienated or emanated "one"). Every object has "the one" present in it, but not as an instantiation; the one is not a form. Every distinction amongst things involve a kind of "alienation" of the one from itself, an emanation of the one. This is all straight-out neoplatonism (e.g. Plotinus).

Hello Mastralvarado! I personally don't think that instance is the same thing as reference. References is an intentional phenomenon; whereas instance is that which allows us to talk of objects and their properties. They're two different things. Specific intentional entities are instances of the form "intentionality", but that doesn't mean instance is intentional anymore than the fact that specific red objects are instances of the red, means that instance is the same thing as redness.

God bless,

Rupert.

[alam]

Hi alam! Sorry if I misunderstood you.

Without worrying too much about what Plato himself might have thought, in neoplatonism, and I think this is correct, the forms exist in the mind or nous of God. So they are perfectly real but just belong to a transcendent order of things.

As for substance, I certainly do think that substance is transcendent. The realm of the forms actually exists "below" it, not above it. Indeed, I think that substance as substance is identical in all its instances (or, if you like, that substance is the alienated or emanated "one"). Every object has "the one" present in it, but not as an instantiation; the one is not a form. Every distinction amongst things involve a kind of "alienation" of the one from itself, an emanation of the one. This is all straight-out neoplatonism (e.g. Plotinus).

Hello Mastralvarado! I personally don't think that instance is the same thing as reference. References is an intentional phenomenon; whereas instance is that which allows us to talk of objects and their properties. They're two different things. Specific intentional entities are instances of the form "intentionality", but that doesn't mean instance is intentional anymore than the fact that specific red objects are instances of the red, means that instance is the same thing as redness.

God bless,

Rupert.


Hi Rupert,

I do not understand this aspect of neo-Platonism. Why should the One be alienated from itself? It is one after all, beyond distinction including the distinction between being and non-being, and possessing no attributes. Duality comes in in the subordinate emanations.

Nor do I understand what you were saying about the multiple co-existent perfect instantiations of the form "God." These instantiations could not exist above the Nous, within the One, which has no distinctions within itself. Neither do they exist in the realm of the forms themselves. Yet neither do they exist in the "real world" where all instantiations are imperfect.

Nor could it possibly be that the One, the Nous and the World Soul themselves comprise the trinity as I think you have explained it, because the One is not metaphysically complex or complex in any sense, whereas God, the Father, on your view is metaphysically complex, being a property-bearing substance.

You've said though that your attention is diverted now with other discussions on Tweb. I am willing to shelve this discussion until those are concluded.

God bless,

[Rupert Pupkin]

I do not understand this aspect of neo-Platonism. Why should the One be alienated from itself? It is one after all, beyond distinction including the distinction between being and non-being, and possessing no attributes. Duality comes in in the subordinate emanations.

I agree that the position does seem somewhat paradoxical initially, so I will give a summary of the argument for it. Let us take as a starting point that predicates and objects are both given in perception. That is, of course, something that requires argument to show, but for the moment I will just assume that it is true.

Now I have claimed that properties must represent instantiations of forms. But that still leaves the question of what they are instantiated in - what makes the object a single entity, an object, rather than just a bundle of properties. I reject bundle theory because I think that acceptance of the predicative form of perception forces us to accept that properties and objects are both equally real, and that we can't analyze one in terms of the other.

I would also dismiss the idea that the unity of objects can be explained in terms of "being" or "existence" or something like that. The reason for that is that objects also serve as the object of intentional phenomena, and these "intentional objects" can either exist or not exist. Thus, I might believe that Santa Claus exists, in which case "Santa Claus" is the intentional object of my belief, but obviously Santa is not real. So objects may be either real or imaginary, but they still retain their "objectness" or unity.

Let us call that in which properties inhere, and which makes objects into objects, "substance". The question is, how is one instance of substance related to another. We could, of course, say that the properties of the two objects are different, but that doesn't really answer the question. The question is how substance in and of itself in the one case is related to the other.

We might be tempted to say that substance is entirely particular, that two different instances of substance are two different particulars, and that one substance has nothing in common with another. But then one has difficulty in explaining why they can all be brought under the common predicate "substance". Furthermore, it seems hard to think of any distinction between substances considered purely as substances. Different things are distinguished by their properties. This is a slightly involved argument, but if we could say that substance A and substance B were themselves distinguishable, it would seem to imply that there is something that we can predicate of one but not the other. It relates to the question of the identity of indiscernibles (see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible), a principle which I accept.

Anyway, having rejected that option, we must also reject any account of substance as a universal. That is, substance cannot be a "differentiating property" that is instantiated in objects. The reason for this is that it either leads to bundle theory, or to an infinite regress. If the addition of this differentiating property in itself just makes the object an object, then we have objects as just bundles of properties again. On the other hand, if bundle theory is not correct, then what is it that this differentiating property is instantiated in?

There seems to be only one possible remaining alternative. That is, there is only one substance; and it is "the one", that which instills unity into things. But we want to avoid Spinoza's view here. He held that there is only one infinite substance, which is OK as far as it goes. But he divorced this one infinite substance from any account of finite objects - finite objects became just bundles of properties within the one substance. That is a form of bundle theory that as we have seen will not do. So the one must be present in each object as well as in the whole. But neither is it a universal present as an instantiation. It is present in particulars, but it is not particular either; particulars are the objects themselves. The one, therefore, transcends both universal and particular, property and object.

This argument operates by a process of exclusion of other options.

Nor do I understand what you were saying about the multiple co-existent perfect instantiations of the form "God." These instantiations could not exist above the Nous, within the One, which has no distinctions within itself. Neither do they exist in the realm of the forms themselves. Yet neither do they exist in the "real world" where all instantiations are imperfect.

Each of the persons of the trinity is a particular in which the form of God is fully instantiated. Therefore, in relation to the form of deity, it is not correct to say that it exists prior to any of its instances. The persons and the form exist together, and exist eternally. Each of the persons of the trinity consists in the universal "God" instantiated in them, plus various other properties (relational at the very least), and is comprised as an object by the presence of "the one" as their substance.

Since the form of deity is fully instantiated in the persons, I don't see why there is any worry about where it is located otherwise. It is located in the persons. It is only if a universal is partly instantiated in something, that we have to bother about where it is located, where it exists.

The only reason for situating the other forms in the mind of God, is that otherwise it would seem to threaten his omniscience, and also introduce something external to God that is eternal (a kind of eternal material world or something). Hence, it is not really correct to say that the forms dwell in a kind of "Platonic heaven". The forms dwell in the mind of God. This does not require that any actual objects exist, since they must exist as intentional objects, rather than real objects. They are the objects of God's beliefs, desires, wishes and so forth.

Since I am a trinitarian, and since all the persons of the trinity are omniscient and fully instantiate divinity, this means that all the forms must be present in the mind of each of the three persons of the trinity. But they need not be identically present; they could be the objects of different intentional acts, provided they are there.

Nor could it possibly be that the One, the Nous and the World Soul themselves comprise the trinity as I think you have explained it, because the One is not metaphysically complex or complex in any sense, whereas God, the Father, on your view is metaphysically complex, being a property-bearing substance.

I agree. I hold that there are three minds, each person of the trinity having their own nous, and not one. Indeed, I believe that it is impossible for there to be only one mind, because with Husserl and phenomenologists, I do not believe that an "I" thinking perspective is possible except with the concept of there being another perspective-holder who is not-I. Please leave this issue aside for the moment, as I will open a thread on it in a couple of weeks once the dust has settled. I want to call it "natural theology and the trinity", or something like that, and argue that the existence of a personal, ego-conscious being requires the existence of at least two other personal beings. In short, I think it is possible to establish the doctrine of the trinity purely on the grounds of reason. But I don't want to get embroiled in that now. The basis of the argument derives from Husserl.

You've said though that your attention is diverted now with other discussions on Tweb. I am willing to shelve this discussion until those are concluded.

That's alright. The debate is progressing more slowly than I expected. If I get too busy, I will just delay responding.

God bless,

Rupert.

[alam]

I agree that the position does seem somewhat paradoxical initially, so I will give a summary of the argument for it. Let us take as a starting point that predicates and objects are both given in perception. That is, of course, something that requires argument to show, but for the moment I will just assume that it is true.

Now I have claimed that properties must represent instantiations of forms. But that still leaves the question of what they are instantiated in - what makes the object a single entity, an object, rather than just a bundle of properties. I reject bundle theory because I think that acceptance of the predicative form of perception forces us to accept that properties and objects are both equally real, and that we can't analyze one in terms of the other.

I would also dismiss the idea that the unity of objects can be explained in terms of "being" or "existence" or something like that. The reason for that is that objects also serve as the object of intentional phenomena, and these "intentional objects" can either exist or not exist. Thus, I might believe that Santa Claus exists, in which case "Santa Claus" is the intentional object of my belief, but obviously Santa is not real. So objects may be either real or imaginary, but they still retain their "objectness" or unity.

Let us call that in which properties inhere, and which makes objects into objects, "substance". The question is, how is one instance of substance related to another. We could, of course, say that the properties of the two objects are different, but that doesn't really answer the question. The question is how substance in and of itself in the one case is related to the other.

We might be tempted to say that substance is entirely particular, that two different instances of substance are two different particulars, and that one substance has nothing in common with another. But then one has difficulty in explaining why they can all be brought under the common predicate "substance". Furthermore, it seems hard to think of any distinction between substances considered purely as substances. Different things are distinguished by their properties. This is a slightly involved argument, but if we could say that substance A and substance B were themselves distinguishable, it would seem to imply that there is something that we can predicate of one but not the other. It relates to the question of the identity of indiscernibles (see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible), a principle which I accept.

Anyway, having rejected that option, we must also reject any account of substance as a universal. That is, substance cannot be a "differentiating property" that is instantiated in objects. The reason for this is that it either leads to bundle theory, or to an infinite regress. If the addition of this differentiating property in itself just makes the object an object, then we have objects as just bundles of properties again. On the other hand, if bundle theory is not correct, then what is it that this differentiating property is instantiated in?

There seems to be only one possible remaining alternative. That is, there is only one substance; and it is "the one", that which instills unity into things. But we want to avoid Spinoza's view here. He held that there is only one infinite substance, which is OK as far as it goes. But he divorced this one infinite substance from any account of finite objects - finite objects became just bundles of properties within the one substance. That is a form of bundle theory that as we have seen will not do. So the one must be present in each object as well as in the whole. But neither is it a universal present as an instantiation. It is present in particulars, but it is not particular either; particulars are the objects themselves. The one, therefore, transcends both universal and particular, property and object.

This argument operates by a process of exclusion of other options.

Thank you Rupert.

I agree that predicates and objects are given in perception, and that one cannot be reduced to the other.

In addition to universals and particulars, Aristotle mentioned singular terms. These terms cannot be multiply predicated, such as "Socrates." I believe "substance" describes the metaphysical reality behind singular terms (any term can be made singular by the addition of a demonstrative, e.g. this).

I agree that substance constitutes an object as such, and agree that in and of itself it is neither instantiated nor instantiates anything. However, I doubt that there is only one substance. If substance is that wherein proeperties are instantiated, i.e. it is what "bears" the properties (which I accept), and there is only one substance, it seems that all objects would instantiate any property which that substance bears. Or, there are just arbitrary clusters of properties in the substance taking us back to the problen you raised for Spinoza. Both are false, so there must be many substances. Their origin, with the exception of God and Christ, must be that they are created from nothing. We can distinguish them in that one substance stands in a relation to one universal which another does not. Hence the multiplicity of objects, and the multiplicity of unities, which instantiate various universals in various degrees.

You wrote, in a slightly different but relevant connection, "But then one has difficulty in explaining why they can all be brought under the common predicate 'substance'." This can apply to the term "particular" itself - how can we call them all "particulars" unless there is a universal of particularity. That could not be, unless we are willing to consider "particularity" as some kind of negative universal and the term "particular" as a placeholder for whatever is not part of the universals but instantiates the universals. This is how I would explain the common predicate "substance." Unlike a particular, however, a substance does not instantiate anything.

You wrote, "Furthermore, it seems hard to think of any distinction between substances considered purely as substances. Different things are distinguished by their properties. This is a slightly involved argument, but if we could say that substance A and substance B were themselves distinguishable, it would seem to imply that there is something that we can predicate of one but not the other." I used to accept identity of indiscernibles too, but Black's thought experiment caused me to doubt it. Nevertheless it seems the substances can still be distinguished relationally.




Each of the persons of the trinity is a particular in which the form of God is fully instantiated. Therefore, in relation to the form of deity, it is not correct to say that it exists prior to any of its instances. The persons and the form exist together, and exist eternally. Each of the persons of the trinity consists in the universal "God" instantiated in them, plus various other properties (relational at the very least), and is comprised as an object by the presence of "the one" as their substance.

Since the form of deity is fully instantiated in the persons, I don't see why there is any worry about where it is located otherwise. It is located in the persons. It is only if a universal is partly instantiated in something, that we have to bother about where it is located, where it exists.

The only reason for situating the other forms in the mind of God, is that otherwise it would seem to threaten his omniscience, and also introduce something external to God that is eternal (a kind of eternal material world or something). Hence, it is not really correct to say that the forms dwell in a kind of "Platonic heaven". The forms dwell in the mind of God. This does not require that any actual objects exist, since they must exist as intentional objects, rather than real objects. They are the objects of God's beliefs, desires, wishes and so forth.

Since I am a trinitarian, and since all the persons of the trinity are omniscient and fully instantiate divinity, this means that all the forms must be present in the mind of each of the three persons of the trinity. But they need not be identically present; they could be the objects of different intentional acts, provided they are there.


My question was phrased in spatial terms following your allusion to Platonic heaven, but concerns not so much where, as how it exists. How are we supposed to conceive of this as a real thing.

We got into this subject because I do not understand how the three instantiations of God which are the trinity are one God rather than three Gods. After all, three instantiations of "apple" are three apples; three instantiations of "man" are three men. By even explaining the relation of the nature versus the persons of the trinity as universal and particular, which the Cappadocians did but Westerns eschew, you have raised this question.

You said the probable reason for this is the each person of the trinity perfectly instantiates the form "God" whereas three apples "down here" only imperfectly instantiate the form "apple". But I am not sure why three perfect instantiations of "apple" should be one apple as opposed to say, three perfect apples. Or why the persons of the trinity each perfectly instantiating "God" should be one God as opposed to three perfect Gods.

Nevertheless, by denying that perfect instantiation is even possible in our world, you posited enough of a difference between the circumstances of the trinity and the circumstances of our world, where three exemplars of some universal are numbered in the plural, that I would like to hear you out and see if it makes any sense that the three persons of the trinity will be one God rather than three Gods. It remains to explain why the conditions of the trinity differ sufficiently from those of our world that three instantiations of a universal will meaningfully be one God rather than three Gods. In this connection I have two questions.

1. What is it about our world which makes perfect instantiation impossible? You have said there are no perfect circles in our world, which is intuitively plausible since I have not seen one, and don't know how to make one, but that doesn't mean it's impossible. Maybe God could create one, or many of them for that matter.

2. Having identified what condition(s) precludes perfect instantiation in our world, can we distinguish it from the condition(s) that enables multiple instantiation. If we can't, then by denying the condition precluding perfect instantiation from God, the multiplicity of instantiation will be washed out, too.




I agree. I hold that there are three minds, each person of the trinity having their own nous, and not one. Indeed, I believe that it is impossible for there to be only one mind, because with Husserl and phenomenologists, I do not believe that an "I" thinking perspective is possible except with the concept of there being another perspective-holder who is not-I. Please leave this issue aside for the moment, as I will open a thread on it in a couple of weeks once the dust has settled. I want to call it "natural theology and the trinity", or something like that, and argue that the existence of a personal, ego-conscious being requires the existence of at least two other personal beings. In short, I think it is possible to establish the doctrine of the trinity purely on the grounds of reason. But I don't want to get embroiled in that now. The basis of the argument derives from Husserl.


Sure, I look forward to reading it.


God bless

[alam]

This is part of an article I wrote which relates to the thread topic.




Some Homoousian (a.k.a "trinitarian") argument concerns the ambiguity of the copula – the is of identity versus the is of predication. An identity statement is convertible. This means that when you say "the current President of the USA is George Bush," it is conversely true that "George Bush is the current President of the USA." The essence of the statement is, "George Bush = current President of the USA." When we have the is of predication though, the statement isn't convertible. To use Daniel B. Wallace's example, "the preaching of the cross is foolishness" does not entail that "foolishness is the preaching of the cross" (Greek Grammar: Beyond the Basics, Zondervan, 1996; p. 41).

According to many Homousians, "The Father is God," "the Son is God," and "there is only one God" do not entail Sabellianism – that the Father is the Son – because the is used in the first two statements is that of predication. So in their view, "while Jesus is God, it is not true that God is Jesus," since "the person we call Jesus does not exhaust the category of Deity" (Murray Harris, Jesus as God, Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1992; p. 297). Polemic inferences from the latter as though it represents the Homoousian view allegedly end up attacking a straw man. Dr. Wallace states:

The assumption that the grammatical equative verb bears the same force as the mathematical equal sign is one of the fundamental flaws in the thinking of Jehovah's Witnesses regarding the deity of Christ. On John 1:1, cf. their booklet, Should You Believe in the Trinity?... , where it is argued that since John 1:1b states that "the Word was with God," John 1:1c cannot mean 'The Word was God": "Someone who is 'with' another person cannot be the same as that other person" (27). This argument seems to assume that all S[ubject]-P[redicate ]N[ominative] constructions are of the convertible proposition type (Wallace, ibid., ftn.)

On the nature of convertible propositions:

[The] convertible proposition...indicates an identical exchange. That is to say, both nouns have an identical referent. The mathematical formulas of A=B, B=A are applicable in such instances. A statement such as "Michael Jordan is the greatest basketball player in NBA history" means the same thing as "the greatest player in NBA history is Michael Jordan." There is complete interchange between the two (ibid.).

This is interesting since, given the definitions in Greek Grammar: Beyond the Basics, later on in John's Gospel we do have a statement about the Father as God which meets the requirements for a convertible proposition:

"This is eternal life, that they may know You, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom You have sent" (John 17:3, NASB).

Notice that the verse does not say the Father is the only true God; the ambiguity of the copula doesn't come into play here at all. Rather, "You" (σέ) and "the only true God" (τόν μόνον αληθινόν θεόν) are accusatives in simple apposition. In Jesus as God (p. 258-259), Murray J. Harris considers a minority view held by Augustine and few others, which amounts to reading the text as, "that they may know You and Jesus Christ, whom You have sent, as the only true God" (Augustine, Tractate 105.3; De Trinitatis vi. 9). He dismisses this as unlikely, since "one would expect a longer phrase such as τόν μόνον αληθινόν θεόν to be repeated with both expressions or else to stand after the second expression, rather than standing only with the first (as here)" (p. 259). Hence τόν μόνον αληθινόν θεόν is naturally read as appositive only to σέ. Concerning the semantic and structural features of simple apposition, Wallace states:

There are four features of simple apposition to be noted (the first two are structural clues; the last two features are semantic): An appositional construction involves (1) two adjacent substantives (2) in the same case, (3) which refer to the same person or thing, (4) and have the same syntactical relation to the rest of the clause (ibid. p. 48)

The first substantive can belong to any category (e.g., subject, predicate nom., etc.) and the second is merely a clarification, description, or identification of who or what is mentioned... The appositive functions very much like a P[redicate ]N[ominative] in a convertible proposition–that is, it refers to the same thing as the first noun. The difference, however, is that a PN makes an assertion about the S[ubject] (an equative verb is either stated or implied); with appositives there is assumption, not assertion (no verb is in mind)" (ibid.).

For a genitive in simple apposition [but the same applies to the other cases: "[t]he semantics of all but the genitive of apposition are the same–i.e., both substantives have an identical referent" (ibid. 62)] the two nouns are equivalent to a convertible proposition. Thus, "Paul the apostle" could be unpacked as "Paul is the apostle" or "the apostle is Paul" (ibid. p. 96).

Hence, in John 17:3 we have an implicit identity statement: God the Father = the only true God.

If the Son of God likewise = the only true God, it follows from transitivity of identity (the principle that if A = B and B = C, then A = C) that the Father is the Son.

On the other hand, if someone only predicates "only true God" of the Son, there still seems to be a problem. If the only true God = the Father, then we are predicating the Father of the Son, which appears to be a category mistake: "...inasmuch as primary substance is not predicable of anything, it can never form the predicate of any proposition. But of secondary substances [i.e. kind essences], the species is predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species and of the individual" (Aristotle, Categories).

Someone may wish to reject this philosophic assumption or its application to the trinity, substituting in its place some other metaphysic, e.g. Whiteheadian, which allows you to predicate one person of another. Nevertheless, this will still be outside the realm of classic Nicenism since it makes the person of the Father, rather than an alleged homoousia, the universal of the trinity.

[Rupert Pupkin]

In addition to universals and particulars, Aristotle mentioned singular terms. These terms cannot be multiply predicated, such as "Socrates." I believe "substance" describes the metaphysical reality behind singular terms (any term can be made singular by the addition of a demonstrative, e.g. this).

But this doesn't solve anything. The question then arises, what is "thisness"? What is it that allows singular terms to be singular terms? It's exactly the same question all over again.

I agree that substance constitutes an object as such, and agree that in and of itself it is neither instantiated nor instantiates anything. However, I doubt that there is only one substance. If substance is that wherein properties are instantiated, i.e. it is what "bears" the properties (which I accept), and there is only one substance, it seems that all objects would instantiate any property which that substance bears. Or, there are just arbitrary clusters of properties in the substance taking us back to the problen you raised for Spinoza. Both are false, so there must be many substances. Their origin, with the exception of God and Christ, must be that they are created from nothing. We can distinguish them in that one substance stands in a relation to one universal which another does not. Hence the multiplicity of objects, and the multiplicity of unities, which instantiate various universals in various degrees.

It depends on what you mean by "substance". If you mean the particular itself, then fine. But if you mean that which gives unity or "objectness" to objects, then I disagree, for reasons outlined above. The concept of "many substances" is incoherent if "substance" is taken as referring to that which gives objects their "objectness". So I think at this point we must just part company philosophically.

You wrote, in a slightly different but relevant connection, "But then one has difficulty in explaining why they can all be brought under the common predicate 'substance'." This can apply to the term "particular" itself - how can we call them all "particulars" unless there is a universal of particularity. That could not be, unless we are willing to consider "particularity" as some kind of negative universal and the term "particular" as a placeholder for whatever is not part of the universals but instantiates the universals. This is how I would explain the common predicate "substance." Unlike a particular, however, a substance does not instantiate anything.

Yes, but the question still arises concerning the placeholding "whatever" (and this is true whether you are referring to particulars or to substance, in your sense), does it have properties? That is, can we form a sentence of the form, "alam's placeholding whatever is X"? If not, then how can one instance of this placeholding whatever be claimed to be distinct from another? Difference is always difference in some respect. The notion of difference without being able to specify any respect of the difference seems, well, odd, to say the least. I would say it is incoherent.

On the other hand, if this placeholding whatever does have properties, then how can it be substance (in the narrow sense)?

I think you are in an impossible bind at this point.

But to answer your question, a "particular" is just a thing with properties, i.e. a thing in which forms are instantiated. Anything t of which we can say "t is P", is a particular. In short, a particular is just an object. Hence a particular is the intersection, complete or partial, of one or more universals with "the one". I do not see how this raises any special problem, apart from explaining what the term "intersection" or "instantiation" itself means. That brings us to Russell's famous problem with realism, the self-referential criticism - namely, wouldn't the concept of instantiation itself have to be a universal, and doesn't that mean that instantiations must themselves be instantiations of the form of instantiation? But, in fact, as Armstrong has pointed out, an analogous problem arises for absolutely every theory, whether nominalist, realist or whatever; the same objection can be reformulated to apply to them. At some point we have to accept certain things as "basic" metaphysically, and not capable of further elaboration in other terms (intentionality, as one example). I would put instantiation in that category.

You wrote, "Furthermore, it seems hard to think of any distinction between substances considered purely as substances. Different things are distinguished by their properties. This is a slightly involved argument, but if we could say that substance A and substance B were themselves distinguishable, it would seem to imply that there is something that we can predicate of one but not the other." I used to accept identity of indiscernibles too, but Black's thought experiment caused me to doubt it. Nevertheless it seems the substances can still be distinguished relationally.

I don't see how you can claim substances are distinguished rationally. All you can do is say that they are, in fact, distinct, but cannot tell me how that can be or in what respect they are distinct. I believe that position is incoherent (because distinction is bound up conceptually with respect of difference), but even if I didn't, I don't see how it is any less paradoxical than the neoplatonist approach.

You said the probable reason for this is the each person of the trinity perfectly instantiates the form "God" whereas three apples "down here" only imperfectly instantiate the form "apple". But I am not sure why three perfect instantiations of "apple" should be one apple as opposed to say, three perfect apples. Or why the persons of the trinity each perfectly instantiating "God" should be one God as opposed to three perfect Gods.

It follows quite consistently from my general approach. Just as two instances of "substance", since they cannot be distinguished in any way, must be identical, so two instances of a form, such as "God", if they cannot be distinguished in any way, must be literally identical, the one God. It is only if they can be distinguished - because one is a partial instantiation and the other is a slightly different partial instantiation, as in the case of humans, that they can be non-identical.

1. What is it about our world which makes perfect instantiation impossible? You have said there are no perfect circles in our world, which is intuitively plausible since I have not seen one, and don't know how to make one, but that doesn't mean it's impossible. Maybe God could create one, or many of them for that matter.

It doesn't matter at all whether or not perfect instantiations are possible in our world. I could grant that they are possible, and it wouldn't affect my position at all. It would only affect my position if you could show that there are, in fact, multiple perfect instantiations somewhere, and that people speaking the language in that region refer to them as being distinct with respect to that form.

In simple terms, I'm just saying that since there are not, as a matter of fact (so far as I know) any perfect instantiations of things, we cannot draw conclusions about the semantics governing how they should be described, on empirical grounds. Any conclusions we draw about how they should be referred to - one or many - must be based on philosophical analysis. In other words, I'm neutralizing the empirical argument of the "but we call Bill, Bob and Joe three humans and not one" variety.

2. Having identified what condition(s) precludes perfect instantiation in our world, can we distinguish it from the condition(s) that enables multiple instantiation. If we can't, then by denying the condition precluding perfect instantiation from God, the multiplicity of instantiation will be washed out, too.

I don't hold that there are any conditions that preclude perfect instantiation in our world. I just hold that it's a contingent matter of fact. Could God make a perfect instantiation of a sphere in our world? Sure, I guess so. Maybe there is some practical reason for not doing so (that the kind of world he wanted to create is not compatible with having perfect instantiations in it, for purely practical reasons), but if so, I don't know what those reasons are.

Hence, in John 17:3we have an implicit identity statement: God the Father = the only true God.

With regard to this and the rest of your second post, I would myself agree with you that the author of John regards the Father as being the only true God (I'm glad this thread is in unorthodox theology, or I would be feeling stones hitting my head about now!) I think he thought of the Son, Jesus, as a kind of Philonic emanation from the Father. But this raises all sorts of deeper hermeneutical issues (which the debate I am currently engaged in addresses). If you are going to just read the text according to the human authors' meaning, then I agree that the trinity is not supported by any NT book. But before you anti-trinitarians start celebrating, I would go on to say that if that is how you read the NT, then no theory is supported by the NT, because the NT authors hold different views which are contradictory and mutually exclusive. So you can pick the gospel of John's view of Christ, the gospel of Mark's view of Christ, Paul's view of Christ, and so forth, but you can't have them all together.

On the other hand, if we are prepared to allow a deeper, divine meaning to the text, then the trinity comes back into play as, I would say, far and away the best synthetic and canonical interpretation of the texts.

[alam]

But this doesn't solve anything. The question then arises, what is "thisness"? What is it that allows singular terms to be singular terms? It's exactly the same question all over again.



It depends on what you mean by "substance". If you mean the particular itself, then fine. But if you mean that which gives unity or "objectness" to objects, then I disagree, for reasons outlined above. The concept of "many substances" is incoherent if "substance" is taken as referring to that which gives objects their "objectness". So I think at this point we must just part company philosophically.



Yes, but the question still arises concerning the placeholding "whatever" (and this is true whether you are referring to particulars or to substance, in your sense), does it have properties? That is, can we form a sentence of the form, "alam's placeholding whatever is X"? If not, then how can one instance of this placeholding whatever be claimed to be distinct from another? Difference is always difference in some respect. The notion of difference without being able to specify any respect of the difference seems, well, odd, to say the least. I would say it is incoherent.

On the other hand, if this placeholding whatever does have properties, then how can it be substance (in the narrow sense)?

I think you are in an impossible bind at this point.

But to answer your question, a "particular" is just a thing with properties, i.e. a thing in which forms are instantiated. Anything t of which we can say "t is P", is a particular. In short, a particular is just an object. Hence a particular is the intersection, complete or partial, of one or more universals with "the one".


Hi Rupert, Thank you for your response.

It is part of the definition of a universal that there is only one of any given universal. Nor is there more than one of "the one." They intersect, this makes one intersection, ergo one particular, one instantiation. So how do you get multiple instantiations of the same universal? It seems to me that you will run up against Leibniz's Law.

One might be tempted to say that "the one" intersects with the universal in different respects, and the different respects support the concept of different instantiaons, but the problem is that the one in and of itself has no different respects, nor does a universal. There is no "partial" intersection of the one and the universal because neither consists in parts. There could be no serial intersections of the one and the universal because both are beyond time. I wrote in the last post,

"If substance is that wherein properties are instantiated, i.e. it is what "bears" the properties (which I accept), and there is only one substance, it seems that all objects would instantiate any property which that substance bears. Or, there are just arbitrary clusters of properties in the substance taking us back to the problen you raised for Spinoza."

And unless the plurality of instantiations themselves are given, Leibniz's Law will ultimately demand that there is only one object [edit: that is, instantiating each universal.]

I suggest that there are many substances intersecting with the universal and this is where multiplicity of instantiation comes in, since it can't come from the universal. We distinguish the substances relationally, in that one intersects with a universal which another does not. Even if this does not ultimately satisfy Leibniz's Law, Black's universe (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_of_indiscernibles#Critique) provides a limiting case for identity of indiscernibles.

The remainder of your criticism devolves on this, I think. If there is something in particular you would like me to explain please say so.


I do not see how this raises any special problem, apart from explaining what the term "intersection" or "instantiation" itself means. That brings us to Russell's famous problem with realism, the self-referential criticism - namely, wouldn't the concept of instantiation itself have to be a universal, and doesn't that mean that instantiations must themselves be instantiations of the form of instantiation? But, in fact, as Armstrong has pointed out, an analogous problem arises for absolutely every theory, whether nominalist, realist or whatever; the same objection can be reformulated to apply to them. At some point we have to accept certain things as "basic" metaphysically, and not capable of further elaboration in other terms (intentionality, as one example). I would put instantiation in that category.


I agree.


I don't see how you can claim substances are distinguished rationally. All you can do is say that they are, in fact, distinct, but cannot tell me how that can be or in what respect they are distinct. I believe that position is incoherent (because distinction is bound up conceptually with respect of difference), but even if I didn't, I don't see how it is any less paradoxical than the neoplatonist approach.



It follows quite consistently from my general approach. Just as two instances of "substance", since they cannot be distinguished in any way, must be identical, so two instances of a form, such as "God", if they cannot be distinguished in any way, must be literally identical, the one God. It is only if they can be distinguished - because one is a partial instantiation and the other is a slightly different partial instantiation, as in the case of humans, that they can be non-identical.


If they cannot be distinguished in any way and are literally identical then it seems they are not multiple instantiations at all. God as such is not multiply instantiated. How then does God bear the contradictory properties of generacy and ungeneracy?


It doesn't matter at all whether or not perfect instantiations are possible in our world. I could grant that they are possible, and it wouldn't affect my position at all. It would only affect my position if you could show that there are, in fact, multiple perfect instantiations somewhere, and that people speaking the language in that region refer to them as being distinct with respect to that form.

In simple terms, I'm just saying that since there are not, as a matter of fact (so far as I know) any perfect instantiations of things, we cannot draw conclusions about the semantics governing how they should be described, on empirical grounds. Any conclusions we draw about how they should be referred to - one or many - must be based on philosophical analysis. In other words, I'm neutralizing the empirical argument of the "but we call Bill, Bob and Joe three humans and not one" variety.


Two perfect circles would really be "one circle," even though one of them was here and another over there? I still think it is more accurate to describe them as two perfect circles rather than one circle. Otherwise how can you make the difference between two perfect circles, three perfect circles or billion circles if all of them are equally "one circle"?


I don't hold that there are any conditions that preclude perfect instantiation in our world. I just hold that it's a contingent matter of fact. Could God make a perfect instantiation of a sphere in our world? Sure, I guess so. Maybe there is some practical reason for not doing so (that the kind of world he wanted to create is not compatible with having perfect instantiations in it, for purely practical reasons), but if so, I don't know what those reasons are.



With regard to this and the rest of your second post, I would myself agree with you that the author of John regards the Father as being the only true God (I'm glad this thread is in unorthodox theology, or I would be feeling stones hitting my head about now!) I think he thought of the Son, Jesus, as a kind of Philonic emanation from the Father. But this raises all sorts of deeper hermeneutical issues (which the debate I am currently engaged in addresses). If you are going to just read the text according to the human authors' meaning, then I agree that the trinity is not supported by any NT book. But before you anti-trinitarians start celebrating, I would go on to say that if that is how you read the NT, then no theory is supported by the NT, because the NT authors hold different views which are contradictory and mutually exclusive. So you can pick the gospel of John's view of Christ, the gospel of Mark's view of Christ, Paul's view of Christ, and so forth, but you can't have them all together.


I agree more or less with your estimate of John , but there are no contradictions in NT Christology. Rather, there are varying emphases reflecting the experience of each with Jesus. Taken all together, not eisegeting or downplaying any aspect that appears inconvenient, we arrive at subordinationist unitarianism, alternately, the hierarchical trinitarianism of the fourth century non-Nicenes.

Edit: Let us say for the sake of the argument that I have decided to cast my lot with John. What sort of interpretive problems emerge from the other NT books?


On the other hand, if we are prepared to allow a deeper, divine meaning to the text, then the trinity comes back into play as, I would say, far and away the best synthetic and canonical interpretation of the texts.

This seems dubious, without further elaboration on your part.

God bless

[alam]

I read your last post again, and realized a more specific response to a couple of points might help.



Yes, but the question still arises concerning the placeholding "whatever" (and this is true whether you are referring to particulars or to substance, in your sense), does it have properties? That is, can we form a sentence of the form, "alam's placeholding whatever is X"? If not, then how can one instance of this placeholding whatever be claimed to be distinct from another? Difference is always difference in some respect. The notion of difference without being able to specify any respect of the difference seems, well, odd, to say the least. I would say it is incoherent.

On the other hand, if this placeholding whatever does have properties, then how can it be substance (in the narrow sense)?

I think you are in an impossible bind at this point.




You've said that intersection and instantiation are basic terms, unsusceptible to further analysis. I am willing to accept that.

However, is it a property of the substance that it intersects universal X? If so, then if the substance is the same as the one, the one has as many properties as there are universals, which is false. The one has no properties. So, I think you will agree that a substance intersecting a universal does not constitute a property or metaphysical complexity in the substance. Such intersection is the only thing I have attributed to the plural substances, thus it does not constitute a property or metaphysical conplexity in them either.

The only difference in what I am saying is that there are in fact plural substances, some of which intersect with some universals, others which intersect with others. my reason for suggesting it is that without some basic and unanalyzable plurality it is hard to account for the plurality of instantiations of a universal. Take the trinity for example. You have it that the one intersects the form "God." This is one instance of intersection, one instantiation of God. You still need two more instantiations to have the trinity. Where do they come from? It cannot be that the one intersects the form of God again because that is assuming a temporal concept. Time is what prevents everything from happening at once. It cannot be that the one intersects the universal God partially and this is the Father, and partially in some other aspect and this is the Son, both for the reason I mentioned in previous post and because, on your view, they are total instantiations.

Or, perhaps the one intersects the form of God and the form of Ungeneracy and this is the Father. The one intersects the form of God and the form of Generacy and this is the Son. This falls back on a form of bundle-theory which you reject; the one intersects whatever universal is instantiated at all, and we just group some of the instantiations together and call them by one name and others by another, in this incorrect view.

There must be something unanalyzably plural in order to have plural instantiation at all. If someone wants to say that the one intersects the same universal multiply, and asserts that as a brute fact, disregarding identity of indiscernibles, so be it. At this point in our discussion, I find it more parsimonious to assert plural substances, rather than one substance (the one) plurally instantiating the same universal. But I would like to understand your view.



It doesn't matter at all whether or not perfect instantiations are possible in our world. I could grant that they are possible, and it wouldn't affect my position at all. It would only affect my position if you could show that there are, in fact, multiple perfect instantiations somewhere, and that people speaking the language in that region refer to them as being distinct with respect to that form.

In simple terms, I'm just saying that since there are not, as a matter of fact (so far as I know) any perfect instantiations of things, we cannot draw conclusions about the semantics governing how they should be described, on empirical grounds. Any conclusions we draw about how they should be referred to - one or many - must be based on philosophical analysis. In other words, I'm neutralizing the empirical argument of the "but we call Bill, Bob and Joe three humans and not one" variety.



It is not necessarily important for the non-trinitarian view to exclude that in some sense they could be called "one circle," but simply to maintain that "two perfect circles" is also accurate. The latter seems to contain all the necessary data; there are two of them and they are perfect circles, i.e. they perfectly instantiate the ideal form of "circle." Never having experienced the perception of two perfect instantiations of "circle", one must show that the concept of there being two perfect circles is incoherent in order to exclude this. Otherwise, as much as trinitarianism claims to worship one God, it is no less probable to say it worships three Gods.

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

The problem I see with your discertations is that you appear to be arguing on a premise of physicality ie: "god" is an object and not an attribution. The language of scripture indicates that the term "god" is an attribution (eg: Exodus 3:6; 7:1).

Peace

[Rupert Pupkin]

It is part of the definition of a universal that there is only one of any given universal. Nor is there more than one of "the one." They intersect, this makes one intersection, ergo one particular, one instantiation. So how do you get multiple instantiations of the same universal? It seems to me that you will run up against Leibniz's Law.

I don't think so, because different objects have different properties and relations which entail their non-identity. I am only claiming that that which yields their "objectness" is the same, "the one". But since as objects they are non-identical, the one considered as the one is the same but considered as the grounds of objectness it is many. This gets to the heart of the notion of "alienation" or "emanation". With respect to instantiated properties, the one is many, but in and of itself, it is one. That is somewhat paradoxical, I agree; but it doesn't seem obviously contradictory unless you treat "the one" as itself being an object or particular, which it isn't. It is that which transcends both particulars and universals. Hence, it is incomprehensible - we do not have the conceptual categories at our disposal to describe it. For us, describing the one is like a man blind from birth attempting to describe colour.

Also, I do have something to add regarding your question about why the world we live in only partially instantiates forms. I have been thinking about that, and I think there is another possible answer, but I haven't thought it through in detail yet. That is, perhaps it is the finiteness of everything in the world that necessitates that they only partially instantiate forms. That is, if we postulate that all forms are infinite, which may be true, then when instantiated in finite objects the instantiation might reasonably be taken to be an infintesmal aspect of their real being.

We distinguish the substances relationally, in that one intersects with a universal which another does not.

But then you're not distinguishing the substances in terms of their substanceness, and therefore, in my opinion, not addressing the crucial question.

If they cannot be distinguished in any way and are literally identical then it seems they are not multiple instantiations at all. God as such is not multiply instantiated. How then does God bear the contradictory properties of generacy and ungeneracy?

No, I am saying that the form of Godhood in each person is literally identical and cannot be distinguished in any way, not that the persons of the trinity are literally identical and cannot be distinguished. Let us call the persons of the trinity, as objects, f, s and h. Let us call the property of Godhood G. Let us call the property of being the source S. Let us call the property/relation of being begotten B. Let us call the property/relation of proceeding P. Then:

For the Father, f: Gf and Sf are true, but Bf and Pf are false.
For the Son, s: Gs and Bs are true, but Ss and Ps are false.
For the Holy Spirit, h: Gh and Ph are true, but Sh and Bh are false.

Now clearly, on this description the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are distinct objects; but they all fully instantiate divinity, and therefore, according to my argument, comprise one God. Any number of objects that fully instantiate a particular form, comprise one of that form, on the theory I have outlined.

Two perfect circles would really be "one circle," even though one of them was here and another over there? I still think it is more accurate to describe them as two perfect circles rather than one circle. Otherwise how can you make the difference between two perfect circles, three perfect circles or billion circles if all of them are equally "one circle"?

I've given the argument why I think they would be one circle, which I think stands so far. As to how they would be distinguished, that is easy - the same way as I have distinguished the persons of the trinity above. That is, the multiple objects which are all one circle, would have other properties which distinguished them (such as spatial location, for example).

I agree more or less with your estimate of John , but there are no contradictions in NT Christology. Rather, there are varying emphases reflecting the experience of each with Jesus. Taken all together, not eisegeting or downplaying any aspect that appears inconvenient, we arrive at subordinationist unitarianism, alternately, the hierarchical trinitarianism of the fourth century non-Nicenes.

Edit: Let us say for the sake of the argument that I have decided to cast my lot with John. What sort of interpretive problems emerge from the other NT books?

Here we part company I think. Since the NT authors all had different views of Jesus, we have to take each in turn. I will take three NT Christologies as examples: (a) the Christology of the author of the gospel of John (whom I deny is the author of the Johannine epistles or Revelation); (b) the Christology of Paul (whom I think only wrote 7 of the books attributed to him, see link below); and (c) the Christology of the author of the gospel of Mark (unknown).

In order to determine where we agree and where we disagree, and this could be a long discussion, I will simply outline my view:

(a) Author of the gospel of John: Held to moderate docetism, that is, denied that Jesus' human nature was in any way derived from Mary (hence no nativity), but held that he was comprised of "heavenly flesh" that had descended down and dwelt among us (e.g. 6:51). The flesh was real but was heavenly and not earthly. Note - a major point in this gospel is the use of irony, and any discussion is going to have to involve deciding which statements are ironic and which are not. Was heavily influenced by Philo and held that the Word was an emanation of the Father, which then was transformed into heavenly flesh and descended to earth.

(b) Paul: Held to strong docetism. He denied that Jesus had a fleshly body at all. Jesus was the heavenly man, and had only a "spiritual body". He merely appeared to be human "according to the flesh", that is, from an earthly, fleshly point of view. For more details, please see the following thread where the discussion has been proceeding for some time:

http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showthread.php?t=96579

(c) Author of Mark: Straight out adoptionist. Jesus was purely a human, born an ordinary man (hence no nativity), but was adopted by God as his Son at his baptism, due to his exemplary life. Was the human Messiah, died and rose again. Not divine in any sense and did not pre-exist.

These three I take to be representative of three early Christian views, so are good starting points.

This seems dubious, without further elaboration on your part.

I am currently doing a detailed elaboration, which I will complete soon, in this debate in the Gym:

http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showthread.php?t=98798

If you have any questions you want to ask about it, you can post them in this thread:

http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showthread.php?t=98797

I cannot respond to queries in that thread until after the debate is formally completed (it's against the rules!), but after the debate, I will try to answer any remaining queries.

However, is it a property of the substance that it intersects universal X? If so, then if the substance is the same as the one, the one has as many properties as there are universals, which is false. The one has no properties. So, I think you will agree that a substance intersecting a universal does not constitute a property or metaphysical complexity in the substance. Such intersection is the only thing I have attributed to the plural substances, thus it does not constitute a property or metaphysical conplexity in them either.

I would say that the intersection of the universal is with an alienation or emanation of the one, not with the one in an unqualified sense. It is that emanation or alienation that gives life, so to speak, to the object, that makes it an object. I'm not sure that we're able to elucidate any more than this on what "alienation" consists in, just as we cannot elucidate on "instantiation".

I think this solution makes a lot more sense that postulating a plurality of substances that cannot be accounted for in terms of ordinary concepts of distinction and differentiation.

I guess I could say this. At some very high level, both on the universal side and the particular side, we are going to transcend our conceptual apparatus. We can infer that something which appears to us a certain way must be going on (i.e. "instantiation", "emanation"), but we can't penetrate into the essence of these things. They are incomprehensible, like the one. I personally am content with that.

It is not necessarily important for the non-trinitarian view to exclude that in some sense they could be called "one circle," but simply to maintain that "two perfect circles" is also accurate. The latter seems to contain all the necessary data; there are two of them and they are perfect circles, i.e. they perfectly instantiate the ideal form of "circle." Never having experienced the perception of two perfect instantiations of "circle", one must show that the concept of there being two perfect circles is incoherent in order to exclude this. Otherwise, as much as trinitarianism claims to worship one God, it is no less probable to say it worships three Gods.

Yes but if what I've argued above is true, it's not perfectly accurate. The inaccuracy lies in this respect. Whenever we say, "we have two circles", I think that entails that the two objects in question only partially instantiate circlehood in different ways. So since that isn't true of the persons of the trinity, I think the statement "there are three gods" would be inaccurate.

By the way, let me add, for the record, that while I disagree with your subordinationist unitarianism, I for one do not consider it "heretical" or whatever. I think the discussion above shows why it is imminently unreasonable to make heresies out of these kinds of issues. If you and I have trouble with the subtleties of Platonism, then what is the average believer to do? Personally I think we should just accept that different Christians have different views on these issues, accept that that says nothing about their faith or their service of Christ, and continue to discuss them in a cordial and friendly manner, as we have done here. I also think that acknowledging the diversity of NT thought on these issues is helpful in this regard. By later standards, all the NT writers were "heretics"!

God bless!

RP.

[Bernie]

Hello RP,

Let us make the distinction between the two cases (the unity of persons of the Trinity and disunity of human persons) as follows. I claim that each of the persons of the Trinity instantiates the form "divinity" fully, whereas each human person instantiates the form "humanity" incompletely or partially. Thus I instantiate the form "humanity" in a partial manner, that displays a certain aspect of humanity, and you instantiate it in a partial manner, that displays a different aspect of humanity, and so forth. No individual human instantiates "humanity" fully; no-one can claim to be the full expression of what it is to be human.

There is one exception to this: I would want to say that Jesus fully instantiated humanity. Of course, some might want to say that Jesus fully instantiated the new, perfected humanity, whereas Adam fully instantiated the old, unredeemed humanity, but that introduces too sharp a disjunction between old and new humanness in my opinion - it makes them two different kinds of things. I would rather say that Jesus alone instantiated humanity, that full instantiation of humanity involves moral perfection because humans are the image of God, and that our imperfection and fallenness represents a less than full instantiation of humanness. To the extent that we are sinful, we are not human, but are "beasts" (hence the description of the antichrist as "the beast").

This has various interesting theological ramifications. It implies that the separation of humanity into those united to Christ and those cut off from him, is only finalized at the resurrection. Then all those who are in Christ will perfectly instantiate humanity, and hence be literally "one human" (Christ), in the same way that the three persons of the Trinity are one God. I think this has to do with the marriage of the lamb and his bride. It also entails that those who are not redeemed, and are in the lake of fire, will be cut off from humanity altogether, and become "beasts". I find this both interesting and plausible.

The crucial importance of Plato here is as follows. Suppose that there is a perfect realm of forms (the "Platonic heaven"), which includes the form of humanness, but also other forms, such as "is a sphere", "is a triangle", "is red", "is a tree", and so forth. By saying that this realm exists in some otherworldly and invisible domain (say, the mind of God), we can then argue that all actual occurrences of these forms in the visible world are imperfect, incomplete, and partial. This seems plausible; one does not find absolutely perfect spheres, say, in the real world; there are always imperfections. Thus the disunity of human persons can be explained by the fact that we dwell in this realm of imperfection and partial instantiation of the forms (the "earth"), whereas the unity of the persons of the trinity can be explained because they dwell in the realm of perfection and full instantiation of the forms (the "heavens").

This of course requires a concept of "partial instantiation", which I think is highly desirable philosophically anyway (to deal with the problem of vagueness in particular - see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vagueness for explanation of what I mean). But the idea of a "partial instantiation" demands that the universal form in question exist in its entirety (it makes no sense to talk of a partial instantation of something non-existent), and therefore entails Platonism - i.e. that universals must in general (perhaps God is an exception) exist before things.
Popped in to read, found your post and this topic really interesting. Trying to wrestle with what you're presenting here, would truth/falsity as essential properties account for partial instantiation within a whole or entire form?

For example (don't know how this is going to come out on your screen, so sorry if it's a mess....)


"+" = truth "-" = falsity


Joe's form...

+++-+-++-+
++--++-+--
++++++--++
+--++++-++

Moe's form....

+--+++++-+
+---++++-+
+++-+-+-++
+++---+++-

In each case, a whole or complete form consists illustatively in four rows of ten qualia, each quale existing in either a + or - state. "Partial" instantiation of "humanity" would be a measure of the ratio of "+" to "-" ; the 4x10 configuration represents the complete form, while partiality is represented by the arrangement within each form of the fragmented imperfection [partiality within the whole] created by the simultaneous instances of the "-"/"+" contrariety.

The perfect human, Larry, would exist thus.....

++++++++++
++++++++++
++++++++++
++++++++++

....for which a case might be made that the purity of truth will be the ultimate or final expression of Jesus' comparison of Himself, the Father and all disciples as "one", or the unity of "+"

[alam]

Hello Apostoli,


Hello Alam,

The problem I see with your discertations is that you appear to be arguing on a premise of physicality ie: "god" is an object and not an attribution.


I do not think that God is physical or an object. Sometimes it is useful to simplify abstract issues by reducing them to geometrical terms such as "intersection". Even Gregory Nazianzen said about his homoousian view, "The Son is the Begotten, and the Holy Ghost the Emission; for I know not how this could be expressed in terms altogether excluding visible things" (Third Theological Oration (Oration 29 (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/310229.htm)).



The language of scripture indicates that the term "god" is an attribution (eg: Exodus 3:6; 7:1).

Peace


What do you mean by an attribution as opposed to an object?

God bless,

[alam]

I don't think so, because different objects have different properties and relations which entail their non-identity. I am only claiming that that which yields their "objectness" is the same, "the one". But since as objects they are non-identical, the one considered as the one is the same but considered as the grounds of objectness it is many. This gets to the heart of the notion of "alienation" or "emanation". With respect to instantiated properties, the one is many, but in and of itself, it is one. That is somewhat paradoxical, I agree; but it doesn't seem obviously contradictory unless you treat "the one" as itself being an object or particular, which it isn't. It is that which transcends both particulars and universals. Hence, it is incomprehensible - we do not have the conceptual categories at our disposal to describe it. For us, describing the one is like a man blind from birth attempting to describe colour.

Also, I do have something to add regarding your question about why the world we live in only partially instantiates forms. I have been thinking about that, and I think there is another possible answer, but I haven't thought it through in detail yet. That is, perhaps it is the finiteness of everything in the world that necessitates that they only partially instantiate forms. That is, if we postulate that all forms are infinite, which may be true, then when instantiated in finite objects the instantiation might reasonably be taken to be an infintesmal aspect of their real being.



But then you're not distinguishing the substances in terms of their substanceness, and therefore, in my opinion, not addressing the crucial question.




Thank you, I understand neo-Platonism better now. If the substances are incommensurable singularities created from nothing, then the "substanceness" of one is incomparable to the other.



No, I am saying that the form of Godhood in each person is literally identical and cannot be distinguished in any way, not that the persons of the trinity are literally identical and cannot be distinguished. Let us call the persons of the trinity, as objects, f, s and h. Let us call the property of Godhood G. Let us call the property of being the source S. Let us call the property/relation of being begotten B. Let us call the property/relation of proceeding P. Then:

For the Father, f: Gf and Sf are true, but Bf and Pf are false.
For the Son, s: Gs and Bs are true, but Ss and Ps are false.
For the Holy Spirit, h: Gh and Ph are true, but Sh and Bh are false.

Now clearly, on this description the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are distinct objects; but they all fully instantiate divinity, and therefore, according to my argument, comprise one God. Any number of objects that fully instantiate a particular form, comprise one of that form, on the theory I have outlined.


Ok.


I've given the argument why I think they would be one circle, which I think stands so far. As to how they would be distinguished, that is easy - the same way as I have distinguished the persons of the trinity above. That is, the multiple objects which are all one circle, would have other properties which distinguished them (such as spatial location, for example).



Here we part company I think. Since the NT authors all had different views of Jesus, we have to take each in turn. I will take three NT Christologies as examples: (a) the Christology of the author of the gospel of John (whom I deny is the author of the Johannine epistles or Revelation); (b) the Christology of Paul (whom I think only wrote 7 of the books attributed to him, see link below); and (c) the Christology of the author of the gospel of Mark (unknown).

In order to determine where we agree and where we disagree, and this could be a long discussion, I will simply outline my view:


Do you not admit harmonizing interpretations of these authors simply on the grounds that they are harmonizing, or would the fact that one interpretation of Paul, for instance, agreed better with John, be a point in that interpretation's favor?


(a) Author of the gospel of John: Held to moderate docetism, that is, denied that Jesus' human nature was in any way derived from Mary (hence no nativity), but held that he was comprised of "heavenly flesh" that had descended down and dwelt among us (e.g. 6:51). The flesh was real but was heavenly and not earthly. Note - a major point in this gospel is the use of irony, and any discussion is going to have to involve deciding which statements are ironic and which are not. Was heavily influenced by Philo and held that the Word was an emanation of the Father, which then was transformed into heavenly flesh and descended to earth.

(b) Paul: Held to strong docetism. He denied that Jesus had a fleshly body at all. Jesus was the heavenly man, and had only a "spiritual body". He merely appeared to be human "according to the flesh", that is, from an earthly, fleshly point of view. For more details, please see the following thread where the discussion has been proceeding for some time:

http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showthread.php?t=96579

(c) Author of Mark: Straight out adoptionist. Jesus was purely a human, born an ordinary man (hence no nativity), but was adopted by God as his Son at his baptism, due to his exemplary life. Was the human Messiah, died and rose again. Not divine in any sense and did not pre-exist.

These three I take to be representative of three early Christian views, so are good starting points.



I am currently doing a detailed elaboration, which I will complete soon, in this debate in the Gym:

http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showthread.php?t=98798

If you have any questions you want to ask about it, you can post them in this thread:

http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showthread.php?t=98797

I cannot respond to queries in that thread until after the debate is formally completed (it's against the rules!), but after the debate, I will try to answer any remaining queries.


You are certainly involved discussing this issue. I will want to catch up on your threads to avoid making a redundant argument.


I would say that the intersection of the universal is with an alienation or emanation of the one, not with the one in an unqualified sense. It is that emanation or alienation that gives life, so to speak, to the object, that makes it an object. I'm not sure that we're able to elucidate any more than this on what "alienation" consists in, just as we cannot elucidate on "instantiation".

I think this solution makes a lot more sense that postulating a plurality of substances that cannot be accounted for in terms of ordinary concepts of distinction and differentiation.

I guess I could say this. At some very high level, both on the universal side and the particular side, we are going to transcend our conceptual apparatus. We can infer that something which appears to us a certain way must be going on (i.e. "instantiation", "emanation"), but we can't penetrate into the essence of these things. They are incomprehensible, like the one. I personally am content with that.

Ok.


Yes but if what I've argued above is true, it's not perfectly accurate. The inaccuracy lies in this respect. Whenever we say, "we have two circles", I think that entails that the two objects in question only partially instantiate circlehood in different ways. So since that isn't true of the persons of the trinity, I think the statement "there are three gods" would be inaccurate.

My example concerned "two perfect circles." If the plural number here entails that the two objects only partially instantiate circlehood, then the phrase "two perfect circles" must be self-contradictory, but why should it be? It seems to contain all the necessary data, there are two of them and they are perfect circles, i..e perfect instantiations of the form "circle."

Regardless of the differences John and Paul may, or may not have had on other things, their writings indicate that the Father IS the one God, apparently an identity relation (posts #1 (http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showpost.php?p=1927672&postcount=1), #12 (http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showpost.php?p=2011254&postcount=12)). I have no higher source of knowledge on God than the scriptural writings.




By the way, let me add, for the record, that while I disagree with your subordinationist unitarianism, I for one do not consider it "heretical" or whatever. I think the discussion above shows why it is imminently unreasonable to make heresies out of these kinds of issues. If you and I have trouble with the subtleties of Platonism, then what is the average believer to do? Personally I think we should just accept that different Christians have different views on these issues, accept that that says nothing about their faith or their service of Christ, and continue to discuss them in a cordial and friendly manner, as we have done here. I also think that acknowledging the diversity of NT thought on these issues is helpful in this regard. By later standards, all the NT writers were "heretics"!

God bless!

RP.

That is a magnanimous expression. I wish more people shared this irenic attitude.

God bless,

[Rupert Pupkin]

Popped in to read, found your post and this topic really interesting. Trying to wrestle with what you're presenting here, would truth/falsity as essential properties account for partial instantiation within a whole or entire form?

The idea of partial instantiation has received a great lease of life from the recent interest in the subject of vagueness. Many fuzzy logic theorists maintain that predications can be neither completely true nor completely false, but something in-between, and if this is directly mapped onto the world, then it implies that instantiation of properties can be partial and incomplete.

Vagueness is a very interesting area of contemporary philosophy dealing with predications which are sometimes neither clearly true nor clearly false. For instance, "is bald". When asked, "is person X bald?", you do not always just get a "yes" or "no" answer. Sometimes, you get a hedging response, where people are hesitant and say something like "somewhat" or, "maybe a bit", or something like that. These kind of predications were famous in ancient Greek philosophy because they generate heap or sorites paradoxes.

Anyway, any theory of partial instantiation, is likely to be bound up with a theory of vagueness. I hope to submit a paper on a theory of vagueness I developed for publication some time at the end of the year - I am waiting for my former lecturer to have his book come out, and then I can submit. My theory can be called fuzzy epistemicism; my lecturer holds to fuzzy plurivaluationism, but his work forms the basis for my theory.

At the moment I'll leave further elaboration of that issue aside, because it is very technical and would really derail the thread!

Thank you, I understand neo-Platonism better now. If the substances are incommensurable singularities created from nothing, then the "substanceness" of one is incomparable to the other.

Precisely. This is the defining move that leads to the neoplatonist position; it is this realization that separates Plotinus from all previous Platonists.

Do you not admit harmonizing interpretations of these authors simply on the grounds that they are harmonizing, or would the fact that one interpretation of Paul, for instance, agreed better with John, be a point in that interpretation's favor?

In relation to the human author's intended meaning, I would be reluctant to use one text to influence my interpretation of another, unless it could be shown with good internal evidence that there was some relationship e.g. evidence of dependency of one work on another or both on some other work (as there is for Matthew and Luke on Mark, or 2 Peter on Jude or vice-versa). We can identify certain "schools" in early Christianity, such as the Pauline, the Johannine, and so forth, and it is somewhat legitimate to interpret later texts within a school in terms of earlier texts from the same school (hence, the pastorals can be seen in the light of Paul's writings, even though they were not written by him); but we need to be very careful not to assume that there is an identical outlook by both authors. That's my opinion, anyway.

For the divine meaning, I think a form of harmonization is essential. But I'm discussing that in the debate so I'll leave it aside here.

Regardless of the differences John and Paul may, or may not have had on other things, their writings indicate that the Father IS the one God, apparently an identity relation (posts #1, #12). I have no higher source of knowledge on God than the scriptural writings.

I essentially agree with you that the human authors of scripture thought this (in one way or another). But, as you'll see from the debate thread, I don't think we should build our theology on what the human author thought.

That is a magnanimous expression. I wish more people shared this irenic attitude.

No problem! I think part of the problem is trying to define who is Christian by stipulating some limited set of doctrines or "articles of religion" which must be affirmed, rather than a more holistic approach. But you'll see that in the debate thread I think - I deal with the issue of how we delimit the Christian community (for practical purposes) in section 4.4 of my third post, which hasn't appeared yet but soon will!

[alam]

The idea of partial instantiation has received a great lease of life from the recent interest in the subject of vagueness. Many fuzzy logic theorists maintain that predications can be neither completely true nor completely false, but something in-between, and if this is directly mapped onto the world, then it implies that instantiation of properties can be partial and incomplete.

Vagueness is a very interesting area of contemporary philosophy dealing with predications which are sometimes neither clearly true nor clearly false. For instance, "is bald". When asked, "is person X bald?", you do not always just get a "yes" or "no" answer. Sometimes, you get a hedging response, where people are hesitant and say something like "somewhat" or, "maybe a bit", or something like that. These kind of predications were famous in ancient Greek philosophy because they generate heap or sorites paradoxes.

Anyway, any theory of partial instantiation, is likely to be bound up with a theory of vagueness. I hope to submit a paper on a theory of vagueness I developed for publication some time at the end of the year - I am waiting for my former lecturer to have his book come out, and then I can submit. My theory can be called fuzzy epistemicism; my lecturer holds to fuzzy plurivaluationism, but his work forms the basis for my theory.

At the moment I'll leave further elaboration of that issue aside, because it is very technical and would really derail the thread!



Precisely. This is the defining move that leads to the neoplatonist position; it is this realization that separates Plotinus from all previous Platonists.



In relation to the human author's intended meaning, I would be reluctant to use one text to influence my interpretation of another, unless it could be shown with good internal evidence that there was some relationship e.g. evidence of dependency of one work on another or both on some other work (as there is for Matthew and Luke on Mark, or 2 Peter on Jude or vice-versa). We can identify certain "schools" in early Christianity, such as the Pauline, the Johannine, and so forth, and it is somewhat legitimate to interpret later texts within a school in terms of earlier texts from the same school (hence, the pastorals can be seen in the light of Paul's writings, even though they were not written by him); but we need to be very careful not to assume that there is an identical outlook by both authors. That's my opinion, anyway.

For the divine meaning, I think a form of harmonization is essential. But I'm discussing that in the debate so I'll leave it aside here.



I essentially agree with you that the human authors of scripture thought this (in one way or another). But, as you'll see from the debate thread, I don't think we should build our theology on what the human author thought.



No problem! I think part of the problem is trying to define who is Christian by stipulating some limited set of doctrines or "articles of religion" which must be affirmed, rather than a more holistic approach. But you'll see that in the debate thread I think - I deal with the issue of how we delimit the Christian community (for practical purposes) in section 4.4 of my third post, which hasn't appeared yet but soon will!


I will watch the debate.


God bless,

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

The language of scripture indicates that the term "god" is an attribution (eg: Exodus 3:6; 7:1).What do you mean by an attribution as opposed to an object?Unlike you and Rupert I am not trained in speculative philosophy. However, I am trained in practical philosophy - aka intelligent computer system design. Thus what I relate, is from that pespective.

Does a seed planted in the ground constitute a forest? Imo, it does if we attribute to that seed the idea of forest. In this perception the object and the idea are distinct even if associated. For instance: the seed will grow into a tree, produce seeds and in time a forest springs forth. Therefore while the object "seed" is not explicitly a forest, conceptually we can attribute to the seed (implicitly) the idea "forest".

ie: an attribution is the sum of attibrutes that define an intricate perception of something (eg: dog & man in a paticular respect are both essentially animals) .

To put it another way: An object might be perceived by the sum of its attributions - some essential, others contingent, others potential. Which for me, raises the thought: Is being pater (and all that father entails) essential to being theos? I don't think so, but I'm still working through the conflicts that arise no matter how the question is answered.

The way I see it (from state theory) - both events (verb) and attributes (noun) define an object - it is, what it is, according to the properties and capabilities observed (or predictable) of it. In short: an object has existence through activity (the properties exist to drive activity or function).

Random thoughts:

Imu, philosophy has the primal entity as simple and therefore without properties - whether inherent or accidental. That being so, the primal entity would seem to be an object without activity or function and therefore is non-existent (at least in regards to observablity) and therefore is not theos to us.

To my mind, though we can not articulate the "self" of theos with any certainty, we can assign properties and capabilities to it...

* scriptually, by the sum of perceived activity.
* psychologically, by the sum of attributions (properties and capabilities) determined from perceived activities.

Thus, though we cannot contemplate theos as an object we can attribute things to theos within the context of our experience/observation/speculative belief.

In regards to philosophic speculative belief, the primal entity is unoriginate. However, I do not see this as unreconcilable with the conception of theos being orginate = theos comes into existence on activity (revelation) in respect to us. To my mind, being unoriginate is simply a status - a personal attribute of an individual not a property or capability of being theos. Something like in humanity where being a parent/son/daughter is merely a status of precedence and not a defect in, or enhancement of, an individual's humanness.

I do not understand how the three instantiations of God which are the trinity are one God rather than three Gods. After all, three instantiations of "apple" are three apples; three instantiations of "man" are three men.In his Metaphysics, Aristotle gives the example "the isosceles and the equilateral are one and the same figure because both are triangles; but they are not the same triangles" (Book 5, Part 6).

For me your question to RP is resolved by answering the question "Is theos an object or an attribution?" If theos is an object then the trinity argument is impossible as only one of the three can be the particular object theos. On the other hand, if theos is an attribution, then multiple entities can emulate the same attributes and be simultaneous in function.

Take the trinity for example. You [RP] have it that the one intersects the form "God." This is one instance of intersection, one instantiation of theos. You still need two more instantiations to have the trinity. Where do they come from?Imu, the difficulty of the conception of "forms" is the third man argument. To me, the concept of an active primal entity resolves that problem. So, it is conceivable that theos pater using himself as prototype instantiated his form when instigating the Son and the Spirit (in this regard we have the example of pro-creation - humans beget humans).

In my mind, the definition of theos is in activity with us. In the christian sciptures that revelation seems to be threefold and in an OT perspective twofold (via the angel of the Lord).

Peace

[alam]

Hello Apostoli,


We've spent a long time discussing the trinity, in the past. Probably nothing in this post will be new to you.


God is a being whom we identify and describe either negatively, or relatively, through his works. For an expansion on this please see here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negative_theology#In_the_Jewish_tradition) The term "God" itself, since it does not seem to be negative, may reference the divine work. Yet the fact that God is Unoriginate does not constitute an absolute property in God, but the absence of one.


Restircting our ability to describe God in this way may seem unsatisfying, because then the being at the very center of everything (God), in and of himself, remains a big blank. Yet on the one hand, our terms will never reach the point of forming a self-sufficient system that does not need the appeal to the incomprheensible, unless they are being newly invented ad hoc all the time, or viciously circular. On the other hand, such a "blank" is only linguistic or logical - it does not necessarily represent a perceptual or experiential void. As Maximinus said concerning the Son's vision of God the Father (John 6:46): "Vidit ergo Patrem, sed vidit incapabilem" ([..The Son] has seen the Father, but He has seen the incomprehensible, Augustini coll. cum Max. 15, 9 (http://www.sant-agostino.it/latino/conferenza_massimino/conferenza_massimino.htm)). God in and of himself is ineffable (http://www.answers.com/ineffable&r=67).


This is why I laid off criticizing RPs neo-Platonism when he appealed to the incomprehensible. I agree with RP that an appeal to the incomprehensible is necessary at some point. At what point could be contentious. But it seemed we were appealing to incomprehensible at the same point - to account for multiple instantiations of the same universal. Its a crap shoot. ;-)




Hello Alam,

Unlike you and Rupert I am not trained in speculative philosophy. However, I am trained in practical philosophy - aka intelligent computer system design. Thus what I relate, is from that pespective.

Does a seed planted in the ground constitute a forest? Imo, it does if we attribute to that seed the idea of forest. In this perception the object and the idea are distinct even if associated. For instance: the seed will grow into a tree, produce seeds and in time a forest springs forth. Therefore while the object "seed" is not explicitly a forest, conceptually we can attribute to the seed (implicitly) the idea "forest".

ie: an attribution is the sum of attibrutes that define an intricate perception of something (eg: dog & man in a paticular respect are both essentially animals) .

To put it another way: An object might be perceived by the sum of its attributions - some essential, others contingent, others potential.


The object might be perceived by the sum of its properties, but is it the sume of its properties? I do not see the world as a soup of free-floating properties which we arbitrarily group and call by one name and others by another. I don't think you do either.


Which for me, raises the thought: Is being pater (and all that father entails) essential to being theos? I don't think so, but I'm still working through the conflicts that arise no matter how the question is answered.


Ok.


The way I see it (from state theory) - both events (verb) and attributes (noun) define an object - it is, what it is, according to the properties and capabilities observed (or predictable) of it. In short: an object has existence through activity (the properties exist to drive activity or function).


The agent is presupposed by its activities.



Random thoughts:

Imu, philosophy has the primal entity as simple and therefore without properties - whether inherent or accidental. That being so, the primal entity would seem to be an object without activity or function and therefore is non-existent (at least in regards to observablity) and therefore is not theos to us.


The primal entity (God) is described in terms of his operations. These operations do not mean essential nor accidental attributes in God, but relative attributes. When all is said and done, the attributes do not describe God, but the operations whose subject is God and whose objects are creatures.


To my mind, though we can not articulate the "self" of theos with any certainty, we can assign properties and capabilities to it...

* scriptually, by the sum of perceived activity.
* psychologically, by the sum of attributions (properties and capabilities) determined from perceived activities.

Thus, though we cannot contemplate theos as an object we can attribute things to theos within the context of our experience/observation/speculative belief.


Ok.


In regards to philosophic speculative belief, the primal entity is unoriginate. However, I do not see this as unreconcilable with the conception of theos being orginate = theos comes into existence on activity (revelation) in respect to us.


But then you are saying God is unoriginate as Father and originate economically as Son, which is modalism.


To my mind, being unoriginate is simply a status - a personal attribute of an individual not a property or capability of being theos.


As I undestand you, you will be saying that unoriginateness is a hypostatic characteristic of the Father.


Something like in humanity where being a parent/son/daughter is merely a status of precedence and not a defect in, or enhancement of, an individual's humanness.


You will have three hypostases of "theos" distinguished by their hypostatic characteristics. This still amounts to three theoi, without recourse to some kind of distinction such as Rupert proposed.


In his Metaphysics, Aristotle gives the example "the isosceles and the equilateral are one and the same figure because both are triangles; but they are not the same triangles" (Book 5, Part 6).

For me your question to RP is resolved by answering the question "Is theos an object or an attribution?" If theos is an object then the trinity argument is impossible as only one of the three can be the particular object theos. On the other hand, if theos is an attribution, then multiple entities can emulate the same attributes and be simultaneous in function.


To me this means that you're saying is theos a particular (object) or a universal (attribution). I do not think "theos" is either.

I will try to explain in more detail later, as I just ran out of time for the evening


Imu, the difficulty of the conception of "forms" is the third man argument. To me, the concept of an active primal entity resolves that problem. So, it is conceivable that theos pater using himself as prototype instantiated his form when instigating the Son and the Spirit (in this regard we have the example of pro-creation - humans beget humans).


what is his form? Is it the same as him or different than him? If it is the same as him then you are left with the third man argument. But if it is different than him, then what is it?


God bless,

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

I am a bit distracted at the moment, so I won't make the mistake of our previous conversations of replying without forethought. If you permit, I'll attempt to reply fully within the week. For now...

what is his form? Is it the same as him or different than him? If it is the same as him then you are left with the third man argument. But if it is different than him, then what is it?Actually, I don't see the necessity of the third man. If the perfect form can instigate, specific instigations of itself. Hence my argument that the existence of entity is contigent on activity.

The way I see it (from state theory) - both events (verb) and attributes (noun) define an object - it is, what it is, according to the properties and capabilities observed (or predictable) of it. In short: an object has existence through activity (the properties exist to drive activity or function).The agent is presupposed by its activitiesActually, the opposite. In crime fraud detection, the activity identifies the agent - modus operandi.

Peace

[Rupert Pupkin]

Does a seed planted in the ground constitute a forest? Imo, it does if we attribute to that seed the idea of forest. In this perception the object and the idea are distinct even if associated. For instance: the seed will grow into a tree, produce seeds and in time a forest springs forth. Therefore while the object "seed" is not explicitly a forest, conceptually we can attribute to the seed (implicitly) the idea "forest".

I think this is where your unconscious nominalism is coming into play. I disagree with your claim that in perception the object and the idea are distinct. Part of the problem I suspect is, that like empiricists, you are thinking about perception as what is present phenomenologically. But concepts are present in perception transcendentally, not phenomenally. This fact can be adduced by various transcendental arguments. In short, I think your account of perception is defective, in precisely the way that most Anglo-American philosophical accounts of perception are.

When we see a seed, we perceive it as a seed, not as a brown-grey spatially extended patch or something like that. Our perception of the object brings with it the concept of the object, and also what Husserl called the horizon of the object, which, roughly speaking, consists of our understanding of the totality of the object as viewed from all different perspectives at different times in its life in different conditions and so forth. In perceiving the seed as a seed, we perceive it as something that will grow into a plant, and from that could come a forest. In perceiving the front of a building, I perceive it as something which has sides and a back, which is why if I move around to view its side and discover that it is actually a Hollywood-style facade I am startled and realize that I have misperceived.

Let me give a practical example for you. Have you ever had the experience of being disoriented in a dark room, and feeling around not knowing where you are. All of sudden, your hand comes across something, say a particular doorknob, that you recognize. Instantly, your perception is transformed; you suddenly realize where you are, you feel yourself as being in a certain location. The difference between when you were feeling around and when you realized where you were, is like the difference between mere sensation and perception.

ie: an attribution is the sum of attibrutes that define an intricate perception of something (eg: dog & man in a paticular respect are both essentially animals).

Not quite sure what you are getting at here. But when we perceive things like dogs and men, we do not perceive more basic forms from which we build up a picture of them as being a dog or a man; we perceive them, instantly, as a dog or a man.

To put it another way: An object might be perceived by the sum of its attributions - some essential, others contingent, others potential. Which for me, raises the thought: Is being pater (and all that father entails) essential to being theos? I don't think so, but I'm still working through the conflicts that arise no matter how the question is answered.

An object is perceived as being that object, not as the sum of its attributions. Of course it does have attributions or properties, and some may be essential and some not to its being what it is. But insofar as there are properties which are essential, these are conceptually bound up with its form. In other words, if humans have a property of having two legs, and we perceive something as a human, then we perceive it as having two legs.

I'm not sure that being the father is in any way essential to being God. I think alam's point is not philosophical - that for some philosophical reason God must be the father - but scriptural.

The way I see it (from state theory) - both events (verb) and attributes (noun) define an object - it is, what it is, according to the properties and capabilities observed (or predictable) of it. In short: an object has existence through activity (the properties exist to drive activity or function).

Correct. Both actuality and potentiality are bound up in the concept of something. This flows out of the concept of an object's horizon; an object's identity is always tied up with its potentiality.

For me your question to RP is resolved by answering the question "Is theos an object or an attribution?" If theos is an object then the trinity argument is impossible as only one of the three can be the particular object theos. On the other hand, if theos is an attribution, then multiple entities can emulate the same attributes and be simultaneous in function.

This is true, but it doesn't solve the main problem. The main problem with the account of deity as a form or attribution, is why we do not then refer to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit as three gods, rather than one. After all, "human" is also a form or an attribution, but if we see Bill, Ted and Joe, we say that there are three humans, not one. That is the problem that Gregory of Nyssa struggled with in There are not three gods. That's what I've been trying to address in response to alam's queries! In my opinion, and I think alam probably agrees with this, this is the huge issue which realist theories of the trinity, that seek to account for God along the lines that you have suggested as an attribution, have to face. Of course one might try a nominalist account, but I don't think there's much hope for those.

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

We've spent a long time discussing the trinity, in the past. Probably nothing in this post will be new to you.For me, Our past conversations were enlightning and educational - as I anticipate this will be.

In this conversation I don't wish to focus on the trinity (though it is hard to avoid it) but rather what it means to be "theos pater". Here I'm not pushing any particular barrow. Just exploring avenues of thought.

Just as a reminder and for Rupert's benefit: I hold that the Father precedes the Son (otherwise they'd be brothers). But I also hold that the Son is the perfect impress of the Father (Heb 1:3). And, theefore I hold that the Son is not inherently subordinate to the Father but willingly subjects himself (Phil 2:6).

God is a being whom we identify and describe either negatively, or relatively, through his works. For an expansion on this please see hereThankyou for the link.

Restricting our ability to describe God in this way may seem unsatisfying, because then the being at the very center of everything (God), in and of himself, remains a big blank. Yet on the one hand, our terms will never reach the point of forming a self-sufficient system that does not need the appeal to the incomprheensible, unless they are being newly invented ad hoc all the time, or viciously circular. On the other hand, such a "blank" is only linguistic or logical - it does not necessarily represent a perceptual or experiential void. As Maximinus said concerning the Son's vision of God the Father (John 6:46): "Vidit ergo Patrem, sed vidit incapabilem" ([..The Son] has seen the Father, but He has seen the incomprehensible, Augustini coll. cum Max. 15, 9). God in and of himself is ineffable.I agree that as an object we cannot describe god - it is invisible after all and therefore beyond our normal comprehension ;-) According to the Christian scriptures, we gain eternal life by coming to know the only true god and Jesus Christ whom He sent forth (Jn 17:3) and it seems, to emulate Jesus we are to speak of Him in terms of revelation (ie: He has been declared - Jn 1:18). Therefore, at least in A.John's & A.Paul's perspective, God is not unutterable nor too great for words.

What I think is incomprehensible, is why God does things. Like create the world.

In regards to philosophic speculative belief, the primal entity is unoriginate. However, I do not see this as unreconcilable with the conception of theos being orginate = theos comes into existence on activity (revelation) in respect to us.But then you are saying God is unoriginate as Father and originate economically as Son, which is modalism.I'm suggesting that the idea of "God to us" is originate on perceived activity. Without this activity, we have to assume (as did the Greeks) that if God exists, it contemplates only itself.

The testimony of the OT & NT is of agency. In OT terms, the agent of the revelation is the angel of the Lord, and in the NT through the agencies of Jesus Christ and then the Holy Spirit.

An evidence of my argument is that to us, God to us is the agent we experience (eg: Jacob saying he had seen the face of God and lived).

Apart from modalism, there is another way to think about it - unity of action. The "let us" of Genesis.

To my mind, being unoriginate is simply a status - a personal attribute of an individual not a property or capability of being theos.As I understand you, you will be saying that unoriginateness is a hypostatic characteristic of the Father.No. I don't see it as essential to the substance. For instance: Adam wasn't born. It seems there is neither a defect nor enhancement of Adam's humanness by his not being born, just as there is no defect or enhancement to our humanness in being born.

Something like in humanity where being a parent/son/daughter is merely a status of precedence and not a defect in, or enhancement of, an individual's humanness.You will have three hypostases of "theos" distinguished by their hypostatic characteristics. This still amounts to three theoi, without recourse to some kind of distinction such as Rupert proposed.In the sensible world there are many examples of conceptual oneness, such as the concept of family - many individuals one family. If God is neither a genus nor species as is often argued, then it must be something above these ideas.

A.Paul gives a spiritual example in regards to the church - though there are many members there is only one body. Imo, the concept of the trinity entails the same principle - a unity of purpose and activity. Similarly, believers are to have the mind of Christ. Are there one or many minds of Christ?

In his Metaphysics, Aristotle gives the example "the isosceles and the equilateral are one and the same figure because both are triangles; but they are not the same triangles" (Book 5, Part 6).

For me your question to RP is resolved by answering the question "Is theos an object or an attribution?" If theos is an object then the trinity argument is impossible as only one of the three can be the particular object theos. On the other hand, if theos is an attribution, then multiple entities can emulate the same attributes and be simultaneous in function.To me this means that you're saying is theos a particular (object) or a universal (attribution). I do not think "theos" is either.Nor do I. However, I don't equate universals (abstracts) with attributions (function). Imu, the debate on universals stems from the tendency to treat them as objects. In earlier posts you and Rupert discused red as if it were an object. I argue that red never exists as a property of an object but color does - red is just a value/rank that is variable on perception. Consider a person who is technically color blind. This person can see color but cannot distinguish between certain colors (eg: red and black are the same). Color in reality is refracted light travelling at a particular frequency. Thus for something like the idea red there is no permanance but there is for the idea color (the idea presupposes all colors).

Imu, the difficulty of the conception of "forms" is the third man argument. To me, the concept of an active primal entity resolves that problem. So, it is conceivable that theos pater using himself as prototype instantiated his form when instigating the Son and the Spirit (in this regard we have the example of pro-creation - humans beget humans).
what is his form? Is it the same as him or different than him? If it is the same as him then you are left with the third man argument. But if it is different than him, then what is it?He isn't visible so his form cannot be expressed in terms of the sensible world. However, it can be described in regards to perceived activity in the world.

If we accept Aristotle's idea that "all attributes belong already to all subjects" then the idea of forms as an object is redundant. Instead we can attribute commonality of things by observing (or predicting) properties and capabilities from their activity.

Peace

[apostoli]

Hello Rupert,

The way I see it (from state theory) - both events (verb) and attributes (noun) define an object - it is, what it is, according to the properties and capabilities observed (or predictable) of it. In short: an object has existence through activity (the properties exist to drive activity or function).Correct. Both actuality and potentiality are bound up in the concept of something. This flows out of the concept of an object's horizon; an object's identity is always tied up with its potentiality.I put the emphasis on pedictability rather than potentiality Possibly you see them as equivalents. In any case I think we are on the same page ;-)

I disagree with your claim that in perception the object and the idea are distinct.I probably explained myself badly in saying "the object and the idea are distinct even if associated". Possibly the following statement clarifies my view = the idea and the object are relative to a context (association). It seems to me, that ideas are attributed or deduced from the object being considered but the idea is not necessarily always inherent in the object. For instance: does "this person" cease to exist as "this person", as it proceeds from baby, to child, to youth, to adult? If you agree that "this person" remains itself through such transitions then I trust you agree that the idea "child" is distinct from the idea "adult". The object cannot be both at the same time in all respects.

Part of the problem I suspect is, that like empiricists, you are thinking about perception as what is present phenomenologically. But concepts are present in perception transcendentally, not phenomenally. This fact can be adduced by various transcendental arguments. In short, I think your account of perception is defective, in precisely the way that most Anglo-American philosophical accounts of perception are.If by transcendental you mean "a state of being or existence above and beyond the limits of material experience" we are in agreement. However, something such as a person's love for another is usually perceptable in some way (even if only to the person who is in love).

When we see a seed, we perceive it as a seed, not as a brown-grey spatially extended patch or something like that. Our perception of the object brings with it the concept of the objectFor one person a seed might be just something they buy at a shop to eat - they may have no conception that it can grow into something. However, when a farmer sows seed he is visualising a crop - so to him they are conceptually the same thing. So I think context of an idea is always needed.

Let me give a practical example for you. Have you ever had the experience of being disoriented in a dark room, and feeling around not knowing where you are. All of sudden, your hand comes across something, say a particular doorknob, that you recognize. Instantly, your perception is transformed; you suddenly realize where you are, you feel yourself as being in a certain location. The difference between when you were feeling around and when you realized where you were, is like the difference between mere sensation and perception.I'm sorry I'm not following your example. In both cases the perception seems to be anticipated by sensation. If that is what you mean then imu, this is similar to the Greek Orthodox view of achieving an understanding of God by personal experience.

ie: an attribution is the sum of attibrutes that define an intricate perception of something (eg: dog & man in a particular respect are both essentially animals).Not quite sure what you are getting at here.My understanding of Aristotle's argument is that the external substance is merely a container for what a thing actually is.

To put it another way: An object might be perceived by the sum of its attributions - some essential, others contingent, others potential.An object is perceived as being that object, not as the sum of its attributions. Of course it does have attributions or properties, and some may be essential and some not to its being what it is. But insofar as there are properties which are essential, these are conceptually bound up with its form. In other words, if humans have a property of having two legs, and we perceive something as a human, then we perceive it as having two legs.
Imu, Aristotle suggests that there is something else not material that makes a thing what it is. The external thing is not the reality of the object. For instance: While most humans are bipedal, a person born without legs will also be found to be human.

For me your question to RP is resolved by answering the question "Is theos an object or an attribution?" If theos is an object then the trinity argument is impossible as only one of the three can be the particular object theos. On the other hand, if theos is an attribution, then multiple entities can emulate the same attributes and be simultaneous in function.This is true, but it doesn't solve the main problem. The main problem with the account of deity as a form or attribution, is why we do not then refer to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit as three gods, rather than one. After all, "human" is also a form or an attribution, but if we see Bill, Ted and Joe, we say that there are three humans, not one.I guess like A.Paul we have to appeal to idealism. The concept of three humans is invalid. However, the concept of multiple individuals participating in humanity is realistic. In the sensible world there are many examples, such as the concept of family - many individuals one family. If God is neither a genus nor species as is often argued, then it must be something above the ideas of genus and species.

As I've recently suggested to Alam, A.Paul gives a spiritual example in regards to the church - though there are many members there is only one body. Imo, the concept of the trinity entails the same principle - a unity of purpose and activity. Similarly, believers are to have the mind of Christ. Are there one or many minds of Christ?

Peace

[Rupert Pupkin]

I probably explained myself badly in saying "the object and the idea are distinct even if associated". Possibly the following statement clarifies my view = the idea and the object are relative to a context (association). It seems to me, that ideas are attributed or deduced from the object being considered but the idea is not necessarily always inherent in the object. For instance: does "this person" cease to exist as "this person", as it proceeds from baby, to child, to youth, to adult? If you agree that "this person" remains itself through such transitions then I trust you agree that the idea "child" is distinct from the idea "adult". The object cannot be both at the same time in all respects.

I still disagree with you. In talking of "association", and that the idea may be "deduced" from the object, you sound like a nominalist analytic philosopher. The idea or concept is given in the perception of the object. You can't perceive the object without having the concept of the object brought along with that perception, not as an association or deduction, but as part of the perception itself.

With respect to your example, I think your confusing the concept of the object and the concepts of its attributes. The terminology "concept" is confusing, since some authors, like Frege, use it only to mean properties (hence Frege speaks of "concepts and objects" as the two basic kinds of things, equivalent to "attributes and substances" in Aristotle), whereas others use it to include both the concept of an object and the concept of a property (which is what I do).

In any case, being a child, or being an adult, is a property of the object (the person). Your example illustrates that being a child or being an adult cannot be an essential attribute of them. But the concept of the object is the concept of the person - it is the concept of them as a person, without regard for their being either child or adult.

If by transcendental you mean "a state of being or existence above and beyond the limits of material experience" we are in agreement. However, something such as a person's love for another is usually perceptable in some way (even if only to the person who is in love).

I'm just using the term "transcendental" in the standard Kantian sense. In general terms, something which is transcendental in this sense is something which represents a condition for the possibility of some fundamental phenomenon (in this case, perception), but is not simply given as part of the phenomenon. It can be shown, I think, that it is impossible to construe perception in any way that denies that we transcendentally apprehend the concepts of the object and predicate we perceive. This is a complex argument and derives from Heidegger, although originally from Husserl (who called his theory, "transcendental phenomenology").

What we know transcendentally, in this sense, is to be distinguished from what we know phenomenally, that is, the "sensual" aspect of perception. Analytic philosophers typically deny any transcendental element (or, like Wittgenstein, they transform them into mysterious "rules of language" which we just do but cannot fathom further). Hence one analytic philosopher who liked Husserl's early work jibed that in his later philosophy Husserl had "gone around the transcendental bend".

For one person a seed might be just something they buy at a shop to eat - they may have no conception that it can grow into something. However, when a farmer sows seed he is visualising a crop - so to him they are conceptually the same thing. So I think context of an idea is always needed.

Again, you're on to something important here, but you need to reconceptualize it I think. What you are talking about is the horizon of the object, and how people can differ in their understanding of the horizon. For example, if I walk into a room and see the front of a table for the first time, I see it as a table, and I have a concept of its horizon. However, that concept will be quite inaccurate, because it will be mainly formed from my general notions about tables (such as that it has a back, sides, four legs, and so forth). If I walk around and look at the back of it, and find gold engraving, the concept of the horizon of the table that I have has to be altered. It is becoming more accurate. The more I inspect the table, the more accurate my concept of its horizon will become. But we always have the concept. We perceive a table as a table, and that brings with it a horizon.

I'm sorry I'm not following your example. In both cases the perception seems to be anticipated by sensation. If that is what you mean then imu, this is similar to the Greek Orthodox view of achieving an understanding of God by personal experience.

The point I'm trying to make is that the sense data is the same, but the perception is not the same, we suddenly have a whole conceptual structure to our perception when we realize where we are.

A simple example is one of those goofy optical illusions, where there is a drawing and you can see it as either a rabbit or a duck. It is not as if we see a shape, and then form hypotheses about what that shape represents. Rather, we see it, immediately, as either a rabbit or a duck. There is no interval wherein we see it just as some kind of mere shape prior to inferring that it is a rabbit or a duck.

Suppose we see it as a duck. Someone points out to us that it is possible to see it as a rabbit. Do we immediately agree, and say, oh yes, that is a reasonable hypothesis? No, we sit staring at the image, trying to see if we can perceive it as a rabbit. All of a sudden we do, and we exclaim, "oh yes, I can see it now; I understand what you mean".

Imu, Aristotle suggests that there is something else not material that makes a thing what it is. The external thing is not the reality of the object. For instance: While most humans are bipedal, a person born without legs will also be found to be human.

Yes but that only shows that I chose a bad example. In actual fact having two legs is not an essential attribute of being human. I was just trying to illustrate the point. But perhaps we could say something like, "a human is a descendant of Adam", or "a human is something that has the potential for language when it grows to adulthood, unless something thwarts that potential (such as brain damage, a missing tongue, or something)".

I'm not sure that there's all that much real disagreement on this point between myself and Aristotle, though. I agree that an object consists of substance and a bundle of essential attributes, together with inessential attributes. If Aristotle is just using the term substance to mean what I mean when I say "a substance and its essential attributes", then fine. Otherwise I do not see how he can be being coherent. Humans have some substance that differentiates them as humans. OK. Can we describe this substance in any way? If we do, wouldn't we be making predications about it, and hence just attributing properties to it? If we can't do that, then how can it be differentiated from any other substance?

I guess like A.Paul we have to appeal to idealism. The concept of three humans is invalid. However, the concept of multiple individuals participating in humanity is realistic. In the sensible world there are many examples, such as the concept of family - many individuals one family. If God is neither a genus nor species as is often argued, then it must be something above the ideas of genus and species.

In saying, the concept of three humans are invalid, aren't you going against every fundamental convention of ordinary langauge? We speak of three humans all the time. I look at a park and say, "look, there are three men over there". I never say, "look, there are multiple individuals participating in humanity over there". This is the problem. Your explanation - and Gregory of Nyssa does this too - resorts to denying the most basic features of perception and language. I think that is definitive proof that it is not correct. If you're going to tell me that I can't say there are three humans over there in the park, then that's kind of the end of the argument for me!

As I've recently suggested to Alam, A.Paul gives a spiritual example in regards to the church - though there are many members there is only one body. Imo, the concept of the trinity entails the same principle - a unity of purpose and activity. Similarly, believers are to have the mind of Christ. Are there one or many minds of Christ?

But the body of Christ thing is given in nominalist terms, as the relations of parts to a whole. So I'm not sure that is true. A nominalist theory of the trinity, in which the three persons are parts of the whole (the whole being God) has a problem - it isn't orthodox. Each of the persons of the trinity has to be fully God.

The problem here is that you're kind of exploiting a loop-hole in language, that can't be extended. Yes, in ordinary language, we do speak of a group of people being of "one mind". But we do not mean that literally; we do not mean that they are literally one person with one consciousness. We know that because we would never look at a group of people and say, "look, there is one person". That is not allowable in English. This shows that the expression "one mind" is not meant to be taken literally. But it would have to be taken literally if it was to solve this problem.

God bless,

Rupert.

[apostoli]

Hello Rupert,

I am not trained in philosophy. Many of it's later characters and much of it's formal language are unfamiliar to me. So please be patient. My background is in computer system design and data normalisation to 5th form. Much of my training seems to be founded in Aristotle's ideas. It will be helpful to me, if when you make reference to Kant etc, if you could direct me to the paticular work so I can can read up and get a better insight.

I'll need to think upon your post before I make a fuller response but to answer your main point, and working from the top of my head...

In saying, the concept of three humans are invalid, aren't you going against every fundamental convention of ordinary langauge?No. As your example adequately demonstrates = "look, there are three men over there". Note the generic terminology which is common to all of us. We all use shorthand in speach to convey generally accepted ideas. By using the generalisation "three men", we have automatically centralised the idea man (the three are of the same kind = man).

In computer speak "man" is the entity and the three refers to a count of instances. If we say "look, Tom, Jerry and Andy are the three men over there" we are being more specific and enter the world of identity.

Entity provides an abstract, identity provides individualisation (reference to a specific instance of an entity).

To me the idea "god" is an entity not an identity. This seems to be indicated in both the OT & NT - you shall have no other gods before me / though there be many gods. That is: there are things to which the idea god is attributed to but which individually contradict the definition of "our God" and therefore are not examples of god in the perspective of the "our". Linguistically we find the same perspective with some men being classified as inhuman.

If by chance we encounter several individuals in which there is a perfect instantiation of man, then there is nothing to distinguish them. Thus of these we can say, as an example of the entity man - "these are man".

I never say, "look, there are multiple individuals participating in humanity over there".Note your lingual contradiction = individual cannot be multiple, though it can be several. We all make mistakes in linguistics and semantics that cloud thought. Also, we might not articulate complex thoughts, but when using plural concepts we are making a referential to a singular idea that has commonality between the instances under observation (and which is an agreed perception).

Strictly speaking, to say there are three men without an agreed reference to a central, singular referential is a contradiction. There cannot be three of anything if their referentials are different. A pea, bean and cabbage are not the same as each other but they are three instances of the agreed idea vegetable (an entity).

This is the problem. Your explanation - and Gregory of Nyssa does this too - resorts to denying the most basic features of perception and language. I think that is definitive proof that it is not correct. If you're going to tell me that I can't say there are three humans over there in the park, then that's kind of the end of the argument for me!Though you can say there are three humans over there, you might be wrong (cp. Plato's shadows in the cave ;-)

To say "there are three men" is linguistically ambiguious unless it has an implied referential which is singular (in this case three instances of man). If we are talking in the context of entity then we are refering to the abstract "man". If our context is identity then we contradict ourselves - because like entity, identity is always singular.

Peace

[Rupert Pupkin]

It will be helpful to me, if when you make reference to Kant etc, if you could direct me to the paticular work so I can can read up and get a better insight.

I guess the best place to start for a brief overview would be to look up something like the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy entry on the topic of interest. There are Encyclopedias of Philosophy on the internet but the quality of their entries varies a lot.

However, on the issue of universals, I would highly recommend the book, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction, by D. Armstrong. It is a short introductory text that provides an excellent overview up to fairly recent times of the whole philosophical discussion of universals.

No. As your example adequately demonstrates = "look, there are three men over there". Note the generic terminology which is common to all of us. We all use shorthand in speach to convey generally accepted ideas. By using the generalisation "three men", we have automatically centralised the idea man (the three are of the same kind = man).

Yes, but you're missing the point. There are three objects, each of which has the property of being a man, and who are over there. In the Predicate Calculus, we would say, "there exist 3 x's, such that Mx and Tx", where M is the predicate "is a man" and T is the predicate "is over there".

But in such a situation, we would never, ever say, that there was one man over there. We would always say, there are three men over there. So, applying the same semantic principle to the trinity, given that "there exist 3 x's, such that Gx", where G is the predicate "is God", the question immediately arises, why should we not say "there are three gods"?

In computer speak "man" is the entity and the three refers to a count of instances. If we say "look, Tom, Jerry and Andy are the three men over there" we are being more specific and enter the world of identity.

The statement "man is an entity" is ambiguous. Is man an object or a predicate? I know of no-one who maintains that man is an object. It either refers to a class of objects (the nominalist view), or it refers to a real property or form (the realist/Platonist view). What you call "instances" are actually objects in which the form of man is instantiated; they are objects of which the predication "is a man" comes out true.

Entity provides an abstract, identity provides individualisation (reference to a specific instance of an entity).

But unless you explain precisely what you mean by "entity" and "identity", the statement is completely vague. A nominalist would say, well, Ok, "entity" refers to a class of objects and "identity" refers to just one object. A realist would say, "entity" refers to a property or form and "identity" refers to an object.

To me the idea "god" is an entity not an identity. This seems to be indicated in both the OT & NT - you shall have no other gods before me / though there be many gods. That is: there are things to which the idea god is attributed to but which individually contradict the definition of "our God" and therefore are not examples of god in the perspective of the "our". Linguistically we find the same perspective with some men being classified as inhuman.

If you are saying that being God is a form or attribute of objects, which seems to be the case, then you are in perfect agreement with what I am saying.

If by chance we encounter several individuals in which there is a perfect instantiation of man, then there is nothing to distinguish them. Thus of these we can say, as an example of the entity man - "these are man".

A couple of points:

You speak here of "a perfect instantiation of man". I assume this is something which none of us achieves down here on earth. It seems then that you are following the same general strategy that I was; trying to draw a demarcation between the way in which properties are instantiated in the earthly realm, and the way in which each of the persons of the trinity instantiates deity. The former instantiate their properties "partially", and the latter "fully". That's just the road I was going down.

But then we have an onus to unpack what is meant by "partial" and "full" instantiation, and provide argument to show that it is plausible, and so forth.

As an aside, you wouldn't want to say, I don't think, that just because a form is fully instantiated in two objects, that there is nothing to distinguish them. You would just want to say that there is nothing essentially related to humanness that distinguishes them. They might have other properties, or stand in other relations, that enables them to be distinguished. For instance the Father is unbegotten but the Son is begotten. So they can be distinguished. But they both fully instantiate deity.

Note your lingual contradiction = individual cannot be multiple, though it can be several. We all make mistakes in linguistics and semantics that cloud thought. Also, we might not articulate complex thoughts, but when using plural concepts we are making a referential to a singular idea that has commonality between the instances under observation (and which is an agreed perception).

I did not say individual can be multiple, I said there were multiple individuals, plural. Individuals not only can be multiple, they are multiple. That is what the plural declension indicates.

But I take the fundamental features of ordinary language and phenomenology to take priority over metaphysical claims. To put this another way, any metaphysical claims that cannot be reconciled with the logical structure inherent in ordinary language and perception, is wrong.

Strictly speaking, to say there are three men without an agreed reference to a central, singular referential is a contradiction. There cannot be three of anything if their referentials are different. A pea, bean and cabbage are not the same as each other but they are three instances of the agreed idea vegetable (an entity).

Nominalists would disagree, and you're going to have to work much harder than that to refute them. For example, some nominalists would say that there are just objects, and that each object resembles other objects to some extent ranging from not at all to as much as possible. Then they say that we can form classes of objects based on their resemblance to each other. Terms such as "man", they argue, denote the class or set, not any particular object.

I could label the set of objects {the moon, my left shoe, the number 4, George Bush's left ear, Mongolia}, and call it "Blerg". Then there would certainly be one Blerg; Blerg would be a "singular referential". The concept of a "set" is well defined mathematically in set theory. So I don't think your argument works at that level. The problem isn't that easy.

God bless,

Rupert.

[Rupert Pupkin]

Hi alam and apostoli. I am unable to continue this discussion at the moment. I wish you both well. I have become much too busy to spend time on TWeb for a while. I have a debate to finish up, which I will do since I am committed to that, but after that will not be here for a while (generally speaking).

I have thoroughly enjoyed the interaction with you both and wish you God's richest blessings in your lives.

In Christ,

Rupert.

[alam]

I have thoroughly enjoyed the interaction with you both and wish you God's richest blessings in your lives.

In Christ,

Rupert.

Hi RP,

I would say the same. Thanks for your kind wishes - may they return to you with interest. Meanwhile I will keep an eye out for papers on fuzzy epistemicism. :noid:

God bless,

[alam]

Hi Apostoli,

For the last week I have been out of town and off line.



Hello Alam,

For me, Our past conversations were enlightning and educational - as I anticipate this will be.

In this conversation I don't wish to focus on the trinity (though it is hard to avoid it) but rather what it means to be "theos pater".

Yes, the meaning of the term "theos pater" in light of Wallace on the semantics of simple apposition is the real topic of the thread.


Here I'm not pushing any particular barrow. Just exploring avenues of thought.

Just as a reminder and for Rupert's benefit: I hold that the Father precedes the Son (otherwise they'd be brothers). But I also hold that the Son is the perfect impress of the Father (Heb 1:3). And, theefore I hold that the Son is not inherently subordinate to the Father but willingly subjects himself (Phil 2:6).

Thankyou for the link.

I agree that as an object we cannot describe god - it is invisible after all and therefore beyond our normal comprehension ;-) According to the Christian scriptures, we gain eternal life by coming to know the only true god and Jesus Christ whom He sent forth (Jn 17:3) and it seems, to emulate Jesus we are to speak of Him in terms of revelation (ie: He has been declared - Jn 1:18). Therefore, at least in A.John's & A.Paul's perspective, God is not unutterable nor too great for words.



It is written:

We may speak much, and yet come short: wherefore in sum, he is all.
How shall we be able to magnify him? for he is great above all his works.
The Lord is terrible and very great, and marvellous is his power.
When ye glorify the Lord, exalt him as much as ye can; for even yet will he far exceed: and when ye exalt him, put forth all your strength, and be not weary; for ye can never go far enough.
Who hath seen him, that he might tell us? and who can magnify him as he is?
There are yet hid greater things than these be, for we have seen but a few of his works.


In considering God as ineffable, I mean nothing more than what this text of Ben Sira says. But you have brought up John 1:18.

If we look at the Greek of John 1:18, we notice the verb EXHGHSATO (he declared) has no object such as AUTON (him). Translations supply it, but it should be bracketed or italicized, as it is in the KJV:


No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him.


Thus the verse doesn't directly state Whom or what the Logos declares. This is a missing piece of data which we supply, upon understanding the meaning of what is said in the passage.

If we can understand that God is the object of EXHGHSATO (he declared) even though this is not said, based upon the meaning of what is said in the verse, then we see that a statement can carry unspoken meanings about God. If a statement can carry unspoken meanings about God, then it is not hard to conceive how Jesus' statements might create an understanding of God in the minds of the hearers, without capturing or defining God in words.


I will try to get around to the rest of your posts soon.


God bless

[alam]

What I think is incomprehensible, is why God does things. Like create the world.


Yes.


I'm suggesting that the idea of "God to us" is originate on perceived activity.


Yes, it is, but God is not an idea. To say the idea "God to us" is originated does not mean that God is originated.





Without this activity, we have to assume (as did the Greeks) that if God exists, it contemplates only itself.


Afaik - The scriptures do not say God "contemplates" things, but rather that he knows them. The scriptures do not call God an "it", as if he was merely an impersonal substance. Beyond that, I do not understand how "without this activity, we have to assume...that if God exists, [he knows] only [himself]." I do not assume that, and see no reason to.




The testimony of the OT & NT is of agency.



As opposed to... what??



In OT terms, the agent of the revelation is the angel of the Lord, and in the NT through the agencies of Jesus Christ and then the Holy Spirit.


Sure.


An evidence of my argument is that to us, God to us is the agent we experience (eg: Jacob saying he had seen the face of God and lived).

Apart from modalism, there is another way to think about it - unity of action. The "let us" of Genesis.


I am not sure what you are getting at. As you are well aware, I too accept that God and Jesus are united in their actions. In fact there is no action of God toward the world, including his action of creating it, which is not mediated through the Logos (e.g 1 Cor. 8:6). Yet it is not too clear why this should mean they are the same God.


No. I don't see it as essential to the substance.


I understood you to say that ungeneracy is a hypostatic characteristic of the Father, as I wrote.


For instance: Adam wasn't born. It seems there is neither a defect nor enhancement of Adam's humanness by his not being born, just as there is no defect or enhancement to our humanness in being born.


Adam, humanness, humanity etc. are disanalogous to God and Jesus. God the Father IS the one God, and IS the only true God, and "there is none other but he" (Mark 12:32). This is the conclusion I derive in the OP of the original thread and #12 in this thread. However, after Adam begat sons, it seems false to say that he was the only true man.




In the sensible world there are many examples of conceptual oneness, such as the concept of family - many individuals one family.



This example shows exactly what is wrong with this appraoch. Many individuals constitute one family. But one individual is not a family. If the individuals of a family are to "family" as the persons of the trinity are to "God", then it follows that no one person of the trinity is God. This flatly contradicts the conclusion I derive in the OP of the original thread and #12 in this thread. God the Father IS God.



If God is neither a genus nor species as is often argued, then it must be something above these ideas.



God is also above the idea of being an "it".



A.Paul gives a spiritual example in regards to the church - though there are many members there is only one body. Imo, the concept of the trinity entails the same principle - a unity of purpose and activity.

Once again, many members constitute one body. But one member is not a body. If the members of a body are to "body" as the persons of the trinity are to "God", then it follows that no one person of the trinity is God. But the scriptures teach that God the Father IS God.




Similarly, believers are to have the mind of Christ. Are there one or many minds of Christ?


What RP said. Of course there is only one mind of Christ - not many - and all believers have it. But unless they are perfect and thinking the thoughts of Christ at all times, they have their own minds too.




Nor do I. However, I don't equate universals (abstracts) with attributions (function). Imu, the debate on universals stems from the tendency to treat them as objects. In earlier posts you and Rupert discused red as if it were an object. I argue that red never exists as a property of an object but color does - red is just a value/rank that is variable on perception. Consider a person who is technically color blind. This person can see color but cannot distinguish between certain colors (eg: red and black are the same). Color in reality is refracted light travelling at a particular frequency. Thus for something like the idea red there is no permanance but there is for the idea color (the idea presupposes all colors).


I would follow up on Rupert's recommendations re the problem of universals.


He isn't visible so his form cannot be expressed in terms of the sensible world. However, it can be described in regards to perceived activity in the world.

If we accept Aristotle's idea that "all attributes belong already to all subjects" then the idea of forms as an object is redundant. Instead we can attribute commonality of things by observing (or predicting) properties and capabilities from their activity.


Why then did you bring up the thrid man argument in the first place?




what is his form? Is it the same as him or different than him? If it is the same as him then you are left with the third man argument. But if it is different than him, then what is it?

Actually, I don't see the necessity of the third man. If the perfect form can instigate, specific instigations of itself. Hence my argument that the existence of entity is contigent on activity.



in·sti·gate ; verb transitive

1. To urge on; goad.
2. To stir up; foment.

Source (http://www.answers.com/instigate?cat=biz-fin)


In·sti·ga·tion ; noun

The act of instigating, or the state of being instigated; incitement; esp. to evil or wickedness.

Source (http://www.answers.com/topic/instigation)


On the face of it, God urging on, goading, stirring up or fomenting his states of being urged on, goaded, stirred up, or fomented does not make sense. I do not understand what this is supposed to solve.





The agent is presupposed by its activities

Actually, the opposite. In crime fraud detection, the activity identifies the agent - modus operandi.



I cannot see how the crime being used to identify the criminal supports the claim that the existence of any entity is contingent on its activity.

John Doe does not come into existence as a result of his stealing a car. His existence is not contingent on his stealing the car (and if it were, he would probably plead necessity).




mo·dus op·er·an·di ; noun, plural

1. A method of operating or functioning.
2. A person's manner of working.

Source (http://www.answers.com/topic/modus-operandi?cat=biz-fin)

Doe's existence cannot be contingent on the manner in which he steals the car, if it is not contingent on his stealing the car to begin with.




Looking back, a number of my responses in this post consist in my saying that I cannot understand what you are saying. The two of your ideas I would most like to understand are:

1. Your argument for why the existence of any entity is contingent on its activity

2. Why you are convinced that the trinity are one God, rather than three Gods


If there is anything in particular you would like me to explain, I too will attempt it.


God bless,

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

Looking back, a number of my responses in this post consist in my saying that I cannot understand what you are saying.Rupert has made me aware that many of the terms I use have ambiguity in the philosophic world, so I'll take his advice and give my definitions before answering

When I use terms such as idea, entity, property, instance, identity, relation, association and object I am using their common, oxford dictionary meaning. Any expansion on a meaning occurs between square backets.

* Idea - notion conceived by the mind
* Entity - a thing's existence as opposed to qualities or relations
* Property - thing owned by something
* Instance - example; paticular case
* Indentity - indivuduality [that by which an instance is uniquely identified]
* Relation - what one thing has to do to another
* Association - connection of ideas
* Object - thing presented to sense

In my world, there is an difference between an object and an entity, but for our purposes consider them synomonous. An entity is like a page in a book. Properties of the entity are like having the page ruled into columns, and the definition of each column given by a column heading. An instance is like the lines below the heading, which contain values for each column. The identity of an instance is like the number of the line we might be focused on - other lines may have the the same values but do not have the same line number as "this" instance.

In my world we ask "what is this" deduced from examining the values within an instance. For example: We may find that a value in one of the columns indicates this instance should not be on this page - such as a credit value in the amount column of a ledger of debtors. Debtors & Creditors have the same properties, the only thing that disassociates them is "rules" governing their properties.

I should demonstrate how in my world object and an entity differ: Say we have an entity called Account balances. From this, by inquiry, we can extract either the object debtors (has debit balance) or creditors (has credit balance). An object is transient, an entity is permanent.

The two of your ideas I would most like to understand are:I'll try to explain my view without adding complexity...

1. Your argument for why the existence of any entity is contingent on its activityMy argument on entity is from the perspective of computer system design/maintenance. In my world, when we model a proposed system we conceptualise what entities we need and assign properties to them. At this stage, all entities are merely abstract ideas. At the end of modeling, if an entity is found to be an orphan (is not associated with other entities) it is deleted fom the model - it will not have activity in this system and therefore to us has no existence.

In my world there are multiple perspectives to activity. Initially, activity is merely predictive. A simple example: Lets assume we have several associative entities - product, person and customer. In this model the focus is on products purchased - who is buying what - so customer is defined as the association of the identity of a particular product and the identity of a particular person (plus other properties eg: purchase date etc). In this model customer is just an abstract idea until a person actually buys something - when that happens, the idea customer gets an instance and becomes a reality.

Similarly, an entity may be assigned instances but these instances may only be abstracts (eg: products) - not proven and not real to us, until each instance has activity - association with instance/s of one or more other entities - for all intents and purposes it has no real existence - it exists only as an abstract example of the entity to which it is assigned (Ultimately, we may decide to delete it from the system and then it definitely has no existence ;-)

2. Why you are convinced that the trinity are one God, rather than three GodsFor the same reason I believe there is one humanity, rather than multiple humanities - as the saying goes: all men are created equal. In the case of humanity, there may be many instances which provide diverse examples of humanity - but there is only one benchmark by which we appraise these instances as being included in the idea humanity.

In the idea Humanity we may find diversity in the values for each property between instances. In the idea God, we find three instances that cannot be differentiated other than by their relationship to each other. In data modeling, relationships are defined by an entity external to the entity in focus.

To quote the Catholic catechism: "The divine persons are relative to one another. Because it does not divide the divine unity, the real distinction of the persons from one another resides solely in the relationships which relate them to one another."

Rupert asked a similar question, and I would have answered as follows...

...given that "there exist 3 x's, such that Gx", where G is the predicate "is God", the question immediately arises, why should we not say "there are three gods"?Perception and precision.

The idea "three gods" may conjure up the pagan idea of rivals competing for attention, diversity of powers and/or diversity of function. In the teaching of the Trinity there is no conflict, diversity of powers nor diversity of function, so it would be inappropriate to say "three gods" because it manifests the wrong mental image.

It'd be like Con the grocer who thinking in his native language when speaking english refers to his daughter as he. "Have you any kids? Yeah, one, soon he turns 18!" In this conversation the inquirer (having English as his native language) would incorrectly assume that Con is refering to a son.

The Catholic Catechism says "We do not confess three Gods, but one God in three persons, the "consubstantial Trinity". The divine persons do not share the one divinity among themselves but each of them is God whole and entire...by nature one God."
http://www.scborromeo.org/ccc/p1s2c1p2.htm

Peace

[alam]

Hi Apostoli,

Hello Alam,

Rupert has made me aware that many of the terms I use have ambiguity in the philosophic world, so I'll take his advice and give my definitions before answering

When I use terms such as idea, entity, property, instance, identity, relation, association and object I am using their common, oxford dictionary meaning. Any expansion on a meaning occurs between square backets.

* Idea - notion conceived by the mind
* Entity - a thing's existence as opposed to qualities or relations
* Property - thing owned by something
* Instance - example; paticular case
* Indentity - indivuduality [that by which an instance is uniquely identified]
* Relation - what one thing has to do to another
* Association - connection of ideas
* Object - thing presented to sense


I don't think there's been a misunderstanding about these terms.


In my world, there is an difference between an object and an entity, but for our purposes consider them synomonous. An entity is like a page in a book. Properties of the entity are like having the page ruled into columns, and the definition of each column given by a column heading. An instance is like the lines below the heading, which contain values for each column. The identity of an instance is like the number of the line we might be focused on - other lines may have the the same values but do not have the same line number as "this" instance.

In my world we ask "what is this" deduced from examining the values within an instance. For example: We may find that a value in one of the columns indicates this instance should not be on this page - such as a credit value in the amount column of a ledger of debtors. Debtors & Creditors have the same properties, the only thing that disassociates them is "rules" governing their properties.

I should demonstrate how in my world object and an entity differ: Say we have an entity called Account balances. From this, by inquiry, we can extract either the object debtors (has debit balance) or creditors (has credit balance). An object is transient, an entity is permanent.

I'll try to explain my view without adding complexity...

My argument on entity is from the perspective of computer system design/maintenance. In my world, when we model a proposed system we conceptualise what entities we need and assign properties to them. At this stage, all entities are merely abstract ideas. At the end of modeling, if an entity is found to be an orphan (is not associated with other entities) it is deleted fom the model - it will not have activity in this system and therefore to us has no existence.

In my world there are multiple perspectives to activity. Initially, activity is merely predictive. A simple example: Lets assume we have several associative entities - product, person and customer. In this model the focus is on products purchased - who is buying what - so customer is defined as the association of the identity of a particular product and the identity of a particular person (plus other properties eg: purchase date etc). In this model customer is just an abstract idea until a person actually buys something - when that happens, the idea customer gets an instance and becomes a reality.

Similarly, an entity may be assigned instances but these instances may only be abstracts (eg: products) - not proven and not real to us, until each instance has activity - association with instance/s of one or more other entities - for all intents and purposes it has no real existence - it exists only as an abstract example of the entity to which it is assigned (Ultimately, we may decide to delete it from the system and then it definitely has no existence ;-)


I will take your word that these are the pragmatics of computer system design. But you haven't explained how we reliably generalize from this process to metaphysics or ontology.

It looks to me - please correct what is wrong - like you are using "activity" in the sense of the function of an 'entity', defined in terms of its interrelation to the system as a whole, which is a criterion for the removal or retention of the entity in the system. These are the things it potentially does or is designed to do. I am speaking about what an entity really does. You mentioned that such an orphan entity has no existence "to us" or for "all intents and purposes." So you are considering its existence relatively, but I am considering it absolutely.



For the same reason I believe there is one humanity, rather than multiple humanities - as the saying goes: all men are created equal. In the case of humanity, there may be many instances which provide diverse examples of humanity - but there is only one benchmark by which we appraise these instances as being included in the idea humanity.



That three instances of humanity are the same as respects their humanity does not mean that they are one human rather than three humans. By the same token, that three instances of divinity are the same as respects their divinity does not mean that they are one God rather than three gods.


In the idea Humanity we may find diversity in the values for each property between instances. In the idea God, we find three instances that cannot be differentiated other than by their relationship to each other. In data modeling, relationships are defined by an entity external to the entity in focus.

To quote the Catholic catechism: "The divine persons are relative to one another. Because it does not divide the divine unity, the real distinction of the persons from one another resides solely in the relationships which relate them to one another."



How does the way in which instances are differentiated from eachother affect this question? There is a thought experiment, aimed against the identity of indiscernibles, which posits a symmetrical universe consisting of two identical spheres. (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible/#Rec) The spheres differ in no way that can be articulated; they don't even seem to differ relationally, because what can be said of one, that it is x distance from an identical sphere, can be said as well of the other. You could try to distinguish them in relation to your own vantage point as observer in this hypothetical universe. But if the perfect sameness of the trinity and the fact that its members are only distinguished relationally is what necessitates that its three instances of God are not three Gods but one God, why wouldn't the perfect sameness of the two spheres in Black's universe and the fact that they are distinguished (at most) relationally necessitate that these two instances of sphereness are not two spheres but one sphere? Or does it? But how?

Rupert asked a similar question, and I would have answered as follows...

Perception and precision.

The idea "three gods" may conjure up the pagan idea of rivals competing for attention, diversity of powers and/or diversity of function. In the teaching of the Trinity there is no conflict, diversity of powers nor diversity of function, so it would be inappropriate to say "three gods" because it manifests the wrong mental image.

It'd be like Con the grocer who thinking in his native language when speaking english refers to his daughter as he. "Have you any kids? Yeah, one, soon he turns 18!" In this conversation the inquirer (having English as his native language) would incorrectly assume that Con is refering to a son.




The term "three Gods" doesn't need to evoke the idea of rival gods competing for attention. The fact that we have to modify "gods" with an adjective like "rival" to get the idea of "rival gods" would suggest that the term "gods" in and of itself does not imply rivalry. We can speak of "two harmonious co-equal gods" without an obvious contradiction in terms.



The Catholic Catechism says "We do not confess three Gods, but one God in three persons, the "consubstantial Trinity". The divine persons do not share the one divinity among themselves but each of them is God whole and entire...by nature one God."
http://www.scborromeo.org/ccc/p1s2c1p2.htm

Peace


We would expect the RC catechism to say something like that.

God bless

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

In my initial posts in this thread, I should have made evident the difference I see between an entity and an object. For which I apologise. And I also apologise for waffling on about system design to explain myself, but it seems the simplest way to explain my meaning and viewpoint.

I am speaking about what an entity really does. You mentioned that an orphan entity has no existence "to us" or for "all intents and purposes." So you are considering its existence relatively, but I am considering it absolutely.
I'm sure you agree our knowledge of God is relative to our personal experience of Him. I believe the same is true of anything and everything. Hence my bolding "to us". Imu, the ancient Greek philosophers held that God existed absolutely but they also argued because God was absolutely good that He was unknowable, impersonal and detached from the world.

I've mainly focused on the concept of an entity and it's properties (what are the essentials of a thing). In the concept of object (see below), I may consider the entity and all its associations, functions etc to define it absolutely in respect of "this" system. However, that entity may also have existence in another system (eg: God's activity in heaven), so I cannot define anything absolutely.

Several posts ago I commented "...you appear to be arguing...god is an object and not an attribution." To which you replied "I do not think that God is...an object. Sometimes it is useful to simplify abstract issues by reducing them...Even Gregory Nazianzen said...for I know not how this could be expressed in terms altogether excluding visible things" = it is in this spirit that I relate everything I say.

Texts such as John 14:7 lead me to contemplate an entity model. Jesus says that if you see him you see the Father. And he says this in the context of his person and his works.

you haven't explained how we reliably generalize from this process to metaphysics or ontology.The Oxford dictionary defines ontology as "a department of metaphysics concerned with the essence of things or being in the abstract". The whole design process I follow is to define all entities in the abstract - define the essence of a thing. This abstraction is very disciplined. The basic rule is every entity & property must have some function. It is from this discipline that our generalisations are reliable - at least within the context they are given - the discipline removes prejudice and opinion. One important rule: a property value for an instance must be invariable .

The aim in modeling is to determine the essential, invariable properties of an entity. Any aspect of an instance of an entity that is variable or merely relational is external to the entity.

It looks to me - please correct what is wrong - like you are using "activity" in the sense of the function of an 'entity', defined in terms of its interrelation to the system as a whole, which is a criterion for the removal or retention of the entity in the system. These are the things it potentially does or is designed to do.In system design there are two basic perspectives: the database and the script (instruction set). Database design concerns itself with entity modeling. Scripting concerns itself with object design and activity. For example: whilst the entity person does not have the property "age" it may have the property "birth/creation date". Thus the script may extract "birth date" for an instance of person, determine todays date and derive the age of the person. In the model I gave for customer, we might have a rule that our products cannot be sold to people under a certain age. So while this instance of person cannot be a customer, it remains in the system because it has association with some other entity or it has the potential to be associated.

When modeling entities, everything is abstract. So activity is perceived as the impact one entity potentially has on other entities. In theory, entities are never designed to do anything other than to exist. Potential activity is intuitive, implied by the logical associations between entities.

That three instances of humanity are the same as respects their humanity does not mean that they are one human rather than three humans. By the same token, that three instances of divinity are the same as respects their divinity does not mean that they are one God rather than three gods.As you know the trinity doctrine teaches that the three are one God in nature, not in person. In your argument you have had to manipulate the phrasing to come to your conclusion - humanity became human, divinity became god. What I am saying is there is one humanity in which individuals participate. And one divinity that the divines participate in. My emphasis is on what a thing essentially is.

How does the way in which instances are differentiated from each other affect this question? There is a thought experiment, aimed against the identity of indiscernibles, which posits a symmetrical universe consisting of two identical spheres. The spheres differ in no way that can be articulated; they don't even seem to differ relationally, because what can be said of one, that it is x distance from an identical sphere, can be said as well of the other. You could try to distinguish them in relation to your own vantage point as observer in this hypothetical universe. But if the perfect sameness of the trinity and the fact that its members are only distinguished relationally is what necessitates that its three instances of God are not three Gods but one God, why wouldn't the perfect sameness of the two spheres in Black's universe and the fact that they are distinguished (at most) relationally necessitate that these two instances of sphereness are not two spheres but one sphere? Or does it? But how?Thankyou for the link. It was an interesting read. I noticed at the end of the article it says "The Principle restricted to merely possible substances follows from Leibniz's identification of substances with complete concepts. For two complete concepts must differ in some conceptual respect and so be discernible." Does substance here refer to materiality or essence?

In my world, given A, B & C having identical properties and values for those properties they would be distinguished by their unique identifier, possibly their position in a list of instances (eg: line number). This property is artificial but essential to the identity of an instance but not essential in defining what the thing is.

Imagine we see a circle, but are told that in fact there are three identical circles, one placed on top of the other. Do we now see three circles or one circle? I suggest actually one but logically, having been told that the three circles are identical, we can assume that having seen one we know what the others look like. And so conceptually we can say we have seen the three. Jesus gives the testimony that if the apostles knew him then they have seen the Father.

The term "three Gods" doesn't need to evoke the idea of rival gods competing for attention. The fact that we have to modify "gods" with an adjective like "rival" to get the idea of "rival gods" would suggest that the term "gods" in and of itself does not imply rivalry.Imu, there are no instances where the term gods is ever used to imply harmony. In all mythologies the gods conflict with each other. So for many people "gods" invokes an automatic image of fractious and malicious beings. As you demonstrate we could add a bunch of superlatives to qualify our use of the word, but then we'd be talking about objects (as the mythologies do) instead of the essence of Godness (as the trinity doctrine does).

We can speak of "two harmonious co-equal gods" without an obvious contradiction in terms.From perception I can speak of seeing two moons last month without an obvious contradiction in terms. Language is often full of ambiguity, and even when grammatically correct can lead people to the wrong conclusions.

The Catholic Catechism says "We do not confess three Gods, but one God in three persons, the "consubstantial Trinity". The divine persons do not share the one divinity among themselves but each of them is God whole and entire...by nature one God."We would expect the RC catechism to say something like that.Very true;-)

I only used the RC Catechism because it was convenient and more succinct than Gregory Thaumatugus' confession of faith. http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0605.htm

Peace

[alam]

Hello Alam,

In my initial posts in this thread, I should have made evident the difference I see between an entity and an object. For which I apologise. And I also apologise for waffling on about system design to explain myself, but it seems the simplest way to explain my meaning and viewpoint.


I'm sure you agree our knowledge of God is relative to our personal experience of Him.


I do not agree. Relative "persoanl experience" and the like often serves as a buzzword under the rubric of which all kinds of nonsense is brought into religion. I am not speaking about relative knowledge of God here, but what is absolute and can be shown from revelation.



I believe the same is true of anything and everything. Hence my bolding "to us". Imu, the ancient Greek philosophers held that God existed absolutely but they also argued because God was absolutely good that He was unknowable, impersonal and detached from the world.

I've mainly focused on the concept of an entity and it's properties (what are the essentials of a thing). In the concept of object (see below), I may consider the entity and all its associations, functions etc to define it absolutely in respect of "this" system. However, that entity may also have existence in another system (eg: God's activity in heaven), so I cannot define anything absolutely.

Several posts ago I commented "...you appear to be arguing...god is an object and not an attribution." To which you replied "I do not think that God is...an object. Sometimes it is useful to simplify abstract issues by reducing them...Even Gregory Nazianzen said...for I know not how this could be expressed in terms altogether excluding visible things" = it is in this spirit that I relate everything I say.


I don't know. When you say something like: "when we model a proposed system we conceptualise what entities we need and assign properties to them. At this stage, all entities are merely abstract ideas. At the end of modeling, if an entity is found to be an orphan (is not associated with other entities) it is deleted fom the model - it will not have activity in this system and therefore to us has no existence," it isn't clear what kind of an analogy you are making to "entity" in the metaphysical sense you defined "Entity - a thing's existence as opposed to qualities or relations". This doesn't seem like much of a simplification. Who is calling the shots regarding non-computer program, metaphysical entities, deleting ones that are orphans etc.?


The Oxford dictionary defines ontology as "a department of metaphysics concerned with the essence of things or being in the abstract". The whole design process I follow is to define all entities in the abstract - define the essence of a thing. This abstraction is very disciplined. The basic rule is every entity & property must have some function.


That is dictated by the pragmatics of computer system design. This is where the analogy breaks down, imo.


It is from this discipline that our generalisations are reliable - at least within the context they are given - the discipline removes prejudice and opinion. One important rule: a property value for an instance must be invariable .

The aim in modeling is to determine the essential, invariable properties of an entity. Any aspect of an instance of an entity that is variable or merely relational is external to the entity.

In system design there are two basic perspectives: the database and the script (instruction set). Database design concerns itself with entity modeling. Scripting concerns itself with object design and activity. For example: whilst the entity person does not have the property "age" it may have the property "birth/creation date". Thus the script may extract "birth date" for an instance of person, determine todays date and derive the age of the person. In the model I gave for customer, we might have a rule that our products cannot be sold to people under a certain age. So while this instance of person cannot be a customer, it remains in the system because it has association with some other entity or it has the potential to be associated.

When modeling entities, everything is abstract. So activity is perceived as the impact one entity potentially has on other entities. In theory, entities are never designed to do anything other than to exist. Potential activity is intuitive, implied by the logical associations between entities.

As you know the trinity doctrine teaches that the three are one God in nature, not in person. In your argument you have had to manipulate the phrasing to come to your conclusion - humanity became human, divinity became god.


I was asking you why you think they are one God (notice, concrete term) and you responded in terms of there being only "one humanity" (abstract) which just dodged the question, and I pointed this out. Any manipulations going on here are not mine. :thumbd:






What I am saying is there is one humanity in which individuals participate. And one divinity that the divines participate in. My emphasis is on what a thing essentially is.


Yes, but that doesn't answer the question: Why you are convinced that the trinity are one God (not, "why do you think they are the same in respect of divinity"), rather than three Gods. This is the question I asked. I will bring it back to your attention from time to time.



Thankyou for the link. It was an interesting read. I noticed at the end of the article it says "The Principle restricted to merely possible substances follows from Leibniz's identification of substances with complete concepts. For two complete concepts must differ in some conceptual respect and so be discernible." Does substance here refer to materiality or essence?

In my world, given A, B & C having identical properties and values for those properties they would be distinguished by their unique identifier, possibly their position in a list of instances (eg: line number). This property is artificial but essential to the identity of an instance but not essential in defining what the thing is.

Imagine we see a circle, but are told that in fact there are three identical circles, one placed on top of the other. Do we now see three circles or one circle? I suggest actually one but logically, having been told that the three circles are identical, we can assume that having seen one we know what the others look like. And so conceptually we can say we have seen the three. Jesus gives the testimony that if the apostles knew him then they have seen the Father.


This is getting into another topic. The reason I brought it up Black's universe was to show that multiple things being qualitatively identical and differing only (at most) relatively provides no clear basis to insist that they are merely multiple instances of thing x rather than multiple x's.


Imu, there are no instances where the term gods is ever used to imply harmony. In all mythologies the gods conflict with each other.


I doubt that. But let's assume your right and whenever "gods" are mentioned in pagan mythology, beings at odds w/eachother are implied. If that was a good enough reason not to use the term "gods" as applied to harmonious beings, then the scriptures would not have described the elect as "Ye are gods". Since they have done so, then mere implications of rivalry from pagan theology are not a good enough reason to eschew the plural "gods" where it is appropriate.


Best,

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

I'm sure you agree our knowledge of God is relative to our personal experience of Him.I do not agree. Relative "personal experience" and the like often serves as a buzzword under the rubric of which all kinds of nonsense is brought into religion.As is the claim of revelation. It seems all the Abrahamic religions make some claim to revelation. In fact, one of the core aguments in tinitarianism is revelation :-}

I am not speaking about relative knowledge of God here, but what is absolute and can be shown from revelation.Given both philosophers and theologians agree that nothing about God can be known absolutely and revelation only provides us a glimpse of God in his relationship with us, I'd be interested in learning your "absolutes".

John 1:1 according to Massey etc should be translated "what God was, the Logos was". Would you consider that absolute and revealed? I trust you'll appeal to John 17:3 as an absolute. Notice the qualification Jesus gives, God is not the true God, but the Father of Jesus is the only true God. My position is that the Father, caused the Son to exist as a perfect replication of himself, which is the revelation of at least A.Paul and A.John.

Why are you convinced that the trinity are one God, rather than three Gods?For the same reason I believe there is one humanity, rather than multiple humanities - as the saying goes: all men are created equal. In the case of humanity, there may be many instances which provide diverse examples of humanity - but there is only one benchmark by which we appraise these instances as being included in the idea humanity.That three instances of humanity are the same as respects their humanity does not mean that they are one human rather than three humans. By the same token, that three instances of divinity are the same as respects their divinity does not mean that they are one God rather than three gods.As you know the trinity doctrine teaches that the three are one God in nature, not in person...What I am saying is there is one humanity in which individuals participate. And one divinity that the divines participate in. My emphasis is on what a thing essentially is.I was asking you why you think they are one God (notice, concrete term) and you responded in terms of there being only "one humanity" (abstract)Throughout the OT & NT "god" is qualified and relative (abstract). So, imo it is not a concrete idea. On the other hand YHWH is concrete, at least to the Isaelites. In Genesis, God as creator is concrete but not identified. Elsewhere it is taught that YHWH is the creator. In Exodus YHWH does not say to Moses I am God, but rather I am the god of your father, the god of Abraham, the god of Jacob. Of interest Jacob thought he had seen the face of God and lived (though elsewhere we learn no man has ever seen God). At Deuteronomy 10:17 we have the revelation that "YHWH your god is god of gods, and lord of lords, a great god." The revelation at Deuteronomy 4:27-29 says that if you seek YHWH with all your heart, even though you are worshiping idols you will find Him. At 1 Corinthians 8:5-6 it is revealed that there are many gods and many lords but "to us" etc.

Any manipulations going on here are not mine.Hmmm. I trust you wouldn't accuse A.Paul or Jesus of word manipulations when they appear to contradict Moses. The OT says only YHWH is our judge, our lord and savior. The NT says Jesus is our judge, our lord and savior. Which will you have?

My emphasis is on what a thing essentially is.Yes, but that doesn't answer the question: Why you are convinced that the trinity are one God (not, "why do you think they are the same in respect of divinity"), rather than three Gods. This is the question I asked. I don't believe the trinity is one God (object) but three instances of God to us (entity). And, the Son being begotten of the Father, is the express image of the Father. The revelation of scripture is that if you know the Son, you know the Father.

I will bring it back to your attention from time to time.And I will simply refer you to Aristotle who observed that there is more to a thing than what we perceive. And possibly quote A.Paul 1 Corinthians 6:16-17.

Harking back to your post #12 and predication. To use a neutral example: There is no contradiction in saying Peter is a man, Paul is a man and John is a man but there is absurdity in concluding Peter is Paul etc, but no absurdity in concluding Peter, Paul and John are each a man. In my world the idea "man" is an invariable constant. Any variability is personal - a man without legs is still a man. Imo, to say Peter, Paul & John are three men, emphasises their differences rather than what is common between them.

Thinking on one of Jesus' parables: Is the vine, the leaves upon its banches and the grapes upon them, three or one?

I doubt that. But let's assume your right and whenever "gods" are mentioned in pagan mythology, beings at odds w/eachother are implied. If that was a good enough reason not to use the term "gods" as applied to harmonious beings, then the scriptures would not have described the elect as "Ye are gods". Since they have done so, then mere implications of rivalry from pagan theology are not a good enough reason to eschew the plural "gods" where it is appropriate.Have a read of Isaiah 42:17.

Psalms 82, refers to the judges of Israel who misruled (vs 2). Psalms 82 does give evidence that being god/s is relative and not absolute (as does John 10:35). At Ps 82:1 it says YHWH "judges amoung the gods". Though it would seem Aseph hadn't read Deuteronomy 32:39.

Peace

[alam]

Hi Apostoli,

Again for the last week I have been out of town and off line.


Hello Alam,

As is the claim of revelation. It seems all the Abrahamic religions make some claim to revelation. In fact, one of the core aguments in tinitarianism is revelation :-}

Revelation gives us information that cannot be derived from pure reason. Thus, there are criteria for who is qualified to deliver revelation (e.g. Deut. 13, 18). Not anybody can come out saying they have dreamed a dream therefore we should all do/believe _______ .

Under the Torah, people could not even come out with their own private dreams as justification for their private beliefs and practices. Idolatry in all forms is condemned and the condemnation was to be enforced, per the above chapters from Deuteronomy.

The homoousian argument from revelation (at least the one I have seen) relies on intuitive leaps that cannot be demonstrated from revelation. Without them it commits the logical fallacy of equivocated middle term. Thus it is a bad argument. It is easy to direct someone to a verse or passage and promise, 'have a read of that, it should answer your questions', but I have had a read of very many things you have recommended. I would like you to spell out your thinking in a plain, step-by-step sequence in your own words.



and revelation only provides us a glimpse of God in his relationship with us, I'd be interested in learning your "absolutes".

The Apostles Creed is a fine summary of them.


John 1:1 according to Massey etc should be translated "what God was, the Logos was". Would you consider that absolute and revealed?


John 1:1 is absolute and revealed. The theory from Massey et al is not.


I trust you'll appeal to John 17:3 as an absolute.


That too is absolute and revealed.


Notice the qualification Jesus gives, God is not the true God, but the Father of Jesus is the only true God.


The Father of Jesus IS (identity, NOT predication, see the posts #12 etc referenced above) God. To say that the Father of Jesus is the only true God is logically equivalent to saying that God is the only true God.


My position is that the Father, caused the Son to exist as a perfect replication of himself, which is the revelation of at least A.Paul and A.John.

God the Father is the replication of nothing before Him. This being unoriginated cannot be replicated, because any replica that is caused to exist is originated, as we have discussed before. To dismiss this as inconsequential, you must thin down the concept of God's essence so that it does not include ungeneracy. Then "for all intents and purposes," as you put it, maybe He was.


Throughout the OT & NT "god" is qualified


The terms for 'God' are often applied to God the Father without qualification.


and relative (abstract).


Relative does not equate to abstract.


In Genesis, God as creator is concrete but not identified. Elsewhere it is taught that YHWH is the creator. In Exodus YHWH does not say to Moses I am God, but rather I am the god of your father, the god of Abraham, the god of Jacob. Of interest Jacob thought he had seen the face of God and lived (though elsewhere we learn no man has ever seen God). At Deuteronomy 10:17 we have the revelation that "YHWH your god is god of gods, and lord of lords, a great god." The revelation at Deuteronomy 4:27-29 says that if you seek YHWH with all your heart, even though you are worshiping idols you will find Him. At 1 Corinthians 8:5-6 it is revealed that there are many gods and many lords but "to us" etc.

Ok.


Hmmm. I trust you wouldn't accuse A.Paul or Jesus of word manipulations when they appear to contradict Moses.


No, but I can accuse you of such, as you have done to me, because we are not prophets.



The OT says only YHWH is our judge, our lord and savior. The NT says Jesus is our judge, our lord and savior. Which will you have?

Because he hath appointed a day, in the which he will judge the world in righteousness by that man whom he hath ordained

But after that the kindness and love of God our Saviour toward man appeared,

5 not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost;

6 which he shed on us abundantly through Jesus Christ our Saviour



I don't believe the trinity is one God (object) but three instances of God to us (entity). And, the Son being begotten of the Father, is the express image of the Father. The revelation of scripture is that if you know the Son, you know the Father.

Ok.


And I will simply refer you to Aristotle who observed that there is more to a thing than what we perceive. And possibly quote A.Paul 1 Corinthians 6:16-17.

Harking back to your post #12 and predication. To use a neutral example: There is no contradiction in saying Peter is a man, Paul is a man and John is a man but there is absurdity in concluding Peter is Paul etc, but no absurdity in concluding Peter, Paul and John are each a man. In my world the idea "man" is an invariable constant. Any variability is personal - a man without legs is still a man. Imo, to say Peter, Paul & John are three men, emphasises their differences rather than what is common between them.


None of this answers post #12 etc.

Thinking on one of Jesus' parables: Is the vine, the leaves upon its banches and the grapes upon them, three or one?

Many of what? One of what?

Have a read of Isaiah 42:17.


They shall be turned back, they shall be greatly ashamed, that trust in graven images, that say to the molten images, Ye are our gods.

Ok.

Psalms 82, refers to the judges of Israel who misruled (vs 2). Psalms 82 does give evidence that being god/s is relative and not absolute (as does John 10:35). At Ps 82:1 it says YHWH "judges amoung the gods".

God the Father is God absolute. He is THE God and there is no other (hu' ha'elohim v'ein `od, Deut. 4:35).



Though it would seem Aseph hadn't read Deuteronomy 32:39.


Undoubtedly the Seer Asaph (2 Chron. 29:30) understood the book of Deuteronomy better than anyone alive today.

Best,

[apostoli]

Hi Alam,

Again for the last week I have been out of town and off line.No worries. I know how it can be...

It seems all the Abrahamic religions make some claim to revelation. In fact, one of the core arguments in trinitarianism is revelationRevelation gives us information that cannot be derived from pure reason.I agree.

My view of revelation: I think of it as an uncovering. Thinking on the disciples - given a sufficient knowledge of the OT, it wasn't a gaint leap in faith to realise that Jesus was/is the promised Messiah. But even the disciples had their doubts (eg: Judas) and lacked a full understanding though they witnessed Jesus' works. What seems particularly hard for them was believing that Jesus' actual Father was God (cp Jn 14:8-11), even though Jesus went to great lengths to explain that this was so. This revelation is summed up by A.John when he says "These things are written that you might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that by believing, you might have life through his name" (Jn 20:31).

Below you make reference to Dt 13 & 18. In these texts one thing that stands out to me is the false revelations in question are by prophets who desire to draw the chosen into the false worship of the gods invented by men (the gods of the nations). If it can be demonstrated that the trinity teaching does this, then it should be rejected out of hand. However, imu of the orthodox teaching of the tri-unity, whereby God sent His only Son, I see a harmony between the OT & NT.

Thus, there are criteria for who is qualified to deliver revelation (e.g. Deut. 13, 18). Not anybody can come out saying they have dreamed a dream therefore we should all do/believe.Dt 13 definitely gives a context why the religious in Jesus' time strived to have him stoned. Among the accusations raised against Jesus was he spoke and acted with absolute authority - he forgave sins by his own authority, and allowed others to do so by the authority of his own name. Whereas, under the Law, this was the exclusive privilege of YHWH.

Dt 18:18 is interesting. My Muslim friend Moose, who is prone to literalism is sure to put this into his armoury (Moose, if you are reading this, also have a look at Acts 6:8 to 7:60).

Under the Torah, people could not even come out with their own private dreams as justification for their private beliefs and practices. Idolatry in all forms is condemned and the condemnation was to be enforced, per the above chapters from Deuteronomy.Probably why throughout Hebrew history, their hands are said to be driping with the blood of God's prophets (cp Acts 7:52-53). The testimony of the OT & NT is that the Jews were prone to idolatry, building temples and making the Law their god. One of the reasons Jesus told the religious leaders that their father was not Abraham but Satan.

Imu, revelation is demonstrated if it is consistent with the message and objectives we find in scripture. For instance: How do you reconcile YHWH being the husband of Israel, with Jesus being the bridegroom of the church?

The homoousian argument from revelation (at least the one I have seen) relies on intuitive leaps that cannot be demonstrated from revelation. Without them it commits the logical fallacy of equivocated middle term. Thus it is a bad argument...I would like you to spell out your thinking in a plain, step-by-step sequence in your own words.I'll attempt a synopsis of my opinion...

My starting point is based on Genesis & Exodus in the light of A.John. If no man has ever seen God, then who was the God that Abram, Isaac & Jacob saw and that declared Himself to Moses?

Judges 2:1 says it was the the angel of the Lord that made the Israelites leave Egypt and who made the covenant with their fathers. At Deut 6:23 & Gen 17:7-8 these things are attributed to YHWH. Particularly in Genesis, it is seen that this angel was seen as the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, though this might be qualified in the light of Judges 15:16,22-23 (cp. Gen 32:30).

Taking A.John at his word, it is evident that the experience of the OT prophets (including Moses) was not with God, but with the "one sent". I associate this emissary with the Son of God. John 14:7-10 says if you know him you know his Father, and he that sees Jesus sees the Father. This would appear to be totally consistent with Genesis & Exodus, whereby the "one sent", in his activity, is seen to be God by those who experienced him.

Hence we get the formula describing the Son as God from God. The homoousia bit which you object to in the creeds, is a logical deduction. Given there is no activity of the Father that isn't attributed to the Son, and everything we can know about the Father is found in knowing the Son, if we are to say anything of the Father, it must be in the context of the revelation of the OT & NT activities. As everything the Father does, the Son does likewise, then only their persons can be differentiated.

John 1:1 is absolute and revealed. The theory from Massey et al is not.Apparently there are several translation options = the Logos is 1. God, 2. a god, 3. divine 4. what God is. The first because of the "pros" in the grammar and vs2 is unacceptable, the 2nd within the context of the entire Gospel seems convoluted. The 3rd is unacceptable as the Greek has a particular word for divine. So, given Col 1:19;2:9; Phil 2:6; Heb 1:3 etc, and the teachings within the Gospel, option 4 seems appropriate.

The Father of Jesus IS (identity, NOT predication, see the posts #12 etc referenced above) God. To say that the Father of Jesus is the only true God is logically equivalent to saying that God is the only true God.The fact that "Only" and "True" are predications undermines your assertion. Either God is God (God without any superlative) or to be God is by some relativity that is specified by the predicate applied.

My position is that the Father, caused the Son to exist as a perfect replication of himself, which is the revelation of at least A.Paul and A.John.God the Father is the replication of nothing before Him. This being unoriginated cannot be replicated, because any replica that is caused to exist is originated, as we have discussed before. To dismiss this as inconsequential, you must thin down the concept of God's essence so that it does not include ungeneracy. Then "for all intents and purposes," as you put it, maybe He was.Using this logic: Adam was not born, his offspring were born therefore either Adam is not human or his offspring aren't human.

If God is unchangable, then things such as becoming Father or creator, must be relational attributes external to His person/personality. Ungeneracy is a relative/comparative attribute and therefore fits in the same basket. Basically, it adds nothing to the Father in His personal existence prior to the begetal of the Son (Of course there are those that believe the Father needed the Son and/or creation to be personally complete but I doubt you adhere to such an idea).

Relative does not equate to abstract.How is God your Father? Relativity requires abstraction or at least analogy to explain itself.

The OT says only YHWH is our judge, our lord and savior. The NT says Jesus is our judge, our lord and savior. Which will you have?Acts 17:31. Because he hath appointed a day, in the which he will judge the world in righteousness by that man whom he hath ordainedMoose raised a question to me, similar to what I proposed to you. His argument is that christians have two saviors not one and this conflicts with the OT. I agree with your cite of Titus 3:4-6. Though I explain it in the context of the personal relationship of the Son to the Father, and their unity of action/purpose. In regards to Acts 17:31, I read it in the context of Galatians 4:4-5, which explains the paticularity of "that man" as the Son of God, who was sent.

Thinking on one of Jesus' parables: Is the vine, the leaves upon its branches and the grapes upon them, three or one?Many of what? One of what?According to Jesus, there is neither one or many but a unity (Jn 15:5).

At Ps 82:1 it says YHWH "judges amoung the gods".God the Father is God absolute. He is THE God and there is no other (hu' ha'elohim v'ein `od, Deut. 4:35).I go with A.Paul at Ephesians 3:14-15;21;4:4-6.

Though it would seem Aseph hadn't read Deuteronomy 32:39.Undoubtedly the Seer Asaph (2 Chron. 29:30) understood the book of Deuteronomy better than anyone alive today.Possibly. Though it would seem that he considered anyone who had power over someone's life and death, such as the Judges and the King was a god.

Peace

[alam]

Hi Apostoli,

This line of discussion is moving ever farther off topic. With your kind indulgence I will discontinue it after this post.


Hi Alam,

No worries. I know how it can be...

I agree.

My view of revelation: I think of it as an uncovering. Thinking on the disciples - given a sufficient knowledge of the OT, it wasn't a gaint leap in faith to realise that Jesus was/is the promised Messiah. But even the disciples had their doubts (eg: Judas) and lacked a full understanding though they witnessed Jesus' works. What seems particularly hard for them was believing that Jesus' actual Father was God (cp Jn 14:8-11), even though Jesus went to great lengths to explain that this was so. This revelation is summed up by A.John when he says "These things are written that you might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that by believing, you might have life through his name" (Jn 20:31).

Below you make reference to Dt 13 & 18. In these texts one thing that stands out to me is the false revelations in question are by prophets who desire to draw the chosen into the false worship of the gods invented by men (the gods of the nations). If it can be demonstrated that the trinity teaching does this, then it should be rejected out of hand. However, imu of the orthodox teaching of the tri-unity, whereby God sent His only Son, I see a harmony between the OT & NT.

Dt 13 definitely gives a context why the religious in Jesus' time strived to have him stoned. Among the accusations raised against Jesus was he spoke and acted with absolute authority - he forgave sins by his own authority, and allowed others to do so by the authority of his own name. Whereas, under the Law, this was the exclusive privilege of YHWH.


The Law does not teach this.

Dt 18:18 is interesting. My Muslim friend Moose, who is prone to literalism is sure to put this into his armoury (Moose, if you are reading this, also have a look at Acts 6:8 to 7:60).

Probably why throughout Hebrew history, their hands are said to be driping with the blood of God's prophets (cp Acts 7:52-53). The testimony of the OT & NT is that the Jews were prone to idolatry, building temples and making the Law their god. One of the reasons Jesus told the religious leaders that their father was not Abraham but Satan.



your ambivalence toward the Old Testament, coupled with a lack of understanding of critical aspects of its narration, distresses me. The martyrdom of the holy prophets was not a consequence of the Deuteronomic Law being enforced as you seemed to imply - it never was enforced [that is, before the return from Babylonian Exile] except under the reign of king Josiah. The prophets were slain because they condemned idolatry, which was institutionalized in one form or another throughout most of the history of old Israel and Judah, as Moses' song (Deut. 32) had predicted.


Imu, revelation is demonstrated if it is consistent with the message and objectives we find in scripture. For instance: How do you reconcile YHWH being the husband of Israel, with Jesus being the bridegroom of the church?


Maybe Isaiah 62:5.




I'll attempt a synopsis of my opinion...

My starting point is based on Genesis & Exodus in the light of A.John. If no man has ever seen God, then who was the God that Abram, Isaac & Jacob saw and that declared Himself to Moses?

Judges 2:1 says it was the the angel of the Lord that made the Israelites leave Egypt and who made the covenant with their fathers. At Deut 6:23 & Gen 17:7-8 these things are attributed to YHWH. Particularly in Genesis, it is seen that this angel was seen as the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, though this might be qualified in the light of Judges 15:16,22-23 (cp. Gen 32:30).

Taking A.John at his word, it is evident that the experience of the OT prophets (including Moses) was not with God, but with the "one sent". I associate this emissary with the Son of God.

Sure.

John 14:7-10 says if you know him you know his Father, and he that sees Jesus sees the Father. This would appear to be totally consistent with Genesis & Exodus, whereby the "one sent", in his activity, is seen to be God by those who experienced him.


The "one sent" was not seen to be the one who sent him, but the representative of him who sent him.


Hence we get the formula describing the Son as God from God. The homoousia bit which you object to in the creeds, is a logical deduction. Given there is no activity of the Father that isn't attributed to the Son, and everything we can know about the Father is found in knowing the Son, if we are to say anything of the Father, it must be in the context of the revelation of the OT & NT activities. As everything the Father does, the Son does likewise, then only their persons can be differentiated.


I bolded everything above that I agree with. However, your "there is no activity of the Father that isn't attributed to the Son" must be false, because the Father's begetting the Son isn't attributed to the Son. And your "the homoousia bit which you object to...is a logical deduction" seems false because nothing in your following paragarph logically necessitates it.



Apparently there are several translation options = the Logos is 1. God, 2. a god, 3. divine 4. what God is. The first because of the "pros" in the grammar and vs2 is unacceptable, the 2nd within the context of the entire Gospel seems convoluted.

It does not seem convoluted to me, though for other reasons I don't agree with the WT rendering of Jn 1:1. These subjective verdicts cannot be supported by non-descript appeals to the context. Tell us what the specific context is and what it allows.


The 3rd is unacceptable as the Greek has a particular word for divine. So, given Col 1:19;2:9; Phil 2:6; Heb 1:3 etc, and the teachings within the Gospel, option 4 seems appropriate.


Option 4, which you glossed a la Massey, says that the predicate nominative theos is qualitative. Within this option there are shades of opinion. At minimum, your option 4 just means that the Logos has the quality of being "theos", whatever "theos" may mean in respect to the Logos.


The fact that "Only" and "True" are predications undermines your assertion. Either God is God (God without any superlative) or to be God is by some relativity that is specified by the predicate applied.

It doesn't undermine it, because I said it is logically equivalent. Do not ignore these distinctions. No change in truth value is created by the substitution of terms.



Using this logic: Adam was not born, his offspring were born therefore either Adam is not human or his offspring aren't human.


This is your own logic, because you want to conceive the Father and the Son in terms of Adam and Seth etc, as two exemplars of the same divine "species." So you must answer your own question. Is unoriginateness part of the particular essence of God the Father? If yes, then the generated Logos doesn't share it. If no, then God the Father merely "happens" to be unoriginate, but might as well have been begotten, Himself - just as Adam for "all practical purposes" - as far as his nature is concerned - might as well have been begotten, as his son was. Maybe there is an endless chain of gods (correction: endless chain of hypostases of God) behind the Father. You cannot show otherwise, as long as the focus is merely on our own subjective reality. If you don't want that, as I don't think you do, then we have to move beyond it.

If God is unchangable, then things such as becoming Father or creator, must be relational attributes external to His person/personality. Ungeneracy is a relative/comparative attribute and therefore fits in the same basket.


No, it doesn't. It is a negative attribute. It neither describes God in himself, nor any relation between God and creatures. It singles out some created condition, in this case generation, and says, "that does not apply to God."

Basically, it adds nothing to the Father in His personal existence prior to the begetal of the Son (Of course there are those that believe the Father needed the Son and/or creation to be personally complete but I doubt you adhere to such an idea).


I hope you do not, either.


The negative attributes of ungeneracy, incomposition, immutability, immortality and the rest, in and of themselves, add nothing to God, as we have discussed before. However, they are ways to purify our thoughts of unworthy concepts of God, and so draw nearer to the true God.



Moose raised a question to me, similar to what I proposed to you. His argument is that christians have two saviors not one and this conflicts with the OT.


This is not correct. As you are well aware, the OT teaches that YHWH, the principle of salvation, raised and empowerd subordinate saviors (moshi`im) from time to time as the agents of his work.


I agree with your cite of Titus 3:4-6. Though I explain it in the context of the personal relationship of the Son to the Father, and their unity of action/purpose. In regards to Acts 17:31, I read it in the context of Galatians 4:4-5, which explains the paticularity of "that man" as the Son of God, who was sent.


Ok.


According to Jesus, there is neither one or many but a unity (Jn 15:5).



No, you raised this issue. You asked if the vine and its grapes are three or one. One of what? Three of what? Of course they all are in a unity. But scripture doesn't dilute the oneness of the One God down to a mere unity of various components. Per my posts on the grammar of simple apposition, God the Father IS the only true God. The one God is not some composite of various entities, the way the grapevine is a composite of its elements.

But these are things we have discussed often before. If you do not remember what I wrote before, or remember but merely want to see me repeat myself, it gives me little incentive to cover the same ground again.

[apostoli]

Hi Alam,

With your kind indulgence I will discontinue [the discussion] after this post.No worries.

However, as you made some rather provocative statements, I'll reply to your post for the benefit of anyone reading this thread.

This line of discussion is moving ever farther off topic.All I've done is answer your questions & assertions. You have always been free to keep the conversation on topic.

these are things we have discussed often before. If you do not remember what I wrote before, or remember but merely want to see me repeat myself, it gives me little incentive to cover the same ground again.My archives go back a couple of years, so I'd rather you didn't repeat yourself. I have made an effort to present a different argument from previous discussions. It has been disappointing that you denigrate rather than educate on the things you disagee with, and only replied "OK" to things you agreed with, but which in context you should have found questionable. I can only assume you were too busy to think on what was said or did not understood what was being said.

Below you make reference to Dt 13 & 18...Dt 13 definitely gives a context why the religious in Jesus' time strived to have him stoned. Among the accusations raised against Jesus was he spoke and acted with absolute authority - he forgave sins by his own authority, and allowed others to do so by the authority of his own name. Whereas, under the Law, this was the exclusive privilege of YHWH.The Law does not teach this.The atonement sacrifices of Leviticus were offered by the high priest for the forgiveness of sin. They did not forgive sin. Only YHWH could do that!

In regards to Dt 13, the Law does teach that any false prophet be stoned. The religious teachers of Jesus' time rejected him as the prophet promised in Dt 18.

your ambivalence toward the Old TestamentI have the same ambivalnace as Jesus. Did God or Moses provide for divorce? According to Jesus it was not God. Also, Jesus declared himself Lord of the sabbath, and in the eyes of the religious leaders broke many of Moses' laws.

Under the Torah, people could not even come out with their own private dreams as justification for their private beliefs and practices. Idolatry in all forms is condemned and the condemnation was to be enforced, per the above chapters from Deuteronomy.Probably why throughout Hebrew history, their hands are said to be driping with the blood of God's prophets (cp Acts 7:52-53).your ambivalence toward the Old Testament coupled with a lack of understanding of critical aspects of its narration distresses me.A harsh judgement on Jesus teaching in Matthew 23.

The martyrdom of the holy prophets was not a consequence of the Deuteronomic Law being enforced as you seemed to imply...The prophets were slain because they condemned idolatry...As 2 Chronicles 24:18-21 indicates.

it never was enforced [that is, before the return from Babylonian Exile] except under the reign of king Josiah.Have you forgotten Jehoiada actions at 2 Chron 23:16-18, which occured sometime before Josiah was born. Notice the reference to David and the law of Moses in vs18.

Imu, revelation is demonstrated if it is consistent with the message and objectives we find in scripture. For instance: How do you reconcile YHWH being the husband of Israel, with Jesus being the bridegroom of the church?Maybe Isaiah 62:5.My question was a free thought. A topic I may eventually raise as a new thread.

Isa 62:4-5 seems to tie into 54:5-7. On comparison, Rom 7:2-4 & Gal 4:22-29, to me, raise a range of questions.

John 14:7-10 says if you know him you know his Father, and he that sees Jesus sees the Father. This would appear to be totally consistent with Genesis & Exodus, whereby the "one sent", in his activity, is seen to be God by those who experienced him.The "one sent" was not seen to be the one who sent himI agree.

but the representative of him who sent him.In the accounts in Genesis and Judges, the one sent was perceived to be God (the scriptural support already presented).

your "there is no activity of the Father that isn't attributed to the Son" must be false, because the Father's begetting the Son isn't attributed to the Son.Apologies on my word omission. My intent was: "there is no activity of the Father towards us that isn't attributed to the Son". You will note that all my posts in this thread have specified "to us".

And your "the homoousia bit which you object to...is a logical deduction" seems false because nothing in your following paragraph logically necessitates it.Even the ordinary, semi and extreme Arians thought Jesus, the Only-begotten God "in likeness" to the Father. Eunomius apology against the homoousians is the best I have read. We have discussed this in the past. Unfortunately, as was argued, to argue so, teaches polytheism.

For we acknowledge, according to the blessed Apostle John, that all things were begotten by [the Son], that Power of Creation being begotten together with him; whence he is the Only-begotten God to all Beings that are inferior to him, and that were made by him. For he alone was begotten and created by the Power of the Unbegotten God, and so became the most perfect of the subordinate Beings, and subservient for the Creation of all the rest, and for the performance of his Father's Will...For we acknowledgr the only-begotten God, our Lord Jesus, to be Incorruptible, and Immortal, and Wise, and Good; but we affirm that the Father is the Cause of his intire Being...We ought therefore to lay aside the Notion of Likeness as to Substance, and to embrace that of the Likeness of a Son to the Father, in agreement with his own words; that is, so to reduce the intire Cause and Origin of all to the One and Only Being, that the Son may be esteem'd subject to his Father...to connect the Operation with the Substance: since we judge of it by its Works, and know the Substance to be without beginning, simple, and without end: but the Operation not to be without beginning; for if it were, the Work it self would be without beginning also, as well as without end: since 'tis not possible for the Works to cease, and yet the Operation never to do so. For 'tis very childish, and the reasoning of a very weak Mind, to say the Operation is unbegotten, and without end...Wherefore if the Word of God demonstrates that his Will is his Operation, and not that his Substance is such; and that the Only-begotten subsisted by the Will of the Father; 'tis certainly necessary that the Son preserve this Likeness, not as to Substance, but as to Operation, which is also his Will. Whence also we ought to be persuaded to preserve that true Notion of his being his Father's Image...for in him were all things created, both things in Heaven, and things on Earth, visible and invisible. For therefore is he call'd, The Image of God. Now these words, All things were created in him, together with the Appellation of the First-born, do not give us the Character of an Unbegotten Substance : for here is nothing about Substance, but about that Operation whereby he, as a Son, performs all things."
http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/eunomius_apology01.htm

Apparently there are several translation options = the Logos is 1. God, 2. a god, 3. divine 4. what God is. The first because of the "pros" in the grammar and vs2 is unacceptable, the 2nd within the context of the entire Gospel seems convoluted. It does not seem convoluted to me, though for other reasons I don't agree with the WT rendering of Jn 1:1.These subjective verdicts cannot be supported by non-descript appeals to the context. Tell us what the specific context is and what it allows.In the context of your comment at the end of your post, I thought it unnecessary to rehash prior discussion. You know as well as I that none of what I have said is subjective and I invite you to reread prior discussion.

The 3rd is unacceptable as the Greek has a particular word for divine. So, given Col 1:19;2:9; Phil 2:6; Heb 1:3etc, and the teachings within the Gospel, option 4 seems appropriate.Option 4, which you glossed a la Massey, says that the predicate nominative theos is qualitative. Within this option there are shades of opinion. At minimum, your option 4 just means that the Logos has the quality of being "theos", whatever "theos" may mean in respect to the Logos.And if we acknowledge the logos as having the quality theos, then we end up with two Gods. This is the problem that the homoousians intended to avoid.

The fact that "Only" and "True" are predications undermines your assertion. Either God is God (God without any superlative) or to be God is by some relativity that is specified by the predicate applied.It doesn't undermine it, because I said it is logically equivalent. Do not ignore these distinctions. No change in truth value is created by the substitution of terms.Logically, by appling the superlative "true" you imply that there are other gods. There maybe false gods. There is an implication in the idea "son". I guess you can propose Jesus was/is a false god. Though, not even the most extreme Arian of the 4th thu 6th centuries put this idea forward. For to deny Jesus has like attributes to the Father is to deny Jesus is the Son of God. The Arians argued Jesus was the only begotten God.

Using this logic: Adam was not born, his offspring were born therefore either Adam is not human or his offspring aren't human.This is your own logic, because you want to conceive the Father and the Son in terms of Adam and Seth etc, as two exemplars of the same divine "species."It is your formula. All I have done is make the references neutral. If you reread my earlier posts in this thread I made the point that God is neither a genus nor a species but something higher. So your accusation is deflective, an avoidance of answer to, imo, the impracticality of your argument.

So you must answer your own question. Is unoriginateness part of the particular essence of God the Father? If yes, then the generated Logos doesn't share it.Consistently I have said to be unoriginate is not part of the essence of God. It is a personal attribute of the Father, external to his personal existence.

If no, then God the Father merely "happens" to be unoriginate, but might as well have been begotten, Himself just as Adam for "all practical purposes" - as far as his nature is concerned - might as well have been begotten, as his son was.Your remarks are churdish, and beneath your education in philosophy. They are simply appealing to the physical world, and the type of illogic that Aristotle refuted. A.Paul argued that apart from the physical world there is the spiritual.

Maybe there is an endless chain of gods (correction: endless chain of hypostases of God) behind the Father.Why? If God is omnipotent, then undoubtedly He can cause a replication of His ousia when He begot another being.

You cannot show otherwise, as long as the focus is merely on our own subjective reality.My reality is that expounded by the scriptures. My explanations may be flawed, but I simply seek a practical way of expressing myself without appeal to conflicting philosophic speculation. As even Eunomius asserted, the Son is like the Father in his operation. And that operation was originate. As I stated in an earlier post you either believe God is detached from creation, contemplating only himself, as the ancient Greek philosophers argued or (to which I add) you believe His operation in creation is active and originate.

If God is unchangable, then things such as becoming Father or creator, must be relational attributes external to His person/personality. Ungeneracy is a relative/comparative attribute and therefore fits in the same basket. Basically, it adds nothing to the Father in His personal existence prior to the begetal of the Son.No, it doesn't. It is a negative attribute. It neither describes God in himself, nor any relation between God and creatures. It singles out some created condition, in this case generation, and says, "that does not apply to God."You avoided the first premise which supports the second, and made no response to the conclusion. Instead you made an unsupported assertion based on personal opinion, in what I presume was an effort to avoid answering the first premise.

According to Jesus, there is neither one or many but a unity (Jn 15:5).No, you raised this issue. You asked if the vine and its grapes are three or one. [And I replied] One of what? Three of what?You were free to have answered "unity", or the relational of perspective. In post #40, I said "Thinking on one of Jesus' parables" and my context was in the two previous paragaphs of my reply - most particularly "Aristotle who observed that there is more to a thing than what we perceive." I presume you didn't bother to read my reference to 1 Corinthians 6:16-17.

Of course they all are in a unity. But scripture doesn't dilute the oneness of the One God down to a mere unity of various components. Per my posts on the grammar of simple apposition, God the Father IS the only true God. The one God is not some composite of various entities, the way the grapevine is a composite of its elements.Harking back to my original post in this thead: Your argument only works if you hold that God is an object.

If you were less focused on forcing your opinion, you might have noticed that at Jn 15:1 Jesus refers to himself as the vine and the Father as the vinedresser. From which you could have derived a reasonable retort. However, the unity that Jesus speaks of is that of His Father's works, the Son's function, the Church's dependence on the Son for it's life and the fruit that is born. From your response, you seem to wish to exclude the Father from this unity.

Peace

[alam]

You have always been free to keep the conversation on topic.


Not being a moderator, the only respect in which I have that freedom is by not responding to messages that would misdirect the thread. I feared yours might from almost the beginning, and you have unfortunately delivered. You have given no indication of understanding the argument in post #12 and your subsequent postings have missed the issues it deals with by a wide margin.


You said you think I am only interested in forcing my view. That is certainly untrue. I am interested in receiving reasonable responses to my view, and in that event, responding well. My earlier discussion with RP tends to bear that out.


One other thing comes to mind from your post, where you wrote:


My explanations may be flawed, but I simply seek a practical way of expressing myself without appeal to conflicting philosophic speculation.



I think this is part of the problem. You don't use the terms and the forms of argument everyone else who talks about theology at this level uses, but import idiosyncratic categories that may seem more practical to you, but not to me and probably not to many others. You are trying to reinvent the wheel. One might think they can achieve greater clarity or universality in shunning philosophically accepted terms and methods of argument, but it is the other way around. This is something I wish more unitarians realized as well. Whereas the intelligibility of the former may be restricted to people who have studied a bit of philosophy, the intelligibility of the latter may not go beyond your own mind or subjective experiences which are completely individual to you. My increasing effort to study these issues from an analytic perspective is due to my awareness of this pitfall.


The purpose of these threads is to inspect certain titles of divinity such as "theos pater" in light of Wallace on the semantics of simple apposition. The discussion of logical consequences of this, as well as criticism of my method, my reading of Wallace, or of Wallace's text itself may also be called for. I still solicit such responses from you and from all other forum contributors who are interested in this subject.

[apostoli]

Hi Alam,

Lets both vent, shake hands and get back to it ;-)

In this conversation I don't wish to focus on the trinity (though it is hard to avoid it) but rather what it means to be "theos pater". Here I'm not pushing any particular barrow. Just exploring avenues of thought.Yes, the meaning of the term "theos pater" in light of Wallace on the semantics of simple apposition is the real topic of the thread.Howie's response (post #8) in your original thread would seem to have addressed Wallace as do your first two paragraphs in post #12 in this thread. So, I am a little lost regarding your intent here in "unorthodox theology" from RP's posts in the original thread, it seems you are not intent to discuss grammar here (?)

You said you think I am only interested in forcing my view. That is certainly untrue. I am interested in receiving reasonable responses to my view, and in that event, responding well. My earlier discussion with RP tends to bear that out.I acknowledge that. My exact words were "If you were less focused on forcing your opinion". I should have added "to me". Possibly, you see the need with me given our long association. However, if you reflect back on the last couple of your posts, you seemed to jump at shadows and issue rhetoric that had no relevance to what I had actually posted.

You have given no indication of understanding the argument in post #12 and your subsequent postings have missed the issues it deals with by a wide margin.I was being polite. Your post #12 is flawed, and full of weighted logic. For instance...

According to many Homousians, "The Father is God," "the Son is God," and "there is only one God" do not entail Sabellianism – that the Father is the Son – because the is used in the first two statements is that of predication. So in their view, "while Jesus is God, it is not true that God is Jesus," since "the person we call Jesus does not exhaust the category of Deity"To use a neutral example: There is no contradiction in saying Peter is a man, Paul is a man and John is a man but there is absurdity in concluding Peter is Paul etc, but no absurdity in concluding Peter, Paul and John are each a man.None of this answers post #12 etc.By substituting man for god as the premise your rhetoric leading to forced conclusions is neutralised.

Sabellianism requires that the Father is the Son. Homousians say the Father is not the Son - the Father and Son are distinct persons but both are by nature/essence/substance God. The 4th century issue was whether or not God it was proper to say God had an immaterial substance.

The extreme Arian Eunomius says "'tis certainly necessary that the Son preserve this Likeness [to the Father], not as to Substance, but as to Operation". A flaw in Eunomius' argument is that Sabellians would agree, as to them God is known from his operations (modes).

in John 17:3 we have an implicit identity statement: God the Father = the only true God. If the Son of God likewise = the only true God, it follows from transitivity of identity (the principle that if A = B and B = C, then A = C) that the Father is the Son.Your conclusion is dependent on the formula being ambiguous. Your formula A=B might mean Father=Son, so your conclusion would start with a weighted premise. Applying the law of non-contradiction we find no conflict: where A=B in respect of C then B=C & A=C. If C is not common to A & B then A does not equal B. In this regard see the bold bit in my first cite of Hengel below.

I think...part of the problem. You don't use the terms and the forms of argument everyone else who talks about theology at this level uses, but import idiosyncratic categories that may seem more practical to you, but not to me and probably not to many others.A valid criticism. Though you may find much of what I have written follows Hengel, Locke and others. I'll avoid use of my own words, and instead quote the philosophers.

The following cite may shed some light on my previous posts.

The togetherness of both predicates is held asunder by the 'in so far', namely, when it is said that two things are alike in so far as they are not unlike, or on the one side or in one respect are alike, but on another side or in another respect are unalike. The effect of this is to remove the unity of likeness and unlikeness from the thing, and to adhere to what would be the thing's own reflection and the merely implicit reflection of likeness and unlikeness, as a reflection external to the thing. But it is this reflection that, in one and the same activity, distinguishes the two sides of likeness and unlikeness, hence contains both in one activity, lets the one show, be reflected, in the other. But the usual tenderness for things, whose only care is that they do not contradict themselves, forgets here as elsewhere that in this way the contradiction is not resolved but merely shifted elsewhere, into subjective or external reflection generally, and this reflection in fact contains in one unity as sublated and mutually referred, the two moments which are enunciated by this removal and displacement as a mere positedness.
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlessenc.htm#HL2_422

You are trying to reinvent the wheel.Possibly, though I have company. Consider the conflict between Quantum Theory and Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-idind/

The original thread had a specific focus, it was to illustrate that God the Father and God the Son, if that expression can be justified, are not the same God. [RP] I can see how you might get around that by suggesting that besides the God who is (identity, not predication) the Father and the God who is the Son, there is a God which is (identity, not predication) the nature of the Father.The cite of Hengel given above addresses your conclusion. As may the law of Identity. Your conclusion would deprive the Father the ability of introspection and therefore personal identity.

In diversity, as the indifference of difference, reflection has become, in general, external to itself; difference is merely a posited or sublated being, but it is itself the total reflection. When considered more closely, both identity and difference, as has just been demonstrated, are reflections, each of which is unity of itself and its other; each is the whole. Consequently, the determinateness in which they are only identity or only difference, is sublated. Therefore they are not qualities, because through the reflection-into-self, their determinateness is at the same time only a negation. What is present, therefore, is this duality, reflection-into-self as such, and determinateness as negation or positedness. Positedness is the reflection that is external to itself; it is the negation as negation-and so therefore in itself or simplicity, the self-related negation and reflection-into-self, but only implicitly; it is relation to the negation as something external to it.

Thus the reflection that is implicit, and external reflection, are the two determinations into which the moments of difference, namely, identity and difference, posited themselves. They are these moments themselves in so far as they have now determined themselves. Reflection in itself is identity, but determined as being indifferent to difference, not as simply not possessing difference, but as being self-identical in its relationship with it; it is diversity. It is identity that has so reflected itself into itself that it is really the one reflection of the two moments into themselves; both are reflections-into-self. Identity is this one reflection of both, which contains difference only as an indifferent difference and is simply diversity. External reflection, on the other hand, is their determinate difference, not as an absolute reflection-into-self, but as a determination to which the [merely] implicit reflection is indifferent; difference's two moments, identity and difference itself, are thus externally posited determinations, not determinations in and for themselves...But by this separation of one from the other they merely sublate themselves. The very thing that was supposed to hold off contradiction and dissolution from them, namely, that something is like something else in one respect, but is unlike it in another - this holding apart of likeness and unlikeness is their destruction. For both are determinations of difference; they are relations to one another, the one being what the other is not; like is not unlike and unlike is not like; and both essentially have this relation and have no meaning apart from it; as determinations of difference, each is what it is as distinct from its other. But through this mutual indifference, likeness is only self-referred, and unlikeness similarly is self-referred and a reflective determination on its own; each, therefore, is like itself; the difference has vanished, since they cannot have any determinateness over against one another; in other words, each therefore is only likeness.

Peace

[alam]

Hi Apostoli,

I acknowledge that. My exact words were "If you were less focused on forcing your opinion". I should have added "to me". Possibly, you see the need with me given our long association. However, if you reflect back on the last couple of your posts, you seemed to jump at shadows and issue rhetoric that had no relevance to what I had actually posted.

I am not interested in forcing my opinions on you. I don't care much whether you share my opinions at the end of the day. Unfortunately I suspect it is the other way around. You seem to keep seeing bases of dissent where there are none, while missing or misrepresenting the arguments I actually make. This is not just in your last couple posts, but for most of the thread. I've kept a uniformly civil tone, but have certainly objected, and will continue to object when you slip in groundless loaded comments, like me "manipulating" this or that.


I wonder whether your recent focus on my argument "forcing" this or that or me trying to "force" you to believe reflects your discovery that my argument, for what it's worth, is indeed pretty solid and forceful.



I was being polite. Your post #12 is flawed, and full of weighted logic.

That is a strong verdict - I hope to find some substance behind it.

According to many Homousians, "The Father is God," "the Son is God," and "there is only one God" do not entail Sabellianism – that the Father is the Son – because the is used in the first two statements is that of predication. So in their view, "while Jesus is God, it is not true that God is Jesus," since "the person we call Jesus does not exhaust the category of Deity"
To use a neutral example: There is no contradiction in saying Peter is a man, Paul is a man and John is a man but there is absurdity in concluding Peter is Paul etc, but no absurdity in concluding Peter, Paul and John are each a man.
None of this answers post #12 etc.

You seem to think that my statement: "According to many Homousians, "The Father is God," "the Son is God," and "there is only one God" do not entail Sabellianism – that the Father is the Son – because the is used in the first two statements is that of predication. So in their view, "while Jesus is God, it is not true that God is Jesus," since "the person we call Jesus does not exhaust the category of Deity" is somehow meant as an argument, when it is not. Here I'm only stating what the Homoousian position actually is. If you think it does not state the Homoousian position, then you're at odds with the Homoousian authors, Wallace and Harris quoted for it.

As your retort to what was not actually meant as an argument, you said,

"To use a neutral example: There is no contradiction in saying Peter is a man, Paul is a man and John is a man but there is absurdity in concluding Peter is Paul etc, but no absurdity in concluding Peter, Paul and John are each a man"

That's true as far as it goes, but it does not contradict the bit from my post you quoted. Nor does it do anything toward refuting that post's real argument. Thus, I wrote,

"None of this answers post #12 etc"

To which you respond:

By substituting man for god as the premise your rhetoric leading to forced conclusions is neutralised.


I don't know what you're talking about here. Your claim about my "rhetoric leading to forced conclusions" is without foundation.


Sabellianism requires that the Father is the Son. Homousians say the Father is not the Son - the Father and Son are distinct persons but both are by nature/essence/substance God. The 4th century issue was whether or not God it was proper to say God had an immaterial substance.

The extreme Arian Eunomius says "'tis certainly necessary that the Son preserve this Likeness [to the Father], not as to Substance, but as to Operation". A flaw in Eunomius' argument is that Sabellians would agree, as to them God is known from his operations (modes).

You're lecturing about things I already know, and which, again, miss the point of post #12 by a wide margin.

in John 17:3we have an implicit identity statement: God the Father = the only true God. If the Son of God likewise = the only true God, it follows from transitivity of identity (the principle that if A = B and B = C, then A = C) that the Father is the Son.
Your conclusion is dependent on the formula being ambiguous. Your formula A=B might mean Father=Son, so your conclusion would start with a weighted premise. Applying the law of non-contradiction we find no conflict: where A=B in respect of C then B=C & A=C. If C is not common to A & B then A does not equal B. In this regard see the bold bit in my first cite of Hengel below.

You did not carefully read what you cited in the context of the post. If God the Father (A) = the only true God (B) and the only true God (B) = the Son (C) [(A = B & B = C)] then by transitivity of identity the Father (A) = the Son (C). This is obviously false. Thus, by a modus tollens inference, we derive that the Father and the Son are not both the only true God [~(A = B & C = B)], from which we can derive that either the Father or the Son is not the only true God [~(A = B) v ~(C = B)]. We do know from John 17:3 that the Father = the only true God. Thus, we are left with the conclusion that the Son is not the only true God. Anyone who has taken a symbolic logic course can identify and follow this logic. It is not affected by what you quoted from Hegel.

[edit: I was wondering why I'd never heard of a "Hengel" writing on logic. It's Hegel Apostoli.]



Yes, the meaning of the term "theos pater" in light of Wallace on the semantics of simple apposition is the real topic of the thread.

Howie's response (post #8) in your original thread would seem to have addressed Wallace as do your first two paragraphs in post #12 in this thread. So, I am a little lost regarding your intent here in "unorthodox theology" from RP's posts in the original thread, it seems you are not intent to discuss grammar here (?)

Howie imparted valuable information, and he explained the reticence of the learned folk on biblical languages to comment on this topic. The purpose of the thread is: "the meaning of the term "theos pater" in light of Wallace on the semantics of simple apposition ".

So it looks to me like your initial claim that

Your post #12 is flawed, and full of weighted logic

has not been borne out. The flaws and weighted illogic in your own post lead me to wonder whether you're playing the sophist again. If so, the game's up. :smile:

Best,

[apostoli]

Hi Alam,

At this stage, I have no incentive to continue this conversation. Thankyou for your time.

[I] wonder whether you're playing the sophist again. If so, the game's up.Not at all. My intention was to explore whether the philosophies of computer system design provide a reasonable explanation of the Trinity. I had thought so, until the other day. Then I reread Eunomius and said to myself "oops" ;-)

But having reread Eunomius, I am reminded how the homoousia argument avoids Bi/Tri theism.

I wonder whether your recent focus on my argument "forcing" this or that or me trying to "force" you to believe reflects your discovery that my argument, for what it's worth, is indeed pretty solid and forceful.Today I reread through this and the original thread. I simply don't see your overall argument as reaching a natural conclusion in regards to the homoousia clause. Your posts did cause me to go back and reread the Creeds. Possibly, you may have an argument regarding the clause "true God from true God" (something I need to ponder).

Where we do agree is that the Father of Jesus is the only true God. And to my knowledge, both the RC & EOC catechisms teach the same thing. Where we disagree, is whether being God is exclusive to the Father. Following Hegel's Law of Diversity, by saying the Son is like the Father, we can only say he is unlike from the viewpoint of the Father looking outward.


In a nutshell, if the identity of reference implied by simple apposition is of such sort as to warrant the application of transitivity of identity, then if the title "God the Father" implies that there is a God such that God IS (identity, not predication) the Father, then if the Son likewise IS this God, then by transitivity of identity the Father IS the Son. This is an argument for modalism.

On the other hand, if modalism is unacceptable on other grounds, and the Son nevertheless IS a God, then the God who IS the Father and the God who IS the Son are not identical.

As it seems to me, this is an argument for ditheism or Arianism.

Either way, it wouldn't bode well for the classic view of the trinity.

I'd appreciate your further thoughts on the grammatical or exegetical aspects of the question, or those of others.

...exactly the same phrase that you raise here, occurs in the original Greek text of the Nicene creed, as adopted in 381 AD. The text of this creed reads as follows:

PISTEUW hEIS ENA QEON PATERA PANTO KRATORA

Yet surely you are not going to deny that the authors of this creed were trinitarians? Doesn't this conclusively disprove your claim?


I'm not certain that the term theos had acquired a transpersonal sense by the time of Nicaea.

The transpersonal meaning is very much a Western idea, found in Augustine and later writers in Latin.But what emerges if theos is not "transpersonal" or somehow able to include multiple persons is this. If the Father and the Son were the same theos they'd necessarily also be the same Person. If the term theos is of solely personal application it only confirms the application of the formulae; the God who is the Father = the Person of the Father.

Notice the Nicene creed doesn't say that they are the same theos, but the same ousia.

But even if we accept that theos had aquired a distinct sense by this time, my example still refutes your claim, because otherwise the creed would imply that the Father was transpersonal also, if the strict formula A=B and B=A applies.
So clearly the grammar of the Greek in this case is different to what you claim.Which is obviously wrong, therefore theos had not acquired a transpersonal sense by the time of Nicaea, which is what I generally indicated.

I think you're not getting the scope of my "claim" (which was really a question, as I put it on this thread). It is not directed at/against homoousianism in all possible manifestations, only at the particular, and I should add dominant branch which adheres to this schema of the trinity. (follow link)

You can say that the folks at Nicaea or EO use the term "God the Father" and they don't agree with me (in general, on the subject of divine ousiai, etc.) but that is not the same as showing they would have disagreed with me on this specific point: that the God Who is the Father = the Person of the Father. Hence it's not a counter example.

Yes but doesn't that entail that the verses you cited originally are not evidence against the trinity either, at least in its Eastern form? In other words, if exactly the same grammatical structure is found in an unambiguously trinitarian document, then either the phrase in question doesn't necessarily count against the trinity, or the grammar has changed.

If your point is that the Western view of the trinity is wrong, and you want to use these verses to support that claim, then - I agree with you!

It could only be the nature of the Father principially, else the Son and the Spirit would be epiphenomena of the Father stripped of their own being.

I think the East would think in terms which are parallel to the relationship between a "human person" and a "human substance" or "human nature". Let us take Adam, who stands in relation to the human race much as God the Father stands in relation to the other persons of the trinity. It would be absurd to say that Adam was primarily a "human substance" rather than a person. The East would also deny that there is a "human substance" that comes prior to the person Adam. Rather, the "human substance" is given in the person Adam. It is this human substance which we all share, which we inherit from Adam. We are distinct individual persons, but we are "one substance" in our humanity. Nonetheless that substance was not an abstract form that existed independently of Adam; it was given in Adam, and in a real sense, we all share Adam's nature (in fact, the Hebrew word 'adam means both the individual person, Adam, and also means "human"). This is why the NT describes everyone who is not "in Christ" as being "in Adam".



Peace

[alam]

Hi Apostoli.


Hi Alam,

At this stage, I have no incentive to continue this conversation. Thankyou for your time.


Not at all. My intention was to explore whether the philosophies of computer system design provide a reasonable explanation of the Trinity. I had thought so, until the other day. Then I reread Eunomius and said to myself "oops" ;-)

But having reread Eunomius, I am reminded how the homoousia argument avoids Bi/Tri theism.


Today I reread through this and the original thread. I simply don't see your overall argument as reaching a natural conclusion in regards to the homoousia clause.


That is because it's not about the homousion. It is about a claim made by many homoousians - that the Father and the Son are the same God. If, as RP suggested, the eastern orthodox don't claim that, then the argument in post #12 etc does not affect their thinking. I acknowledged this on the original thread.


Your posts did cause me to go back and reread the Creeds. Possibly, you may have an argument regarding the clause "true God from true God" (something I need to ponder).


Where we do agree is that the Father of Jesus is the only true God.


We can only agree on that provided that we agree that God the Father is one and the same as the only true God. The Father is not a mere part, an aspect or a "person[ality]" of the only true God


And to my knowledge, both the RC & EOC catechisms teach the same thing.


Maybe the EO, if RP correctly related their view. The RC catechism - not in a million years. :hehe:


Where we disagree, is whether being God is exclusive to the Father.


"God" in the scriptures is an equivocal term, though there seems to be a drive to suppress that, nowadays. I would say that being theos in the sense that the Father is theos is exclusive to the Father. Being theos in the sense that the Son is theos is exclusive to the Son.


Following Hegel's Law of Diversity, by saying the Son is like the Father, we can only say he is unlike from the viewpoint of the Father looking outward.


Interesting stuff.


Best,

[apostoli]

Hi Alam,

Today I reread through this and the original thread. I simply don't see your overall argument as reaching a natural conclusion in regards to the homoousia clause.That is because it's not about the homousion. It is about a claim made by many homoousians - that the Father and the Son are the same God.Thanks for clarifying.

What I had understood your intent was to show the Son is not the same identity/person as the Father, and the Father is not the same God as the Son (see bottom of this post)

If, as RP suggested, the eastern orthodox don't claim that, then the argument in post #12 etc does not affect their thinking. I acknowledged this on the original thread.I'd suggest that in regards to the formula "true God from true God" the RCC mainstream are in agreement with the EOC (see below).

Where we do agree is that the Father of Jesus is the only true God.We can only agree on that provided that we agree that God the Father is one and the same as the only true God. The Father is not a mere part, an aspect or a "person[ality]" of the only true GodThe bit in bold I find a little vague (no criticism intended).

To me an "aspect" could imply a manifestation or emanation as might personality. I've read that Basil went out of his way to avoid using the word prosopon and like vagaries of language in his writings so as to stop anyone accusing him of suggesting anything in semblance to the idea of "the actors mask" = Sabellianism. Imu, the technical terminology is along the lines of there are three distinct identities in the Godhead, each of whom in essence/nature are fully God.

A RCC source that matches what I was taught at school says "Jesus frequently calls God "Father" in the Scriptures, and this usage implies a loving God active within His creation. God the Father is the first person, or distinction, within the Godhead. The Father is in a sense the "origin" or "source" of the Trinity. God the Father is often called "God Unbegotten" in early Christian thought.
http://www.ancient-future.net/nicene.html

Where I differ with the author is I would have omitted the words "in a sense" and have said emphatically that "the Father is the source and cause of the Son". It is in this regard that I see the Father as being acclaimed as "true God".

And to my knowledge, both the RC & EOC catechisms teach the same thing.Maybe the EO, if RP correctly related their view. The RC catechism - not in a million years.The RCC Catechism does give mixed messages such as citing the Lateran Council IV "We firmly believe and confess without reservation that there is only one true God, eternal infinite (immensus) and unchangeable, incomprehensible, almighty and ineffable, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; three persons indeed, but one essence, substance or nature entirely simple." However, from a full read of the Cathecism you might find "not in a million years" is not precisely true of RCC teaching.

The Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, in the aticle, The Father as the Source of the Whole Trinity, says...
"The Father alone is the principle without principle (arche anarchos) of the two other persons of the Trinity, the sole source (peghe) of the Son and of the Holy Spirit."
http://www.catholicculture.org/library/view.cfm?recnum=1176

Something I've only recently become aware: "In the Byzantine period the Orthodox side accused the Latin speaking Christians, who supported the Filioque, of introducing two Gods, precisely because they believed that the Filioque implied two causes--not simply two sources or principles--in the Holy Trinity. The Greek Patristic tradition, at least since the Cappadocian Fathers, identified the one God with the person of the Father, whereas, St. Augustine seems to identify Him with the one divine substance (the deitas or divinitas).

It is of course true that, as the Vatican document points out, the Fourth Lateran Council excludes any interpretation that would make divine substance the source or cause, of the Son's generation and the, Spirit's procession. And yet the Cappadocian idea of "cause" seems to be almost absent in the Latin theological tradition."
http://www.orthodoxresearchinstitute.org/articles/dogmatics/john_zizioulas_single_source.htm

Where we disagree, is whether being God is exclusive to the Father."God" in the scriptures is an equivocal term, though there seems to be a drive to suppress that, nowadays. I would say that being theos in the sense that the Father is theos is exclusive to the Father. Being theos in the sense that the Son is theos is exclusive to the Son.In a sense I agree with you. But then it seems we either have two Gods or two types of God. Ignoring the word
homoousia and accepting the post Nicene explanations of what it is meant to communicate seems to resolve the problem.

Following Hegel's Law of Diversity, by saying the Son is like the Father, we can only say he is unlike from the viewpoint of the Father looking outward.Interesting stuff.Indeed. Very interesting. The same principle seems to apply to Jesus' humanity.

Peace

[apostoli]

Hi Alam,

it may be that a more accurate rendering of theos pater is “Father God” (similar to “Christ Jesus” which precedes it in 1:1). It should also be noted that in Galatians 1:3 the writer uses another interesting turn of phrase regarding pater and theos as does the writer of Thessalonians in 1:3 of that epistle. These verses also shed light on the meaning of theos paterJust as a hindsight on Howie's comment: comparing Gal 1:1 & Gal 1:3, I encountered a curiosity...

The KJV, RSV, ASV & NEB render Gal 1:3 "from God the Father and our Lord Jesus Christ". However, they render Eph 1:2 "from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ". The NASB, NIV & NWT has Gal 1:2 consistent with Eph 1:2 (both reading "God our Father"). So I had a look at Nestle's 1904 recession of the Greek for both verses, which agrees with W&H rendition given in the NWT Interlinear. It seems there is a variant rendering of the Greek in the Received Text, where "to us/our" occurs after the word "Lord" whereas in the recession "to us/our" occurs after the word "Father".

This caused me to rethink on your original proposition for convertible propositions, i.e. theos is patēr and patēr is theos.

I think it is true to say God = our Father, therefore Our Father = God, but not true to say Father = God. Likewise, it is true to say Jesus Christ = our Lord, therefore Our Lord = Jesus Christ but not true to say Lord = Jesus Christ.

On face value, I don't think the vagaries of language resolve your inquiry. Ultimately, I suggest theology has to be allowed to mediate. For instance: whereas in the OT it was YHWH that was both God and Lord, in the NT we have an apparent division of the Monad that needs to be reconciled.

Peace

[alam]

Hi Apostoli,


There must be Nicenes on these forums who want to discuss such issues - the filioque, substance and causation in the trinity, the Gregories, Augustine, Photius et al. You may want to seek them for the purpose of conversation on such topics.

That is because it's not about the homousion. It is about a claim made by many homoousians - that the Father and the Son are the same God.

Hi Alam,

Thanks for clarifying.

What I had understood your intent was to show the Son is not the same identity/person as the Father, and the Father is not the same God as the Son (see bottom of this post)


What I am arguing here is that the Father and the Son are not the same God.


I'd suggest that in regards to the formula "true God from true God" the RCC mainstream are in agreement with the EOC (see below).

Ok.


We can only agree on that provided that we agree that God the Father is one and the same as the only true God. The Father is not a mere part, an aspect or a "person[ality]" of the only true God

The bit in bold I find a little vague (no criticism intended).


Ok.


To me an "aspect" could imply a manifestation or emanation as might personality. I've read that Basil went out of his way to avoid using the word prosopon and like vagaries of language in his writings so as to stop anyone accusing him of suggesting anything in semblance to the idea of "the actors mask" = Sabellianism. Imu, the technical terminology is along the lines of there are three distinct identities in the Godhead, each of whom in essence/nature are fully God.

A RCC source that matches what I was taught at school says "Jesus frequently calls God "Father" in the Scriptures, and this usage implies a loving God active within His creation. God the Father is the first person, or distinction, within the Godhead. The Father is in a sense the "origin" or "source" of the Trinity. God the Father is often called "God Unbegotten" in early Christian thought.
http://www.ancient-future.net/nicene.html


Ok!


Where I differ with the author is I would have omitted the words "in a sense" and have said emphatically that "the Father is the source and cause of the Son".


We agree on this, as before.


The RCC Catechism does give mixed messages such as citing the Lateran Council IV "We firmly believe and confess without reservation that there is only one true God, eternal infinite (immensus) and unchangeable, incomprehensible, almighty and ineffable, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; three persons indeed, but one essence, substance or nature entirely simple." However, from a full read of the Cathecism you might find "not in a million years" is not precisely true of RCC teaching.


You're right in the sense that given a million years, maybe the RCs will become unitarian. :wink:

However, when they say that "there is only one true God, eternal infinite (immensus) and unchangeable, incomprehensible, almighty and ineffable, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit;" whereas my argument in post #12 shows that the Father IS, in the sense of identity, the only true God, the views are irreconcilable.




The Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, in the aticle, The Father as the Source of the Whole Trinity, says...
"The Father alone is the principle without principle (arche anarchos) of the two other persons of the Trinity, the sole source (peghe) of the Son and of the Holy Spirit."
http://www.catholicculture.org/library/view.cfm?recnum=1176

Something I've only recently become aware: "In the Byzantine period the Orthodox side accused the Latin speaking Christians, who supported the Filioque, of introducing two Gods, precisely because they believed that the Filioque implied two causes--not simply two sources or principles--in the Holy Trinity. The Greek Patristic tradition, at least since the Cappadocian Fathers, identified the one God with the person of the Father, whereas, St. Augustine seems to identify Him with the one divine substance (the deitas or divinitas).

It is of course true that, as the Vatican document points out, the Fourth Lateran Council excludes any interpretation that would make divine substance the source or cause, of the Son's generation and the, Spirit's procession. And yet the Cappadocian idea of "cause" seems to be almost absent in the Latin theological tradition."
http://www.orthodoxresearchinstitute.org/articles/dogmatics/john_zizioulas_single_source.htm


Ok...


In a sense I agree with you. But then it seems we either have two Gods or two types of God.


In terms of the original languages, there are a lot more than two types of "God." Judges, angels and idols are called "elohim" or "elim". You must know this, given our past discussions. Otherwise, I agree with your second alternative. The Logos, the monogenhs theos, is in a class all his own. The Father too is in a class of his own.



Ignoring the word
homoousia and accepting the post Nicene explanations of what it is meant to communicate seems to resolve the problem.

Indeed. Very interesting. The same principle seems to apply to Jesus' humanity.


If you think this is relevant to the topic, you should explain.


Best,

[alam]

Hi Alam,

Just as a hindsight on Howie's comment: comparing Gal 1:1 & Gal 1:3, I encountered a curiosity...

The KJV, RSV, ASV & NEB render Gal 1:3 "from God the Father and our Lord Jesus Christ". However, they render Eph 1:2 "from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ". The NASB, NIV & NWT has Gal 1:2 consistent with Eph 1:2 (both reading "God our Father"). So I had a look at Nestle's 1904 recession of the Greek for both verses, which agrees with W&H rendition given in the NWT Interlinear. It seems there is a variant rendering of the Greek in the Received Text, where "to us/our" occurs after the word "Lord" whereas in the recession "to us/our" occurs after the word "Father".


There are places in the NT where theos and patēr are in apposition w/out any qualification such as "our". An example of this would be Galatians 1:1 in the very chapter you're referring to.


This caused me to rethink on your original proposition for convertible propositions, i.e. theos is patēr and patēr is theos.

I think it is true to say God = our Father, therefore Our Father = God, but not true to say Father = God. Likewise, it is true to say Jesus Christ = our Lord, therefore Our Lord = Jesus Christ but not true to say Lord = Jesus Christ.


It is not true that any Lord = Jesus, just as it is not true that any god = the Father. Instead, the Lord that is Jesus = Jesus, and that the God that is the Father = the Father. Just as the apostle that is Peter = Peter, something I specified on the original thread. The point is that the copula "is" in each case signifies IDENTITY rather than predication. Please refer to post 12 and those on the original thread.

[apostoli]

Hi Alam,

I will reply more fully later. Bit busy at the moment

There are places in the NT where theos and patēr are in apposition w/out any qualification such as "our". An example of this would be Galatians 1:1 in the very chapter you're referring to.

It is not true that any Lord = Jesus, just as it is not true that any god = the Father. Instead, the Lord that is Jesus = Jesus, and that the God that is the Father = the Father. Just as the apostle that is Peter = Peter, something I specified on the original thread. The point is that the copula "is" in each case signifies IDENTITY rather than predication. Please refer to post 12 and those on the original thread.My earlier revision of opinion was based on a footnote in Wallace's article "THE SEMANTICS AND EXEGETICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OBJECT-COMPLEMENT CONSTRUCTION IN THE NEW TESTAMENT"
http://faculty.gordon.edu/hu/bi/Ted_Hildebrandt/New_Testament_Greek/Text/Wallace-Semantics-GTJ.pdf.

I acknowledge what you say about theos pater. However, in common language this is no different (imo) to saying Queen Elizabeth. To me the terminology does not imply unique identity. Unique identity is experienced by personal attachment - the - this is to me.

We, who have Adam as an ancestor have in different respects many fathers, but ultimately as cause only one = the Son but as ultimate source, an absolute one = the Father. For example: my father's father is the source of me but my father is the cause of me.

Peace

[alam]

Hi Alam,

I will reply more fully later. Bit busy at the moment

No rush at all.

My earlier revision of opinion was based on a footnote in Wallace's article "THE SEMANTICS AND EXEGETICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OBJECT-COMPLEMENT CONSTRUCTION IN THE NEW TESTAMENT"
http://faculty.gordon.edu/hu/bi/Ted_Hildebrandt/New_Testament_Greek/Text/Wallace-Semantics-GTJ.pdf.

Er, what footnote? There are lots of them there. Rather than placing incomplete posts due to lack of time, I'd find it more helpful if you simply took a little more time and brought your argument together in one place in a lucid way. Then I and others would readily understand and be able to interact with your argument.




I acknowledge what you say about theos pater. However, in common language this is no different (imo) to saying Queen Elizabeth.




If you acknowledge what I am saying about theos pater then we have nothing to dispute here. I agree that the queen who is Elizabeth = Elizabeth. The queen who is Elizabeth does not = the queen who is Mary. The queenship may be the same, but that is a move to the abstract, which is not the same as the concrete. The two may possess the same queenship, that of England, but they are not the same queen. That is what I am arguing.



To me the terminology does not imply unique identity. Unique identity is experienced by personal attachment - the - this is to me.


I don't understand why this is problematic.


We, who have Adam as an ancestor have in different respects many fathers, but ultimately as cause only one = the Son but as ultimate source, an absolute one = the Father. For example: my father's father is the source of me but my father is the cause of me.


Even assuming the distinction you are making between source and cause, I do not understand what relevance this has to my argument.


Best,

[apostoli]

Hi Alam,

It is not true that any Lord = Jesus, just as it is not true that any god = the Father. Instead, the Lord that is Jesus = Jesus, and that the God that is the Father = the Father. Just as the apostle that is Peter = Peter, something I specified on the original thread.The point that you seem to the evading: being God is a title,like being Lord, Apostle, King or Queen - the title has no real significance and only becomes recognisable by specification (and agreement) and qualiication.

The point is that the copula "is" in each case signifies IDENTITY rather than predication.My suggestion is that the copula is "Father" rather than "God". It is "Father" that is the nominated identity not "God".

I acknowledge what you say about theos pater. However, in common language this is no different (imo) to saying Queen Elizabeth.If you acknowledge what I am saying about theos pater then we have nothing to dispute here.There is a difference between acknowledge and to agree with the inference you wish to derive.

I agree that the queen who is Elizabeth = Elizabeth. The queen who is Elizabeth does not = the queen who is Mary. The queenship may be the same, but that is a move to the abstract, which is not the same as the concrete. The two may possess the same queenship, that of England, but they are not the same queen. That is what I am arguing.Imu, queen, apostle etc are titles that do not lead to personal identity. Such titles indicate an office that can be held by two or more people simultaneously. The concrete is who holds the title in the current perspective.

In England there is the example of King Richard and King John who held the throne simultaneously (though one indirectly and the other directly). One throne, two persons.

Prince Phillip, the Queen of England's escort/husband is not King of England, though he could have been King of Greece. if they still had a monarchy. Similarly, queen Mary of England was not actually "Queen" but legally king George's escort. Mary and Phillip had/have no legal right to the throne. In opposition Prince Charles is King elect should Queen Elizebeth II die.

These are examples of the liberal nature of language. Something it appears your whole argument is hinging on.

It seems to me that you are attempting to make "God" an identity rather than a title. As you often argue = there are many gods mentioned in the scriptures.

To me the terminology does not imply unique identity. Unique identity is experienced by personal attachment - the - this is to me.I don't understand why this is problematic.Above you mentioned Queen Mary. Which Queen Mary did you mean - the one from Denmark, Scotland or England? Imu: in common language we constantly qualify things when an inference is not commonly understood.

The problem as I see it: the scriptures talk about sovereignty of God = the throne of heaven. Using the English throne as an example: you would seem to have Jesus as Prince Charles who has legal entitlement to the throne but no authority. However, scripture has Jesus sitting on the throne with His Father (ie: the end of Revelation)!

We, who have Adam as an ancestor have in different respects many fathers, but ultimately as cause only one = the Son but as ultimate source, an absolute one = the Father. For example: my father's father is the source of me but my father is the cause of me.Even assuming the distinction you are making between source and cause, I do not understand what relevance this has to my argument.Was Adam a man? Was Eve a man? was Able a man? Man and God are just titles/associations not specific identities!

Peace

[alam]

Hi Apostoli.


Hi Alam,

The point that you seem to the evading: being God is a title,like being Lord, Apostle, King or Queen - the title has no real significance and only becomes recognisable by specification (and agreement) and qualiication.


I think my whole argument in post 12 (http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showpost.php?p=2011254&postcount=12) is evading you. What you're saying here doesn't address it.



My suggestion is that the copula is "Father" rather than "God". It is "Father" that is the nominated identity not "God".


:doh: The copula is neither the word 'Father' nor the word 'God'. A copula is:

an equating verb (such as `be' or `become') that links the subject with the complement of a sentence [Source (http://www.answers.com/copula&r=67)].


For our purposes here it is the word "is". The copula "is" is ambiguous because different things can be meant when we say that "A is B". One of the meanings of the copula or equative verb is that of identity, that A = B. In this case according to Wallace the proposition is convertible; the subject and the predicate nominative can be switched without changing the basic meaning. So if this is what you are talking about when you say "It is "Father" that is the nominated identity not "God", it flies in the face of what I quoted, that the expression is convertible. It makes no difference which is the subject and which is the predicate nominative, because they have identical reference.

This was explained in post 12 (http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showpost.php?p=2011254&postcount=12). You may want to re-read that post, asking questions about concepts or terms (like "copula") which you find unclear or do not understand.



There is a difference between acknowledge and to agree with the inference you wish to derive.

Imu, queen, apostle etc are titles that do not lead to personal identity. Such titles indicate an office that can be held by two or more people simultaneously. The concrete is who holds the title in the current perspective.


Two people holding the office of queen are two queens. They are not the same queen.


In England there is the example of King Richard and King John who held the throne simultaneously (though one indirectly and the other directly). One throne, two persons.


And two kings. King Richard and King John are not the same king. These instances further confirm my argument.


Prince Phillip, the Queen of England's escort/husband is not King of England, though he could have been King of Greece. if they still had a monarchy. Similarly, queen Mary of England was not actually "Queen" but legally king George's escort. Mary and Phillip had/have no legal right to the throne. In opposition Prince Charles is King elect should Queen Elizebeth II die.

These are examples of the liberal nature of language. Something it appears your whole argument is hinging on.

It seems to me that you are attempting to make "God" an identity rather than a title. As you often argue = there are many gods mentioned in the scriptures.


That wasn't my point. It makes no difference whether "God" is an "identity" or a title. According to Wallace, nouns in simple apposition, such as "the apostle Paul" can be unpacked as convertible propositions, propositions where the mathematical equal sign expresses the meaning of the copula "is". In other words, the expression "the apostle Paul" means that Paul = the apostle and the apostle = Paul. The two terms have an identity of reference within the context of this expression.

What this does not mean is that Paul = any apostle, or that Paul is the only apostle. Rather, the apostle who is Paul = Paul. In this light, it doesn't matter that "apostle" is a title of office rather than a proper noun. In the appositive phrase it is serving as a definite description identical in reference to the proper noun "Paul". Paul and Peter may have in common the status of being an apostle, but they are not the same apostle.

In the same way, the God who is the Father = the Father. Conversely, the Father who is God = God. It does not matter whether the term "god" itself is a designation of office or function or a personal identifier. Nor does it matter which you take as the subject and which as the predicate nominative. In the expression "God the Father" the term "God" and the term "the Father" have one and the same referent.


I hope this helps.

[apostoli]

Hi Alam,

[The point that you seem to the evading: being God is a title,like being Lord, Apostle, King or Queen - the title has no real significance and only becomes recognisable by specification (and agreement) and qualiicationI think my whole argument in post 12 is evading you. What you're saying here doesn't address it.Possibly I have missed your point. Today I was randomly reading "Insight on the sciptures" and came across the heading '"God" and ""Father: not distinctive' (WT&TS 1978 vII Page 8) - apparently "theos pater" was a title attributed to Jupiter.

[My suggestion is that the copula is "Father" rather than "God". It is "Father" that is the nominated identity not "God".The copula is neither the word 'Father' nor the word 'God'. A copula is:

an equating verb (such as `be' or `become') that links the subject with the complement of a sentence.After a later reread, I knew you would jump on my short hand. Let me rephrase = 'the "is" is the Father not God'. There are connotations that immediately jump to mind regarding Father that do not necessarily jump to mind regarding the god/gods. Thus what can be attributed to father cannot be necessarily attributed to god. In many respects (imo) your argument for simple apposition (imo) seems to fail. However, I do see it as succeeding if the Fathership is seen as originating with begetal of the Son (given that believers in the Christ are sons by adoption - which seems to be the NT testimony).

For our purposes here it is the word "is". The copula "is" is ambiguous because different things can be meant when we say that "A is B". One of the meanings of the copula or equative verb is that of identity, that A = B. In this case according to Wallace the proposition is convertible; the subject and the predicate nominative can be switched without changing the basic meaning. So if this is what you are talking about when you say "It is "Father" that is the nominated identity not "God", it flies in the face of what I quoted, that the expression is convertible. It makes no difference which is the subject and which is the predicate nominative, because they have identical reference.But only if there is no ambiguity. There are many lords, gods and fathers mentioned in scripture. So it seems qualification is required in respect of how each is relevant to us. Imu, in A.Paul's letters the Father is the Father of the Son whom He sent to repurchase us.

This was explained in post 12. You may want to re-read that post, asking questions about concepts or terms (like "copula") which you find unclear or do notI've reread post #12 several times. Your argument still escapes me. I've even attempted to research for similar argument, but your's seems unique. Guess I'm missing something.

[There is a difference between acknowledge and to agree with the inference you wish to derive.

Imu, queen, apostle etc are titles that do not lead to personal identity. Such titles indicate an office that can be held by two or more people simultaneously. The concrete is who holds the title in the current perspective.Two people holding the office of queen are two queens. They are not the same queen.I live under a monarchy. There can only be one Queen or King (as an office) at any one time, though there can be two or more persons holding the ofice of Queen or King at any one time (albeit not both actively). The interesting thing of my example of King Richard and King John, is that on King Richard's return to England John was subjected to Richard but was not an inferior King. For to do so would have made the Magna Carta and other of his actions null and void.

[In England there is the example of King Richard and King John who held the throne simultaneously (though one indirectly and the other directly). One throne, two persons.And two kings. King Richard and King John are not the same king. These instances further confirm my argument.In law two persons one kingship. In law they were as if one.

[Prince Phillip, the Queen of England's escort/husband is not King of England, though he could have been King of Greece. if they still had a monarchy. Similarly, queen Mary of England was not actually "Queen" but legally king George's escort. Mary and Phillip had/have no legal right to the throne. In opposition Prince Charles is King elect should Queen Elizebeth II die.

These are examples of the liberal nature of language. Something it appears your whole argument is hinging on.

t seems to me that you are attempting to make "God" an identity rather than a title. As you often argue = there are many gods mentioned in the scriptures.That wasn't my point. It makes no difference whether "God" is an "identity" or a title. According to Wallace, nouns in simple apposition, such as "the apostle Paul" can be unpacked as convertible propositions, propositions where the mathematical equal sign expresses the meaning of the copula "is". In other words, the expression "the apostle Paul" means that Paul = the apostle and the apostle = Paul. The two terms have an identity of reference within the context of this expression.

What this does not mean is that Paul = any apostle, or that Paul is the only apostle. Rather, the apostle who is Paul = Paul. In this light, it doesn't matter that "apostle" is a title of office rather than a proper noun. In the appositive phrase it is serving as a definite description identical in reference to the proper noun "Paul". Paul and Peter may have in common the status of being an apostle, but they are not the same apostle.

In the same way, the God who is the Father = the Father. Conversely, the Father who is God = God. It does not matter whether the term "god" itself is a designation of office or function or a personal identifier. Nor does it matter which you take as the subject and which as the predicate nominative. In the expression "God the Father" the term "God" and the term "the Father" have one and the same referent.I understand what you are saying but allow me to give my perspective. Years back, one of the older ladies at the Greek takeaway where I regularly got my lunch named me "apostoli" as a familiar name because many of their customers were named Paul. It was simply a term of endearment towards me (the Greek's apostle=Paul therefore Paul=apostoli).

She even named a sandwich after me (which we invented together) the "apostoli" ;-)

A problem arose, when I walked in at busy lunch times, the sandwich makers got confused - when she exclaimed "apostoli" they made an "apostoli" when really all she had done was greet me loudly but warmly. I ate a lot of "apostolies" in that time ;-)

Peace

[alam]

Hi Alam,

Possibly I have missed your point. Today I was randomly reading "Insight on the sciptures" and came across the heading '"God" and ""Father: not distinctive' (WT&TS 1978 vII Page 8) - apparently "theos pater" was a title attributed to Jupiter.

After a later reread, I knew you would jump on my short hand. Let me rephrase = 'the "is" is the Father not God'. There are connotations that immediately jump to mind regarding Father that do not necessarily jump to mind regarding the god/gods. Thus what can be attributed to father cannot be necessarily attributed to god.

It can be attributed to "god" if that god happens to be the Father. AFAICT, you're saying that the Father is the subject and God is the predicate nominative. But the idea of a convertible proposition is that they are interchangeable.


In many respects (imo) your argument for simple apposition (imo) seems to fail. However, I do see it as succeeding if the Fathership is seen as originating with begetal of the Son (given that believers in the Christ are sons by adoption - which seems to be the NT testimony).


I'm not sure in what respects you think my argument fails, unless you're expecting it to prove things it wasn't meant to prove. I don't know why your theological claim should be a precondition of its success. It is not what the argument is about.


For our purposes here it is the word "is". The copula "is" is ambiguous because different things can be meant when we say that "A is B". One of the meanings of the copula or equative verb is that of identity, that A = B. In this case according to Wallace the proposition is convertible; the subject and the predicate nominative can be switched without changing the basic meaning. So if this is what you are talking about when you say "It is "Father" that is the nominated identity not "God", it flies in the face of what I quoted, that the expression is convertible. It makes no difference which is the subject and which is the predicate nominative, because they have identical reference.

But only if there is no ambiguity. There are many lords, gods and fathers mentioned in scripture. So it seems qualification is required in respect of how each is relevant to us. Imu, in A.Paul's letters the Father is the Father of the Son whom He sent to repurchase us.


The point is that there is no ambiguity in the appositive phrase. Both terms have an identical referent. Per last post:

"What this does not mean is that Paul = any apostle, or that Paul is the only apostle. Rather, the apostle who is Paul = Paul. In this light, it doesn't matter that "apostle" is a title of office rather than a proper noun. In the appositive phrase it is serving as a definite description identical in reference to the proper noun "Paul".



I've reread post #12 several times. Your argument still escapes me. I've even attempted to research for similar argument, but your's seems unique. Guess I'm missing something.


The basic point is that "God" applied to the Father has the same referent as "the Father."

ref·er·ent (rĕf'ər-ənt, rĭ-fûr'ənt)
n.
A person or thing to which a linguistic expression refers. (Source (http://www.answers.com/referent&r=67))


There is an identity of reference between the two terms of the appositive phrase - even though the terms may tell us different things about the referent.

So regardless of how one wants to set up the definition of "person", we know from this that whatever person IS the Father also IS (in the sense of identity, complete overlap of reference) the one God.


I live under a monarchy. There can only be one Queen or King (as an office) at any one time, though there can be two or more persons holding the ofice of Queen or King at any one time (albeit not both actively). The interesting thing of my example of King Richard and King John, is that on King Richard's return to England John was subjected to Richard but was not an inferior King. For to do so would have made the Magna Carta and other of his actions null and void.


Ok.


In law two persons one kingship. In law they were as if one.


This is a good example of what I am not talking about - abstracts like kingship or godship. In some circumstance two kings may constitute one kingship, but they are nevertheless two kings. Saying they are "as if" one doesn't change this.


I understand what you are saying but allow me to give my perspective.


If you understood that, then you must be able to understand the argument.


Years back, one of the older ladies at the Greek takeaway where I regularly got my lunch named me "apostoli" as a familiar name because many of their customers were named Paul. It was simply a term of endearment towards me (the Greek's apostle=Paul therefore Paul=apostoli).

She even named a sandwich after me (which we invented together) the "apostoli" ;-)

A problem arose, when I walked in at busy lunch times, the sandwich makers got confused - when she exclaimed "apostoli" they made an "apostoli" when really all she had done was greet me loudly but warmly. I ate a lot of "apostolies" in that time ;-)

Peace

Sure, things can get mixed up in this way. This is why I am trying to keep to a simple logical and grammatical level.

Best,

[apostoli]

Hi Alam,

I took your advice and reread post #12 again. I thought it useful to go through it with you and discuss where I am not following your argument.

Some Homoousian (a.k.a "trinitarian") argument concerns the ambiguity of the copula – the is of identity versus the is of predication. An identity statement is convertible. This means that when you say "the current President of the USA is George Bush," it is conversely true that "George Bush is the current President of the USA." The essence of the statement is, "George Bush = current President of the USA." When we have the is of predication though, the statement isn't convertible[b]. To use Daniel B. Wallace's example, "the preaching of the cross is foolishness" does not entail that "foolishness is the preaching of the cross" (Greek Grammar: Beyond the Basics, Zondervan, 1996; p. 41).Referring back to your original thread: The way I am seeing your argument, we could convert "President Bush" to "Bush President". I realise the argument would allow "Bush the President".

I note that the cite of Wallace you give below uses the example = "Paul the apostle" could be unpacked as "Paul is the apostle" or "the apostle is Paul".

Converting theos pater into various forms: "The Father is God", "The God is Father", "God is the Father" it seems we have an exchange of subjects (Father vs God) and what follows the is, is qualitative. In contrast "God the Father" seems definite to me as if a proper name.

It seems to me that the first two forms do not fit Wallace's condition...
"For a genitive in simple apposition he semantics of all but the genitive of apposition are the same–i.e., both substantives have an identical referent" (ibid. 62)] the two nouns are equivalent to a convertible proposition."


According to many Homousians, "The Father is God," "the Son is God," and "there is only one God" do not entail Sabellianism – that the Father is the Son – because the is used in the first two statements is that of predication. So in their view, "while Jesus is God, it is not true that God is Jesus," since "the person we call Jesus does not exhaust the category of Deity" (Murray Harris, Jesus as God, Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1992; p. 297).The Homousians also believe their view is not tritheist. I feel this is an important consideration. If we take the view that to be God is a unique attribute of a particular individual then obviously the Son cannot be God, and imo, can only be Son as in allegory.
Imo, if we opt for categories of Godship (allowing the Son to be called God but in a different sence), then we have multiple Gods. As scripture tells us there are many gods, it seems the term is not unique to any individual. The Homousians argue that there is in fact only one God (all other gods are falsely called god) and the Son is true Son of the Father, thus as scripture holds that the Father is the only true God, the Son must be God from God. So it seems that the Homousians define God not as a person but as an organisation. From that view it could be said "Jesus is God (attribute wise), but it is not true that God (the organisation) is Jesus"

Polemic inferences from the latter as though it represents the Homoousian view allegedly end up attacking a straw man. Dr. Wallace states:

The assumption that the grammatical equative verb bears the same force as the mathematical equal sign is one of the fundamental flaws in the thinking of Jehovah's Witnesses regarding the deity of Christ. On John 1:1,cf. their booklet, Should You Believe in the Trinity?... , where it is argued that since John 1:1b states that "the Word was with God," John 1:1c cannot mean 'The Word was God": "Someone who is 'with' another person cannot be the same as that other person" (27). [b]This argument seems to assume that all S[ubject]-P[redicate ]N[ominative] constructions are of the convertible proposition type (Wallace, ibid., ftn.)I don't see the association between this and your intro. I'm guessing it is being used to support your opening sentence in post #12 "Some Homoousian (a.k.a "trinitarian") argument concerns the ambiguity of the copula – the is of identity versus the is of predication".

We have discussed Jn 1:1 several times. Imu, the person of the the Logos is shown as distinct from the person of Theos, so it would be true to say "Someone who is 'with' another person cannot be that other person" but there is nothing stopping them having the same qualities, acreditations etc.

[Wallace] On the nature of convertible propositions:

"[The] convertible proposition...indicates an identical exchange. That is to say, both nouns have an identical referent. The mathematical formulas of A=B, B=A are applicable in such instances. A statement such as "Michael Jordan is the greatest basketball player in NBA history" means the same thing as "the greatest player in NBA history is Michael Jordan." There is complete interchange between the two (ibid.)."

This is interesting since, given the definitions in Greek Grammar: Beyond the Basics, later on in John's Gospel we do have a statement about the Father as God which meets the requirements for a convertible proposition: "This is eternal life, that they may know [b]You, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom You have sent" (John 17:3, NASB).

Notice that the verse does not say the Father is the only true God; the ambiguity of the copula doesn't come into play here at all. Rather, "You" (σέ) and "the only true God" (τόν μόνον αληθινόν θεόν) are accusatives in simple apposition.As you know I accept the Father of Jesus as the only true God. However, I see significance in Jesus' qualification "true" (As we have discussed, the scriptures speak of other gods).

I see significance in the "You". I see it as a direct reference to the Father of the Son, not a generic Father. Also I believe the whole message of Jn 17 changes if we have Jesus praying to the only true God and then declaring Him Father.

The way I read Jn 17:3: It is not sufficient to take in the knowledge of the only true God to attain eternal life but it is necessary to take in knowledge of both the Father and the Son. In this case the Father is proved to be the only true God because He sent the Son to save us.

In Jesus as God (p. 258-259), Murray J. Harris considers a minority view held by Augustine and few others, which amounts to reading the text as, "that they may know You and Jesus Christ, whom You have sent, as the only true God" (Augustine, Tractate 105.3; De Trinitatis vi. 9). He dismisses this as unlikely, since "one would expect a longer phrase such as τόν μόνον αληθινόν θεόν to be repeated with both expressions or else to stand after the second expression, rather than standing only with the first (as here)" (p. 259). Hence τόν μόνον αληθινόν θεόν is naturally read as appositive only to σέ.I have read that Augustine creatively rendered several scriptures to fit his arguments.

Concerning the semantic and structural features of simple apposition, Wallace states:

There are four features of simple apposition to be noted (the first two are structural clues; the last two features are semantic): An appositional construction involves (1) two adjacent substantives (2) in the same case, (3) which refer to the same person or thing, (4) and have the same syntactical relation to the rest of the clause (ibid. p. 48)

The first substantive can belong to any category (e.g., subject, predicate nom., etc.) and the second is merely a clarification, description, or identification of who or what is mentioned... The appositive functions very much like a P[redicate ]N[ominative] in a convertible proposition–that is, it refers to the same thing as the first noun. The difference, however, is that a PN makes an assertion about the S[ubject] (an equative verb is either stated or implied); with appositives there is assumption, not assertion (no verb is in mind)" (ibid.).

For a genitive in simple apposition [but the same applies to the other cases: "[t]he semantics of all but the genitive of apposition are the same–i.e., both substantives have an identical referent" (ibid. 62)] the two nouns are equivalent to a convertible proposition. Thus, "Paul the apostle" could be unpacked as "Paul is the apostle" or "the apostle is Paul" (ibid. p. 96).OK.

Hence, in John 17:3 we have an implicit identity statement: God the Father = the only true God.Possibly we have different thoughts on what it means to be the only true God. I see it in terms of fulfillment of scripture. I think the second half of Jn 17:3 is significant: As referent, it was not the only true God that sent forth the Son, but the Father of the Son (the why the Father is the only true God).

If the Son of God likewise = the only true God, it follows from transitivity of identity (the principle that if A = B and B = C, then A = C) that the Father is the Son.I understand the concept but am not following your logic in regards to Father and Son. I haven't encountered homoousians who teach that the Son is the one true God. Imu, the RCC etc teach that the one true God is the Father, Son and Spirit "three persons indeed, but one essence, substance or nature entirely simple". As we have discussed this teaching seems to conflict with Jn 17:3.

On the other hand, if someone only predicates "only true God" of the Son, there still seems to be a problem. If the only true God = the Father, then we are predicating the Father of the Son, which appears to be a category mistake: "...inasmuch as primary substance is not predicable of anything, it can never form the predicate of any proposition. But of secondary substances [i.e. kind essences], the species is predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species and of the individual" (Aristotle, Categories).In book 7 of his Metaphysics, Aristotle discusses substance in it's various forms.
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.html

Someone may wish to reject this philosophic assumption or its application to the trinity, substituting in its place some other metaphysic, e.g. Whiteheadian, which allows you to predicate one person of another. Nevertheless, this will still be outside the realm of classic Nicenism since it makes the person of the Father, rather than an alleged homoousia, the universal of the trinity.Not sure what you are arguing here.

The Fourth Lateran Council declared...

The Father is from no one; the Son is from the Father only; and the Holy Spirit is from both the Father and the Son equally. God has no beginning; He always is, and always will be. The Father is the progenitor, the Son is the begotten, the Holy Spirit is proceeding. They are all one substance, equally great, equally all-powerful, equally eternal. They are the one and only principle of all things—Creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal, who, by His almighty power, from the very beginning of time has created both orders of creatures in the same way out of nothing, the spiritual or angelic worlds and the corporeal or visible universe.
http://www.therealpresence.org/archives/Trinity/Trinity_001.htm

Peace

[alam]

Hi Alam,

I took your advice and reread post #12 again. I thought it useful to go through it with you and discuss where I am not following your argument.

Referring back to your original thread: The way I am seeing your argument, we could convert "President Bush" to "Bush President". I realise the argument would allow "Bush the President".

I note that the cite of Wallace you give below uses the example = "Paul the apostle" could be unpacked as "Paul is the apostle" or "the apostle is Paul".

Converting theos pater into various forms: "The Father is God", "The God is Father", "God is the Father" it seems we have an exchange of subjects (Father vs God) and what follows the is, is qualitative. In contrast "God the Father" seems definite to me as if a proper name.

It seems to me that the first two forms do not fit Wallace's condition...
"For a genitive in simple apposition [but the same applies to the other cases: "[t]he semantics of all but the genitive of apposition are the same–i.e., both substantives have an identical referent" (ibid. 62)] the two nouns are equivalent to a convertible proposition."


The Homousians also believe their view is not tritheist. I feel this is an important consideration. If we take the view that to be God is a unique attribute of a particular individual then obviously the Son cannot be God, and imo, can only be Son as in allegory.
Imo, if we opt for categories of Godship (allowing the Son to be called God but in a different sence), then we have multiple Gods. As scripture tells us there are many gods, it seems the term is not unique to any individual. The Homousians argue that there is in fact only one God (all other gods are falsely called god) and the Son is true Son of the Father, thus as scripture holds that the Father is the only true God, the Son must be God from God. So it seems that the Homousians define God not as a person but as an organisation. From that view it could be said "Jesus is God (attribute wise), but it is not true that God (the organisation) is Jesus"

I don't see the association between this and your intro. I'm guessing it is being used to support your opening sentence in post #12 "Some Homoousian (a.k.a "trinitarian") argument concerns the ambiguity of the copula – the is of identity versus the is of predication".

We have discussed Jn 1:1 several times. Imu, the person of the the Logos is shown as distinct from the person of Theos, so it would be true to say "Someone who is 'with' another person cannot be that other person" but there is nothing stopping them having the same qualities, acreditations etc.

As you know I accept the Father of Jesus as the only true God. However, I see significance in Jesus' qualification "true" (As we have discussed, the scriptures speak of other gods).

I see significance in the "You". I see it as a direct reference to the Father of the Son, not a generic Father. Also I believe the whole message of Jn 17 changes if we have Jesus praying to the only true God and then declaring Him Father.

The way I read Jn 17:3: It is not sufficient to take in the knowledge of the only true God to attain eternal life but it is necessary to take in knowledge of both the Father and the Son. In this case the Father is proved to be the only true God because He sent the Son to save us.

I have read that Augustine creatively rendered several scriptures to fit his arguments.

OK.

Possibly we have different thoughts on what it means to be the only true God. I see it in terms of fulfillment of scripture. I think the second half of Jn 17:3 is significant: As referent, it was not the only true God that sent forth the Son, but the Father of the Son (the why the Father is the only true God).

I understand the concept but am not following your logic in regards to Father and Son. I haven't encountered homoousians who teach that the Son is the one true God. Imu, the RCC etc teach that the one true God is the Father, Son and Spirit "three persons indeed, but one essence, substance or nature entirely simple". As we have discussed this teaching seems to conflict with Jn 17:3.

In book 7 of his Metaphysics, Aristotle discusses substance in it's various forms.
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.html

Not sure what you are arguing here.

The Fourth Lateran Council declared...

The Father is from no one; the Son is from the Father only; and the Holy Spirit is from both the Father and the Son equally. God has no beginning; He always is, and always will be. The Father is the progenitor, the Son is the begotten, the Holy Spirit is proceeding. They are all one substance, equally great, equally all-powerful, equally eternal. They are the one and only principle of all things—Creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal, who, by His almighty power, from the very beginning of time has created both orders of creatures in the same way out of nothing, the spiritual or angelic worlds and the corporeal or visible universe.
http://www.therealpresence.org/archives/Trinity/Trinity_001.htm

Peace




The convertibility of the statement, where God = the Father and the Father = God, means that "God" is not a collective term. You've said you understand that according to my argument you could not call Jesus the one true God. But you went on to explain that homoousians think "God" is some collective office, which is the very thing the argument excludes. If God = the Father, that excludes that God = Jesus or that God = the trinity. Jesus is "elohim" אלהים in the hebraic idiom which you acknowledged, but not the one true God.

[apostoli]

Hi alam,

The convertibility of the statement, where God = the Father and the Father = God, means that "God" is not a collective term. You've said you understand that according to my argument you could not call Jesus the one true God. But you went on to explain that homoousians think "God" is some collective office, which is the very thing the argument excludes. If God = the Father, that excludes that God = Jesus or that God = the trinity. Jesus is "elohim" אלהים in the hebraic idiom which you acknowledged, but not the one true God.

Your argument (to me) doesn't work because neither Father nor God are exclusive terms. In Exodus YHWH is called God of Gods. All your examples Jordan, Bush etc require personal (specific) identification. In Jn 17:3, Father = the Father of Jesus Christ not of us. Thus Jesus' Father is proved to be the truest god because he fulfills his promises. However, it doesn't make him exclusively (in biblical idiom) god.

Peace

[alam]

Hi alam,



Your argument (to me) doesn't work because neither Father nor God are exclusive terms. In Exodus YHWH is called God of Gods. All your examples Jordan, Bush etc require personal (specific) identification. In Jn 17:3, Father = the Father of Jesus Christ not of us. Thus Jesus' Father is proved to be the truest god because he fulfills his promises. However, it doesn't make him exclusively (in biblical idiom) god.

Peace


Within an appositional phrase, the two elements have an identity of reference. This is a premise of my argument, which I take on Wallace's authority. The expression "God the Father" entails that the "god" so referenced is identical with the "father" so referenced. We can know that the two terms have the same referent, as a grammatical matter-of-fact, without knowing who the referent is.

Best,

[apostoli]

Hi Alam,

In simple apposition "the president" is not specific to an individual. Thus Lincoln is not Bush. Though the office remains the same office. As you noted "Within an appositional phrase, the two elements have an identity of reference."

In our discussion, it seems (to me) that the referent at Jn 17:3 (Father) is the Father of the Son and not some generic father. As you said "The expression "God the Father" entails that the "god" so referenced is identical with the "father" so referenced. We can know that the two terms have the same referent, as a grammatical matter-of-fact".

At Jn 17:3 we know who the referent is which is at odds with your conditional (as does all your quotations of Wallace's examples of Jordan & Bush) = "without knowing who the referent is". It seems we must know who the referent is in some unique sense for your argument to work! (eg: from your examples: George Bush Jnr & Michael Jordan are readily identifiable apart from their rankings).

Peace

[alam]

Hi Apostoli,

Hi Alam,

In simple apposition "the president" is not specific to an individual. Thus Lincoln is not Bush. Though the office remains the same office. As you noted "Within an appositional phrase, the two elements have an identity of reference."

In our discussion, it seems (to me) that the referent at Jn 17:3 (Father) is the Father of the Son and not some generic father. As you said "The expression "God the Father" entails that the "god" so referenced is identical with the "father" so referenced. We can know that the two terms have the same referent, as a grammatical matter-of-fact".

At Jn 17:3 we know who the referent is which is at odds with your conditional (as does all your quotations of Wallace's examples of Jordan & Bush) = "without knowing who the referent is". It seems we must know who the referent is in some unique sense for your argument to work! (eg: from your examples: George Bush Jnr & Michael Jordan are readily identifiable apart from their rankings).


I agree with you that the personal identity of the referent in John 17:3 is the Father of Christ. Still, this information isn't essential to my argument in post 12. Simple apposition does not require the appositive to be a proper noun and/or personal identifier. So regardless of the personal identity of the referent in John 17:3, we can know on a grammatical level that the "You" and the "only true God" in John 17:3 have one-and-the-same referent. That's all my argument asserts; it doesn't purport to answer the former question.

God bless,

[apostoli]

Hi Alam,

regardless of the personal identity of the referent in John 17:3,we can know on a grammatical level that the "You" and the "only true God" in John 17:3 have one-and-the-same referent. That's all my argument asserts...We agree on referent. Though I do not do so in respect of simple apposition but rather on the basis of simple grammar - the pronoun "you", substitutes for whoever was last nominated as the subject/target, and whatever accusation occurs after "you" applies to that one.

I am seeing Jn 17:3 as a subject-predicate nominative construction, and therefore if "You, the only true God" is convertible it would be along the lines of "the only true God is you, the Father of Jesus Christ" Possibly you agree (?)

In any case, my argument is simply the referent is not identified as "the only God", but qualified as "only true God".

Deut 4:3 seems to influence some peoples understanding of John 17:3. John 17:3 seems to reflect Jeremiah 9:24. However, there it is to know YHWH, while at Jn 17:3 it is to know both the Father and the one he sent forth, Jesus Christ. Possibly, Judges 2:1 with Numbers 15:41 & Exodus 33:14 give us a reconciliation.

Simple apposition does not require the appositive to be a proper noun and/or personal identifier.And yet it seems that we always end up with a particular identity as referent (the "this"). Imu, apposition is lingual shorthand. For example: "The President is Head of State of the USA" implies the personal identifier "President of the USA" even though the personal qualifier for President ("of the USA") is not articulated. Same wise, the current office holder's proper name might also be implied.

To me this demonstrates that we need to take context and idiom into account rather than plain grammar. For instance: Wallace in an article on semantics, notes that the text of John 5:18 "patera idion elegen ton qeon" must be "rendered, "he called God his own father", rather than, "he called his own father God” (accordingly the ideas are not convertible).

apart from [the] 'rules,' one could conceivably see patera as object and ton qeon as complement. However, in light of the overall context, such a meaning would be absurd. And even if the context had been ambiguous, since the validity of the 'rules' has been established in all other reversed order constructions, such grammatical evidence would be wholly on the side of taking patera as complement and ton qeon as object.
http://faculty.gordon.edu/hu/bi/Ted_Hildebrandt/New_Testament_Greek/Text/Wallace-Semantics-GTJ.pdf

John 5:18 is interesting as it is here that the Jews accuse Jesus of making himself equal to God. In my reading of John 5 Jesus confirms their accusation but with qualification. Vs 23 & 24 seem to provide a context to Jn 17:3.

-----------------------------


I finally had a chance to reread Wallace's article I referred to in post #54, so can now complete my response to your post #55.

My earlier revision of opinion was based on a footnote in Wallace's article "THE SEMANTICS AND EXEGETICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OBJECT-COMPLEMENT CONSTRUCTION IN THE NEW TESTAMENT"
http://faculty.gordon.edu/hu/bi/Ted_Hildebrandt/New_Testament_Greek/Text/Wallace-Semantics-GTJ.pdfEr, what footnote? There are lots of them there. Er, what footnote? There are lots of them there. Rather than placing incomplete posts due to lack of time, I'd find it more helpful if you simply took a little more time and brought your argument together in one place in a lucid way. Then I and others would readily understand and be able to interact with your argument.There are several footnotes I found interesting, but footnote #34 concerning Acts 13:23 and "Sotera Iesous" was my main focus.

If the construction is taken as an object-complement ("God has brought to Israel Jesus [as] Savior") rather than simple apposition ("God has brought to Israel a savior, [namely] Jesus"), one is faced with the difficulty that Jesus is introduced in the message as though the residents of Pisidian Antioch were already familiar with his name.

When I wrote post #51 I considered that the idea "theos pater" would have been familiar to both the Greek (via Homer & Plato) and the Hebrew (via OT even if in only 15 cites) - though to the pagan Greek this may have been in reference to God as creator but to the Hebrew this may have been in relation to the nation of Israel's election/adoption as firstborn son. I am unaware of the Israelites having a concept of personal sonship as the NT teaches (which accounts for the Jews reaction at Jn 5:18).

This was the starting point of my thoughts.

I think it is true to say God = our Father, therefore Our Father = God, but not true to say Father = God.It is not true that any Lord = Jesus, just as it is not true that any god = the Father.I had contemplated whether "theos pater" might be constructed "God [as] Father" vs "God [namely the] Father". I couldn't see how it could be taken as the definite, "God [is the] Father" without adding the "of us" or another qualification such as "God [is the] Father of Jesus Christ". Once that was done I could see how the phrase was convertible without changing the primary substantive.

Using Ephesians 1:1-5 as a guide, "theos pater emon" of vs3 is defined by vs5 where A.Paul says we are sons by adoption through Jesus Christ. In vs3 we seem to have another context. It is the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ who blesses us through Christ.

At Galatians 1:4 we encounter "theos kai pater emon". However from chapter 4 we again find a relational difference between "us" and Jesus - "God sent forth His Son...that we might receive the adoption of sons."

It seems to me that when A.Paul uses theos pater without qualification he does so as a proper name. So it seems to me that there are three ways to understand theos pater - Jesus as Son, we as adopted sons through Jesus and both Jesus and us as sons.

None of the above is an examination of theological argument. Merely an examination of what I understand to be a consistent teaching in the NT and the context in which I understand theos, pater and theos pater in their grammatical various uses.

Peace

ps: out of curiosity: it seems that there is not a term in the OT & NT for a direct idea of grandfather - instead every precursor is depicted as first person father. Could you shed any light on this idea?

[apostoli]

pss Alam,

Where I mentioned Deut 4:3, I meant 4:39 Lots of keys on my keyboard aren't coming out without a firm press, so expect typos in my posts. Please be patient in this regard.

Another correction: Using Ephesians 1:1-5a s a guide, "theos pater emon" of vs2is defined by vs5 where A.Paul says we are sons by adoption through Jesus Christ. In vs3 we seem to have another context. It is the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ who blesses us through Christ.

Thanks.

[alam]

Hi Apostoli,

Hi Alam,

We agree on referent. Though I do not do so in respect of simple apposition but rather on the basis of simple grammar - the pronoun "you", substitutes for whoever was last nominated as the subject/target, and whatever accusation occurs after "you" applies to that one.

I am seeing Jn 17:3 as a subject-predicate nominative construction, and therefore if "You, the only true God" is convertible it would be along the lines of "the only true God is you, the Father of Jesus Christ" Possibly you agree (?)


Sure. In John 17:5, Christ addresses the "You" of verse 3 as su pater: "You, Father." Here again is an appositive phrase, where the "You" and the "Father" share the same referent; the "You" = the "Father". If the "You" who = the "Father" also = "the only true God," then by transitivity of identity, the "Father" = "the only true God." Verse 5 has pater in the vocative case, where it typically denotes the father of the speaker, thus the Father of Jesus (cf. v. 1). So, using the same method as my argument in post 12 and building on it, we derive from John 17:1-5 that Jesus' Father = the only true God.



In any case, my argument is simply the referent is not identified as "the only God", but qualified as "only true God".


Ok.


Deut 4:3 seems to influence some peoples understanding of John 17:3. John 17:3 seems to reflect Jeremiah 9:24. However, there it is to know YHWH, while at Jn 17:3 it is to know both the Father and the one he sent forth, Jesus Christ. Possibly, Judges 2:1 with Numbers 15:41 & Exodus 33:14 give us a reconciliation.


Yes.


And yet it seems that we always end up with a particular identity as referent (the "this"). Imu, apposition is lingual shorthand.

Yes.


For example: "The President is Head of State of the USA" implies the personal identifier "President of the USA" even though the personal qualifier for President ("of the USA") is not articulated. Same wise, the current office holder's proper name might also be implied.


Neither of these phrases "The Presidient is Head of State of the USA" and "President of the USA" use apposition. I'm not sure what you're getting at.


To me this demonstrates that we need to take context and idiom into account rather than plain grammar.


I am dealing with context and idiom, but trying to do so logically and grammatically.


For instance: Wallace in an article on semantics, notes that the text of John 5:18 "patera idion elegen ton qeon" must be "rendered, "he called God his own father", rather than, "he called his own father God” (accordingly the ideas are not convertible).


This is not an appositive phrase though, but an object-complement construction. The object-complement construction differs from apposition in that in the former, "one accusative substantive is the direct object of the verb and the other accusative (either noun, adjective, participle, or infinitive) complements the object in that it predicates something about it" (Wallace, Greek Grammar p. 182) whereas in the latter "the two adjacent substantives...have the same syntactical relation to the rest of the clause" (p. 48 (http://theologyweb.com/campus/showpost.php?p=2011254&postcount=12)). These are apples and oranges.



apart from [the] 'rules,' one could conceivably see patera as object and ton qeon as complement. However, in light of the overall context, such a meaning would be absurd. And even if the context had been ambiguous, since the validity of the 'rules' has been established in all other reversed order constructions, such grammatical evidence would be wholly on the side of taking patera as complement and ton qeon as object.
http://faculty.gordon.edu/hu/bi/Ted_Hildebrandt/New_Testament_Greek/Text/Wallace-Semantics-GTJ.pdf

John 5:18 is interesting as it is here that the Jews accuse Jesus of making himself equal to God. In my reading of John 5 Jesus confirms their accusation but with qualification. Vs 23 & 24 seem to provide a context to Jn 17:3.

-----------------------------


I finally had a chance to reread Wallace's article I referred to in post #54, so can now complete my response to your post #55.

There are several footnotes I found interesting, but footnote #34 concerning Acts 13:23 and "Sotera Iesous" was my main focus.

If the construction is taken as an object-complement ("God has brought to Israel Jesus [as] Savior") rather than simple apposition ("God has brought to Israel a savior, [namely] Jesus"), one is faced with the difficulty that Jesus is introduced in the message as though the residents of Pisidian Antioch were already familiar with his name.

When I wrote post #51 I considered that the idea "theos pater" would have been familiar to both the Greek (via Homer & Plato) and the Hebrew (via OT even if in only 15 cites) - though to the pagan Greek this may have been in reference to God as creator but to the Hebrew this may have been in relation to the nation of Israel's election/adoption as firstborn son. I am unaware of the Israelites having a concept of personal sonship as the NT teaches (which accounts for the Jews reaction at Jn 5:18).

This was the starting point of my thoughts.

I had contemplated whether "theos pater" might be constructed "God [as] Father" vs "God [namely the] Father". I couldn't see how it could be taken as the definite, "God [is the] Father" without adding the "of us" or another qualification such as "God [is the] Father of Jesus Christ". Once that was done I could see how the phrase was convertible without changing the primary substantive.

Using Ephesians 1:1-5 as a guide, "theos pater emon" of vs3 is defined by vs5 where A.Paul says we are sons by adoption through Jesus Christ. In vs3 we seem to have another context. It is the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ who blesses us through Christ.

At Galatians 1:4 we encounter "theos kai pater emon". However from chapter 4 we again find a relational difference between "us" and Jesus - "God sent forth His Son...that we might receive the adoption of sons."

It seems to me that when A.Paul uses theos pater without qualification he does so as a proper name. So it seems to me that there are three ways to understand theos pater - Jesus as Son, we as adopted sons through Jesus and both Jesus and us as sons.


I agree.

"...there is the use of the compound appellative θεός πατήρ in various combinations..., each of which implies that θεός is identified with the Father. When this πατήρ lacks a defining genitive, it is invidious to choose between Jesus Christ and believers as the person or persons to whom that fatherhood is exhibited. Both are probably included, since on occasion each is joined to the word pair (ο) θεός (καί) πατήρ and the sonship of believers is based on the sonship of Jesus.


None of the above is an examination of theological argument. Merely an examination of what I understand to be a consistent teaching in the NT and the context in which I understand theos, pater and theos pater in their grammatical various uses.


Post 12 (http://theologyweb.com/campus/showpost.php?p=2011254&postcount=12) is premised in part on the idea that se ton monon alēthinon theon (Jn 17:13) is an appositive phrase. Harris identifies it as such, and all Bible versions I know translate it that way. From what I can tell, it looks like you're suggesting it might be an object-complement construction. Wallace does give ginōskō as one of the verbs taking an objective complement (Greek Grammar 183), yet we don't see many (anyone?) translating John 17:3 that way. Wallace doesn't list it as one of the instances of exegetical significance where there is serious doubt as to which construction, apposition or object-complement is involved.

The reason for this might be that unless the complement precedes the object, "the complement will tend toward the qualitative-indefinite range" (185). Yet, ton monon alēthinon theon, which would have to be the complement inasmuch as the pronoun se would be the object (184 n. 32), is articular, and thus definite. This would make se ton monon alēthinon theon atypical as an object-complement construction. But it is a perfectly good appositive phrase.

As such, the "You" (se) and "the only true God" (ton monon alēthinon theon) share the same referent. One does not have a wider reference than the other. The "You" whom Jesus addresses in John 17 is, exhaustively and self-identically, the only true God. N.B. that the veracity of this conclusion does not depend on knowing Whom exactly Jesus was addressing. You can know that the "You" = "the only true God," without actually knowing the true God as the verse commands. This is ironic but does not affect the truth of the argument.



Peace

ps: out of curiosity: it seems that there is not a term in the OT & NT for a direct idea of grandfather - instead every precursor is depicted as first person father. Could you shed any light on this idea?


That is so for the Hebrew Bible, although the NT has pro-go'-nos meaning "forebear" (1 Tim. 5:4; 2 Tim. 1:3) and mam'-mē or "grandmother" (1 Tim. 1:5).

Best,

[alam]

That is so for the Hebrew Bible, although the NT has pro-go'-nos meaning "forebear" (1 Tim. 5:4; 2 Tim. 1:3) and mam'-mē or "grandmother" (1 Tim. 1:5).

That was 2 Timothy 1:5. Thanks.

[apostoli]

Hi Alam,

And yet it seems that we always end up with a particular identity as referent (the "this"). Imu, apposition is lingual shorthand. Yes.For example: "The President is Head of State of the USA" implies the personal identifier "President of the USA" even though the personal qualifier for President ("of the USA") is not articulated. Same wise, the current office holder's proper name might also be implied.Neither of these phrases "The Presidient is Head of State of the USA" and "President of the USA" use apposition. I'm not sure what you're getting at.

Thankyou for leading me through the vagaries of languge. I understand apposition as any two adjacent nouns or noun phrases (ie: the "president is something" or " the pesident, something". Possibly I've misunderstood (?)

In any case, my argument is simply the referent is not identified as "the only God", but qualified as "only true God".Ok.

Post 12 is premised in part on the idea that se ton monon alēthinon theon (Jn 17:13) is an appositive phrase. Harris identifies it as such, and all Bible versions I know translate it that way. From what I can tell, it looks like you're suggesting it might be an object-complement construction. Wallace does give ginōskō as one of the verbs taking an objective complement (Greek Grammar 183), yet we don't see many (anyone?) translating John 17:3that way. Wallace doesn't list it as one of the instances of exegetical significance where there is serious doubt as to which construction, apposition or object-complement is involved.

The reason for this might be that unless the complement precedes the object, "the complement will tend toward the qualitative-indefinite range" (185). Yet, ton monon alēthinon theon, which would have to be the complement inasmuch as the pronoun se would be the object (184 n. 32), is articular, and thus definite. This would make se ton monon alēthinon theon atypical as an object-complement construction. But it is a perfectly good appositive phrase.

As such, the "You" (se) and "the only true God" (ton monon alēthinon theon) share the same referent. One does not have a wider reference than the other. The "You" whom Jesus addresses in John 17 is, exhaustively and self-identically, the only true God. N.B. that the veracity of this conclusion does not depend on knowing Whom exactly Jesus was addressing. You can know that the "You" = "the only true God," without actually knowing the true God as the verse commands. This is ironic but does not affect the truth of the argument.

My argument is simply, that whomever Jesus is addressing is nominated to be be truely God (emphatic) but (in idiom) by virtual of the one Whom He sent forth. Such equating with the proof testimony of the OT. Possibly we agree (?)


Peace

[alam]

Hi Alam,



Thankyou for leading me through the vagaries of languge. I understand apposition as any two adjacent nouns or noun phrases (ie: the "president is something" or " the pesident, something". Possibly I've misunderstood (?)



The four features Wallace gives for simple apposition are quoted in post 12 (http://theologyweb.com/campus/showpost.php?p=2011254&postcount=12). The fourth is that the terms should "have the same syntactical relation to the rest of the clause" (Wallace, 48). "The president is something" doesn't match, because this is a complete proposition. "The president, something" could meet the criteria.



My argument is simply, that whomever Jesus is addressing is nominated to be be truely God (emphatic) but (in idiom) by virtual of the one Whom He sent forth. Such equating with the proof testimony of the OT. Possibly we agree (?)


Peace







This touches on two issues. You said "whomever Jesus is addressing is nominated to be be truely God (emphatic)" which is true. My point was that Jn 17:3 shows he is the only true God in the same sense of "is" that, e.g., Bush is the current President of the US. In the latter case, "is" directly equates Bush with the current President of the US; they are the same individual. Likewise, God the Father and the only true God are the same individual. If you agree with this, then we do agree.

The second issue stems from your comment that the Father "is nominated to be be truely God...(in idiom) by virtual of the one Whom He sent forth." I haven't been trying to prove why, or in virtue of what, the Father is the only true God, or what it means to be the only true God. They are worthwhile questions, but I would like us to reach an understanding on the first item before going on to them.

Best,

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

The four features Wallace gives for simple apposition are quoted in post 12 (http://theologyweb.com/campus/showpost.php?p=2011254&postcount=12). The fourth is that the terms should "have the same syntactical relation to the rest of the clause" (Wallace, 48). "The president is something" doesn't match, because this is a complete proposition. "The president, something" could meet the criteria.I understand what you are saying, but in grammer, following your comment below the "is" whether explicit or implicit seems crucial. I'm not arguing grammar merely meaning to clarify my understanding.

[You touch] on two issues. You said "whomever Jesus is addressing is nominated to be be truely God (emphatic)" which is true. My point was that Jn 17:3 shows he is the only true God in the same sense of "is" that, e.g., Bush is the current President of the US. In the latter case, "is" directly equates Bush with the current President of the US; they are the same individual. Likewise, God the Father and the only true God are the same individual. If you agree with this, then we do agree.I suspect we agree, though the office might be perceived as conditional (& in respect of president time constrained):-}

The second issue stems from your comment that the Father "is nominated to be be truely God...(in idiom) by virtual of the one Whom He sent forth." I haven't been trying to prove why, or in virtue of what, the Father is the only true God, or what it means to be the only true God. They are worthwhile questions, but I would like us to reach an understanding on the first item before going on to them.So we seems to be in agreement = the Father of Jesus the Christ is the only true God (as far as I know this is a common denominator with most Christian denominations).

The question arises: What does it mean to be the Father of the Son?

Peace

[alam]

Hello Alam,

I understand what you are saying, but in grammer, following your comment below the "is" whether explicit or implicit seems crucial. I'm not arguing grammar merely meaning to clarify my understanding.

I suspect we agree, though the office might be perceived as conditional (& in respect of president time constrained):-}

So we seems to be in agreement = the Father of Jesus the Christ is the only true God (as far as I know this is a common denominator with most Christian denominations).

It is not a common denominator with most Christian denominations that God the Father and the only true God are the same individual. The fact that you'd add this makes me think you still don't understand my argument. Give me some excuse to think you understand the argument. Then we can proceed to your next question.


The question arises: What does it mean to be the Father of the Son?

Peace

[apostoli]

Hi alam,

It is not a common denominator with most Christian denominations that God the Father and the only true God are the same individual.I'd be interested in any emphatic cite from the the RCC, EOC or any other group (apart from Mormons or Pentecostals) that substantiates your remark.

The fact that you'd add this makes me think you still don't understand my argument. Give me some excuse to think you understand the argument. Then we can proceed to your next question.All denomination that I know of say the Lords prayer = Our Father. Though they perceive "the" as a common, there is different perception as to what it means!

As far as I can follow your philosophic argument, it is one of obsterfication, I'm understanding you as fixated ( as were the ancients Greeks) of God as a detached creator rather than God as Father.

Peace

[alam]

Hi alam,

I'd be interested in any emphatic cite from the the RCC, EOC or any other group (apart from Mormons or Pentecostals) that substantiates your remark.

The cite you provided from the RC catechism: "there is only one true God, eternal infinite (immensus) and unchangeable, incomprehensible, almighty and ineffable, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit" makes the point well enough. :ahem:


All denomination that I know of say the Lords prayer = Our Father. Though they perceive "the" as a common, there is different perception as to what it means!

As far as I can follow your philosophic argument, it is one of obsterfication, I'm understanding you as fixated ( as were the ancients Greeks) of God as a detached creator rather than God as Father.

Peace


Nothing I've argued here tends in that direction, regardless of where you get a word like "obsterfication". Edit: I'm asking that you try to disengage yourself from speculating about who is fixated on what, or what the ancient Greeks thought or didn't think about God, subjects I've not broached at all here and for our purposes don't care about. These things are not relevant to the argument I've presented up to now. This is because the argument makes no assumptions about what it means to be the only true God, or to be the Father of Christ--as I've already said. Its point is simply that they are the same individual.

Best,

[apostoli]

Hi Alam,

The cite you provided from the RC catechism: "there is only one true God, eternal infinite (immensus) and unchangeable, incomprehensible, almighty and ineffable, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit" makes the point well enough. :ahem:I gave you the cite (and expected a backlash) but do you understand the context (what it is saying in the context of OT scripture)?

Nothing I've argued here tends in that direction, regardless of where you get a word like "obsterfication". Edit: I'm asking that you try to disengage yourself from speculating about who is fixated on what, or what the ancient Greeks thought or didn't think about God, subjects I've not broached at all here and for our purposes don't care about. These things are not relevant to the argument I've presented up to now. This is because the argument makes no assumptions about what it means to be the only true God, or to be the Father of Christ--as I've already said. Its point is simply that they are the same individual,OK!

However, there are obvious ramifications of being truely Father of a Son, which Son is of the the only true God, that in simple argument need to be considered.

We can assume God is potential or actually active, my premise is God has activity, imo your argument (rightly or wrongly) premises God as passive.


Peace

[alam]

Hi Apostoli.

Hi Alam,

I gave you the cite (and expected a backlash) but do you understand the context (what it is saying in the context of OT scripture)?

Following English word order, in the statement "God the Father and the only true God are the same individual", "God the Father" and "the only true God" are the subjects of the copula "are", and "the same individual" is the predicate nominative. The copula in this statement must be in the sense of identity, as this sense was laid out in post 12. If it was the sense of mere predication, as used in what Wallace terms a subset proposition, the PN "the same individual" would describe a general class, having wider reference than the subject "God the Father" or "the only true God", which represents a subset of the reference of the PN. Yet the expression "the same individual" refers to no more than one individual, vid. not a general class. Thus it's not a subset proposition, but an identity statement: that the only true God = the individual who = God the Father. This is the same as to say in simple English that "God the Father and the only true God are the same individual".


The reason your quote from the catechism shows the RCs do not think the Father and the only true God are the same individual is this. If (1) God the Father and the only true God are the same individual, i.e. the only true God = the individual who = God the Father, and yet (2) the only true God is the Trinity (i.e. the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit), then it must follow from transitivity of identity that God the Father is the Trinity, which is not admissible RC doctrine, in either sense of the copula. So unless you accuse them of logical inconsistency, of denying a conclusion which follows logically from their doctrines, at least one of the two initial propositions must not belong to their doctrine. (2) is known to be their doctrine from your catechism quote. Hence it is (1) that cannot be their doctrine.



do you understand the context (what it is saying in the context of OT scripture)?


In light of my argument, I understand that it is false according to the scriptures. But you're trying to dive into the OT, and leave my grammatical argument based on the NT dangling. I figure you're going for some backdoor approach. But Wallace made a sage observation about the problem with trying to subordinate grammar to semantics and idiom:


McGaughy follows the principle of structural linguistics (which is also largely adopted in this grammar) that proper grammatical analysis must begin with structure and end with semantics (ibid., 10-16). Otherwise hopeless confusion arises and built-in biases do not get properly challenged. The grammatical features of the language will be a surer guide than the lexical or semantic features that change from author to author and from time to time (and from interpreter to interpreter!).


OK!

However, there are obvious ramifications of being truely Father of a Son, which Son is of the the only true God, that in simple argument need to be considered.

We can assume God is potential or actually active, my premise is God has activity, imo your argument (rightly or wrongly) premises God as passive.

There you go again. I've indicated nothing like that. It seems like you are more trying to pigeonhole me into a straw caricature you have created, and argue against that, than address what has actually been presented.

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

Following English word order, in the statement "God the Father and the only true God are the same individual", "God the Father" and "the only true God" are the subjects of the copula "are", and "the same individual" is the predicate nominative. The copula in this statement must be in the sense of identity, as this sense was laid out in post 12. If it was the sense of mere predication, as used in what Wallace terms a subset proposition, the PN "the same individual" would describe a general class, having wider reference than the subject "God the Father" or "the only true God", which represents a subset of the reference of the PN. Yet the expression "the same individual" refers to no more than one individual, vid. not a general class. Thus it's not a subset proposition, but an identity statement: that the only true God = the individual who = God the Father. This is the same as to say in simple English that "God the Father and the only true God are the same individual".I've aleady agreed that "God the Father and the only true God are the same individual". However, in the context of John 17:1-3, what does "only true" actually mean? I suggest the simple grammar of the verses tells us.

To me, the context of John 17:3 is given by verses 1 & 2. Particularly vs2, where it is the Son who gives eternal life (a perogative (in the OT) usually uniquely associated with YHWH. cp. Deut 32:35-39), but in an NT context the allocation of life is received only to those whom the Father has given to the Son. vs3 expands on vs2, conditioning eternal life on taking in the knowledge of both the Father and the Son (thus in this regard the Father is not unique). Imu, the Father is proved the only true God, because He sent his own Son, not by some superior existence to the Son.

if...the only true God = the individual who = God the Father, and yet (2) the only true God is the Trinity it must follow from transitivity of identity that God the Father is the TrinityNot necessarily, it would depend on the context eg: Helena, the one true Greece, said in one context, would not contradict, the Senate, the one true Greece, said in another context. Neither makes the Senate, Helena or visa versa.

The context of the RCC (Fourth Lateran council), is that the Father, Son and Spirit "are the one and only principle of all [created] things".

The reason your quote from the catechism shows the RCs do not think the Father and the only true God are the same individual is this. If (1) God the Father and the only true God are the same individual, i.e. the only true God = the individual who = God the Father, and yet (2) the only true God is the Trinity (i.e. the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit), then it must follow from transitivity of identity that God the Father is the Trinity, which is not admissible RC doctrine, in either sense of the copula. So unless you accuse them of logical inconsistency, of denying a conclusion which follows logically from their doctrines, at least one of the two initial propositions must not belong to their doctrine. (2) is known to be their doctrine from your catechism quote. Hence it is (1) that cannot be their doctrine.The RCC catechism partly quotes the Fourth Lateran council which was focused on refuting the Albigensians (there are two sources of the universe) and Abbot Joachim (there are multiple Gods).

Though it does say "there is only one true God...the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit;" it qualifies this with...

The Father is from no one; the Son is from the Father only; and the Holy Spirit is from both the Father and the Son equally. The Father is the progenitor, the Son is the begotten, the Holy Spirit is proceeding...

The Father is entirely in the Son and entirely in the Holy Spirit; the Son is entirely in the Father and entirely in the Holy Spirit; the Holy Spirit is entirely in the Father and entirely in the Son."
http://www.therealpresence.org/archives/Trinity/Trinity_001.htm


The logic is simple: if Jesus' Father is truely God, then as Son, Jesus must also be truely God. Of course at John 17:3 we find the Father identified as "the only true God". So on face value there appears to be a contradiction. Imu, the RCC in one respect perceive that the true God is not an individual but an entity persisting in the perfect unity in action of three individuals (ie: Jn 10 & 17; Romans 8). However, as the Son is from the Father then the Father is first principle of the Son.

you're trying to dive into the OT, and leave my grammatical argument based on the NT dangling.The OT testimony gives the context of John 17:3. Alternatively, we can assume A.John just makes an arbitrary statement that is lacking in explanation or substantiation.

I figure you're going for some backdoor approach.My attempt is to walk through the front door rather than seeking an open window to climb through, which I suspect you are attempting to do.

But Wallace made a sage observation about the problem with trying to subordinate grammar to semantics and idiom:In Wallace's article I referred to earlier he makes the point that semantics and context need to be taken into account. For example: On page 109, he suggests that...

the semantics of the construction needs to be examined. Specifically, what is the meaning of kurion [at Rom 10:9]? Because it precedes the object, it has already been established that it falls within the qualitative-definite range. If qualitative, then the meaning is probably "master." If definite, then the meaning is more likely "Yahweh" (i.e., "the Lord”).80 I believe that the meaning "Yahweh" is probably what is meant here. In support of this are the following lines of evidence.

(a) From my count, there are five other passages in which the assertion is made that Jesus Christ is Lord (i.e., kurioj is not in simple apposition with Ihsouj / Xristoj, but the two are in a predicate relation). In Col 2:6, the most dubious example, the text reads parelabete ton Xriston Ihsoun ton kurion. This may be read, "you received Christ Jesus the Lord" (a statement in which no predication is made), or "you received Christ Jesus [as] the Lord" (an object-complement construction)."

"80 The qualitative idea, of course, would stress more what he does rather than specifying who he is (cf. I Pet 3:6). A definite kurion would probably have a par excellence force to it. Thus, by implication, since Yahweh is the one who deserves the name "Lord" above all others, Yahweh could well be implied by a definite kurion.

I'm still thinking on Wallace's remarks. However, it seems he is arguing from the basis of grammar that Jesus of the NT is YHWH of the OT. As far as I can tell Wallace holds that the Father and the Son are distinct individuals, so he seems to differentiate between YHWH, the God apparent to the Israelites and God as an entity.

The way I see it, the Father is not the only true God by predication but by definition. And by definition, the Father, is Father of the Son whom He sent forth


Peace

[alam]

Hello Alam,

I've aleady agreed that "God the Father and the only true God are the same individual".



I don't see where. You did say "So we seems to be in agreement = the Father of Jesus the Christ is the only true God" (#72) but then added "(as far as I know this is a common denominator with most Christian denominations)" which is false, per my argument last post, and betrays that you still do not understand.


However, in the context of John 17:1-3, what does "only true" actually mean? I suggest the simple grammar of the verses tells us.

To me, the context of John 17:3 is given by verses 1 & 2. Particularly vs2, where it is the Son who gives eternal life (a perogative (in the OT) usually uniquely associated with YHWH. cp. Deut 32:35-39), but in an NT context the allocation of life is received only to those whom the Father has given to the Son. vs3 expands on vs2, conditioning eternal life on taking in the knowledge of both the Father and the Son (thus in this regard the Father is not unique). Imu, the Father is proved the only true God, because He sent his own Son, not by some superior existence to the Son.


Maybe so, maybe not. My point is that the Father does = the only true God. Once we are clear about that, then we can look at this issue.


Not necessarily, it would depend on the context eg: Helena, the one true Greece, said in one context, would not contradict, the Senate, the one true Greece, said in another context. Neither makes the Senate, Helena or visa versa.


This is again assuming mere predication rather than identity. You are still foundering on the first paragraph of post 12. What my argument shows is that the Father = the only true God. The equal sign denotes identity, not mere predication.


The context of the RCC (Fourth Lateran council), is that the Father, Son and Spirit "are the one and only principle of all [created] things".

The RCC catechism partly quotes the Fourth Lateran council which was focused on refuting the Albigensians (there are two sources of the universe) and Abbot Joachim (there are multiple Gods).

Though it does say "there is only one true God...the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit;" it qualifies this with...

The Father is from no one; the Son is from the Father only; and the Holy Spirit is from both the Father and the Son equally. The Father is the progenitor, the Son is the begotten, the Holy Spirit is proceeding...

The Father is entirely in the Son and entirely in the Holy Spirit; the Son is entirely in the Father and entirely in the Holy Spirit; the Holy Spirit is entirely in the Father and entirely in the Son."
http://www.therealpresence.org/archives/Trinity/Trinity_001.htm


The logic is simple: if Jesus' Father is truely God, then as Son, Jesus must also be truely God. Of course at John 17:3 we find the Father identified as "the only true God". So on face value there appears to be a contradiction. Imu, the RCC in one respect perceive that the true God is not an individual but an entity persisting in the perfect unity in action of three individuals (ie: Jn 10 & 17; Romans 8). However, as the Son is from the Father then the Father is first principle of the Son.


Unfortunately, there is no logic in this relevant to my argument.



The OT testimony gives the context of John 17:3. Alternatively, we can assume A.John just makes an arbitrary statement that is lacking in explanation or substantiation.




The third and best alternative is that we first understand the grammar of John 17:3, and then look at context and other factors.


My attempt is to walk through the front door rather than seeking an open window to climb through, which I suspect you are attempting to do.


I started these threads and gave them their topic. You do not even understand the core argument I've presented. You are the one crawling through the window, but you seem to have gotten stuck halfway. I'm willing to give you a hand, if you want.


In Wallace's article I referred to earlier he makes the point that semantics and context need to be taken into account. For example: On page 109, he suggests that...

the semantics of the construction needs to be examined. Specifically, what is the meaning of kurion [at Rom 10:9]? Because it precedes the object, it has already been established that it falls within the qualitative-definite range. If qualitative, then the meaning is probably "master." If definite, then the meaning is more likely "Yahweh" (i.e., "the Lord”).80 I believe that the meaning "Yahweh" is probably what is meant here. In support of this are the following lines of evidence.

(a) From my count, there are five other passages in which the assertion is made that Jesus Christ is Lord (i.e., kurioj is not in simple apposition with Ihsouj / Xristoj, but the two are in a predicate relation). In Col 2:6, the most dubious example, the text reads parelabete ton Xriston Ihsoun ton kurion. This may be read, "you received Christ Jesus the Lord" (a statement in which no predication is made), or "you received Christ Jesus [as] the Lord" (an object-complement construction)."

"80 The qualitative idea, of course, would stress more what he does rather than specifying who he is (cf. I Pet 3:6). A definite kurion would probably have a par excellence force to it. Thus, by implication, since Yahweh is the one who deserves the name "Lord" above all others, Yahweh could well be implied by a definite kurion.

I'm still thinking on Wallace's remarks. However, it seems he is arguing from the basis of grammar that Jesus of the NT is YHWH of the OT. As far as I can tell Wallace holds that the Father and the Son are distinct individuals, so he seems to differentiate between YHWH, the God apparent to the Israelites and God as an entity.

The way I see it, the Father is not the only true God by predication but by definition. And by definition, the Father, is Father of the Son whom He sent forth


Peace




Yes, I believe Wallace makes such a point re Rom. 10:9. I don't disagree with his grammatical analysis. The context of the OT does indeed then become a determining factor. Yet you are trying to run off into context, idioms, idiosyncracies and whatever before understanding the grammar. I will not discuss anything here on such terms.



Incidentally, this thread is not about Romans 10:9. Wallace identifies it as an object-complement construction, but I have explained why I do not think John 17:3 is an object-complement construction. Do you remember where, or are you too eager to flood the thread with irrelevant matter?



My view is that with a person who cannot understand or admit a simple grammatical point, there's little use proceeding into more ambiguous and complicated matters.



Best,

[apostoli]

...The third and best alternative is that we first understand the grammar of John 17:3, and then look at context and other factors.In which case we need also to look at 1 John 5:20 where many translations have Jesus as the true God (which fits the grammar), while others leave the text ambiguous implicating the Father (which imo fits the context).

I started these threads and gave them their topic. You do not even understand the core argument I've presented. You are the one crawling through the window, but you seem to have gotten stuck halfway. I'm willing to give you a hand, if you want.I'd appreciate the guidance. So far I am not convinced by your argument (ie: AJ.ohn was writing to ordinary people like me not academics steeped in theosophy). The closest support I've found for you proposal/s in translations is the NEB "This is eternal life - to know thee who alone art truely God" (and yet, in this rendering the Father is not true God, but truely God (something I understand you reject on the basis of grammar). From what I've read, for the text to mean what (imu) you seem to want it to read, it needs to be rendered, "truely you alone, are God" or "you alone, are true God" (assuming you hold the Son is a type of God/god). Which no one I've encountered suggests as a translation of the Greek.

The typical argument I've encountered is that if the Father is "alone, the true God", then Jesus cannot be god in any description as, grammatically, anyone other than the Father that is called god is a false god (and therefore an idol of this world (ie: man invented) (cp 1 Jn 5:21).

Incidentally, this thread is not about Romans 10:9. Wallace identifies it as an object-complement construction, but I have explained why I do not think John 17:3 is an object-complement construction. Do you remember where, or are you too eager to flood the thread with irrelevant matter?It isn't irrelevant in my eyes (or most commentators I've read). Imu, it illustrates the defect in taking literal grammar, without accepting context as a basis for understanding/translating scripture. Imu, if we take grammar only to account then at 1Jn 5:20 Jesus is called emphatically true God and eternal life.

IMy view is that with a person who cannot understand or admit a simple grammatical point, there's little use proceeding into more ambiguous and complicated matters.I'm tempted to quote in full the preface to the NEB which notes the often arbitrary nature of grammar in the NT (liberties taken by NT authors), where things that were meaningful in the vernacular lose clarity on literal (grammatical) translation.

Without a lot of gobbly-gook techo speek, can you set out in a plain fashion what you are elieve John 17:3 is saying. Then demonstrate it via the grammar (as agreed by a consensus of authorities), support it by lexicon referrals and prove via grammar (conclusively) that 1 John 5:20 does not conflict with whatever proposal you offer . So a non-linguist such as myself can reconcile your argument with what understand as the plain teaching of scripture.

Peace

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

Skip my last post. Possibly the below more directly examines your argument...

I started these threads and gave them their topic.Your 1st post in the original thread asked...

"Is it correct to identify [the] expression [theos pater] as two nouns in simple apposition? If so, is it correct to say that there is an implicit identity statement here which can be "unpacked" in the form of a convertible proposition, i.e. theos is patēr and patēr is theos? I am getting this notion from Dr. Wallace grammar pp. 48, 96, & 41:"

You do not even understand the core argument I've presented...My view is that with a person who cannot understand or admit a simple grammatical point, there's little use proceeding into more ambiguous and complicated matters.Reading Wallace your grammatical points aren't simple. Lets examine where I don't understand your core argument which I assumed was that of para 1&2 of post #12...

Sure. In John 17:5,Christ addresses the "You" of verse 3 as su pater: "You, Father." Here again is an appositive phrase, where the "You" and the "Father" share the same referent; the "You" = the "Father". If the "You" who = the "Father" also = "the only true God," then by transitivity of identity, the "Father" = "the only true God." Verse 5 has pater in the vocative case, where it typically denotes the father of the speaker, thus the Father of Jesus (cf. v. 1). So, using the same method as my argument in post 12 and building on it, we derive from John 17:1-5 that Jesus' Father = the only true God.Imu, the referent of "you" (in NT language) is always particularly known. So, there is no need to rely on complex argument, simple greek grammar proves the point.

B. Second Person for Third Person ("You" = "Someone")

In the Greek NT there is, most likely, no indeinite second person as there is in modern colloquial English (By "indefinite" I mean the use of the second person for either the first or the third person.)...The Greeks, however use the appopriate person to express what we colloquilly say with the second person...

You said "whomever Jesus is addressing is nominated to be be truely God (emphatic)" which is true. My point was that Jn 17:3 shows he is the only true God in the same sense of "is" that, e.g., Bush is the current President of the US. In the latter case, "is" directly equates Bush with the current President of the US; they are the same individual. Likewise, God the Father and the only true God are the same individual. If you agree with this, then we do agree."Wallace on page 48, says "In the sentence 'Paul is an apostle', apostle is a PN; in the sentence 'Paul the apostle is in prison" apostle is in apposition to Paul". on page 96 Wallace says "For a genitive in simple apposition the two nouns are equivalent to a convertible proposition. Thus, 'Paul the apostle' could be unpacked as 'Paul is the apostle' or 'the apostle is Paul'". However on page 41 Wallace says...

there is another semantic relationship between S and PN. Sometimes called a convertible proposition, this construction indicates an identical exchange. That is to say, both nouns have an identical referent. The mathematical formulas of A=B, B=A are applicable in such instances. A statement such as "Michael Jordan is the greatest basketball player in NBA history" means the same thing as "the greatest player in NBA history is Michael Jordan." There is complete interchange between the two. 15

15 However, this does not mean that it is not important to distinguish which one is the subject: the first sentence answers the question, "who is Michael Jordan?" while the second answers "Who is the greatest player in NBA history?"

Following Wallace: "the only true God" answers the question "who is the Father?" Thus the second question is "who is the only true God?" would be answered "Jesus' Father". If this is your proposition, then I've previously misunderstood you and unconditionally apologise for my ignorance. I had understood your argument as converting the subject from "Jesus' Father" to "the true God".

Following English word order, in the statement "God the Father and the only true God are the same individual", "God the Father" and "the only true God" are the subjects of the copula "are", and "the same individual" is the predicate nominative. The copula in this statement must be in the sense of identity, as this sense was laid out in post 12. If it was the sense of mere predication, as used in what Wallace terms a subset proposition, the PN "the same individual" would describe a general class, having wider reference than the subject "God the Father" or "the only true God", which represents a subset of the reference of the PN. Yet the expression "the same individual" refers to no more than one individual, vid. not a general class. Thus it's not a subset proposition, but an identity statement: that the only true God = the individual who = God the Father. This is the same as to say in simple English that "God the Father and the only true God are the same individual".While I agree "God the Father and the only true God are the same individual". I believe that the identity of person is the Father of Jesus, and the identity of office is "only true God".

There are four featues of simple apposition to be noted (the first two are structural; the last two features are semantic): An appositional construction involves (1) two adjacent substantives (2) in the same case, (3) which refer to the same person or thing, (4) and have the same syntactical relation to the rest of the clause. 41 Thus, the appositive "piggy-backs" on the first nominative's use, as it were. For this reason apposition is not an independent syntactical category.

The appositive functions very much like a P[redicate ]N[ominative] in a convertible proposition--that is, it refers to the same thing as the first noun. The difference, however, is that a PN makes an assertion about the S[ubject] (an equative verb is either stated or implied); with appositives there is assumption, not assertion (no verb is in mind). In the sentence 'Paul is an apostle', apostle is a PN; in the sentence 'Paul the apostle is in prison" apostle is in apposition to Paul

41. An appositive, strictly speaking, is substantival, not adjectival. Thus adjectives or participles in second attributive position are not generally appositives, but usually have an adjectival force.

In [a generative] in simple apposition, however, both nouns are in the same case and the appositive does not name a specific example that falls within the category named by the noun to which it is related. Rather, it simply gives a different designation that either clarifies who is the one named or shows a different relation to the rest of the clause than what the first noun itself could display. Both words have the same referent, though they describe it in different terms.

For example, in "Paul the apostle", "the apostle" is in simple apposition to "Paul" The appositive clarifies who is the one named. In "God, our Father", "Father" is in simple appositiion to "God" and shows a different relation to the rest of the clause than the first noun by itsef could display...

For a genitive in simple apposition the two nouns are equivalent to a convertible proposition. Thus, "Paul the apostle" could be unpacked as "Paul is the apostle" or "the apostle is Paul"

As I've understood your argument, you hold that both "Father" and "only true God" are fully interchangable identities (subjects) of the "you" in John 17:3. However, from what Wallace says on page 392 of the NT use of "you" and what he says about preserving the subject on page 41 and what he says of the appositive not naming a specific example that falls within the category named by the noun to which it is related (see above), the referent "you" must be known, and therefore the identity is "Jesus' Father" who is designated "only true God". If this is your proposition, then I've previously misunderstood you and again unconditionally apologise for my ignorance.

Peace

ps:

I notice that many/most translations deliminate the phrase "only true God" with commas. Given the subject of John 17:3 is knowledge of both the Father and the Son, would it be plausable to view the clause as parenthetic?

Wallace page 53, notes "parenthetic nominative...use is primarily explanatory and is frequently an editorial aside, especially in the Fourth Gospel...A parenthetic nominative is the subject of an explanatory clause within another clause..."

[alam]

Hi Apostoli.

Hello Alam,

Skip my last post. Possibly the below more directly examines your argument...

Your 1st post in the original thread asked...

"Is it correct to identify [the] expression [theos pater] as two nouns in simple apposition? If so, is it correct to say that there is an implicit identity statement here which can be "unpacked" in the form of a convertible proposition, i.e. theos is patēr and patēr is theos? I am getting this notion from Dr. Wallace grammar pp. 48, 96, & 41:"

Reading Wallace your grammatical points aren't simple. Lets examine where I don't understand your core argument which I assumed was that of para 1&2 of post #12...

Imu, the referent of "you" (in NT language) is always particularly known. So, there is no need to rely on complex argument, simple greek grammar proves the point.

B. Second Person for Third Person ("You" = "Someone")

In the Greek NT there is, most likely, no indeinite second person as there is in modern colloquial English (By "indefinite" I mean the use of the second person for either the first or the third person.)...The Greeks, however use the appopriate person to express what we colloquilly say with the second person...

Yes, the "You" (se) is grammatically definite.


Wallace on page 48, says "In the sentence 'Paul is an apostle', apostle is a PN; in the sentence 'Paul the apostle is in prison" apostle is in apposition to Paul". on page 96 Wallace says "For a genitive in simple apposition the two nouns are equivalent to a convertible proposition. Thus, 'Paul the apostle' could be unpacked as 'Paul is the apostle' or 'the apostle is Paul'".


Yes.


However on page 41 Wallace says...

there is another semantic relationship between S and PN. Sometimes called a convertible proposition, this construction indicates an identical exchange. That is to say, both nouns have an identical referent. The mathematical formulas of A=B, B=A are applicable in such instances. A statement such as "Michael Jordan is the greatest basketball player in NBA history" means the same thing as "the greatest player in NBA history is Michael Jordan." There is complete interchange between the two. 15

15 However, this does not mean that it is not important to distinguish which one is the subject: the first sentence answers the question, "who is Michael Jordan?" while the second answers "Who is the greatest player in NBA history?"


That's also true, for the reason he gives.


Following Wallace: "the only true God" answers the question "who is the Father?" Thus the second question is "who is the only true God?" would be answered "Jesus' Father". If this is your proposition,


That is the proposition.


then I've previously misunderstood you and unconditionally apologise for my ignorance. I had understood your argument as converting the subject from "Jesus' Father" to "the true God".


Notice that in simple apposition there is no grammatical subject or predicate nominative. The two terms have the same syntactical relation to the rest of the clause. In John 17:3, neither "You" nor "the only true God" is the subject. Instead, they are both objects of the verb ginōskōsin (they might know). What I get from Wallace is that simple apposition is equivalent to a convertible proposition only in the sense that in both kinds of constructions, the two substantives have identity of reference. This means that if we are asking "who is the Father," John 17:3 tells us that the Father is the only true God. If we are asking, "who is the only true God," Jn 17:3 tells us that the only true God is the Father.


While I agree "God the Father and the only true God are the same individual". I believe that the identity of person is the Father of Jesus, and the identity of office is "only true God".


My argument does not exclude that "the only true God" describes the office of the Father. "Paul the Apostle" is an illustration of simple apposition, and apostleship is an office. However, in the appositive phrase "Paul the Apostle", the appositive "the Apostle" does not refer to a general category which Paul exemplified, although it "clarifies who is the one named or shows a different relation to the rest of the clause than what the first noun itself could display." (cf. your quote). If you mean that in the phrase "You the only true God", "the only true God" indicates the office of the Father in the way that in the phrase "Paul the Apostle", "the Apostle" indicates the office of Paul, then this is compatible with my argument.



There are four featues of simple apposition to be noted (the first two are structural; the last two features are semantic): An appositional construction involves (1) two adjacent substantives (2) in the same case, (3) which refer to the same person or thing, (4) and have the same syntactical relation to the rest of the clause. 41 Thus, the appositive "piggy-backs" on the first nominative's use, as it were. For this reason apposition is not an independent syntactical category.

The appositive functions very much like a P[redicate ]N[ominative] in a convertible proposition--that is, it refers to the same thing as the first noun. The difference, however, is that a PN makes an assertion about the S[ubject] (an equative verb is either stated or implied); with appositives there is assumption, not assertion (no verb is in mind). In the sentence 'Paul is an apostle', apostle is a PN; in the sentence 'Paul the apostle is in prison" apostle is in apposition to Paul

41. An appositive, strictly speaking, is substantival, not adjectival. Thus adjectives or participles in second attributive position are not generally appositives, but usually have an adjectival force.

In [a generative] in simple apposition, however, both nouns are in the same case and the appositive does not name a specific example that falls within the category named by the noun to which it is related. Rather, it simply gives a different designation that either clarifies who is the one named or shows a different relation to the rest of the clause than what the first noun itself could display. Both words have the same referent, though they describe it in different terms.

For example, in "Paul the apostle", "the apostle" is in simple apposition to "Paul" The appositive clarifies who is the one named. In "God, our Father", "Father" is in simple appositiion to "God" and shows a different relation to the rest of the clause than the first noun by itsef could display...

For a genitive in simple apposition the two nouns are equivalent to a convertible proposition. Thus, "Paul the apostle" could be unpacked as "Paul is the apostle" or "the apostle is Paul"

As I've understood your argument, you hold that both "Father" and "only true God" are fully interchangable identities (subjects) of the "you" in John 17:3.

The "Father" and "the only true God" are interchangeable only to the extent that these two expressions refer exclusively to the same individual -- they have complete overlap of reference. Yet they tell us different things about this individual.


However, from what Wallace says on page 392 of the NT use of "you" and what he says about preserving the subject on page 41 and what he says of the appositive not naming a specific example that falls within the category named by the noun to which it is related (see above), the referent "you" must be known, and therefore the identity is "Jesus' Father" who is designated "only true God".



If we were to try to deduce a convertible S-PN proposition out of Jn. 17:3, "You" would be the subject of the proposition, because as a pronoun it takes priority in the "pecking order" (cf. Wallace 44, c.1) which decides subject and predicate in Greek, a language in which word order is not a sure guide to this question.



If this is your proposition, then I've previously misunderstood you and again unconditionally apologise for my ignorance.


Misunderstanding some things is a universal predicament, and if that is what has occurred no apology is needed.


Peace

ps:

I notice that many/most translations deliminate the phrase "only true God" with commas. Given the subject of John 17:3 is knowledge of both the Father and the Son, would it be plausable to view the clause as parenthetic?

Wallace page 53, notes "parenthetic nominative...use is primarily explanatory and is frequently an editorial aside, especially in the Fourth Gospel...A parenthetic nominative is the subject of an explanatory clause within another clause..."


Neither "You" nor "the only true God" nor "whom You have sent" nor "Jesus Christ" could be a parenthetic nominative when none of these expressions are in the nominative to begin with.


Best,

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

I notice that many/most translations deliminate the phrase "only true God" with commas. Given the subject of John 17:3 is knowledge of both the Father and the Son, would it be plausable to view the clause as parenthetic?

Wallace page 53, notes "parenthetic nominative...use is primarily explanatory and is frequently an editorial aside, especially in the Fourth Gospel...A parenthetic nominative is the subject of an explanatory clause within another clause..."
Neither "You" nor "the only true God" nor "whom You have sent" nor "Jesus Christ" could be a parenthetic nominative when none of these expressions are in the nominative to begin with.I'm not understanding your comment.

If Jn 17:3 was rendered "this means eternal life [the taking in of knowledge/to know] that you [are] the only true God and [that] the one you sent forth [is] Jesus Christ", I understand we wouldn't have nominees of the subject "ginōskōsin" Merely a statement. However, I have yet to encounter a translation in this form.

Taking three disparate translations I understand that there are two nominees of whom we must "ginōskōsin"...

The KJV has "this is life eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God and Jesus Christ, whom thou sent forth."

The NWT has "This means everlasting life, the taking in of knowledge of you, the only true God, and of the one whom you sent forth, Jesus Christ."

The NEB has "This is eternal life: to know thee who art alone truely God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent".

In each case, there seems to be a qualification to the primary nominee of each clause (?)

In any case I don't see the difference between appositional clauses and parenthetic clauses. They both seem to have the same function=to expand on, clarify, the subject of the clause. Would you expand on this.

Notice that in simple apposition there is no grammatical subject or predicate nominative.I need clarification on this. Imu, "Paul, the apostle" and "the apostle Paul", would have the same identity of person as subject (Paul), as well as, the same identity of office as subject (apostle). Is this correct?

The two terms have the same syntactical relation to the rest of the clause.I've been viewing the clause as "you, the only true God"

In John 17:3,neither "You" nor "the only true God" is the subject. Instead, they are both objects of the verb ginōskōsin (they might know).I need clarification on this. This suggests to me an intersection. What in data modeling I'd call an associative entity (an object), in which the unique identifier is a combination of both the person and the office.

Peace

[alam]

Hi Apostoli,

It's been one of those weeks. Thanks for your patience.


Hello Alam,

I'm not understanding your comment.

If Jn 17:3 was rendered "this means eternal life [the taking in of knowledge/to know] that you [are] the only true God and [that] the one you sent forth [is] Jesus Christ", I understand we wouldn't have nominees of the subject "ginōskōsin" Merely a statement. However, I have yet to encounter a translation in this form.


Yes. I think you are understanding my point now. By bringing in the equative verb you'd also be bringing in its ambiguity re identity versus predication (post 12, again), which is not there in the original. The KJV and NWT renderings, as respects the translation of se ton monon alethinon theon, are literal renderings of the Greek, and cannot be improved for clarity.




Taking three disparate translations I understand that there are two nominees of whom we must "ginōskōsin"...


:stop: Nominative, not "nominee"! The nominative is one of five cases in Greek. The nominative case often marks the subject of a verb. In John 17:3, neither the Greek for "You" nor "the only true God" is in the nominative. Rather, they are in the accusative case. They are the objects of the verb ginōskōsin.

If you have Wallace's text, I recommend reading his chapter on the nominative case, especially the introduction.




The KJV has "this is life eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God and Jesus Christ, whom thou sent forth."

The NWT has "This means everlasting life, the taking in of knowledge of you, the only true God, and of the one whom you sent forth, Jesus Christ."

The NEB has "This is eternal life: to know thee who art alone truely God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent".

In each case, there seems to be a qualification to the primary nominee of each clause (?)

In any case I don't see the difference between appositional clauses and parenthetic clauses. They both seem to have the same function=to expand on, clarify, the subject of the clause. Would you expand on this.


In appositional phrases, the noun and its appositive have identity of reference. I don't think Wallace indicated such a thing about a parenthetic nominative, although the usages may be similar in other ways.


Notice that in simple apposition there is no grammatical subject or predicate nominative.

I need clarification on this. Imu, "Paul, the apostle" and "the apostle Paul", would have the same identity of person as subject (Paul), as well as, the same identity of office as subject (apostle). Is this correct?


It seems to me that the essence of what you're saying is correct. Why don't you expand a bit on what you mean, so I can a better idea of what you are asking.


The two terms have the same syntactical relation to the rest of the clause.


I've been viewing the clause as "you, the only true God"


Good. :yes:



In John 17:3,neither "You" nor "the only true God" is the subject. Instead, they are both objects of the verb ginōskōsin (they might know).

I need clarification on this. This suggests to me an intersection. What in data modeling I'd call an associative entity (an object), in which the unique identifier is a combination of both the person and the office.

Peace


This is overcomplicating it. We have subject and verb (they might know) and two grammatical objects, "you" and "the only true God." Subject, verb, and object. Same as in English. It is not a matter of person versus office.

Best,

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

It's been one of those weeks. Thanks for your patience.No prob. Thought you might have been out of town.

Thank you for making time, and having the patience (with me) to reply. It is appreciated :-}

On my part, it was worth the wait as it allowed me additional time to think on our conversation and do some remedial reading on both NT & English grammar (whatever I might have once known, I've obviously forgotten the technicalities, so feel free to correct anything below).

I apologise for the delay in posting a reply. I wanted to be more thoughtful and objective in my response than I may have been previously.

I notice that many/most translations deliminate the phrase "only true God" with commas. Given the subject of John 17:3 is knowledge of both the Father and the Son, would it be plausible to view the clause as parenthetic?

Wallace page 53, notes "parenthetic nominative...use is primarily explanatory and is frequently an editorial aside, especially in the Fourth Gospel...A parenthetic nominative is the subject of an explanatory clause within another clause..."Neither "You" nor "the only true God" nor "whom You have sent" nor "Jesus Christ" could be a parenthetic nominative when none of these expressions are in the nominative to begin with.I'm not understanding your comment.My focus was on parenthetic. I understand there is/was a thing called a parenthetic accusative (at least in classical Greek), possibly there is a more modern term used to classify it (?) Though I did find the phrase in google, I didn't get enough information to form a complete opinion.

I assumed the parenthetic accusative would have a similar definition to the parenthetic nominative that I quoted from Wallace. My apology for not being clearer in my question.

One reason I asked the question was because of the following definition in an English glossary...

Apposition: a post-head parenthetical dependent (e.g. Jack Parker, my neighbour, and John, who moved to Hove last year).
http://beta.visl.sdu.dk/visl/en/info/engglos.html

Another reason I asked the question was based on the transition of he/him of Jn 17:2 to I/me in Jn 17:4 This led me to consider whether A.John is somewhat editorial in verses 2 & 3, or whether there is some idiom of NT Greek of which I am unaware (?).

In appositional phrases, the noun and its appositive have identity of reference. I don't think Wallace indicated such a thing about a parenthetic nominative, although the usages may be similar in other ways.More particularly, the parenthetic occured to me because of the way most translations render Jn 17:3 - especially the symmetry effected through the change in word order in the last clause - giving us, person then something about the person in each of the objective clauses applying to the verb ginōskōsin (see below).
http://www.blueletterbible.org/cgi-bin/versions.pl?book=Jhn&chapter=17&verse=3&version=KJV#3

Some versions such as ASV, NWT, HNV & Young keep to the Greek word order, and these I wouldn't see as parenthetic - except for maybe the ending = "Jesus Christ" (see below).

If Jn 17:3 was rendered "this means eternal life the taking in of knowledge/to know [that] you [are] the only true God and [that] the one you sent forth [is] Jesus Christ", I understand we wouldn't have nominees of the [subject of "ginōskōsin" Merely a statement. However, I have yet to encounter a translation in this form.Yes. I think you are understanding my point now. By bringing in the equative verb you'd also be bringing in its ambiguity re identity versus predication (post 12, again), which is not there in the original.I'm not sure if I do follow your argument at the beginning of post #12. Below is a review of my thoughts and the questions that arise in my mind...

Some Homoousian (a.k.a "trinitarian") argument concerns the ambiguity of the copulaWould you give an example other than from Augustine or his imitators. In the case of Augustine and his imitators I would probably agree with you (especially in Augustine's rendering of Jn 17:3). But then again, I don't see them as Homoousian in the Nicea sense or orthodox sense.

the is of identity versus the is of predication.Would you expand on this. I took you to be speaking grammatically (?). But possibly you are allowing for formal logic also (?)

It is true that Homoousian argument is founded in philosophic predication, which imu, differs significantly from what is traditionally understood by the phrase "grammatical predication".

The Homoousian argument often seems to follow Aristotle and the first of his ten kinds of predications = substance (ousia=being, to be).

You might find the following interesting (quoted from the following link)
http://aristotle.tamu.edu/~rasmith/Courses/Ancient/predication.html

Aristotle [uses a] complicated classification of kinds of predications (genê tôn katêgoriôn: the word 'category' is derived from the Greek katêgoria, 'predication'...

In the Categories, Aristotle makes a distinction between homonymous and synonymous things.

A and B are homonymous = A and B are both called F, but with different definitions of F
A and B are synonymous = A and B are both called F and with the same definition of F

"In English, homonymy and synonymy are relationships between words. Two words are homonyms if they sound alike but have different spellings, or at least different meanings, and two words are synonymous if they have different sounds (or at least spellings) but the same meaning. From a modern philosophical viewpoint, this at once raises questions about whether it is words or occurrences of words that are homonymous or synonymous and what the identity conditions are for words. Those issues do not really arise for Aristotle's distinction, however, since for him it is things, not words, which are homonymous or synonymous. 'Homonymous' really means 'like-named', and 'synonymous' means 'named together.' Things are homonymous, in Aristotle's sense, if the same word applies to them both but not in virtue of the same definition, and things are synonymous if the same word applies to them in virtue of a single definition."

An identity statement is convertible. This means that when you say "the current President of the USA is George Bush," it is conversely true that "George Bush is the current President of the USA." The essence of the statement is, "George Bush = current President of the USA." When we have the is of predication though, the statement isn't convertible.Would you expand on what you mean by "identity statement". As I understand the term we'd have Bush + the President (who is this person?), in opposition to Bush = President (what is this person?) and President=Bush (who has this attribute/office?).

Personally, when the clause "you, the only true God" is isolated from the sentence, I see it as a "+" construction. If I converted it, it would be to (something like) "the only true God [who is] you". Which I view as an "=" construction. To me this differs from saying "Bush, the President" and "President Bush" which are mutually convertible without modification. When I take "apesteilas" from the next clause into account I view the "you, the only true God" as predicated ("because" rather than "is"). Which is consistent with the OT testimony of God ("because" justifies "is").

Imu, predication tells us something particular about something. Following Wallace: in a convertible proposition we have the answer to two questions eg: "President Bush" answers "What is Bush? Bush is the President!" and "Who is the president? The President is Bush!", so it seems we have implicit grammatical predication if we decompose the proposition. As I see it: the proposition "Bush, the President" answers the question "Who is this particular person?" with the answer being an object and it's compliment, where the compliment qualifies the object. The two components of the clause combined give uniqueness of identity or at least particularity of reference (this person in that activity).

Imu, an appositional clause is convertible (as is demonstrated by the last clause of Jn 17:3). But this seems no different to any other form of convertible clause, where the predicate and subject (or object and compliment) are swapped around, to change primary focus. Imu, in each rendering we receive the same information, and reach the same conclusions. I'm uncertain if such would be true if "you, the only true God" or "theos pater" were converted. I'm inclined to believe that the meanings (the ideas conveyed) in the unconverted phrases would be modified on conversion.

In this regard I contemplated two renderings of the final clause of Jn 17:3: "the one whom you sent forth, Jesus Christ" (NWT) and "Jesus Christ, whom you have sent" (KJV). The second rendering (KJV and many others) might be grammatically allowable but it seems to modify A.John's overall teaching in the Gospel (and allows belief, as some do, that Jesus was just an inspired man). Pedantically, from A.John's overall gospel, I perceive Jesus Christ is not "the one [the Father] sent forth", given it was the Logos that become flesh, was named Jesus, and was recognized as the Christ. In this scenario the person has many identities summed up in the person named Jesus (However, we do not have a particular identity of person, merely predications. On the other hand, we do seem to have a particular identity, where the one sent, is the particular Son of God). This seems to fit the teaching at Jn 1:1-18 & 20:31.

Essentially, I would argue that given a subject/object and a predicate/object compliment, that whatever the thing that is in primary focus is clarified by a qualification.

In short: in Jn 17:3, though each objective clause is appositional and grammar would allow conversion, I perceive a precedence in A.John's teaching, and to change precedence changes meaning. Thus A.John identifies that the Father of Jesus is the only true God, not the only true God as Father (which I perceive conversion of the clause would require).

Notice that in simple apposition there is no grammatical subject or predicate nominative.
I need clarification on this. Imu, "Paul, the apostle" and "the apostle Paul", would have the same identity of person as subject (Paul), as well as, the same identity of office as subject (apostle). Is this correct?It seems to me that the essence of what you're saying is correct. Why don't you expand a bit on what you mean, so I can get a better idea of what you are asking.Basically, imu, we need a compound of both "Paul" and "the apostle" (in any order) to identify to which particular "Paul" or "apostle" we are referring.

In John 17:3,neither "You" nor "the only true God" is the subject. Instead, they are both objects of the verb ginōskōsin (they might know).I need clarification on this. This suggests to me an intersection. What in data modeling I'd call an associative entity (an object), in which the unique identifier is a combination of both the person and the office.This is overcomplicating it. We have subject and verb (they might know) and two grammatical objects, "you" and "the only true God." Subject, verb, and object. Same as in English.As I understand it there are two objects of the verb ginōskōsin (per KJV: you (Jesus' Father) and Jesus Christ). However, each has an object compliment. In some English grammars I read, there is reference to a subject of the object, though imu, in apposition we can have a primary & secondary subject of the object, which can be interchanged as a term of reference in a object with object compliment construction. I'm presuming the same applies in NT Greek (?)

It is not a matter of person versus office.I agree. Imu, to lose ambiguity the two terms need to be combined.

Peace

[alam]

Hello Alam,

No prob. Thought you might have been out of town.

Hi Apostoli,



Not out of town, just very busy. :sigh:

Thank you for making time, and having the patience (with me) to reply. It is appreciated :-}

On my part, it was worth the wait as it allowed me additional time to think on our conversation and do some remedial reading on both NT & English grammar (whatever I might have once known, I've obviously forgotten the technicalities, so feel free to correct anything below).

I apologise for the delay in posting a reply. I wanted to be more thoughtful and objective in my response than I may have been previously.

Ok.


My focus was on parenthetic. I understand there is/was a thing called a parenthetic accusative (at least in classical Greek), possibly there is a more modern term used to classify it (?) Though I did find the phrase in google, I didn't get enough information to form a complete opinion.

I assumed the parenthetic accusative would have a similar definition to the parenthetic nominative that I quoted from Wallace. My apology for not being clearer in my question.

One reason I asked the question was because of the following definition in an English glossary...

Apposition: a post-head parenthetical dependent (e.g. Jack Parker, my neighbour, and John, who moved to Hove last year).
http://beta.visl.sdu.dk/visl/en/info/engglos.html


The appositive does have the function of "clarif[ying], descri, or identif[ying...] who or what is mentioned" in the first substantive (Wallace, Greek Grammar 48).

This relationship can be described as parenthetic, epexegetic or other ways. Yet "the appositive 'piggy-backs' on the first nominative's use, as it were. For this reason simple apposition is not an independent syntactical category" (48). This aspect of the appositive contrasts with the parenthetic nominative, which Wallace lists under the grammatically independent uses of the nominative, where "[t]he substantive in the nominative case is grammatically unrelated to the rest of the sentence" (49).

In particular, a parenthetic nominative "is the subject of an explanatory clause within another clause" (53). A 'clause' is a "[unit] of thought forming part of a compound or complex sentence. Each clause normally contains a subject and predicate or a nonfinite verbal form (i.e., either an infinitive or participle)" (656, emphasis mine).

Now it does not seem possible for the accusatives in se ton monon alēthinon theon to be grammatically unrelated to the rest of the sentence, for the fact that they are accusatives - the objects of a verb (ginōskōsin).

But assuming you asking that we put this consideration aside and read it as though the other features of a parenthetic nominative hold up, I need to know where you think the parenthesis begins and ends, because this will be what you are posing as the parenthetic clause. Where is the subject and the predicate, or the non-finite verb? What other entity in the sentence does this clause explain (inasmuch as the parenthetic clause is explanatory?).

AFAICT there is no reason to read se ton monon alēthinon theon as something other than apposition. The best other option that has come up is that it might be an object + objective complement, but I don't think so, per our foregoing discussion around the end of August. If it is in some way parenthetic, it is in the sense that is already implied in the definition of apposition, inasmuch as the appositive "clarif, descri, or identif[ies...] who or what is mentioned" in the first substantive (Wallace, [i]Greek Grammar 48).







More particularly, the parenthetic occured to me because of the way most translations render Jn 17:3 - especially the symmetry effected through the change in word order in the last clause - giving us, person then something about the person in each of the objective clauses applying to the verb ginōskōsin (see below).
http://www.blueletterbible.org/cgi-bin/versions.pl?book=Jhn&chapter=17&verse=3&version=KJV#3


This symmetry does not call for the presence of parenthetic clauses in John 17:3. The symmetry is broken down by Harris in the previously cited section from "Jesus as God" in terms of two parallel appositive expressions: "You, the only true God" and "Whom You have sent, Jesus Christ."

I think it is correct that an appositive can be translated using parentheses, although it is not conventional, because a comma does the job as well. The idea of "Paul, the Apostle" or "Paul, [namely,] the Apostle" is also conveyed by "Paul (the Apostle)." Whatever the case, it is still appositive; the term in parentheses is not a clause of its own.



Some versions such as ASV, NWT, HNV & Young keep to the Greek word order, and these I wouldn't see as parenthetic - except for maybe the ending = "Jesus Christ" (see below).

I'm not sure if I do follow your argument at the beginning of post #12. Below is a review of my thoughts and the questions that arise in my mind...

Some Homoousian (a.k.a "trinitarian") argument concerns the [b]ambiguity of the copulaWould you give an example other than from Augustine or his imitators. In the case of Augustine and his imitators I would probably agree with you (especially in Augustine's rendering of Jn 17:3). But then again, I don't see them as Homoousian in the Nicea sense or orthodox sense.


Hmm... I already said that the argument that God the Father and the only true God are the same individual does not immediately affect all homoousian thinking. Assuming RP's presentation of Eastern orthodox thought was correct, it does not affect EO thinking. The argument pertains to that kind of homoousianism which I think we would class as Western or "Augustinian." The fact some other elements do not think Augustinism is Nicene or "orthodox" homoousianism is beyond the scope of the thread.


[b]the is of identity versus the is of predication.Would you expand on this. I took you to be speaking grammatically (?). But possibly you are allowing for formal logic also (?)


Sure. The argument begins with a grammatical point, but from the grammatical point we derive an identity, that God the Father = the only true God (i.e. God the Father and the only true God are the same individual) which we can deal with using formal logic.



It is true that Homoousian argument is founded in philosophic predication, which imu, differs significantly from what is traditionally understood by the phrase "grammatical predication".

The Homoousian argument often seems to follow Aristotle and the first of his ten kinds of predications = substance (ousia=being, to be).

You might find the following interesting (quoted from the following link)
http://aristotle.tamu.edu/~rasmith/Courses/Ancient/predication.html

Aristotle [uses a] complicated classification of kinds of predications (genê tôn katêgoriôn: the word 'category' is derived from the Greek katêgoria, 'predication'...

In the Categories, Aristotle makes a distinction between homonymous and synonymous things.

A and B are homonymous = A and B are both called F, but with different definitions of F
A and B are synonymous = A and B are both called F and with the same definition of F

"In English, homonymy and synonymy are relationships between words. Two words are homonyms if they sound alike but have different spellings, or at least different meanings, and two words are synonymous if they have different sounds (or at least spellings) but the same meaning. From a modern philosophical viewpoint, this at once raises questions about whether it is words or occurrences of words that are homonymous or synonymous and what the identity conditions are for words. Those issues do not really arise for Aristotle's distinction, however, since for him it is things, not words, which are homonymous or synonymous. 'Homonymous' really means 'like-named', and 'synonymous' means 'named together.' Things are homonymous, in Aristotle's sense, if the same word applies to them both but not in virtue of the same definition, and things are synonymous if the same word applies to them in virtue of a single definition."


This is interesting and the issue of homonyms becomes relevant at a later stage of my argument, after what was presented in post 12.


An identity statement is convertible. This means that when you say "the current President of the USA is George Bush," it is conversely true that "George Bush is the current President of the USA." The essence of the statement is, "George Bush = current President of the USA." When we have the is of predication though, the statement isn't convertible.Would you expand on what you mean by "identity statement". As I understand the term we'd have Bush + the President (who is this person?), in opposition to Bush = President (what is this person?) and President=Bush (who has this attribute/office?).



"Identity" is the relation of one entity to itself. If we say that x has the relation of identity to y, we are saying that x and y are the same entity, that x = y. A statement which predicates of x a relation of identity to y is an identity statement.

Thus, an identity statement is a statement of the form "x is y" where the "is" has the force of the mathematical equal sign. Both "Bush is the President" and "the President is Bush" are identity statements. The "is" here can be replaced with the equal sign.

"Bush is the current President of the US" predicates of Bush the relation of identity to the current President of the US. Therefore this is an identity statement.

"The current President of the US is Bush" predicates of the current President of the US the relation of identity to Bush. This too is an identity statement. The content of these two identity statements is the same, though their emphasis is different. The statements differ in that one reverses the subject and predicate of the other. Thus, they answer different questions. Yet the truth of one of these statements follows from the truth of the other.

"Bush the President," which I think you are symbolizing as"Bush + the President" is not an identity statement, because it is not propositional. It just adds the designation "the president" to "Bush." But per Wallace, this expression presupposes that an identity statement could be made of its two terms, and that this identity statement would be true. Thus, the truth of the identity statement "Bush is the President" guarantees the appropriateness of the expresssion "Bush the President." Conversely, if it is proper to say "Bush the President," the truth of the aforementioned identity statement follows.






Imu, predication tells us something particular about something.


Why wouldn't predication also be able to tell us something in general about something? What do you call a statement that tells you something in general about something, if not a predicative statement? A predicative statement simply tells us something about something. Whether it is something specific or unique to that entity, or something in general will decide whether it is a predication of identity or not.

Bush is the current president of the US.

This is a predicative statement that is also an identity statement. It is not locating Bush within a general class, but has pin-pointed one entity and equated that entity with Bush.

Bush is a president.

This has located Bush within a general class of entities called "presidents." We do know that Bush is identical with one entity in this class, but we do not know which one.

Both are predicative statements.



Following Wallace: in a convertible proposition we have the answer to two questions eg: "President Bush" answers "What is Bush? Bush is the President!" and "Who is the president? The President is Bush!", so it seems we have implicit grammatical predication if we decompose the proposition.


The answer to both questions is deducible from a convertible proposition, but the convertible S-PN proposition itself will answer only one of these questions, depending on whether "Bush" is the subject or not. Notice also that an expression like "President Bush" is not a convertible proposition, because it is not a proposition at all. We have to "decompose" it in order to uncover the implicit predication.

But for our purposes, which kind of question each formulation of the identity statement will answer is a secondary issue to that in virtue of which the terms are convertible, and on which I am basing my argument: identity of reference.

The referent of a word is that entity to which the word refers. In the statement "Bush is a president," the predicate "a president" refers to any one of a class of presidents. It locates the subject "Bush" within this class as a subset of it. For this reason Wallace calls this kind of predicative statement a "subset proposition." I believe it is correct to say that the reference of the predicate, being indefinite, covers the whole class (cf. diagram p. 42).

Yet in a convertible proposition, the reference of the subject and the predicate is identical: there is complete overlap. The predicate will tell us something new about the subject, but it does not actually refer to anything different than the subject does.

Wallace says that the two substantives in apposition also have this relation of identity of reference. Which is subject and which is predicate does not apply, because an appositive phrase is not a predicative statement. The appositive phrase only presupposes that such a predicative statement involving an "identical exchange" (p. 41) could be made about the two substantives in apposition, and that this statement would be true. Hence, from an instance of apposition like "the President, Bush" it follows that Bush = the President, and the President = Bush. This is all my argument requires for its premise.




Imu, an appositional clause is convertible (as is demonstrated by the last clause of Jn 17:3). But this seems no different to any other form of convertible clause, where the predicate and subject (or object and compliment) are swapped around, to change primary focus. Imu, in each rendering we receive the same information, and reach the same conclusions.


It is no different in terms of the identity of reference, which is my whole point. I am not sure why you introduce this with the adversative "but" as though you are bringing up something detrimental to my point. This is what I have been arguing for a long time now.



I'm uncertain if such would be true if "you, the only true God" or "theos pater" were converted. I'm inclined to believe that the meanings (the ideas conveyed) in the unconverted phrases would be modified on conversion.


se ton monon alēthinon theon uses apposition just as hon apesteilas iēsoun khriston does, which parallels it. Your inclination to think that the content would be changed by reversing the order of the terms is what has not been borne out. This would change the emphasis, not the content.



Pedantically, from A.John's overall gospel, I perceive Jesus Christ is not "the one [the Father] sent forth", given it was the Logos that become flesh, was named Jesus, and was recognized as the Christ. In this scenario the person has many identities summed up in the person named Jesus (However, we do not have a particular identity of person, merely predications. On the other hand, we do seem to have a particular identity, where the one sent, is the particular Son of God). This seems to fit the teaching at Jn 1:1-18 & 20:31.


But it seems correct to say that God sent Jesus Christ down from heaven in the same sense that it is correct to say that Abraham came from Ur. In each case, we are using the name to refer to the person behind the name.



In short: in Jn 17:3, though each objective clause is appositional and grammar would allow conversion, I perceive a precedence in A.John's teaching, and to change precedence changes meaning. Thus A.John identifies that the Father of Jesus is the only true God, not the only true God as Father (which I perceive conversion of the clause would require).


Perhaps you are right in making the distinction that for John/Jesus, the Father is the known entity who is then equated with the only true God, rather than the other way around. But then, my argument does not entail otherwise.


For Wallace, the fact that, "'Michael Jordan is the greatest basketball player in NBA history' means the same thing as 'the greatest player in NBA history is Michael Jordan.' There is complete interchange between the two" is compatible with the fact that "it is...important to distinguish which one is the subject: the first sentence answers the question, 'Who is Michael Jordan?' while the second answers 'Who is the greatest player in NBA history?'" (41). This is because the terms are interchangeable only insofar as "both nouns have an identical referent. The mathematical formulas of A=B, B=A are applicable in such instances" (ibid.). Although the truth of the first sentence entails the truth of the second, the ordering of the terms as subject and the predicate nominative will reflect which of the terms is the term whose reference is known. Yet this is a contingent state of affairs, whereas the identity relation expressed, assuming that it is true, is true universally.

John 17:3 implies that the Father of Jesus = the only true God. From this it follows that the only true God is the Father of Jesus. There is no alternative once the mathematical equal sign is admitted as a valid representation of the meaning of the copula in the convertible S-PN proposition, a connection Wallace explicitly makes.

But which term is "the known entity" (42), hence which will be the subject and which the predicate in any given formulation of the identity statement, will vary depending on who is being addressed. If you are correct in your approximation of John, John begins with the Father of Jesus as the known entity and proceeds to equate this entity with the only true God, the God of Israel. Yet, since an equative statement is true both ways, if we were starting from a different epistemic position, where the God of Israel is the known entity to us, it would be natural to proceed in the other way.



Basically, imu, we need a compound of both "Paul" and "the apostle" (in any order) to identify to which particular "Paul" or "apostle" we are referring.


In some circumstance it is sufficient to refer to Paul as "the Apostle", as often appears in medieval commentaries, or just as "Paul." In other situations, even "the Apostle Paul" won't be enough, e.g. among people ignorant of the key figures of Christianity. These are contingent situations and the degree of specificity needed to pinpoint the entity we mean by "Paul the Apostle" varies accordingly. Yet these concerns are peripheral to my argument, which does not revolve around an epistemic problem of how we know the true God, but around a grammatical point - that the two substantives in apposition have identity of reference.

This grammatical point tells us that when the substantives are in apposition, either one refers to one and only one entity, namely, the same entity to which the other refers. This is known independently of knowing to what entity both substantives refer.


In some English grammars I read, there is reference to a subject of the object, though imu, in apposition we can have a primary & secondary subject of the object, which can be interchanged as a term of reference in a object with object compliment construction. I'm presuming the same applies in NT Greek (?)


An object typically receives the action of a verb, and the subject does the action. An appositive is neither inherently subjective nor objective. The idea is that the noun and its appositive will either both be the object, or both be the subject (or whatever case appeears in the Greek). Both have the same syntactical relation to the rest of the clause (48).


Best

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

There was nothing in your post that I found objectionable. Though I do need some time to digest the points you have made -)

Today (Sunday) I was reading Caius and Cyprian. There are possibly things you said which might have conflict with the the argument of the first centuries of the Church. As you know I'm inclined to Novatiain's explanation of the Trinitity I need to think on these, particularly Caius.

Peace

[alam]

Hello Alam,

There was nothing in your post that I found objectionable. Though I do need some time to digest the points you have made -)

Today (Sunday) I was reading Caius and Cyprian. There are possibly things you said which might have conflict with the the argument of the first centuries of the Church. As you know I'm inclined to Novatiain's explanation of the Trinitity I need to think on these, particularly Caius.

Peace


Hi, Apostoli,

Sure, take your time. Novatian's theory of the trinity is preferable to most, imo. Let me know what you find.

I thought a couple of illustrations might help convey my point re the structure of John 17:3, as well as the distinction between a subset proposition and a convertible proposition or identity statement.



hAÚTĒ DÉ ESTIN hĒ AIŌ´NIOS ZŌĒ´

For this is the eternal life:

hÍNA GINŌ´SKŌSIN............SÉ | TÓN MÓNON ALĒTHINÓN THEÓN............KAÍ

That they-[might-]know.....You, . the only true God,..................and

................hÓN APÉSTEILAS | IĒSOÚN KHRISTÓN

.............him-whom You-sent, . Jesus Christ. (John 17:3)



Murray Harris broke down the verse like this on p. 259 of "Jesus as God". TÓN MÓNON ALĒTHINÓN THEÓN is appositive to SÉ just as IĒSOÚN KHRISTÓN is appositive to hÓN APÉSTEILAS. These two appositional constructions are parallel, joined by the conjunction KAÍ. So, following Wallace's commentary on apposition, the verse means both that (1) the one addressed as SÉ is identical with the only true God, and (2) that the one Whom this God has sent is identical with Jesus Christ. Both appositional constructions are in the accusative, and are objects of GINŌ´SKŌSIN (they [might] know). Eternal life is described as their (apostles', believers') knowing the Father, the only true God, and the one sent by God, Jesus Christ. This is my baseline reading of the verse based on simple syntax and semantics.



An uncritical anti-trinitarian argument from Jn 17:3 often focuses on the term "only" (MÓNON). Although MÓNON is in the attributive position to TÓN...ALĒTHINÓN THEÓN (the true God), some anti-trinitarian argument seems to take it adverbially, so that the verse means something like, "You alone/solely/exclusively [are] the true God" (i.e. to the exclusion of the Son and the Holy Spirit).

I won't say that is wrong, but it is not the angle I am coming from.

The typical Homoousian (Augustinian, if you like) response to this uncritical anti-trinitarian reading of Jn 17:3 is to insist on the adjectival sense of MÓNON. They will insist that the verse does not imply that the Father alone or exclusively is the true God - merely that the Father "is" the only true God - to which they add that the Son too "is" the only true God, as well as the Holy Spirit.

The assumption behind this is that "the only true God" denotes a wider concept than the concept of any single person of the Trinity. According to such a view, to say that the Father "is" the only true God does not EQUATE the person of the Father with the only true God, but locates the person of the Father "within" the range of what it means to be the only true God; as one entity (among other entities) of which the only true God is predicable. Here is how we can diagram this.


________________________________
|......................_____....|
|. the only true God ..|....|...|
|...________________...| S .|...|
|...|...............|..|____|...|
|...|.. the Father .|.._____....|
|...|_______________|..|....|...|
|......................| HS |...|
|......................|____|...|
|_______________________________|


This corresponds to the model and diagram which Wallace gives for a subset proposition (p. 42).

A more traditional way of diagramming the same idea is found here (http://www.gotquestions.org/images/trinity.jpg).

It seems extraordinary to make a definite, sortal noun-phrase like "the only true God" function like the predicate in a subset proposition. But a Homoousian/Augustinian answers that you simply must grant that this is a legitimate way to speak of God, because God is different from all other realities. Once you grant this, supposedly there can be no objection to the coherence or scriptuality of their theory on the trinity.

My argument holds that even if that works out, it is still in tension with Jn 17:3. This is because the phrase TÓN MÓNON ALĒTHINÓN THEÓN is appositive to SÉ, and in apposition, one term does not have broader reference than the other. Instead, the terms have identity of reference. The referents of the terms ARE equated, though only implicitly. The relation between "You" (i.e. Father) and "the only true God" in Jn 17:3 is diagrammed thus:

________________......________________
|...............|.....|...............|
|. the Father ..|. = .| the only true |
|...............|.....| God ..........|
|_______________|.....|_______________|


This is also based on Wallace's diagram p. 42. Given John 17:3, there is no simple way to evade the conclusion that God the Father is the only true God, to the exclusion of another entity. How we harmonize this conclusion with John 1:1,18 belongs to the next stage of my argument.

God bless

P.S. What I described above as the "Augustinian" interpretation of John 17:3 actually isn't Augustine's. As post 12 (http://theologyweb.com/campus/showpost.php?p=2011254&postcount=12) mentioned, Augustine wanted to read the verse in a way that applied "the only true God" simultaneously to "You" and to "the one You have sent, Jesus Christ." Something to the effect : "that they may know You [as] the only true God, as well as Jesus Christ whom You have sent [as the only true God]." Augustine's hypothesis seems to require that "the only true God" be an objective complement rather than appositive. This is interesting, because the reason I decided "the only true God" wasn't an objective complement when you brought this up earlier was due to the fact that it is definite, whereas, according to Wallace, the complement will tend to be qualitative or indefinite. Yet Latin does not have a definite article, and Augustine knew only Latin.


John 17:3 turns out in Latin as,


Haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te solum verum deum, et quem misisti Iesum Christum.


A literal translation, except for the fact that the Greek article is untranslatable. Maybe this is why the object-complement route seemed more plausible to Augustine, and, given his predispositions, the peculiar reading which makes it the complement both of "te" and "quem misisti Iesum Christum"(?)

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

I didn't anticipate that you would reply to my last post so promptly. In between I contemplated a post and have now thought it might add to our discussion to post it. For the moment I'll defer replying to your latest post (which as usual I need to think upon).

Thanyou for the thorough reply in post #86, it is most helpful.

There may be things in post #88 that answer some things below. At the moment I'm conflicted by your agument (???) I need to think on it!

Yet these concerns are peripheral to my argument, which does not revolve around an epistemic problem of how we know the true God, but around a grammatical point - that the two substantives in apposition have identity of reference.

This grammatical point tells us that when the substantives are in apposition, either one refers to one and only one entity, namely, the same entity to which the other refers. This is known independently of knowing to what entity both substantives refer.I accept what you say in regards to apposition and now understand what you mean by "identity" conversion. However, I'm still not understanding where you are leading.

Possibly you are investigating whether some homousians lean toward Sabellianism eg: Augustine (?)

To avoid me getting distracted, in the quote below, I've omitted some things from post #12. I presume this is the argument flow...

Some Homoousian (a.k.a "trinitarian") argument concerns the ambiguity of the copula – the is of identity versus the is of predication. An identity statement is convertible...When we have the is of predication though, the statement isn't convertible...

According to many Homousians, "The Father is God," "the Son is God," and "there is only one God" do not entail Sabellianism – that the Father is the Son – because the is used in the first two statements is that of predication. So in their view, "while Jesus is God, it is not true that God is Jesus," since "the person we call Jesus does not exhaust the category of Deity"...

...in John 17:3 we have an implicit identity statement: God the Father = the only true God.

If the Son of God likewise = the only true God, it follows from transitivity of identity (the principle that if A = B and B = C, then A = C) that the Father is the Son.The conclusion I'm deriving from post #12 is that you are suggesting that the Father is the only one to be identified (equated) as "true God" - exclusively has the identity of only true God. I don't disagree. However, from this, I would reason, that as nobody else should be called true God, we would have a contradiction, if we called anyone (other than the Father) even God - as that other must be a false God and by negation not God. Thus Jesus should not to be considered God.

As I understand the Homoousian argument, Jesus can be called true God because he is the Son of the only true God, being begotten as God (jn 1:18) by the Father. While the Father is true God of himself, the Son is God to us by the will of the Father. I've encountered such formulas in the Ante-Nicene fathers.

On the other hand, if someone only predicates "only true God" of the Son, there still seems to be a problem. If the only true God = the Father, then we are predicating the Father of the Son, which appears to be a category mistake: "...inasmuch as primary substance is not predicable of anything, it can never form the predicate of any proposition. But of secondary substances [i.e. kind essences], the species is predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species and of the individual" (Aristotle, Categories).As we know, many a pre Nicea writer called Jesus God and seem to justify doing so, holding that Jesus is truely the Son of God. Thus God derived from true God.

I don't think this conflicts with Aristotle's ideas on essence...

...In some cases indeed it is even obvious that the begetter is of the same kind as the begotten (not, however, the same nor one in number, but in form), i.e. in the case of natural products (for man begets man), unless something happens contrary to nature, e.g. the production of a mule by a horse. (And even these cases are similar; for that which would be found to be common to horse and ass, the genus next above them, has not received a name, but it would doubtless be both in fact something like a mule.) Obviously, therefore, it is quite unnecessary to set up a Form as a pattern (for we should have looked for Forms in these cases if in any; for these are substances if anything is so); the begetter is adequate to the making of the product and to the causing of the form in the matter. And when we have the whole, such and such a form in this flesh and in these bones, this is Callias or Socrates; and they are different in virtue of their matter (for that is different), but the same in form; for their form is indivisible.

Another question is naturally raised, viz. what sort of parts belong to the form and what sort not to the form, but to the concrete thing. Yet if this is not plain it is not possible to define any thing; for definition is of the universal and of the form. If then it is not evident what sort of parts are of the nature of matter and what sort are not, neither will the formula of the thing be evident...

It is clear also that the soul is the primary substance and the body is matter, and man or animal is the compound of both taken universally; and 'Socrates' or 'Coriscus', if even the soul of Socrates may be called Socrates, has two meanings (for some mean by such a term the soul, and others mean the concrete thing), but if 'Socrates' or 'Coriscus' means simply this particular soul and this particular body, the individual is analogous to the universal in its composition...

What the essence is and in what sense it is independent, has been stated universally in a way which is true of every case, and also why the formula of the essence of some things contains the parts of the thing defined, while that of others does not. And we have stated that in the formula of the substance the material parts will not be present (for they are not even parts of the substance in that sense, but of the concrete substance; but of this there is in a sense a formula, and in a sense there is not; for there is no formula of it with its matter, for this is indefinite, but there is a formula of it with reference to its primary substance-e.g. in the case of man the formula of the soul-, for the substance is the indwelling form, from which and the matter the so-called concrete substance is derived; e.g. concavity is a form of this sort, for from this and the nose arise 'snub nose' and 'snubness'); but in the concrete substance, e.g. a snub nose or Callias, the matter also will be present. And we have stated that the essence and the thing itself are in some cases the same; ie. in the case of primary substances, e.g. curvature and the essence of curvature if this is primary. (By a 'primary' substance I mean one which does not imply the presence of something in something else, i.e. in something that underlies it which acts as matter.) But things which are of the nature of matter, or of wholes that include matter, are not the same as their essences, nor are accidental unities like that of 'Socrates' and 'musical'; for these are the same only by accident.
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.7.vii.html

Someone may wish to reject this philosophic assumption or its application to the trinity, substituting in its place some other metaphysic...Nevertheless, this will still be outside the realm of classic Nicenism since it makes the person of the Father, rather than an alleged homoousia, the universal of the trinity.I'm not understanding what you are getting at here.

Imu, the homoousian's held the universal of the trinity is the Father. Athanasius argued that the Son being the true Image of the Father was begotten in the homoousia (not a creature or work, but an offspring proper to the Father's essence). It is also plain that he did not argue that the Son was from the homoousia, the Son being neither "an effluence of the Perfect, nor a dividing of the impassible Essence, nor an issue; but absolutely perfect Son, living and powerful, the true Image of the Father".

Reading Athanasius and others I don't detect philosophic assumption. Of the Son it seems they held that "He was begotten ineffably and incomprehensibly" but as "offspring proper to the Father".
http://biblestudy.churches.net/CCEL/FATHERS2/NPNF204/NPNF2022.HTM
http://biblestudy.churches.net/CCEL/FATHERS2/NPNF204/NPNF2066.HTM

Peace

[apostoli]

Hello Alam,

Thankyou for post #88, it was helpful.

Below I'm not being adversarial. Consider the below as me talking to myself and sorting through my thoughts. Though I have no immediate dispute with your grammatical argument for Jn 17:3, as you have explained it, your overall argument just isn't clicking with me.

It seems extraordinary to make a definite, sortal noun-phrase like "the only true God" function like the predicate in a subset proposition. But a Homoousian/Augustinian answers that you simply must grant that this is a legitimate way to speak of God, because God is different from all other realities. Once you grant this, supposedly there can be no objection to the coherence or scriptuality of their theory on the trinity.

My argument holds that even if that works out, it is still in tension with Jn 17:3.I agree with you! Though I suspect the overall Homoousian/Augustinian argument is not based on treating the clause as a "predicate in a subset proposition". Possibly, if the clause "you, the only true God" is taken in isolation, and then extrapolated to support/refute someone else's theology it does (?) but when put in the context of Jn 17:1&2, we get a wider view of Jn 17:3.

Imo, vs2 needs to be accounted for. Here it is not the "only true God" (the Father) that gives eternal life but he who was sent forth (the Son). From vs2, we also learn that this is so, because the Father has given the Son the authority. Which by definition implies the Son is made God to us. The implication (in my mind) is that because it is through the Son that eternal life is received, he is proved true God (compared to man's false gods who bring death), and as the Father is the source and cause of the Son (who is proved true God to us), the Father is proved true God to all, including the Son (cp Jn 20:17). The problem of course is some may see this as teaching that there are two Gods (a greater and a lesser). I see this as being resolved by the view of the Trinity which teaches that there is one Monarchy - the Father, Son and Spirit - these rule in unity, as equals, from the one throne - this tri-unity of individuals is God to us.

Eternal life is described as their (apostles', believers') knowing the Father, the only true God, and the one sent by God, Jesus Christ. This is my baseline reading of the verse based on simple syntax and semantics.This fits my reading of the text. Though I do weight my understanding by reference to Jn 17:1&2, which would have us understand that the one sent forth is the Son of the Father. Cyprian (Epistle LXXII) while discussing the invalidity of the baptism performed by heretics quotes Jn 17:3 and concludes "Since, therefore, from the teaching and testimony of Jesus Christ, the Father who sent must be first known, then afterwards Christ, who was sent, and there cannot be a hope of salvation except by knowing the two together..." (ANF V5, p383) Which also fits my opinion. Bringing Jn 17:1&4 into account, it seems we must not merely come to "know" Jesus Christ (what he did), but know that he is the Son of the only true God (the why he did what he did).

This seems to fit the overall grammar of Jn 17:1-4. Several commentators I've read, see significance in Jesus referring to himself in the third person, thus we have the knowledge of "the only true God" is through Jesus Christ (eg: Lucke).

This seems to be the starting point of both Orthodox & Augustine Trinitarian argument. To know Jesus is to know the only true God (aka, If you know/see me you know/see the Father).

The typical Homoousian (Augustinian, if you like) response to [the] uncritical anti-trinitarian reading of Jn 17:3 [that the Father is true God to the exclusion of the Son and the Holy Spirit] is to insist on the adjectival sense of MÓNON. They will insist that the verse does not imply that the Father alone or exclusively is the true God - merely that the Father "is" the only true God - to which they add that the Son too "is" the only true God, as well as the Holy Spirit.I'm not sure if such gives a precise orthodox viewpoint but it might be close (ie: true God from true God). As I understand the Augustine argument "the Trinity is the one and only and true God", whereas the Father, Son and Spirit are true God in regards to their participation (mutuality) in the Trinity. Which seems a more complex argument.

In Book 1,C6/P9 of On the Trinity, Augustine gives a rendering of 1 Jn 5:20 which seems unusual "For we know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding, that we may know the true God, and that we may be in His true Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God, and eternal life." From the argument