Below is what I consider to be a powerful philosophical argument against the coherence of libertarian free will:

1.) If an action, A, obtains as a free action on the part of a free agent, S, then S is causally responsible for A.

2.) S is causally responsible for A only if S is the cause of A.

3.) Thus, if A is a free action on the part of S, S is the cause of A (by 1 and 2).

4.) Identical causes in identical circumstances result in identical effects. In other words, if E causes F in an exhaustive set of antecedent circumstances, C, with respect to E and F (i.e. the full set of circumstances prior to but not including E and F), then there are no possible worlds where E and C hold but ~F obtains.

5.) Thus, if S causes A in an exhaustive set of antecedent circumstances, C, with respect to S and A, there are no possible worlds where S and C hold but ~A obtains (by 4).

6.) Thus, if A obtains as a free action on the part of S in C, there are no possible worlds where S and C hold but ~A obtains (by 3 and 5).

7.) Libertarian free will entails that the free actions of free agents are not deterministic functions of antecedent circumstances.

8.) An action, A, is not a deterministic function of antecedent circumstances if and only if, given an exhaustive set of antecedent circumstances, C, with respect to A, in which A obtains, there is a possible world where C holds but ~A obtains.

9.) If A obtains as a free action on the part S, in an exhaustive set of antecedent circumstances, C, with respect to S and A, then S and C together constitute an exhaustive set of antecedent circumstances with respect to A.

10.) Thus, if libertarian free will holds and A obtains as a free action on the part of S in C, there is a possible world where S and C hold but ~A obtains (by 7, 8 and 9).

11.) But, 6.) and 10.), when combined with the assumption that libertarian free will holds, entail a contradiction.

12.) Thus, libertarian free will does not hold.

I’m curious to see how the defenders of LFW will respond to this. I suspect that the most controversial premise of this argument will be 4.). Let’s call this principle the ‘Identical Causes to Identical Effects’ (ICE) principle. My preliminary argument for ICE would be that causality has to do with explanation. To say that A causes B is to say that B finds its explanation in A. But, if ICE fails, then causality becomes divorced from explanation. To say that A causes B, if ICE fails, means that A offers no explanation for why B obtains rather than ~B since it is possible that A, in the same circumstances, could have caused ~B instead of B. But, if such is the case, then the whole notion of causality, IMHO, is rendered meaningless.

Thoughts?

Kenny

yeah, pretty much by making 4 an absolute, I say you prove determinism and disprove libertarian free will.

To say that A causes B, if ICE fails, means that A offers no explanation for why B obtains rather than ~B since it is possible that A, in the same circumstances, could have caused ~B instead of B.

I disagree that A (being a thinking rational person) offers no explanation to the attainment of B, however, I actually insist that the explanation only goes back so far and terminates and further questioning has no answer.

So lets say that with circumstance Z A will cause B, but with circumstance X instead, A will cause ~B. Now let me mention here that I do not believe that all actions that could be called free are libertarian free so of course neither of those choices would be libertarian free (I could provide some links that explains this view of mine).

Now X and Z are not exclusive circumstances, So in the presence of both X and Z, A has a libertarian free choice. And the explanation goes like this. If A chooses B, then there is an explanation and that is that A did so because A after a process of deliberation determined to go with reason Z. If A chooses ~B, then A determined to choose in correspondence to X.

To ask why in the first situation A went with reason Z over X has no explanation beyond A determined B in accordance with Z.

So basically, I would insist that for the rational libertarian free choice, there is an irreducability where explanations terminate and cannot be sought further.

Number 4 is definately the problem. If there is truly free will among everyone, the identical circumstances and identical causes don't always result in identical effects, if there is more than one free will involved.

The other problem is that no two circumstances are ever identical, so your hypothetical will never become reality.

MIchael

Today @ 01:25 PM post located here
themuzicman:

Number 4 is definately the problem. If there is truly free will among everyone, the identical circumstances and identical causes don't always result in identical effects, if there is more than one free will involved.

The other problem is that no two circumstances are ever identical, so your hypothetical will never become reality.

MIchael

Exactly, themusicman.
Premise four essentially begs the question.

On the contrary, it is yourselves who are begging the question. Unless you are suggesting that free will decisions are totally uncaused ex nihilo events, then a "hypothetical case" such as kenny has postulated is very much to the point. That is the nature of scientific enquiry: either the positing of testable hypotheses in fact or in principle. This is an in principle case, since we cannot possibly attain knowledge of the "exhaustive set of antecedent circumstances". But the fact that we cannot, does not mean that it is impossible, and therefore the "thought experiment" can legitimately be done. Otherwise you are presupposing the investigation by saying that "of course no two free will decisions, even given identical "ex set ante circ" are or can be the same." What metaphysical, psychological and logical cheek!!

As I posted on another thread:

...if one was faced with the necessity of doing either A or B, and that if one saw every reason to do A and no reason whatever to do B, then one would simply not be able to do B. From this conclusion it was no great leap to the slightly stronger conclusion that, if one was faced with a choice between A and B, and one was aware of considerations that could be brought in support of both alternatives, and if the considerations that supported A seemed to one clearly and decisively to outweigh the considerations that supported B, then one would simply not be able to do B. Van Inwagen defended, in "When Is the Will Free?," (7) the thesis that the general principles about ability that lead philosophers to incompatibilism should lead anyone who accepts them to accept these conclusions as well.
And he went on to argue that, since occasions that call for serious deliberation - occasions, that is, on which one is choosing between alternatives and it does not seem to one that (once all the purely factual questions have been settled) that the reasons that favor either alternative are clearly the stronger - at best only a small proportion of the occasions on which we make a choice are occasions on which we make a free choice...
Van Inwagen concluded that no action is free unless it is the outcome of deliberation in which one considers reasons that support that act, reasons that support various alternative acts, and in the course of which one finds no obvious answer to the question, "Which set of reasons should prevail?"
Van Inwagen on Free Will; Ted Honderich

And how many of our decisions match the last criteria?
Do you have to decide to be honest, moral, etc each time you make a decision? Are you like the character in Gene Wolfe's book, who must invent himself each day, because he has no memory?
How could I trust you, or anyone, if I could not "determine" your responses to given events based on past performance?
How strange that those who regale against the Calvinists "arbitrary" God, claim that very right to be "arbitrary" themselves. LFW is revealed for what it is.

Today @ 02:20 PM post located here
Solly:

On the contrary, it is yourselves who are begging the question.

In what way does the insistence that libertarian free will demands that two different outcomes are possible with everything else being the same beg the question?

Unless you are suggesting that free will decisions are totally uncaused ex nihilo events, then a "hypothetical case" such as kenny has postulated is very much to the point.

Not "uncaused" but "self-caused" that is, the decision is solely the province of the free moral agent. That agent is the reason for A over B or vice versa.

That is the nature of scientific enquiry: either the positing of testable hypotheses in fact or in principle.

This is logic, not "scientific enquiry" afaics. Scientific inquiry is going to posit either a methodological framework which probably cannot distinguish free will from randomness in the first place--unless you can suggest some method for accomplishing the distinction?

This is an in principle case, since we cannot possibly attain knowledge of the "exhaustive set of antecedent circumstances". But the fact that we cannot, does not mean that it is impossible, and therefore the "thought experiment" can legitimately be done.

Certainly what he's suggesting is possible: We call it "determinism". When you use determinism as a premise to say that libertarian free will is impossible, then you have begged the question.

Otherwise you are presupposing the investigation by saying that "of course no two free will decisions, even given identical "ex set ante circ" are or can be the same." What metaphysical, psychological and logical cheek!!

I'd call it cheek that you can produce a straw man so quickly. We're not saying that the decisions could not be the same. He's suggesting that they must be the same. I'm cool with the possibility that a free will agent could make a given decision maybe 70% of the time given the exact same circumstances--or some other percentage, ftm. Premise four asserts that the rate must be 100%.

As I posted on another thread:
...if one was faced with the necessity of doing either A or B, and that if one saw every reason to do A and no reason whatever to do B, then one would simply not be able to do B. From this conclusion it was no great leap to the slightly stronger conclusion that, if one was faced with a choice between A and B, and one was aware of considerations that could be brought in support of both alternatives, and if the considerations that supported A seemed to one clearly and decisively to outweigh the considerations that supported B, then one would simply not be able to do B. Van Inwagen defended, in "When Is the Will Free?," (7) the thesis that the general principles about ability that lead philosophers to incompatibilism should lead anyone who accepts them to accept these conclusions as well.
And he went on to argue that, since occasions that call for serious deliberation - occasions, that is, on which one is choosing between alternatives and it does not seem to one that (once all the purely factual questions have been settled) that the reasons that favor either alternative are clearly the stronger - at best only a small proportion of the occasions on which we make a choice are occasions on which we make a free choice...
Van Inwagen concluded that no action is free unless it is the outcome of deliberation in which one considers reasons that support that act, reasons that support various alternative acts, and in the course of which one finds no obvious answer to the question, "Which set of reasons should prevail?"
Van Inwagen on Free Will; Ted Honderich

Honderich appears to assume that the reasoning process that discerns pros and cons would be the same every time. Can we separate the will from the thoughts that impell the will? Honderich seems to have conceived of determinism built-in to the thought process.
Van Inwagen appears to miss the boat in that free will could dismiss overpowering reasons to act in a given manner. Free will need not be relegated to choices between two mol rationally balanced options.

And how many of our decisions match the last criteria?
Do you have to decide to be honest, moral, etc each time you make a decision?

Only insofar as the decision itself demands those aspects of my will.

Are you like the character in Gene Wolfe's book, who must invent himself each day, because he has no memory?

That's a strong hit of the view that libertarian free will is equivalent to randomness. Do you suggest that my decision not to steal yesterday determines that I will not steal today?
Is the pattern of my decisionmaking prescriptive (I must decide thus because it's how I'm made or how I am) or is it descriptive (I decide thus because it's the way I actually decide)?

How could I trust you, or anyone, if I could not "determine" your responses to given events based on past performance?

Piffle. As you noted above, the conditions will vary with each and every decision, so you cannot possibly predict the outcome in that respect.
Instead, you use the actual decisions to track a pattern in the way my will drives me . . . not the manner in which my environment pushes the buttons--unless you're assuming that I have no free will.
The latter would beg the question of whether or not I had free will, btw.

How strange that those who regale against the Calvinists "arbitrary" God, claim that very right to be "arbitrary" themselves. LFW is revealed for what it is.

Deterministic?

OK, I'll demonstrate why #4 is invalid, with an experiment on myself:

Q: What color do you choose? A: Red.

Q: What color do you choose? A: Blue.

QED.

Michael

I have to reject that the option with the strongest most obviously right reasoning should dictate what one chooses and this is evident from my own experience. My reasoning for resisting temptation is always the same, and yet I can give in to it even when it does not have a strong pull on me, and I have also resisted even when it has been very unbearable.

Yesterday @ 11:43 PM post located here
geebob: I disagree that A (being a thinking rational person) offers no explanation to the attainment of B, however, I actually insist that the explanation only goes back so far and terminates and further questioning has no answer.

Okay, but my objection isn’t about whether or not the explanation terminates somewhere. The explanation may very well terminate on the agent herself such that further questions like “Why did S choose A instead of ~A in circumstances C?” have no other answer than, “that is how S would have chosen in circumstances C.” So, weather the chain of explanation terminates is not the issue. The real question is weather or not S functions as an adequate causal explanation for A. Now, if under the same identical circumstances, S may very well have chosen ~A, then it seems that S does not function as an adequate causal explanation for the occurrence of A for the very simple reason that an adequate explanation of A answers the question, “Why A instead of ~ A?” and the presence of S in C does not answer that question since S in C may very well have caused ~A instead of A.

Now, you may wish to take this back a step and say the explanation for A is that S chose A so that S’s choice functions as the explanation for A, but that beyond this the chain of explanation is irreducible. On this answer, the question “Why did S chose A instead of ~A?” has no answer. However, if you make this move, then the ultimate causal explanation for A terminates on S’s choice and not on S herself. This entails that S is not causally responsible for her choice, since S offers no causal explanation for why S chose A instead of ~A! But, if S is not causally responsible for her own choices, then I fail to see how she can be held morally accountable for them. For all the insistence on the part of advocates of lfw that lfw is necessary to preserve moral responsibility, I actually see the two as quite incompatible with one another.

If A chooses B, then there is an explanation and that is that A did so because A after a process of deliberation determined to go with reason Z… To ask why in the first situation A went with reason Z over X has no explanation beyond A determined B in accordance with Z.

Okay, but if you insist the chain of explanation terminates here, then as I explained above, the explanation for A’s actions never gets back to A herself and thus A is not causally responsible for the action and thus not morally responsible for it.

In Christ,
Kenny

Today @ 01:25 PM post located here
themuzicman: Number 4 is definately the problem. If there is truly free will among everyone, the identical circumstances and identical causes don't always result in identical effects, if there is more than one free will involved.

Well, I agree that number 4 is inconsistent with lfw and maintaining that free agents are causally responsible for their actions. I also agree that if one maintains that free agents are genuinely causally responsible for their actions and lfw holds, then number 4 is false. That’s because this is a valid deductive argument. If one denies the conclusion of a valid deductive argument and maintains that all the other premises, save one, are true, then one must conclude that the remaining premise is false. The question, however, is whether one can deny number 4 without rendering the whole notion of causality meaningless. Causality has to do with explanation and an explanation provides an answer to the question “Why p instead of ~p”? If the same cause in the exact same circumstances could just as well result in p as ~p, then appealing to the cause as an explanation for why p occurred is meaningless.

The other problem is that no two circumstances are ever identical, so your hypothetical will never become reality.

This is irrelevant. We’re not talking about what is, but what could have been. We are talking about logical possibilities and logically consistent state of affairs and not necessarily actualities. Besides, if this is a problem for me it is just as much one for the advocate of lfw who insists that a free agent could have acted differently in the exact same circumstances. This also involves an unrealizable hypothetical.

In Christ,
Kenny

Today @ 01:46 PM post located here
Captain Ochre: Exactly, themusicman. Premise four essentially begs the question.

Well, if the fact that the premises of a valid deductive argument are together logically inconsistent with the denial of its conclusions constitutes an instance of question begging, then all valid deductive arguments are question begging. But, usually the criteria for question begging are a little more restrictive than that. There are a couple of ways for a premise in a deductive argument to be question begging. A premise can be question begging if it is logically equivalent to the conclusion. But, premise 4 in my argument is not logically equivalent to the conclusion. It only entails the conclusion when combined with the other premises of the argument. Another way for a premise to be question beginning is if the warrant for that premise depends on the warrant one has for the conclusion. But, premise 4’s warrant is grounded in fundamental intuitions about the nature of causality and explanation, not in any explicit denial of libertarian free will. So, as I see it, premise 4 does not beg the question in any respect.

In Christ,
Kenny

The explanation may very well terminate on the agent herself such that further questions like “Why did S choose A instead of ~A in circumstances C?” have no other answer than, “that is how S would have chosen in circumstances C.”

Of course I'd reject that answer right off the bat. I wouldn't say, "that is how S would have chosen in circumstances C." I would just say "S did in fact choose that way for reasons X'. I reject that there is any particular fact of how S would choose in a circumstance when the choice is a libertarian one.

However, if you make this move, then the ultimate causal explanation for A terminates on S’s choice and not on S herself. This entails that S is not causally responsible for her choice, since S offers no causal explanation for why S chose A instead of ~A!

Well, A is the choice (at least that's how I saw it) and the choice is caused by S. In light of that, I can't help but think that your question is either answered or you can't help but push the question back to "why did S choose A and not ~ A" to which I would insist that you look at the concept of intentionality (or at least my layman's view of it, I'm not sure of what a technical usage of the term indicates). S choose A because S went with reasons X and not reasons Z. And as to why S choose in accordance with X and not Z simply does not go beyond the fact that S choose in accordance X and and not Z. And this choice is no more anchored in the circumstances except that the potential for S to choose A and the potential for S to choose ~A is grounded in circumstance C combined with A's personal makeup.

But lets look at that last point closer. You are insisting that there must be one causal outcome for there to be an explanation. I don't see that this is the case at all. In circumstance C which S finds herself in, 8 different possibilities may present themselves to her, but in reality, she would never choose 5 of those possibilities. Perhaps S would choose A, A and C, B, D and C but she wouldn't choose D or C by themselves, or A and B together and she wouldn't choose E under any circumstance. This is a siginficant complexity that arises and all from the the fact that S who has certain dispositions finds herself in circumstance C. But your insisting that we only have have substance if everything is reduced to a single certainty. But This seems not only explanatory but fairly insightful into how C effects S and results in the various possibilities that are available and the ones that are excluded.

under the definition of free will, show me any being in existance that has this definition but God.

Today @ 06:17 PM post located here
Kenny:



But, premise 4 in my argument is not logically equivalent to the conclusion. It only entails the conclusion when combined with the other premises of the argument.

Well, now, I think you're wrong about that.
Define "free will" and let us see if it is compatible with your fourth premise.
Seems to me that premise four can only leave us with the same free will that a pinball has to choose it's path around the table, or the freedom a TI calculator has to show forth numbers after certain buttons are pushed. Premise four makes all responses programmed and predictable in principle.

Another way for a premise to be question beginning is if the warrant for that premise depends on the warrant one has for the conclusion. But, premise 4’s warrant is grounded in fundamental intuitions about the nature of causality and explanation, not in any explicit denial of libertarian free will. So, as I see it, premise 4 does not beg the question in any respect.

Then it's time you took another look, imo.
Your "fundamental intuitions about the nature of causality and explanation" go by the name of "determinism".
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=determinism

Edit to add:

Here's how you titled the thread:
A Philosophical Argument for the Incoherency of Libertarian Free Will

Here's what you subsequently admitted:
"Well, I agree that number 4 is inconsistent with lfw and maintaining that free agents are causally responsible for their actions."

You sought to justify your premise on intuitive grounds, iirc (after it was challenged, anyway). You don't see anything wrong with that approach in a deductive proof? If you're going to prove something to somebody who might disagree with you, you need to start with agreeable premisses.

4 is disproved via quantum physics. In other words, if it is not true even for nonthinking objects, so why should it be true for thinking ones?

Yesterday @ 06:15 PM post located here
Kenny:

Now, if under the same identical circumstances, S may very well have chosen ~A, then it seems that S does not function as an adequate causal explanation for the occurrence of A for the very simple reason that an adequate explanation of A answers the question, “Why A instead of ~ A?” and the presence of S in C does not answer that question since S in C may very well have caused ~A instead of A.

You just argued in a circle, above.
If god did not have to create the universe, does that mean, therefore, that god is an insufficient explanation for the universe?
IOW, precisely why (without going in a circle) is an explanatoin inadequate if the acting agent could have done otherwise under the same conditions?
---
On second thought, it's not quite a circle, but it does inspire reduction to absurdity. Try to adequately explain anything according to your criterion and it seems that you must fail.

Now, you may wish to take this back a step and say the explanation for A is that S chose A so that S’s choice functions as the explanation for A, but that beyond this the chain of explanation is irreducible. On this answer, the question “Why did S chose A instead of ~A?” has no answer. However, if you make this move, then the ultimate causal explanation for A terminates on S’s choice and not on S herself. This entails that S is not causally responsible for her choice, since S offers no causal explanation for why S chose A instead of ~A!

Your statement above resembles a semantic shell game. If S made the decision uncoerced, then how could the decision not be causally S's? When you say "S offers no causal explanation for why S chose A instead of ~A, it seems that the "causal explanation that you find missing is one external to the person S herself. If you don't look external to S, I don't see why you don't see a causal chain terminating (at its beginning) at S with S being responsible for the decision.

But, if S is not causally responsible for her own choices, then I fail to see how she can be held morally accountable for them. For all the insistence on the part of advocates of lfw that lfw is necessary to preserve moral responsibility, I actually see the two as quite incompatible with one another.

So all you need now is a non-fallacious argument in support of your view.
Ready anytime.

Okay, but if you insist the chain of explanation terminates here, then as I explained above, the explanation for A’s actions never gets back to A herself and thus A is not causally responsible for the action and thus not morally responsible for it.

Your explanation was incoherent, imo. "A" needs no explanation beyond "I felt like it". Unless I'm missing something, you seem to be saying that unless A has some motivation outside the self (such as hunger being the motivation for eating something), then A isn't really responsible for the decision to eat.