Well, looking at science, the evidence for either one over the other looks pretty inconclusive, I don't really want to look at biblical/theological evidence here.........so, are there any philosophical arguments which would lead one to choose a belief in either one over the other?

What are the scientific arguments for Determintism?
I've only heard of one expiriment that suggested otherwise.

Sorry If I'm getting off topic right away.

The scientific side, is really about interpretations of Quantum theory, hidden variables, what a grand unified theory of everything will look like etc. Empirically it's rather difficult, the uncertainty principle rather gets in the way of us looking at particles on a detailed enough level.

Originally posted by markporter

Well, looking at science, the evidence for either one over the other looks pretty inconclusive, I don't really want to look at biblical/theological evidence here.........so, are there any philosophical arguments which would lead one to choose a belief in either one over the other?

you ask a good question

for starters try:
http://www.staff.brad.ac.uk/fweinert/QMConference.htm
http://webware.princeton.edu/vanfraa...7.htm#Lectures

both pop up with:
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&i...riment&spell=1

Actually, I would say QM provides strong evidence that complete physical determinism is false. Local hidden variable theories are ruled out by empirically observed violations of Bell's theorem. Non-local hidden variables are still possible, though. But, from a Christian perspective, we believe that more than just physical causes opperate in the world. So just because physical determinism is false (which is exactly what Christians should expect), that doesn't mean that determinism is false when all the other types of causes are factored in.

do you think that non-local hidden variable theories are implausible Kenny?

Originally posted by markporter

do you think that non-local hidden variable theories are implausible Kenny?

You mean God?

In my humble opinion...

As long as we can make choices, we have indeterminism. Even if we're stuck on a track that we're not aware of, we still perceive the ability to make decisions for ourselves. We have indeterminism for all intents and purposes. Determinism only counts for practical purposes if we can reliably predict future outcomes. We can't do that at the quantum level, and we can't do that with people either. Nor do we currently have any assurance that we'll be able to at any point in the future.

Originally posted by Chuck Lee

In my humble opinion...

As long as we can make choices, we have indeterminism. Even if we're stuck on a track that we're not aware of, we still perceive the ability to make decisions for ourselves. We have indeterminism for all intents and purposes.

In other words, whatever is true is already the case. We can't gain or lose what we already experience due to this question.

Originally posted by markporter

do you think that non-local hidden variable theories are implausible Kenny?

No. Philosophically, I am committed to the principle of sufficient reason. Consequently, I don’t believe that anything occurs which does not have some sort of sufficient explanation. But, as a Christian, I would also not expect physical determinism to be true. I would expect a world in which there was plenty of order and regularity so that genuine moral interaction could take place (since moral action requires us to be able to intend for certain consequences to result from our actions, but we could not do that in a world that has no predictability to it), but I would also expect that world to have some built in physical contingency to it in order to allow genuine interaction between humans and God. It’s nice that, as far as the laws of physics as we understand them are concerned, that’s the way it appears to be. The physical indeterminism inherent in QM is a very attractive feature from a Christian perspective, so why postulate a non-local hidden variable theory to get rid of it and thereby spoil the whole thing .

But, physical indeterminism does not amount to metaphysical indeterminism. If science could ever establish definitively that not every event has a physical cause, I would interpret that not as evidence for genuine metaphysical randomness in the world, but as evidence for there being causes which are non-physical in nature. Of course, since science limits itself strictly to the study of physical causes, science qua science could never recognize or evaluate non-physical causes. Things that are not physically caused will be perceived by science qua science either as random or simply as unexplained “noise” in the system.

In Christ,
Kenny

Indeterminism as a scientific position, or as a philosophical position about observational activities, is something I’ve never fully grasped. On the one hand, the term (indeterminism) seems to be a wholly epistemological, only dealing with our knowledge of how particles on the quantum level behave. In other words, because of our finite perspective (or limited cognitive capacities) we cannot and/or will not ever know the inscrutable nature of quantum behavior. However, this is merely knowledge. Just because we cannot know about a certain thing or a certain thing’s behavior doesn’t give us rational reason to conclude random uncausality. This seems wrong, because we move from an epistemological consideration and give indeterminacy metaphysical implications. Thus, I’ve never seen indeterminacy as relevant to the determinism/indeterminism debate, with regard to the metaphysical realm. However, if, scientifically or observationally is can be seen that these particles are actually coming into existence without a cause, not only will our fundamental intuitions about reality collapse (Whatever begins to exist has a cause), but we will have good reason to think that quantum indeterminacy is relevant to determinism/indeterminism, with regard to its metaphysical status in reality. One problem with the latter coming to fruition is the fact that quantum mechanics (confined to a strictly scientific enterprise) is still in its infancy and so should not be hurled around as sufficient substantiation for various conclusions relevant to determining the veracity of determinism or indeterminism.

There are two philosophical arguements for libertarian free will that I know of and thus for indeterminism as libertarian free will is indeterministic.

choices have been mentioned. More needs to be said about that.

There are many instances when people think that they could have choosen otherwise. Sometimes while deliberating, we think we can really go either way. Now if determinism is true, then these cognitions are fundamentally flawed. Simply trusting that these beliefs are accurate works in favor of free will.

then there is the moral arguement.

It goes something like this.

1 a description of much of our moral responsibility applies only to things we have control over. (corporate responsibility would be an exception, but clearly other types of moral responsibility, particularly the types this premise relies on hold regardless of the validity of types such as corporate responsibility that do not involve control)

2 the result of something that we have no control over is also something we have no control over

3 if determinism is true then our actions are the result of events that happened long before we made those actions... even before we were born.

4. we have no control over events that happened before we were born.

5. thus we are not morally responsible for our actions if they were determined before we were born.


accept premise 1 and 2 and determinism is ruled out.

Kenny,

How does physical indeterminism not amount to metaphysical indeterminism? Based on the premise that everying relevant to physics is relevant to metaphysics and everything relevant to metaphysics is not relevant to physics, how can the discovery of the operations of a physical phenomena not have metaphysical ramifications? You state that the discovery of physical indeterminacy (on a particular micro-level) does not entail all of reality having a random nature. Further, you say that all the discovery of physical indeterminacy entails is that there are causes, which are non-physical in nature. This metaphysical statement seems to suggest a tenet that quantum cosmologists desire to avoid: the non-existence of a cause (physical or non-physical). Moreover, the discovery of physical indeterminacy via quantum cosmology does not mean to suggest that all of physical reality is random; it only suggests that metaphysical statements suggesting all of reality to have cause to be erroneous. For example, the proposition that whatever begins to exist has a cause is a metaphysical proposition. A counter-example to this proposition would be the validity of quantum mechanics, since it posits the uncausality of particles popping into reality. Thus, scientific discoveries on the physical level seem to have metaphysical implications.

How does physical indeterminism not amount to metaphysical indeterminism

I think Kenny's position is that what appears indeterministic on the physical level is really the result of deterministic things on a different level - actions of God/other spirits etc.

Originally posted by markporter

I think Kenny's position is that what appears indeterministic on the physical level is really the result of deterministic things on a different level - actions of God/other spirits etc.

Yes, that's it. All I am saying is that just the fact everything does not follow as the result of antecedent physical causes does not mean that everything does not follow from antecedent causes. I would expect, if Christianity is true (and it is ), that not everything would have a physical cause, since we would expect God to have built in some physical contingency in order to leave "room" for divine acts in the physical world that are not mediated through physical causes (unless we want to be deists) but which do not violate the inherent order of the world as God has made it and also to leave room for acts conducted by other purely spiritual beings. But, being the theological determinist that I am, , I would argue that everything has some sort of antecedent cause, even if not a physical one.

Kenny,

Thanks for the clarification. Although, your conclusion seems sobering for the proponant of the Kalam Cosomological Argument. The argument depends upon the first premise (whatever begins to exist has a cause) to be metaphysically true. You say that the principle is not violated because God exists to be able to give quantum phenomenon (particles popping into existence with no prior/antecedent cause) the required supernatural explanation. However, within an argument that is trying to prove God’s existence, such a substantiation begs the question. Either God exists or He doesn’t. Either way, the possibility for good arguments for His existence exists. However, if God exists, arguments against His existence are wrong in some way. Similarly, if God doesn’t exist, arguments for His existence are wrong in some way. The logically proven nature of the antecedent for the former conditional is contingent upon the former conditonal’s consequent having a sound argument in its favor. Thus, if an argument for His existence is to be formulated, the justification for the truth of the premises can’t have among its reasons the existence of God, for that is the question at issue. Therefore, it seems like solving the conundrums involved with quantum mechanics by positing the existence of God cripples some of natural theology.

Further down, you say that it makes sense for God to build into the furniture of the universe physical contingencies, which require the ability for God to perform the miraculous within the natural realm. Either this point was given as a supplement to making sense of quantum mechanics or it wasn’t. If it was, then either it reduces quantum activity to the miraculous (which is sort of intriguing) or it doesn’t. If the former, then this either begs the question or it doesn’t. If it begs the question, it is fallacious. Does it beg the question? It begs the question only if such an explanation is given to a naturalist. It seems that either naturalism is true or supernaturalism is true. If the former, then your explanation is groundless. If the latter, it may still be the case that quantum events have physical causes anyway. Either they have physical causes or they don’t. I think they might given some things I’ve read that I thought were convincing. Moreover, how is your explanation given any weight if it already assumes beforehand the truth of supernaturalism? It just seems to be assuming to much.

So, I suggest seeking other ways to explain quantum mechanics other than attributing its activity to supernatural, causal agency.

matt